Dear Reader,

It is our great pleasure to introduce you to the Fall 2014 issue of the Chicago Journal of History. Conceived as a platform to promote undergraduate scholarship in history and allied fields, the journal aims at bringing students together and creating a lively exchange of ideas. The essays included in this issue have been selected in the same spirit. They represent a wide range of historical questions and research interests. It is our hope that you will the ideas in them to be thought provoking.

Claire Arnold's prize-winning essay "'The Delights of a Plunge into the Unknown': Reimagining Children's Adventure Literature in the Nineteenth Century" looks at the forms of literature popular with British children towards the end of the nineteenth century. Shifting the historiographical focus from adults to the children themselves, Arnold argues that the popularity of such literature cannot be explained only by their association with British imperialism. Such literature, she argues, grew popular because it contained themes that resonated deeply with its target audience.

Zoe Beiser's " Black Citizenship on the Whale Ships in Antebellum America" examines what historians now refer to as the "maritime republic". Examining instances in which American authorities intervened on behalf of African American soldiers captured by British authorities, she sheds light on complex questions of race, national pride, and the ever-changing meanings of citizenship in antebellum America.

Colin Bos's ""Links to the Present": The Long History of Contested Heritage in Ghana's Slave Castles" presents a thoughtful critique of the large anthropological literature on heritage tourism to colonial era slave castles in Ghana. Bos contends that the history of such tourism is much longer than anthropologists are willing to grant. To this end, his essay provides a rigorous and provocative analysis of European and American accounts of travel of Ghana all the way from the nineteenth century to the 1950s.

Jeffery Lewandrowski's " The Inevitable Collapse of Peace: A study of the Weakness of the Peace of Amiens" presents a highly readable analysis of one of the most complicated diplomatic episodes in European history. In a similar vein, Kyuhyun Jo's "China's Exercise of *Realpolitik* and 'Containment' during the First and Second Indochina Wars, 1954-1973" explores Chinese-Vietnamese relations during the First and Second Indochina Wars, untangling China's strategic objectives and motives in its dealings with its sometimes-ally. The strength of Jo's essay lies in its vast base of American, Chinese, French and Vietnamese primary sources.

Last in this issue is Aidyn P.M. Osgood's " Vice in Vauxhall: Debauchery and the Pleasure Garden, 1730-1770". Osgood studies how Jonathan Tyres, master of ceremonies and proprietor of Vauxhall, navigated the problem of cultivating an air of polite respectability and, at the same time, attracting those visitors who came looking for boisterous merrymaking.

We hope that you will enjoy reading these essays and look forward to receiving your feedback. Please direct your questions and/or feedback to ughistoryjournal@gmail.com.

Sincerely,
Pranav Jain and Thomas Prendergast



Adventures of Robinson Crusoe by Daniel Defoe (http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00053424/00001, University of Florida Digital Collections

'The Delights of a Plunge into the Unknown': Reimagining Children's Adventure Literature in the Nineteenth Century

By Claire Arnold, University of Chicago

"'Yes, I will be ready,' she called back cheerfully, and sprang out of bed to make a hasty toilet, which was to be followed by an equally hasty breakfast, and then, heigho for the delights of a plunge into the unknown!'"[1]

Cicely Frome, the Captain's Daughter by Bessie Marchant, 1900

"The foregoing pages, incomplete though they are, will have shown at least how overwhelming is the supply of printed matter for the young. To over-rate the importance of the influence of such a supply on the national character and culture is impossible." [2]

Juvenile Literature As It Is by Edward Salmon, 1888

By the turn of the nineteenth century, the reading materials available to British children had grown from a scant collection of religious and educational texts to thousands of titles encompassing everything from fairy tales and folk legends to adventure stories, schools stories, and historical fiction. Between the years 1850 and 1910 popular children's authors could easily write and sell over a hundred different titles over the course of their careers; publishers included upward of twenty pages of advertising in the back of each volume; [3] and dozens of magazines were founded for the express purpose of amusing children.[4] Among the diverse offerings "the delights of the unknown" held a particular draw. However, as the adventure genre swelled in popularity among children, adults looked on

1 Bessie Marchant *Cicely Frome*, *the Captain's Daughter* (Edinburgh: Nimmo, Hay and Mitchell, 1900), 74.

2 Edward Salmon, *Juvenile Literature As It Is*, (London: Henry Drane, 1888), 209.

3 e.g. Marchant, *Cicely Frome, the Captain's Daughter,* back pages.

4 Kirsten Drotner, *English Children and Their Magazines, 1751-1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 68-70.

with apprehension. As scholar Edward Salmon clearly articulated in the above excerpt from a literature review, children's reading habits were believed to be of critical importance to both their individual well-being and the well-being of the entire nation. Yet while adults in this period had many conversations about what children *should* read, what children *wanted* to read was far less discussed.

Unfortunately, adults' overbearing and prescriptive discourse on children's literature in the nineteenth century has shaped modern historical studies of the adventure genre: modern scholars have continued to focus on authorial and parental intentions for children rather than on the experience of children themselves. Children are unhappily relegated to the sidelines, described as merely passive receptors of imperial or masculine ideologies.[5] Regrettably, by failing to consider children's perspectives in their analyses, historians have prevented themselves from seeing the valuable insights on Victorian middle-class mentalities these texts can offer. By re-introducing children's experiences as readers into an analysis of adventure literature, I will demonstrate how children's books and magazines together reveal the creation of a new children's culture in this period; which, although built on the aspirations and anxieties of adults, ultimately could not be understood by them. Articulating what this new children's culture consisted of and understanding how it was formed sheds light on the mindset a generation in the midst of rapid social and economic change.

While explaining why the quantity and quality of publications for children rapidly grew and changed in this period is fairly straightforward, understanding the rise of the adventure genre proves more difficult. The growth of publications for children in general can be attributed to a combination of advances in printing and transportation, educational reforms, economic growth and changing conceptions of childhood. Advances in printing technologies and transportation networks over the course of the nineteenth century made it easier and cheaper for publishers to produce and move materials. An increasingly literate and economically stable audience provided a new and quickly expanding group of consumers. And the validation of childhood as a distinct period of life provided a new market for educational and entertaining publications that specifically targeted children. But despite the enormous popularity and tremendous output of authors like George A Henty, William G A Kingston, and L T Meade, their names are virtually unrecognizable today. An explanation of such a topical phenomenon must appeal to a particular cultural mindset, which in turn reveals important aspects of both adults and children's cultural identities.

Unfortunately, the first historians to analyze these publications focused exclusively on adults; consequently they determined adventure literature was simply part of Britain's imperial project, written to train new imperial citizens. [6] Historian Martin Green articulated the earliest and strongest form of this argument, which underlined the imperial and masculine aspects of adventure fiction for all ages. He wrote:

> The adventure tales that formed the light reading of Englishmen for two hundred years and more after *Robinson Crusoe* were, in fact, the energizing myth of English imperialism. They were, collectively, the story England told itself as it went to sleep at night; and, in the form if its dreams, they charged England's will with the energy to go out into the world and explore, conquer, and rule.[7]

This line of argumentation has been continued by historians like Richard Phillips and Dennis Butts, who see children's publications as being "dominated by male values," and providing their readers with an "unquestioning acceptance of the legitimacy of British rule."[8] More recent historians, including Michelle Smith and Sally Mitchell, have challenged the "boys only" characterization of the adventure genre, pointing to both the substantial number of adventure stories published for girls and girls' evident enjoyment of "boys' books" as evidence for their arguments. [9] But their analyses have maintained a division between girls and boys as well as a division between home and empire by arguing that adventure stories represented either girls' particular versions of imperialism, [10] or that they illustrated the creation of a separate girl's print culture domestically.[11] These arguments all fail to take children's own perspectives as readers into account, and consequently these historians limited the potential of their analyses and presupposed their own conclusions. Advocacy for certain gender roles and imperial ideologies certainly existed in Victorian adventure literature, along with certain views on social morality, charity, religion, industrialization, urbanization and education; but none of these things was the motivating cause of its popularity. To really understand why adventure was so popular among children, and subsequently what cultural attitude it represents, we should instead turn to those that made it so: the child readers themselves.

I will argue that instead of simply reflecting back the pedagogic intent of the adults who wrote, published, and purchased them, children's adventure literature reflected how it felt to be a child in this period. In a market that was overwhelmed with publications aimed at them, children decided to make

5 Martin Green, *Dreams of Adventure, Deeds of Empire,* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1979,); Richard Philips, *Mapping Men and Empire: A Geography of Adventure* (London: Routledge, 1997); Dennis Butts, "Shaping Boyhood: Empire Builders and Adventurers," in *Encyclopedia of Children's Literature,* ed. Peter Hunt (New York: Routledge, 1996).

6 Green, *Dreams of Adventure, Deeds of Empire,* xi.

7 Green, Dreams of Adventure, Deeds of Empire, 3.

8 Butts, "Shaping Boyhood: Empire Builders and Adventurers," in *Encyclopedia of Children's Literature*, 332.

9 Sally Mitchell, *New Girl: Girls Culture in England, 1880- 1915* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.)

10 Michelle J. Smith *Empire in British Girls' Literature and Culture: Imperial Girls, 1889-1915* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.)

11 Mitchell, *The New Girl: Girls Culture in England 1880-1915.*

the adventure genre popular because those stories contained themes that children strongly connected to: the exclusion or marginalization of adult figures, the possibility of economic self-sufficiency, and the ability for self-creation. These themes, shared by fictional and non-fictional publications, came out of the particular aspirations and anxieties of the middle class environment these children grew up in. In this environment adventure novels played a critical role: although realistic in setting, descriptions, and characters, they essentially depicted fantasy worlds in which children could encounter, combat, and overcome real world anxieties.

The popularity of the genre, however, was unexpected by contemporary adults, who expressed their surprise and uncertainty about understanding children's changing tastes in surveys and book reviews. Likewise surprising to adults was the fact that children did not exclusively read in the gender categories defined by authors and publishers. Adults' surprise in response to children's reading habits, combined with the major themes of adventure stories themselves, illustrate how children's publications in the nineteenth century heralded the creation of an independent children's culture in which children could play an active role and from which adults were excluded.

Despite children's increased ability to choose their own books, the consumers of children's literature in the nineteenth remained a combination of adults and children. Consequently, in order to argue that the content of children's adventure stories corresponded to children's needs and desires, we need a way to separate children's and adults' influences on these texts. One such method of separation is the consideration of fictional adventure stories in parallel with the non-fictional materials, like magazines, that children read as well. By recreating the environment in which children would have consumed adventure stories through our consideration of magazines and of relevant historical context, the aspects of adventure that were most pertinent to children will become evident. Fictional novels and non-fictional magazines offer different, but complementary, perspectives on childhood.

While magazines reacted more quickly to changing tastes and had more direct lines of communication with their readers, they were constrained by the presence of authoritative adults and of their pragmatism. Books, on the other hand, were limited by their slow production and one-sided communication, but offered rich imaginative spaces in which children could recreate their own worlds in the absence of adults. Significantly, adventure novels also made use of a plot structure that was much older than the genre itself. Thus, the central themes of the genre should be thought of as period-specific versions of universal themes rather than as hyper-topical imperial and masculine tropes. Re-integrating the central themes of children's adventure into a broader historical context therefore demonstrates the creation of a children's culture that had little imperial or hyper-masculine basis.

Themes of Adventure and Their Historical Contexts

Three main themes emerged from adventure novels in the nineteenth century: the marginalization of adult figures in children's lives, children's capacity for independence and self-sufficiency, and the possibility of self-creation. Echoed in non-fictional magazines, these themes had important bearing on children's everyday lives and experiences at the end of nineteenth century. This can be confirmed by noting the parallels between these themes and the historic situation of the middle class from which they emerged. In both books and magazines, adults were marginalized or disappeared altogether, enabling children to enter adult society as equals. In novels, parental figures usually died or were removed through similar circumstances. This often served as a motivation for the story. For example, in Chapter Two in *Cicely Frome, the Captain's Daughter* the protagonist received news that her father had died at sea.[12] Main characters were often introduced as orphans with less authoritative adults filling parental roles: like an uncle, or an older brother.[13] If the character's parents were still alive, they were usually separated from the children through some exceptional circumstance. It is worth noting that the removal of parents was not always a traumatic experience, and children sometimes elected to leave their parents voluntarily.[14] This suggests that the marginalization of adults was a necessary removal of authority figures, which allows the child protagonists to act independently.

The most important effect of the removal of adult figures is that child protagonists were either separated from adult society altogether, or were granted the same freedom and liberties as an adult. The former usually occurred in an isolated setting: the children are captured by natives, isolated on a homestead, or shipwrecked on a desert island.[15] But even if children were not separated completely from adult society, they were accepted into it as equals. Interestingly, in these cases the adults would often take on some childlike characteristics. A child character working on a ship, for example, discovers the sailors do not drink, smoke, swear, or otherwise act in disreputable ways. In *By Name or Fame,* the author described rough and tumble life on board a fishing vessel in the following way:

> The skipper was kind and forbearing; he neither ill-treated the boys himself or permitted any of the crew to do so, and everything went on regularly and comfortably. There were a few books on board, and of an evening after the trawl was lowered, and before the watch below had turned into their bunks, William, who was the best reader on board, would be asked to read aloud for a while.

12 Bessie Marchant, *Cicely From, the Captain's Daughter* (Edinburgh: Nimmo, Hay and Mitchell, 1900).

13 Marchant, *The Half- Moon Girl*; William H G Kingston, *Manco the Peruvian chief, or, an Englishman's Adventures in the Lands of the Incas* (London: Collins Clear Type Press, 1900).

14William H. G. Kingston, *A Voyage Round the World; a Book for Boys* (Edinburgh: T.Nelson and Sons, 1879); George A. Henty, *In the Hands of the Cave-Dweller* (London: Blackie and Sons, 1890).

15 R.M. Ballantyne, *The Pirate City: an Algerine Tale* (Edinburgh: T. Nelson and Sons, 1974); Marchant, *The Sisters of Silver* Creek; R. M. Ballantyne, *The Coral Island: A Tale of the Pacific Ocean* (London: Nisbet, 1913).

> Sometimes there were songs, and as the *Kitty* was fortunate, and her taking of fish good, the men were all cheerful and good-tempered.[16]

This representative passage not only illustrates how adults were described in a way that makes them lose their authority and their potential danger, it also demonstrates how children were often singled out as exceptional even among adults, through their cleverness, their ability to read, or their bravery. Removal from adult society or exceptionalism within it allowed child protagonists to prove themselves without the aid of adults, surely an attractive quality to their readers.

When adults did appear in adventure books, they were often treated in dismissive or diminutive ways, allowing children to take control of their situations. One way this was done was by having adults characters admit a child's superiority, as in *Captain Bayley's Heir* when an adult says "I should prefer taking the general verdict of the School [your classmates] … boys are seldom far out in their estimate of persons; they have more instinct than men, and a boy seldom far wrong in his estimate of character."[17] To a similar end, adults were often described as ridiculous, boring, or ineffective. In *Waihoura, the New Zealand Girl*, a neighbour was described as follows: "Mr. Nicholas Spears rolled his round eyes about, and twitched his mouth in such a curious manner when he spoke, that Lucy could scarcely refrain from laughing outright." Less dramatic adults were presented as boring, or sadly diminished from their youthful vigor. Again, from *Cicely Frome*, "Cicely had always looked down upon [their neighbors] as uninteresting, and not worth knowing; but even the most commonplace and ordinary people come in useful at a pinch."[18] Such dismissive commentary was sometimes accompanied by the subtle suggestion that life declined rapidly after childhood ended, as is seen in the novel *One in Ten Thousand* : "like many other women of the middle class, she had sunk since her marriage from the trim, pretty girl to the somewhat slatternly matron."[19] In a similar vein, adults were sometimes described as downright useless, as the protagonist of *Maori and Settler* comments on his father:

> His father he regarded with a somewhat contemptuous kind of affection. He did not doubt that he was a very learned man, but he had small patience with his inability to make up his mind, his total want of energy, and his habit of leaving everything for his wife to decide upon and carry out.[20]

In situations in these novels in which adults appeared inferior to children, they were often also cast on children's mercy, either as vanquished villains, or as those needing care. In the villainous role, adults were perceived as having various character flaws. In *The Sisters of Silver Creek,* the villainous adult was a neighboring shop-keeper, who makes injurious loans, and was introduced as having "a surly voice, like a dog that wants to bite."[21] Earlier in that same novel, one of the sisters asserted her authority over the greedy loan collector:

> Kitty did not laugh, however, but bowed the money lender out with such grave dignity that he caught himself bowing in return in a manner so servile that he became downright angry because he felt so mean in the presence of this girl, with her air of grand superiority.[22]

When adults were not antagonists, their status was lowered by being put under children's care or protection. For example, in *The Sisters of Silver Creek*, the sisters "rescued" an abused servant from the home of the villainous shop-keeper, and subsequently cared for this old woman just as one would a child.[23] And in *One in Ten Thousand*, the protagonist was driven to distress by her attempts to limit the spending habits of her invalid, foolish, and money-mismanaging mother.[24] This final role reversal offered children the ultimate authority over adults: not only were children portrayed as knowing better, they were actively allowed to control adults' actions.

Magazines also demonstrated the marginalization of adult figures, or at least parents, through the way readers consumed those magazines and the resulting communities that formed. By all reading the same magazines, vast networks of children shared the same reading material and sensibilities. This was enhanced by the cultural communities these magazines actively created through write-in contests, letters, advice columns and societies like *Atalanta's* Scholarship and Reading Union. This had the potential to create bonds between children quite far away from each other by giving them a common identity and set of references through the magazine. This was heightened by children reading the same kinds of novels, particularly if children exchanged the novels or borrowed them from a common source. Magazines illustrated a new community for children outside of the family unit, one in which parents did not necessarily have a place. This figurative removal of parents and their control corresponded to their literal removal in fictional texts.

Historically, the marginalization of adults, especially parents, from magazines and adventure stories can be connected to a growing separation between parents and their children over the course of the nineteenth century. This process was accelerated by new forms of education alongside an increased focus on independent self-improvement. Over the course of the nineteenth century parents became less involved in their own children's education. As middle class families increasingly had the means to do so, it became a marker of success to send chil-

16 George Henty, *For Name or Fame; or, Through Afghan Passes* (London: Blackie and Sons, 1886), 51.

17 George A Henty, *Captain Bayley's Heir, a Tale of the Gold Fields of California* (Glasgow: Blackie and Sons, 1905), 134.

18 Marchant, *Cicely Frome*, 169.

19 L.T. Meade, *A Girl in Ten Thousand*, 75.

20 George A Henty, *Maori and Settler: a Story of the New Zealand War* (Glasgow: Blackie and Sons, 1891), 8.

21 Bessie Marchant, *The Sisters of Silver Creek,* (Edinburgh: Blackie and Sons, 1908), 58.

22 Marchant, *The Sisters of Silver Creek,* 25.

23 Marchant, *The Sisters of Silver Creek.*

24 Meade, *One in Ten Thousand.*

dren away to the boarding schools that had previously been the exclusive domain of the gentry.[25] So although parents were still responsible for their children's education, they were less directly involved in it; once in a school setting, children were in community dominated by their peers, which accelerated the widening gap between them and adults.

This separation points to creation of a children's culture that would not have been accessible to adults, even if they read the same materials. If parents did choose to investigate what their children were reading, they could not have possibly had the same responses as children; adults neither grew up in the same context as their child, nor were reading the texts at the same age. Educating children in general is built on a particular paradox: children are educated for the future using the tools of the present. [26] The reverse is just as true. Though children's authors, educators, and parents drew on their personal experiences of childhood to sympathize with children, circumstances had changed significantly enough between the two generations that adults could not fully understand what it was like to be a child in these decades. And, as children were increasingly involved in communities dominated by their peers, they reaffirmed their similarities with other children as well as their separation from adults. This seems to be one major reason children identified strongly with the fictional protagonists of adventure novels, who, once separated from adults, formed communities in which adults neither existed nor were required.

The second major theme shared between these novels and magazines was built on the marginalization of adult figures: the ability of children to be economically and socially self-sufficient. In novels, economic crises and rewards were incredibly prominent and economic worries often served as the motivation for many plot points. The protagonists were often in pursuit of a will or inheritance; for example, in *The Young Rajah*, the protagonist was searching for a long-lost will in order to prove his inheritance of his father's land, and in *The Half Moon Girl*, the protagonist's journey was motivated by the necessity of discovering which month a distant relative had died in order to settle a disputed will. If the motivating plot development was not a search for a lost will or missing inheritance, the conclusion of the plot was often a legally acquired economic stability through advantageous marriage or a sudden windfall. For example, in *By Name or Fame*, the protagonist discovered he is the lost son of landed gentry and thereby acquired land and a fortune of his own; [27] while in *In the Hands of the Cave Dwellers*, the protagonist rescued and subsequently married the daughter of a wealthy Mexican cattle rancher.[28]

But this reward of economic stability only came after the child protagonists in these novels demonstrated their ability to work for their own self-sufficiency, often learning the satisfaction of honest labor along the way. An excellent example of this can be found in *The Sisters of Silver Creek*, in which three orphaned sisters immigrated to Canada to live with an uncle after the death of their mother, only to discover upon their arrival that their uncle has died in apparent poverty. Nevertheless, the three young sisters established a functional and flourishing homestead, selling the products of their farm to support themselves. Eventually, they discovered their uncle was secretly quite rich indeed; but before finding his stash of silver hidden in the attic of their small farmhouse they learned to enjoy working. One character reflected: "as time went on, and she with her sisters began to feel the joy of earning money, and the bliss of independence, this feverish unrest about the riches, which perhaps had no existence, began to subside."[29]

Magazines had a more pragmatic take on the importance of self-sufficiency and the benefits of hard work. This economic attitude aligned with decidedly middle class aspirations and anxieties in this period tied to their unique social status and identity in Victorian consumer culture. As a class with little historical precedent for their identity, attitudes towards employment and consumption were critical to the middle class. [30] Historically, leisure had been associated with the upper class, and thus with nobility, refinement and respectability, while work was seen as unfortunate, unpleasant and the mark of inferior character. But while the middle class had the financial means to emulate the consumption and lifestyle of the upper class, they did not have the independent fortunes or land inherences that would have allowed them to do so without working. Their solution was to invert the values associated with work and leisure. Instead of thinking of working for a living as unsavory, the middle class recast certain kinds of work as an indication of strong moral character. [31] Excessive leisure was then redefined as decadent, lazy and immoral. [32] But at the same time, the middle class aspired to the standard of leisure set up the upper class, and this contradiction between work and leisure was visible in the child protagonists' struggles in adventure novels.

The tension underlying middle class identity, in which upper class lifestyles were both glorified and rejected, is amply visible in this literature's not uncommon instances of secret noble heritages and sudden windfalls. Through these plot devices, there seemed to be a tacit acknowledgement that to be truly comfortable, one must in fact have an inheritance or an estate. This delicate balance between rejecting upper class values about work and leisure while secretly aspiring to particular aspects of them seems to characterize the experience of a middle class still struggling to figure out its own identity. As parents hoped their children's generation would have a higher standard of life, children felt increased pressure to improve their own economic situation. In this context, the sudden windfall or vast undiscovered inheritance after slight work is the perfect form of wish fulfillment for these children: allowing them to both fulfill the

25 Steinbach, *Understanding the Victorians*, 126.
26 Drotner, English Children and their Magazines, 1751- 1945, 45.
27 Henty, *For Name or Fame.*
28 Henty, *In the Hands of the Cave Dwellers.*
29 Marchant, *Sisters of Silver Creek*, 174.
30 Young, *Middle-Class Culture in the Nineteenth Century*, 15.
31 Young, *Middle-Class Culture in the Nineteenth Century*, 71.
32 Young, *Middle-Class Culture in the Nineteenth Century,* 71.

moral requirements of hard work and to live the life of leisure to which they aspired.

The theme of economic self-sufficiency, while drawn from the anxieties and aspirations of the adults around them, also played a key role in the creation of a separate children's culture. The economic self-sufficiency demonstrated by protagonists in adventure novels echoed a new self-sufficiency that children in fact had. As the time between infancy and adult responsibilities lengthened, children had the ability to take jobs and earn money. This meant children had the economic means to make their own choices about the materials they consumed; and, for middle class children as for middle class adults, consumption played an important role in forming identity. Consequently, children were able to pick and choose what they wanted from the vast body of publications provided for them. The decisions made with this newfound agency aided the creation of a separate culture in which adults were not needed and could not entirely control.

Together, the marginalization of adult figures and potential for economic self-sufficiency created the basis for the third major theme of children's adventure literature: the ability for self-creation. Adventure novels offered the ideal space for self-creation; by removing child protagonists from their homes and society and setting them in open, unformed spaces, protagonists were given the ability to create their world however they chose. Adventures take place in liminal spaces that are ambiguous and malleable, spaces that "for all [their] local color and detailed natural history… [are] blank, unknown space, somewhat frightening but ultimately malleable"[33] In this environment, societal norms could be blurred, allowing new possibilities for both boys' and girls' behavior. As Philips argues, "although superficially confined to male dominated regions far from home, adventure occupies ambivalent space in which boundaries between home and away, women and men may become fuzzy and unstable."[34] The flexibilities of these settings allowed male and female protagonists alike to reconstruct their own versions of masculinity and femininity. Within the space carved out by adventure novels children were able to create their own identities; and the identities they created most closely reflected their own hopes and desires.

The malleability of adventure spaces was used most dramatically in regards to gender, as we see especially clearly in Meade's and Marchant's texts. Meade, more liberal, shaped her protagonists to embody the qualities she though were most important for "new girls." Her female protagonists capably and happily took control of problems, and lived working and active lives. In *A Countess of Canada* a female character happily joins her father on a long and arduous journey, brushing off opposition with "a merry laugh," saying, "It is work for a girl if a girl has got it to do."[35] This attitude is shared by Marchant. In *Cicely Frome,* in addition to being able to "hunt, fish and row," the girl protagonist enjoyed shooting; when she is invited on a hunt she responds "eagerly": "I should love it. I haven't touched a gun for a fortnight, and was desperately afraid the rains would be on us before I had another chance."[36] Even in books by male authors like Henty, female characters enjoyed the same excitement as boys. When facing a storm at sea, one such intrepid girl remarks:

> I shall be glad for the sake of the others," Marion replied, "for the sea to go down. Father and mother are both quite worn out; for it is almost impossible for them to sleep, as they might be thrown out of their berths if they did not hold on. For myself, I am in no hurry for the gale to be over, it is so magnificently grand.[37]

The idea of self-creation was also important for boys, although it was less dramatic as it was less of a challenge to traditional gender expectations in this period. Nevertheless, there were many instances when male characters went against their parents' wishes and are subsequently cast out to fend for themselves. In *With Kitchner in the Soudan,* the father of the main character was disowned for an objectionable marriage; he subsequently changed his name and moves his young family to Egypt. [38] In *In the Hands of the Cave Dwellers,* the protagonist fled his intended career as a clerk in his father's business to have his own adventures at sea.[39] Such plots result in an increased emphasis on taking action and proving oneself through personal deeds; once separated from society, often through shipwrecks, boys eagerly reformed their own societies with their own particular rules and practices.

Empowering children to decide their own futures accelerated the creation of a separate children's culture; as children read about "new" girls and boys, their notions of societal norms changed, and they absorbed the message they could in turn change those norms themselves. Removing adults from meaningful roles within these stories gave children the opportunity to construct their own imagined worlds. Removing adults from children's shared society in real life gave children some small opportunities to challenge accepted norms. Adult authors did not seem to have been aware of this effect of their novels; perhaps because they felt comfortable with the bending of societal norms in the exceptional and fictional world of adventure. But for the children who were reading those texts, each encounter with an exceptional story made the story seem a little less exceptional. Thus, the more children consumed adventure novels where rules are changed in exceptional circum stances, the less rigid those rules seemed. This further distanced children's attitudes from adults' by giving the two generations different baselines.

Through this description and historical contextual-

33 Philips, *Mapping Men & Empire,* 42.

34 Philips, *Mapping Men & Empire,* 89.

35 Marchant, *A Countess from Canada,* (Toronto: Musson, 1911).

36 Marchant, *Cicely Frome,* 129.

37 George Henty, *Maori and Settler* (*Maori and settler: a Story of the New Zealand War* (Glasgow: Blackie and Sons, 1891), 91.

38 George A Henty,*With Kitchener in the Soudan: a story of Atbara and Omdurma* (London: Blackie and Sons, 1903).

39 Henty, *In the Hands of the Cave Dwellers.*

ization of the major themes in these novels and magazines, it should become clear that, from the readers' perspective, the main purpose of adventure literature was not to train imperial citizens. The settings of the novels, goals of their protagonists, and eventual rewards all have more to do with middle class aspirations than promoting a masculine, imperial project. We can conclude, then, that what made adventure novels so successful was in fact their emphasis on the themes which most resonated with children: the capacity for self-sufficiency and the ability for self-creation. These themes aligned well with the hopes and fears of the middle class audience towards whom these novels and magazines were directed. As one historian claims: "this new type of fiction, with its clever mixture of betterment and excitement, must have been especially appealing to boys who had been raised to propriety and abnegation and were facing new demands and liberties."[40]

Adventure novels promoted characters who had the requisite courage, ability and flexibility to navigate new and unknown worlds, paired with the reassurance that not only would they be successful, they would have fun. Ultimately, adventure stories created a picture of childhood in which children were in control of their own fates; and this is what children liked enough to make these stories so popular in the nineteenth century.

Adult Commentary on Children's Literature

The character of adult commentary on children's reading habits supports the emergence of a separate children's culture in this period: such commentary further emphasized the distance between adults' expectations for children's tastes and children's actual tastes. The mere existence of such commentary already begins to demonstrate these points; by taking the time to research and understand children's tastes, adults both validated children's abilities to choose their own literature and acknowledged their own limited understanding of children's choices. The contents of adult commentary further emphasized this distance by articulating a tension between what adults thought children *should* enjoy reading and what children *did* enjoy reading. Victorian adults cared deeply about children's reading habits and were willing to compromise their standards to appeal to children's tastes. But despite their best efforts, adults only partially understood what children wanted and consequently were concerned and frustrated with the reading patterns they observed.

Adults were strongly motivated to provide children with proper reading material because they believed that what a child read could fundamentally influence his/her moral character and future prospects. As the publishing industry expanded over the second half of the century the variety of material to which children had access increased, as had children's ability to purchase those materials themselves. Victorian adults firmly believed that reading "sensational" or lowbrow literature not only reflected poorly on the child's character, but could lead them astray into acting out those books's plots. As one such dramatic account remarked:

> Some time ago a youth was so maddened by reading one of the tales provided for his entertainment that he shot dead his father and brother. Another young fellow in the habit of purchasing these weekly 'dreadful' was apprehended on a charge of unlawfully keeping firearms in his room. A clerk who had devoted his leisure to a study of Harrison Ainsworth's novels tried to induce his master to leave his bedroom by mewing like a cat at his door, and awaited his exit with a handkerchief charged with chloroform. Having rendered his employer insensible, it was his object to steal the cashbox. His plan failed, and he was taken into custody. [41]

A similar account of using an adventure book as a guide for action is presented in the same text, as the author continued:

> This exploit was eclipsed by that of some half-dozen lads, who, after reading a boys' weekly- a copy of which they had carefully included in their cargo- started off in an open boat down the Thames on their way to Australia! When caught they were found to have provided themselves with revolver, powder, shot and biscuits. [42]

The potential for poorly chosen reading material to lead children to a "disastrous moral fall,"[43] was not limited to books marketed to boys. As one author warns, "that which their sisters read is in no way superior;" reading cheap romances had the potential to permanently ruin these susceptible young minds' hopes for future domestic bliss. [44] So, although the content of books and magazines had superficially shifted from overtly moralistic to entertaining over the nineteenth century; such commentary demonstrated the extent to which children's reading habits were still of critical importance to adults.

However, despite these concerns it seems adults at the end of the nineteenth century could not quite figure out what children did in fact want to read. As one author explained:

> In the circumstances, therefore, it is not surprising that slowly but surely two questions are beginning to occupy a pace in the literary discussion of the day. First, what do children read? Second, what is written for them? Little seems to be known by the general public on either point. Everyone can tell you what he or she read in early youth….no reliable data exist as to the work of individual writes for the young, or the precise nature of the books read by the rising generation.[45]

Adults' subsequent attempts to determine an answer to these questions took the form of both surveys and reviews. In response to an increasing anxiety about children's reading

40 Drotner, *English Children and Their Magazines,* 107.

41 Salmon, Juvenile Literature As It Is, 190
42 Salmon, Juvenile Literature As It Is, 191.
43 Salmon, "What Girls Read," 522.
44 Salmon, "What Girls Read," 523.
45 Salmon, *Juvenile Literature As It Is*, 12.

habits, a general survey was taken in 1884 by Charles Welsh. The survey was conducted by sending a circular to "numerous schools for boys and girls" throughout England, with a variety of questions, including:

> What is your favorite book, and why do you like it best? Who is your favorite author? Who is your favorite writer of fiction? Which of his books do you like best? What other writers of fiction do you like? Which is your favorite magazine and why do you prefer it? …what histories have you read? What biographies? What travels? What other books? What pieces of poetry do you like best?[46]

This survey received close to 2,000 written responses from children between ten to nineteen years old: 790 boys and a little over 1,000 girls.[47] The sheer number of respondents illustrates how strongly children were invested in their own reading choices. The results of this survey were subsequently analyzed and published by Edward Salmon in 1886 in two articles titled, "What the Working Class Reads," and "What Girls Read."[48] [49] Salmon then published a more comprehensive book in 1888 titled *Juvenile Literature as It Is*, which included a more substantial description of the survey's results, some children's written responses, and more of his own analysis.

A different perspective on children's reading habits can be found in newspaper reviews of recently published book for children. Written by adults for other adults, these columns offered advice for choosing books that would please both adults and children. One such series was a regular column published in the popular newspaper *The Graphic* titled "Our Christmas Bookshelf," from 1893 to 1900. Publishers did a roaring trade around Christmas, selling not only novels but bound annals of some of the more widely circulated periodicals like *Boys Own* and *Atalanta*. As one newspaper editor writes "every Christmas the favorite writers for boys provide the popular dish of sensation stories, variously sea soned to suit various taste."[50] Like Salmon's texts, these reviews had a specific purpose in mind: to guide adults to appropriate books to purchase as gifts, but the resulting reviews are telling of both children's perceived tastes and adults' reactions to them.

These two perspectives on children's reading habits, although different in form and audience, shared their intentions and results. Both Salmon's scholarly analysis and *The Graphics*' consumer-minded descriptions served as guides for adults to children's tastes. The simple fact that adults needed and wanted such guides demonstrates both an increasing separation between the two generations and adults' growing willingness to cater to children's tastes. In both sources, we can see children's tastes diverged from adults' expectations and wishes in three main areas: in the kind of content children want, in the way lessons are presented and in the way gendered books are consumed.

In these reviews, adults first noted children's evolving tastes in their expressions of desire for more excitement and adventure in their stories. Newspaper reviews stated this rather bluntly: as one column that negatively reviewed the reprint of an older text remarked:

> The child of our own day, accustomed to lively and tastefully illustrate books, would make rather a wry face if presented with some of the literature intended to amuse the child of a century, or even a half century ago…. Instead of sensation stories they would get didactic, improving narratives about painfully good boys and girls, while the humor of the drawings would hardly appeal to modern childish taste.[51]

Other newspaper reviews reiterated this theme, noting that when a protagonist is unsympathetic, "the self-denying young man…is a little too perfect to be natural."[52] The writer of another column remarks "nowadays young people are apt to complain the [Sir Walter Scotts] works are too full of introduction and length description,"[53] before suggesting shorter and presumably more entertaining equivalents. Books were often praised for their "perilous journeys" and "vivid battles" while "interest kept up" appeared to be a major selling point.

Along with underlying children's diminished patience with the slow, dense stories of before, newspapers articles emphasized how entertaining details, believability and vivid cultural detail also maintained children's interest. One book was praised for "a pleasant, sensible story of everyday life and realistic girls, not unlikely heroines."[54] Another author was recognized for having "a happy knack of describing rustic sights and scenes, while his account of Moujik folklore is equally interesting."[55] Such reviews stressed the importance of books being descriptive, believable and accurate if children were to enjoy them. Additionally, newspapers reviews noted the new emphasis on economic challenges and rewards in children's literature. One editor writes "in these modern times… most of the adventured seek money rather than glory, and it is quite remarkable how many of the boys' books deal with the quest for hidden treasure."[56] Another notes the importance of children learning to support themselves on their own. The surprise expressed over these developments demonstrated that adults did not expect to find such themes entertaining to children.

Salmon's text likewise picks out the importance of including entertaining and informative qualities to engage children's interest. In response to a review claiming that the author Mayne Reid was a favorite of children, Salmon asserted that "the verdict was quite mistaken. The majority of Mayne Reid

46 Salmon, *Juvenile Literature as it Is,* 13.
47 Salmon, *Juvenile Literature as it Is,* 14, 21.
48 Salmon "What the Working Class Reads" *Nineteenth Century*, 1886.
49 Salmon "What Girls Read" *Nineteenth Century,* 1886.
50 "Our Christmas Bookshelf," *The Graphic,* November 26, 1898.
51 "Our Christmas Bookshelf," *The Graphic* December 3, 1898.
52 "Our Christmas Bookshelf," *The Graphic*, December 2, 1893.
53 "Our Christmas Bookshelf," *The Graphic,* December 22, 1894.
54 "Our Christmas Bookshelf," *The Graphic* December 22, 1894.
55 "Our Christmas Bookshelf," *The Graphic*, December 14, 1895.
56 "Our Christmas Bookshelf," *The Graphic,* November 26, 1898.

was too fond of natural history and detail to be palatable to the youthful mind."[57] But of popular children's author Ballantyne, Salmon only had words of praise, writing:

> Science, indeed, without being made ridiculous, under Mr Ballantyne's touch becomes humorous. Could a scientific lecture be delivered in brighter form than the following, or a better illustration be given of the precise method in which what are commonly called "dry" subjects can be brought successfully to the attention of youth?[58]

The books that were most successful were those that adapted to children's changing tastes, becoming faster-paced, more humorous, and more exciting, a phenomenon to which both newspaper reviews and Salmon's analysis attested.

As children's tastes changed and their options grew more numerous, adults were confronted with a difficult problem: how could they incorporate the necessary moral instruction without driving children away? Salmon tackled this problem in fairly standard way: "When books were few and far between," he writes, "an author might indulge in long-winded dissertations almost to his heart's content. Now, if he has a moral to point, he must point it in the facts of his narrative."[59] Newspapers reviewers agreed with Salmon's assessment: if a lesson was to be successful, it had to take a back seat to the entertaining aspects of the novel. Books were praised when they manage to cleverly hide moral within an amusing plot. Of once such book the editor admiringly wrote that the author's "moral is driven home in such an unassuming fashion it may well yield fruit."[60] A similar book was praised for its dual accomplishments: "it will do girls good to read, as well as amuse them thoroughly."[61] Such commentary marks how adults were becoming willing to consider what children wanted while attempting to give them what they needed, underlining children's control over their reading habits.

Likewise, authors were mostly highly praised when they understood "not only childish ways and fancies, but of what will appeal to the childish mind."[62] This praise emphasizes several important implications of adults' commentary on children's literature. First, the praise that the author understands "childish ways and fancies" demonstrates that adults believed children had a special kind of mental life that was not accessible to most adults. Granting this independent mental life was an important prerequisite for the formation of an exclusionary children's culture; adults could not fully understand children even if they wanted to. The second part of this praise, that the author could pick "what appeals to the childish mind", spoke to adults' willingness to make concessions to children's tastes. Publishers were completely on board with this; even religious publishing houses like T. Nelson, for example, explicitly shied away from publishing "goody-goody" stories.[63] So although adults certainly did not want to completely relinquish control over what children consumed, they seem to have been increasingly aware that they had to modify their stories to suite children's tastes.

Nonetheless, the single biggest shock to adults who inquired into children's tastes was the discrepancies between the gender to which reading materials were marketed, and the gender that actually read them. Practically every book or magazine for children out of infancy in this period was specified as "for girls" or "for boys", whether in the title itself, through the publishers advertising, or through reviews. For example, some texts would have titles like *My First Voyage to Southern Seas, a Book for Boys* or *The Palace Beautiful: a Story for Girls.*[64] Others would be parts of publishers' series with a title like "The Boy's Own Library." And columns in *The Graphic* separated books specifically for girls in sections with titles like "A Garden of Girls," "Books for Girls" or "Our Girls Again."[65] Many adults seem to have assumed children adhered to these categories, but both newspapers reviews and Salmon's surveys illustrate how this was not the case.

When Salmon received girls' responses to queries about their favorite author or favorite books, he was astounded. When asked "Who is your favorite author?" girls returned the following results:

Author	*Number*	*Percentage**	*Main Genre**
Charles Dickens	330	33%	Adult Fiction
Sir Walter Scott	226	22.6%	Adult Fiction
C. Kingsley	91	9.1%	Historical Fiction
C.M. Yonge	91	9.1%	Girls Fiction
Shakespeare	73	7.3%	Plays
E. Wetherell	54	5.4%	Religious Fiction
Mrs. Henry Wood	51	5.1%	Girl's Fiction
George Eliot	41	4.1%	Adult Fiction
Lord Lytton	41	4.1%	Adult Fiction
Longfellow	31	3.1%	Literature
Charlotte Maria Tucker (A.L.O.E.)	30	3%	Religious Children's Fiction
Anderson	29	2.9%	Fairy tales
Hesba Sretton	21	2.1%	Religious Children's Fiction
Canon Farrar	19	1.9%	Historical Fiction
Grimm Brothers	19	1.9%	Fairy tales
Thackeray	18	1.8%	Adult Fiction
Mrs. Walton	17	1.7%	Religious Children's Fiction
Melville	17	1.7%	Adult Fiction
W.H.G. Kingston	16	1.6%	Boy's adventure

57 Salmon, *Juvenile Literature As It Is*, 35.
58 Salmon, *Juvenile Literature As It Is,* 56-7.
59 Salmon, "What Girls Read," 516.
60 "Our Christmas Bookshelf," *The Graphic,* November 9, 1895.
61 "Our Christmas Bookshelf," *The Graphic,* December 14, 1895.
62 December, "Our Christmas Bookshelf," *The Graphic* 10, 1898.
63 Dempster, Thomas Nelson and Sons in the Late Nineteenth Century: A Study in Motivation, Part 2," 8.
64 William H G Kingston, *My First Voyage to Southern Seas; a Book for Boys* (Edinburgh: Nelson and Son, 1869); L T Meade, *The Palace Beautiful: A Story for Girls* (London: Cassel and Co., 1902).
65 "Our Christmas Bookshelf," *The Graphic*, November 24, 1894; "Our Christmas Bookshelf," *The Graphic,* December 8, 1900; "Our Christmas Bookshelf," *The Graphic,* December 14, 1895.

"The analysis of the voting," Salmon writes, "suggests some curious reflections to those who have at all studied 'girls' literature.' Hardly one of the recognized writers for girls is mentioned."[66] Instead the survey is topped by two authors who, although very popular, did not even explicitly write "children's literature" at all: Charles Dickens and Sir Walter Scott, with 330 and 226 votes respectively. They each more than double the votes for the third most popular author, Charles Kingsley, who wrote the popular historical adventure *Westward Ho!* He is tied with the first explicitly "girls" author on the list, C.M. Yonge, likewise with 91. After this, the votes dropped off rapidly, but represented a wide variety of genres, including classics, plays and poetry as well as both boys and girls authors. [67] The responses for girl's favorite books revealed a similar misalignment.[68] These results had more in common with the boys' favorites than established girls' authors. And this trend continued in Salmon's questions about favorite magazines: among the girls *The Boy's Own* is the second most popular behind *The Girl's Own*. Clearly the division between boys and girls reading was not as rigid as Salmon expected it to be: as Salmon then observed, "if girls were to choose their own books…they would make a choice for themselves very different from that which their elders make for them." [69]

Such a conclusion is also visible in newspaper reviews of books, which pointed out girls' changing tastes and new demands. Many of the books advertised in girls sections had striking similarities to those advertised for boys. In column published in 1894, the editor notes "the Revolt of Daughters has left its mark on most of the fiction provided for girls in their early teens. Heroines are far more emancipated than of yore." [70] A year later, the editor noted that the author Mrs. Molesworth, known for her "sweet, wholesome tale[s] of girlish life… goes with the times, so that a New Girl eager to win independence is to be found amongst the attractive feminine gallery of 'White Turrets.'"[71] In 1898 the editor confirmed girls read those stories intended for boys: "Although girls are not supposed to want such exciting fare as their brothers, they certainly enjoy a spice of adventure to flavor their books."[72] In this assessment, the phrase "are not supposed to" takes on particular importance, as it recognized that children were actively challenging adults' expectations by reading across gender lines.

The predominance of girls reading boys' books and adults' ensuing reactions to it raise two different questions: how had girls been accessing these books without adult knowledge, and why were girls not reading the books that had been written for them? The fact that girls had access to these books underscores the limited influence and oversight adults had over their children's reading habits. In large Victorian families, books were often passed between siblings: several women later recalled reading their brothers' books with great gusto and enjoyment in their younger years. [73] Additionally, books seem to have been exchanged among friends; advice for getting a friend to return a book being a common subject of advice columns. Thus, we can conclude that not only did girls have the opportunity to read outside of their parents control; they did so frequently enough to list some of those authors as their favorites.

Why girls did not want to read the books provided for them underscores the gap between adults' suppositions of children's interests and children's actual needs in this period. Salmon claimed, rightly, that girls' literature was failing to serve the needs of girls "today," needs that had changed drastically even in a twenty-five year period.[74] This is one of the few points on which girls themselves agreed. One girl who responded to Salmons' survey is reported as writing back:

> Charlotte Yonge's stories are pretty, and if they were not quite so goody-goody, would be very nice stories of home and everyday life. Anne Beale is still more goody-goody in her style… A great many girls never read so-called 'girls' books at all; they prefer those presumably written for boys. Girls as a rule don't care for Sunday School twaddle; they like a good stirring story, with a plot and some incident and adventures- not a collection of texts and sermons and hymns strung together, with a little 'Child's Guide to Knowledge' sort of conversation. This is also, I am sure, why girls read so many novels of the commoner type- they have, as a rule, nothing else in any way interesting. People try to make boys' books as exciting and amusing as possible, while we girls, who are much quicker and more imaginative, are very often supposed to read milk-and-watery sorts of stories that we could generally write better ourselves.[75]

Clearly, this passage illustrated the extent to which children did not share the gender expectations pushed by Victorian adults. But this excellent and articulate response underlines the main ways children in general felt underserved by the literature available to them in this period. There is an undercurrent of independence and assertiveness: you cannot understand what we want, but we can get it ourselves.

This sentiment seems to underpin the popularity of the entire adventure genre, as well as its role in building a separate children's culture over the course of the nineteenth century. Adults could control production, but not reception; the amount of children's literature available had grown enormously, and children were offered a much wider choice about what they were going to read. Furthermore, children were no longer completely limited by what their parents chose to purchase for them, but through friends, siblings, classrooms, and lending libraries had access to a full range of materials. The results were

66 Salmon, "What Girls Read," 528.
67 Salmon, "What Girls Read," 528.
68 See Appendix A, Table III
69 Salmon, "What Girls Read," 529.
70 "Our Christmas Bookshelf," *The Graphic,* November 24, 1894.
71 "Our Christmas Bookshelf," *The Graphic,* November 9, 1895.
72 "Our Christmas Bookshelf," *The Graphic,* December 10, 1898.
73 Mitchell, *The New Girl,*115.
74 Salmon, "What Girls Read, "517.
75 Salmon, *Juvenile Literature As It Is,* 28-9.

twofold. First, there was the outright rejection of specific books: if children found a book sufficiently boring, they simply would not read it. Second was the more troublesome mental rejection of the parts of stories that children found boring: the moral or the lesson. Children's ability to contradict adults' wishes speaks most strongly to the creation of a separate children's culture in which adults were not wanted or needed.

Conclusion

In the second half of the nineteenth century, children's adventure literature emerged in the British literary marketplace. Although the adventure genre never disappeared entirely, the most popular authors of the previous half century faded from view. What is there to be gained by revisiting the rise and fall of this relatively short-lived and topical genre?

From a methodological perspective, the reconsideration of children's adventure literature affirms the incredible potential value that these materials offer as historical resources. Publications for children can be the basis of rich, nuanced and distinctive accounts of the personal identities and collective imaginings of individuals, nations, and other social groups. Unfortunately, a tendency to diminish children as historical actors has been a barrier to the successful use of this source collection; when in fact children's materials offer a particularly rich historical resource precisely because of their unique position between two generations as well as the passionate and intense reactions they attract.

Clearly, literature produced for children rests at the intersection of a number of fundamental but contested conceptions of personal identity, historical memory and the future of society. Children's literature explains how things are now and demonstrates its authors' hopes or fears for the future. It registers society's aspirations and anxieties. It mediates between the experiences of the current generation and the memories of the one before. It provides inroads to the psyches of its consumers, its producers and its commentators. Such a valuable resource should be used more extensively.

Appendix A: Surveys of Children's Reading Habits

Surveys taken by Charles Welsh in 1884, published by Edward Salmon in 1888; fields with * are my own additions.

II. *Boys' Favorite Authors*, as published in *Juvenile Literature as It Is*, 1888.

Note: Answers to "What is your favorite book?" were all write in; so the results are scattered. Salmon only includes the title in is results.

Author	*Number*	*Percentage**	*Main Genre**
Charles Dickens	223	28%	Adult fiction
W.G.H. Kingston	179	23%	Boys Adventure
Walter Scott	128	16%	Adult Fiction
Jules Verne	114	14%	Adventure Fiction
Captain Marryat	102	13%	Boys Adventure
R.M. Ballantyne	67	8%	Boys Adventure
Harrison Ainsworth	61	8%	Historical Adventure
Shakespeare	44	6%	Plays
Mayne Reid	33	4%	Boys Adventure
Lord Lytton	32	4%	Adult Fiction

III. *Girls' Favorite Books* from *Juvenile Literature As It Is*, 1888.

Title	*Author**	*Number*	*Genre**
Westward Ho!	Charles Kingsley	34	Children's Adventure
The Wide, Wide World	Susan Warner	29	Religious Fiction
The Bible	N/A	27	Religious
A Peep Behind the Scenes	Mrs. O F Walton	27	Children's fiction
John Halifax, Gentleman	Dinah Maria Craik	25	Fiction
David Copperfield	Charles Dickens	22	Adult Fiction
Little Women	Lousia May Alcott	21	American Fiction
Ivanhoe	Walter Scott	18	Historical Fiction
The Days of Bruce	Grace Aguilar	16	History Nonfiction
The Daisy Chain	Charlotte Yonge	13	Religious Fiction

IV. *Boys' Favorite Books* from *Juvenile Literature As It Is*, 1888.

Book	*Author**	*Number*	*Genre**
Robinson Crusoe	Daniel Defoe	43	Adventure
Swiss Family Robinson	Johann David Wyss	24	Adventure
Pickwick Papers	Dickens	22	Adult Fiction
Ivanhoe	Walter Scott	20	Romance
Boys' Own Annual	Various	17	Journal
The Bible	Unknown	15	Religious
Tom Brown's Schooldays	Thomas Hughes	15	School Story
Valentine Vox	Henry Cockton	13	-
Vice Versa	-	12	-
St. Winifred's	F W Farrar	11	School Story

V. *Children's Favorite Magazine's and Papers* from *Juvenile Literature as It Is*, 1888.

Paper Title	*Number (Boys)*	*Number (Girls)*	*Total**
The Boy's Own Paper	404	88	492
The Girl's Own Paper	-	315	315
Little Folks	7	71	78
Cassell's Family Magazine	5	35	40
Punch	14	24	38

Appendix B: Books

I. Basic Publication and Setting Information: Author, Title, Year Publisher, Places to which the protagonist travels, and the Year the story is set.

Place(s) traveled to are given with modern names. Omitted are point of origin (usually England or Canada) and places passed through.

Year(s) set: are approximated based on the historical events referenced in the plot or the author's introduction. "Present" means contemporary to publication.

Author	*Title*	**Year pub**	**Place(s) traveled to:**	**Year(s) set:**
Ballantyne	*The Young Fur Traders*	1856	Canada	Present
	The Pirate City: an Algerine Tale	1874	Algeria	1800s-1820s
	The Coral Island: a Tale of the Pacific	1884	Pacific Ocean	1850s-1860s
	The Walrus Hunters: A Romance of the Realms of Ice	1893	North American Arctic	Present
Henty	*Captain Bayley's heir: a Tale of the Gold Fields of California*	1889	American West	Present
	A Final reckoning; a Tale of Bush Life in Australia	1890	Australia	Early 1800s
	Condemned as a Nihilist: a Story of Escape from Siberia	1892	Russia, Siberia	Present
	For Name or Fame; or, through Afghan passes	1901	Afghanistan	1870s-80s
	The Treasure of the Incas: a Story of Adventure in Peru	1903	Peru	1880s
Kingston	*Ned Garth, Made Prisoner in Africa*	1862	Indian Ocean	Present
	The Young Rajah	1878	India	Present
	Adventures of Dick Onslow Among the Red Skins	1884	American Midwest	Present
	Manco the Peruvian chief, or, an Englishman's Adventure in the Country of the Incas	1900	Amazon Peru	1800s
	Janet Maclaren: the Faithful Nurse	18--	Canada	Present
Marchant	*The Half Moon Girl*	1898	India	Present
	Cicely Frome, the Captain's Daughter	1900	India (Ceylon)	Present
	Sisters of Silver Creek	1908	Canada	Present
	A Countess from Canada	1911	Canada	Present
	The Adventurous Seven	1914	Australia	Present
Meade	*A Girl in Ten Thousand*	1890	London	Present
	A Ring of Rubies	1892	London	1870s
	Light o' the Morning, the Story of an Irish girl	1900	England	1800s
	The Palace Beautiful, a Story for Girls	1902	London	Present
	How it All Came Round	191-	England	Present

II. Plot details, Part I: Background: Protagonist Age, the fate of their Mother and Father, the Reason they must leave home

Age: If an age is not specified the text, age is adolescent (A) for teens and child (C) for preteen. Most books span several years, the age listed is the age at the beginning of the major plot action. Multiple ages are given when there are multiple main characters.

Parent's fates: Fates are given in relation to child, e.g. "runs away," means the child runs away from the mother and father. If parents are not mentioned, listed N/A.

Title	**Age**	**Mother's Fate**	**Father's Fate**	**Reason for travel/adventure**
The Young Fur Traders	15	Runs away	Runs away	Wants to be a fur trader instead of a clerk
The Pirate City	19	Dead	Travels with	Is on a trading voyage; then captured by Algerian pirates
The Coral Island	15	Leaves willingly	Leaves willingly	Joins crew of ship; then shipwrecked
The Walrus Hunters	A	Leaves willingly	Leaves willingly	Leaves home to hunt walruses; then caught up in war
One of the 28th	19 15	Poor Widow	Dead	Is captured by a French vessel of the coast of England during the Napoleonic Wars
Captain Bayley's Heir	17	Dead	N/A	To escape an underserved bad reputation
A Final Reckoning	17	Shopkeeper	Dead	To escape an underserved bad reputation
Condemned as a Nihilist	16	N/A	In England	To be clerk in fathers company branch; then to escape false imprisonment in Siberia
For Name or Fame	15	Stolen by gypsies	Stolen by gypsies	Joins crew of fishing boat from workhouse; then shipwrecked; then joins British Army
The Treasure of the Incas	25, 15	Dead	Dead	To make his fortune for marriage (older), for fun (younger)
Ned Garth, Made Prisoner in Africa	14	Dead	Dead	To join navy
The Young Rajah	18	Dead	Dead	to recover father's will from an Indian price and reclaim his rightful inheritance
Adventures of Dick Onslow Among the Red Skins	G	N/A	N/A	Various adventures in the western U.S.
Manco the Peruvian Chief	15	Separated from	Separated from	To escape the capture by the Spanish army; then to find hidden Incan treasure
The Half Moon Girl	16	Dead	Dead	To ascertain uncle's date of death to determine the inheritance of a piece of land
Cicely Frome, the Captain's Daughter	15	Dead	Thought Dead	to join brother in India; then to find and discover truth about father's fate
Sisters of Silver Creek	17; 15 13	Dead	Dead	To live with uncle after mothers death; then support selves after uncle is found to be dead as well
A Countess from Canada	20s	Dead	Ill	To support family when father falls ills
The Adventurous Seven	19;	Dead	in Australia	To join father after guardian's death; then to find father
A girl in Ten Thousand	20	Negligent	Dead	To become a nurse to support family
Light o' the Morning, the Story of an Irish girl	15	Negligent	Alive	To save family castle after her father's financial ruin
The Palace Beautiful: A Story for Girls	16;1 3;12	Dead	Dead	To survive on small income after mothers death; to find lost brother
A Ring of Rubies	19	Alive	Negligent	To make money for poor family; to save a special ring from various people who want it
*How it All Came Round**	20	Dead	Dead	To rectify the injustice created by maliciously exchanged wills

III. Plot Details: Economic Details: Family's Economic Background, Any Employment undertaken by the protagonist, and Conclusion of story

Economic Background: one of four broad categories: gentry (landed), middle class, working class and settler; further specified with father's profession, if possible.

Employment: job(s) formally or informally done by children in the novel e.g. clerk, establishing homestead, sailor

Reward and Conclusion: If there are multiple main characters, multiple conclusions are listed.

Title	**Economic Background**	**Employment**	**Conclusion**
The Young Fur Traders	Settlers	Clerk; fur trader	Comfortable life in Canada, friend marries sister
The Pirate City	Middle class: merchant	Enslaved	Is saved, marries, lives comfortably in England
The Coral Island	Middle class: Sea captain	Joins crew of ship	Saved from shipwrecked island
The Walrus Hunters	Eskimos	Self-sufficiency, hunters	
Captain Bayley's Heir	Middle class: "merchants of the city"	Ships crew, store-clerk, gold miner	Marries and inherits property, becomes member of parliament
A Final reckoning	Working class: shopkeepers	Carpenter	Becomes rich in Australia, returns to England and buys an estate
Condemned as a Nihilist	Middle class: Merchant	Work for father's company	Returns to England to work with father's company
For Name or Fame	Working Class: workhouse	Sailor, soldier	Finds long lost parents, inherits property
The Treasure of the Incas	Middle Class: Out of work lieutenant	No particular	Finds sufficient treasure to marry
Ned Garth, Made Prisoner in Africa	Middle class: navy	Joins navy	Marries childhood friend who comes into unexpected inheritance.
The Young Rajah	Secretly upper class	Sailor	Discovers background, inheritance
Adventures of Dick Onslow Among the Red Skins	Explorer	Explorer	Proceeds to California
Manco the Peruvian Chief	Middle class: merchants	No particular	Finds hidden Aztec treasure
The Half Moon Girl	Gentry	No particular	Recovers inheritance
Cicely Frome, the Captain's Daughter	Middle class	House-keeper for brother; works on farm	Settled comfortably
Sisters of Silver Creek	Middle class, impoverished	Farmers; maid	Finds uncles silver in attic
A Countess from Canada	Settler	Transports things, teaches	Secures family's financial security
The Adventurous Seven	Middle class, settlers	Settlers	Find father, establish home in Australia
Title	*Background*	*Employment*	*Conclusion*
A Girl in Ten Thousand	Middle class: Country doctor	Nurse	Comes into inheritance, settles debts
Light o' the Morning, the Story of an Irish girl	Gentry	No particular	Saves family castle
A Ring of Rubies	Middle Class: impoverished	Rents out jewelry	Inherits and marries
How it All Came Round	Middle Class and Working Class	Maid	Sorts out exchanged wills, both live comfortably

"Portrait of a Black Sailor" , Artist Unknown. Creative Commons.

Black Citizenship on the Whale Ships of Antebellum America

By Zoe Beiser, Brown University

In 1842, Amory Edwards, the United States consular agent at the port of Buenos Aires wrote to the United States Secretary of State that "one Charles Peterson," an "American," was "forcibly taken by a vessel's captain."[1] Decades earlier, in the years before the War of 1812, the British navy began compelling American seamen into its ranks, precipitating public outcry. Long after American independence was solidified, the impressment of seamen continued to dishonor the young nation. The protection of American mariners remained vital to the country's reputation and necessitated the intervention of the American government, even when imperiled sailors, like Charles Peterson, were denied rights at home as black men.

James Jacobs, a white "citizen of America for many years," sought to aid the captured Peterson. Jacobs was on business as a clerk, when he "saw in the office of the Captain of the Port then a negro, whose name he understood to be Charles Peterson." [2]Jacobs talked with Peterson, who "told him that he had been pressed, and asked to take the Bounty and enter the service, and that he Peterson had told them he would not."[3] Peterson told Jacobs that "he had sent his protection to the consul of the United States," and he asked Jacobs "to call and see the consul, and request him to get him Peterson set at liberty." [4]Jacobs felt obligated through the common bonds of citizenship to help a fellow American, and went to the U.S.

1 Letter to the 20 January 1841, Despatches from US Consuls in Buenos Aires, reel 7, NARA.

2 "Deposition of James Jacobs," 20 January 1841, Despatches from US Consuls in Buenos Aires, reel 7, NARA.

3 Ibid

4 Ibid

consular agent in Buenos Aires to lobby on behalf of his black countryman. Armed with Jacobs' testimony, Amory Edwards urged his superiors in Washington DC to act quickly on behalf of Peterson, "a citizen of the United States."[5]

Despite Edwards' assertion of Peterson's citizenship, there was no concrete definition of national citizenship in the antebellum U.S. No explicit definition existed until the ratification of the Fourteenth amendment to the U.S. constitution in 1868. However, what did exist as the benchmark of national citizenship emerged thousands of miles outside the United States in places like Buenos Aires. The impressment crisis of the 1790s and 1800s pressured the American government to send consular agents to foreign ports to protect American mariners. These consular officials were empowered to extend government welfare to individuals that they perceived to be "citizens."[6] "Citizenship" connected Americans to their nation at a time when popular nationalism and pride in country were still being inculcated.[7] As importantly, however, citizenship claims were also racial and gender claims, assertions of a civic identity that made white manhood and American citizenship mutually reinforcing.[8] It was in this context that black mariners like Charles Peterson, a proportionally significant population in the whaling industry, struggled to secure protection at sea. As they traversed the globe on whaling voyages, black mariners laid claim to the name "American," placing particular emphasis on shared roles as laborers and men. Long before the proclamation by the Supreme Court of African Americans' exclusion from community and citizenship, black whalers made a place for black citizenship within the nation, in ports far outside its borders. They pressured Washington D.C. to recognize their citizenship in the name of national honor.

I Black Whale and Consular Officials

In the nineteenth century, maritime jobs became one of the most common black male occupations.[9] For a black man living in a slaveholding nation where racism limited employment options in even the "free" states, ships provided wages, opportunities for advancement, and a workplace where "his color might be less of a determinant of his daily life and duties than elsewhere."[10]The whale ship was a "total institution," one that contained a group of men in a laboring environment under close and arbitrary rule, fostering community and a specific culture that countenanced negotiation as well as authoritarian discipline.[11] Whaling men were often unskilled, and were paid very little as compared to other maritime workers, in fact they might walk away from a voyage with nothing at all if the journey had been unsuccessful.[12] As Jeffrey Bolster and Briton Cooper Busch have pointed out, blacks occupied a central role on whale ships. One estimate suggests there were more than 3,000 black men working on New Bedford vessels from 1803 to 1860.[13] While the mixed-race nature of whale ships could breed animosity and divisions, it could also allow for cross-racial cooperation, in the form of mutinies, aid in foreign ports,

5 Letter to the U.S. Secretary of State, 20 January 1841, Despatches from US Consuls in Buenos Aires, reel 7, NARA.
6 Matthew Taylor Raffety, *The Republic Afloat: Law, Honor, and Citizenship in Maritime America* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013): 174-211.

7 William J. Novak, "The Legal Transformation of Citizenship in Nineteenth- Century America," in *The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in American Political History*, ed. Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak, and Julian E. Zelizer (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003); Thomas A. Foster. *New Men: Manliness in Early America* (New York: New York University Press, 2011); see also Rogers M. Smith, *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); Paul A. Gilje, *Liberty On the Waterfront: American Maritime Culture in the Age of Revolution* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Leon Fink, *Sweatshops at Sea: Merchant Seamen in the World's First Globalized Industry, from 1812 to the Present* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2011)

8 Citizenship has long been connected with manhood, for more on the connection between manliness and citizenship see: Amy S. Greenberg, *Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire* (Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Dana D. Nelson, *National Manhood: Capitalist Citizenship and the Imagined Fraternity of White Men* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998); Gail Bederman, *Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Nancy Isenberg, *Sex and Citizenship in Antebellum America* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998)

9 James M. Lindgren, "Let Us Idealize Old Types of Manhood: The New Bedford Whaling Museum, 1903-1941" *The New England Quarterly*, Vol. 72. No. 2 (June, 1999): 189; for other estimates of numbers of African American men on whaling ships see: Kathryn Grover. *The Fugitive's Gibraltar: Escaping Slaves and Abolitionism in New Bedford, Massachusetts* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001); Briton Cooper Busch, *Whaling Will Never Do for Me: The American Whaleman in the Nineteenth Century (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1994)*; for more on opportunities for black men in the whaling industry see: Jeffrey W. Bolster. *Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the Age of Sail* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).
10 Jeffrey W. Bolster. *Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the Age of Sail* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997) 4, 75.

11 Busch, *Whaling Will Never Do for Me,* 2.

12 Busch, *Whaling Will Never Do for Me,* 8-9.
13 Busch, *Whaling Will Never Do for Me,* 33

and everyday foredeck camaraderie.[14] These multiracial American whale ships engaged on long voyages, often equipped with provisions to sustain them for four years.[15]Over the course of long voyages, whale ships made stops at foreign ports to pick up provisions and sort out difficulties that arose on board, applying to the only American legal representative in these ports: American consuls. Legislation in the 1790s established consular offices abroad, and an act of 1803 required masters to acquire the express consent of American consuls before discharging seamen abroad, and obliging them to give three months' extra pay to discharged American citizen-seamen.[16]Consular agents were "often political appointees, journeying out to some remote post with little to sustain them aside from their ignorance of local conditions and their hope of enrichment from fat fees."[17] Some were well-entrenched in a local area, although most were not. Consuls faced the challenges of low fees, local turmoil, and difficult jobs that involved judging cases of mutinies, aiding and controlling abandoned mariners, dealing with local political officials, and securing pay from resistant captains. Moreover, the regulations for extra wages and consular protections technically applied only to American citizens, requiring consuls to evaluate claims to American citizenship.[18] American consuls were often the only legal recourse to whalemen abroad, and many embraced the role of national protector in sometimes hostile foreign territory.[19] In protecting mariners from aggressive foreign powers, the American government through consular officials forged close relationships with mariners, including black mariners, exerting a strong presence in their lives on ship and in port. Consuls may also have felt pressured to extend significant support to these mariners because of the political rhetoric that identified the American seaman as both a national symbol and a rights- deserving citizen. In antebellum America, the image of the brave seaman was a powerful and pervasive national trope. As illustrated by the poems, songs, and broadsides of the antebellum U.S., the body of the American seamen was a socially constructed idea that came to symbolize the nation.[20] Thus, violence to the body of the seaman, especially by foreigners, was construed as a challenge to its honor.[21] The positive and patriotic image of the proud and manly American mariner could extend to black men, as it did for Paul Cuffe who earned respect and fame, and Frederick Douglass who, dressed as a mariner, experienced favorable treatment at the hands of a train conductor because of his "soft spot" for seamen. Impressment of these manly sailors was humiliating and dishonorable for the nation.[22] The Federalist Congress passed a law in 1796 to protect sailors from impressment by issing Seamen's Protection Certificates.[23] The idea of the brave American seaman impressed into the British Navy was a central rhetorical justification for the War of 1812. The conflicts with the Barbary nations, the Quasi- War with France, and the War of 1812 all intensified as American mariners were molested by foreign entities. When President James Madison delivered his war message to Congress on June 1, 1812, he listed Britain's impressment of American sailors as the first cause of war.[24] Towards the beginning of the war, the proud American Captain Porter attacked a British war ship and championed the phrase "Free Trade and Sailors Rights," which he emblazoned on his ship. The phrase embodied the democratic rights of the common man, embodied in the sailor, and was an expression of American pride and nationalism that became imbedded in American rhetoric and imagination.[25] While seamen may have been mere pawns in political battles over territory and national security, the potency and popularity of the slogan illustrate the extent that the manly seaman was endowed with the rights and privileges of citizenship in the national imagination.[26]

This remained the case thirty years later, when Charles Peterson was impressed in the South Atlantic. While American consuls made efforts to identify and protect American citizens, the laws did little to prevent British press gangs from abducting Americans well into the nineteenth century.[27] Sailors like Peterson were forcibly impressed, with the option of accepting a monetary bounty for serving the Crown. Peterson, facing imprisonment, made an attempt to send his documentation of citizenship to the consul, claiming his rights under the U.S. government. Influenced by the impressment crisis, many Americans shaped their notions of the privileges of being an American citizen and articulated the centrality of autonomy and consent in American citizenship. While British subjects

14 Busch, *Whaling Will Never Do for Me,* 50; also see Bolster, *Black Jacks*
15 Busch, *Whaling Will Never Do for Me,* 4-7.
16 Busch, *Whaling Will Never Do for Me,* 63. also see Raffety, *The Republic Afloat*
17 Busch, *Whaling Will Never Do for Me,* 64.

18 Busch, *Whaling Will Never Do for Me,* 72.

19 For more on consular agents see: Charles Stuart Kennedy, *The American Consul: A History of the United States Consular Service, 1776-1914* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990); Raffety, *Republic Afloat*, 151-174; Busch, *Whaling Will Never Do For Me*, 62-86.
20 Paul Gilje, "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights': The Rhetoric of the War of 1812," *Journal of the Early Republic* 30, no. 1 (Spring, 2010): 1-23; Raffety, *Republic Afloat,* 151-174.

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22 For more on the impressment crisis see: Paul Gilje, "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights': The Rhetoric of the War of 1812," *Journal of the Early Republic* 30, no. 1 (Spring, 2010): 1-23; Raffety, *Republic Afloat,* 151-174.

23 Gilje, "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights," 1-23.
24 Raffety, *Republic Afloat*, 200-201.

25 Gilje, "Free Trade Sailors Rights," 1-23.
26 Raffety, *Republic Afloat*, 198-210
27 Gilje, "Free Trade and Sailors Rights," 1-23

owed their allegiance to the crown, and could thus be forced to serve it, American citizens shared a relationship with the government based on consent, freely given. The American seaman, this rhetoric suggested, chose to be part of the country, and chose to fight for it, while the British subject was compelled to. Political propaganda around the impressment crisis helped to solidify in the national consciousness the notion of citizenship as consensual on the part of autonomous independent men.[28] The celebrated fiction of citizenship by choice was, of course, ironic for many Americans, notably enslaved African Americans, Indians, and women. Yet, as Francois Furstenberg adeptly argues, the concept of consent was used to justify slavery and other unequal relationships. If American citizenship was based on morally autonomous, educated men, willing to fight for their freedom, all those who did not fight or resist were tacitly consenting to their subjugation.[29]This reasoning was bolstered by the rhetoric of impressment, which stressed that being an American citizen meant "choice" rather than "obligation," illustrated vividly by the American seamen captured and forced into British naval service.[30] The fact that these impressed mariners were not actually able to fight their way out of imprisonment, compelled the government to intervene for the freedom of its independent male citizens. In 1828 the U.S. consul at Rio de Janeiro, Mr. Wright, wrote to the Brazilian authorities on behalf of Joseph Anderson Lyons, an impressed mariner. Wright wrote passionately, "I claim not his service for my country; he has asked my protection as an oppressed American and I claim for him his liberty."[31] In response, the Minister of the Marines for Brazil promised to release Lyons.

Consuls did not mince words in declaring their commitment to defending the honor of the nation through defense of its seamen. Mr. Wright bemoaned the "many acts of injustice towards our Country," referring to transgressions against American mariners in the port.[32] He assured officials in Washington DC that, "inspired by a proper sense of the dignity of our government and seamen," he never allowed "our country's rights to pass without complaint."[33] Responding to possible complaints that he acted too strongly he passionately wrote, "If governmental agents cannot protect against insults and injuries offered to their country, I see no object in placing them at Foreign Coasts."[34] Mr. Wright asserted his commitment to defending the honor of the nation by protecting its seamen. The consul expressed concern for "my character" as well as the "character" of the country, promising to defend American seamen. Similarly, the consul at Tahiti, J.R. Blackler declared that the forced expulsion of distressed seamen is "barbarous," claiming that "no nation respecting its own honor and the protection of its citizens could possibly submit to" it.[35] Blackler faced some difficulties with the Tahitian government after opposing Tahitian laws that were unfavorable to American citizens. According to his letter, when the Tahitian officials asked him whether or not it was his duty to question their laws, he replied "I came to watch over the interests of my countrymen."[36] He explained "that my duty was 1st To my God, 2d to my country and 3d to myself. That these three made it my positive duty to protect my countrymen from oppression."[37] When an official questioned his exact duties he charged the man "with a breach of honorable trust."[38] Many consular agents embraced an imperative to protect the nation's honor in the context of foreign empires vying for national supremacy, reflecting gendered understandings of nation and citizen, and requiring rigorous protection of its mariner representatives, white and black.

II **American Nationalism for African Americans and the Quarantine Acts**

American national identity was not a self-evident choice for those of African ancestry living in a slaveholding republic. As historian James Sidbury argues, enslaved people of African origin began to overlook their geographic differences in the mid-eighteenth century and instead proclaimed their common identity as "Africans." This diasporic identity was reflected in the writings of prominent Africans in Britain and North America as early as the 1760s.[39] However, by the 1820s, black political commentators were instead focusing on an American identity that spoke less to an African nation in exile and more about a cohort of American citizens denied their rights. By the 1830s, the abolition movement began vociferously to argue for an end to slavery, focusing on black national belonging as a

28 Denver Brunsman, "Subjects vs. Citizens: Impressment and Identity in the Anglo-American Atlantic." *Journal of the Early Republic* Vol. 30 No. 4 (Winter 2010): 557-586.

29 François Furstenberg, *In the Name of the Father: Washington's Legacy, Slavery, and the Making of a Nation* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006)

30 Denver Brusnman, "Subjects vs. Citizens," 557-586; See also Gilje, "Free Trade and Sailors Rights," 1-23.
31 Letter to the U.S. Secretary of State, February 1828, Despatches from US Consuls in Rio de Janeiro, reel 4, NARA.
32 Letter to the U.S. Secretary of State, February 1831, Despatches from US Consuls in Rio de Janeiro, reel 5, NARA.
33 Ibid

34 Ibid
35 Letter to the U.S. Secretary of State, March 1839, Despatches from US Consuls in Tahiti, reel 1, NARA.
36 Letter to the U.S. Secretary of State, April 1841, Despatches from US Consuls in Tahiti, reel 1, NARA.
37 Ibid
38 Ibid
39 James Sidbury, *Becoming African in America: Race and Nation in the Early Black Atlantic* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); for more on tensions between an "American" and "African" identity see: Leslie M. Alexander, *African or American?: Black Identity and Political Activism in New York City, 1784-1861* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008).

central justification for the illegality of their enslavement. As African Americans recognized the connection between demanding rights and identifying as Americans, pride in Africa was replaced with American nationalism, at least rhetorically. This was also a response to the rise of the African Colonization Society, which many blacks perceived as a way to deport the free black population in order to strengthen the institution of slavery within the nation.[40] Indeed free black communities condemned the Colonization society in strongly nationalist terms, stressing their identities as Americans. At the Annual Convention of the People of Colour in Philadelphia in 1831, the society decried African Colonization in its opening address, declaring "if we must be sacrificed for their philanthropy, we would rather die at home."[41] They protested the deportment of black Americans from "our own native land," and urged the convention to turn "its attention more to the elevation of our people in this, our native home."[42] The conventioneers proclaimed their commitment to the uplift of the black community within the U.S., as "citizens and men."[43] The free blacks of the conference spoke out against colonization focusing on their shared commitment to the United States. While the free African Americans of the Convention looked within the nation in their quest to gain rights, black mariners traveling across the globe were also demanding American citizenship. Precisely because of their far-flung travels, black sailors were best able to reconcile desires for American citizenship rights with an ongoing diasporic identity. There is no better example than David Walker, the Boston author of An Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World. Walker's inflammatory 1829 pamphlet accused the American government of hypocrisy and revealed the injustices of slavery using religious language and making calls on humanity and on American republican traditions of liberty and equality. David Walker made his case against the institution of slavery in highly nationalistic terms, yet, as suggested in his title, also expressed the connections among Africans across the globe via maritime work.[44]

In foreign ports, black mariners demanded protections for themselves and were recognized as American citizens, yet within the borders of the U.S. black Americans faced racism, exclusion, and highly disparate treatment. Perhaps the most striking example of the confusing nature of black American citizenship for mariners is reflected in the Southern Quarantine Laws for African American Seamen which temporarily imprisoned all free black men, including visiting mariners. The "Quarantine" laws were passed in many Southern states (including North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas) beginning in the 1820s. The first Quarantine Law was implemented in South Carolina in 1822.[45] It was created in the aftermath of the famous Denmark Vesey slave uprising, reflecting the fearsome image of the powerful black man in the minds of many white Americans.[46] When the supposed Vesey insurrection was discovered, swift punishment was meted out to the black population. Denmark Vesey, the supposed lead conspirator, was a sailor who had resided in St. Domingue before the Haitian Revolution. The seaman Vesey was imagined by the white population as the seed of insurrection among normally-peaceful slaves.[47] Vesey's free mobility and his autonomy represented a real threat to the Southern slaveholding states.

Black mariners were a threat in their very bodies as symbols of free, independent, mobile black manhood, a stark challenge to the regime of slavery which commodified, emasculated, and contained black slaves. The Quarantine Laws were an expression of anxiety by Southern officials who recognized the claims that free black mariners could, and indeed were, making for their manhood and citizenship. Government officials of these southern states were wary of dangerous Atlantic peoples and ideologies, vocalizing a fear of the "moral contagion" that they might introduce to society, in specifically biological terms.[48] Black mariners were a danger in their mobility and their global connections. Linebaugh and Rediker suggest the potency of on-ship cross-racial communities to transcend racial and national boundaries in their demands for basic rights. Maritime work did offer unprecedented mobility and cross-cultural interaction. Olaudah Equiano, for example, forged connections with London abolitionists, radical Irish thinkers, Scottish intellectuals, the London Corresponding Society, the Jacobin Society of Norwich, and the American Quak-

40 Sidbury, *Becoming African in America*, 181-183.

41 Howard Holman Bell, *Minutes of the Proceedings of the National Negro Conventions, 1830-1864* (New York: Arno Press, 1969): 14-15.

42 Bell, *National Negro Conventions*, 14-17
43 Ibid, 4-15.
44 David Walker and Peter P Hinks, *David Walker's Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000)

45 For more on the Quarantine Laws see: Michael Schoeppner, "Peculiar Quarantines: The Seamen Acts and Regulatory Authority in the Antebellum South," *Law and History Review* 31, no. 3 (2013): 559-586.; Philip Hamer, "Great Britain, the United States, and the Negro Seamen Acts, 1822-1848," *The Journal of Southern History* 1, no. 1 (1935): 3-28.

46 Schoeppner, "Peculiar Quarantines," 559-586
47 Ibid
48 Ibid

ers in Philadelphia[49]. Putting black mariners in jail was a way to constrain the mobility and manly independence that posed such a threat to southern social order.[50] Black mariners forcefully claimed their rights in the face of these laws.

In 1844, the black mariner William Martin brought a suit against William M'Clune, master of the ship *Cynosure* on which Martin had been hired. Martin testified to the District Court of Massachusetts "that the Libellant was taken to New Orleans in said vessel without any agreement on his part to go." This action was especially dangerous in that "he was also liable to be there sold into perpetual slavery." Shortly after, Martin was returned to the *Cynosure*, and brought to Boston. Martin concludes his testimony, "that in consequence of the previous he suffered a damage of fifty dollars and is entitled to a reasonable compensation for all the time he has served on board said vessel." William Martin, black "cook and steward" on board the ship, was so outraged by his treatment at being imprisoned, that he demanded the captain pay him extra wages for this unjust and harmful treatment. Identifying his own dutiful service on board, he claimed that it was unjust for him to be imprisoned. Thomas Anderson, a black seaman, also brought his case of imprisonment to the court of Boston. Anderson complained that "it was well known" to his captain that "the port of New Orleans is not a port of discharge in the United States....to persons of his color," and declared angrily that he "would never have consented to ship on board the said ship Junius had he suspected" that the said ship would go to such a port.[51]Strongly-worded publications from the North reprimanded the South for these laws, specifically on the grounds of civil liberties. Protestors also took advantage of the romanticization of the American mariner in anti-impressment rhetoric, calling attention to black mariners' ties to citizenship abroad. An 1842 article that detailed the imprisonment of Rufus Kinsman, a black seaman from Connecticut, declared that this "outrage" was committed "among a people clamorous for free trade and sailor's rights!"[52]Thus, the article satirically confronted the southern states with the contradiction of pride in American mariners in the context of foreign conflicts, with the laws' exclusion and imprisonment of a substantial portion of that population, black men, within the nation. Writing for the *Emancipator*, William Powell wrote an imagined discussion among sailors, in which a seaman declared that in the great struggle with Britain, black mariners nobly fought for the country, yet when these same men sailed to southern ports they were imprisoned. One seaman declared "Shame!-Shame!! Shipmates I blush for my country, and am forced to exclaim, Oh Columbia! Columbia!! the pride of the world, the nation's glory. Does not thou assume pre-eminence with all other nations for magnanimity and honor?... crime whatever?"[53]

Imprisoned black mariners protested their treatment, importantly, as American citizens, an identity they had been able to claim in the trans-Atlantic maritime ports of the globe and asserted was equally applicable at home. Amos Daley, a black mariner from Rhode Island who was imprisoned in South Carolina, claimed his rights based on his identity as a citizen of Rhode Island. He declared that he carried his Seamen's papers, and his captain and first mate swore that he was a citizen. So long as citizenship was determined in the nexus of local relationships, in the eyes of himself and his crew- mates, Daley was, indeed, an American "citizen." In 1842, a group of African Americans in Boston petitioned Congress to challenge the Seamen Acts, declaring their faith that Congress would "grant them relief, and render effectual in their behalf the privileges of citizenship secured by the

Constitution."[54] The use of "citizenship" reflected the understanding among free blacks that just as they represented the U.S. government abroad, it must represent them in turn. Anderson detailed his cruel imprisonment, and complained that he was paid a mere twenty-three dollars upon his release, demanding that "the sum of one hundred and twenty dollars was due" him for the pain and inconvenience he suffered.[55] In 1844 the Special Court of Massachusetts decided that William McClune had to "pay the sum of two hundred dollars unto the said William Martin."[56]Black men's successful claiming of national citizenship abroad must have made their denial of rights

49 Olaudah Equiano, Karlee Anne Sapoznik and Paul E Lovejoy, *The Letters and Other Writings of Gustavus Vassa(Olaudah Equiano, the African) Documenting Abolition of the Slave Trade* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2013): xxv; see also Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Buford Rediker, *The Many-headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000): 243-247.

50 For more on the threat of African American mobility see, for example: Linebaugh and Rediker, *The Many-headed Hydra*; David S. Cecelski, *The Waterman's Song: Slavery and Freedom in Maritime North Carolina* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

51 "Thomas Anderson v. S. Page etal," Special Court 1858, National Archives, RG 21, Box 260

52 Gilje, "Free Trade and Sailors Rights," 1-23.

53 Ibid; see also Philip Hamer, "Great Britain, the United States, and the Negro Seamen Acts, 1822-1848," *The Journal of Southern History* 1, no. 1 (1935): 3-28.

54 Schoeppner, "Peculiar Quarantines," 559-586.

55 "Thomas Anderson v. S. Page etal," Special Court 1858, National Archives, RG 21, Box 260.

56 "William Martin v. Ship Cynosure," Special Court 1844, National Archives, RG 21, Box 149.

at home stark indeed.[57]

III American Citizenship Abroad Consuls took an active role in the lives of mariners, reflecting the powerful reach of the American government in the maritime industry. Much modern historiography has argued that the early American state was potent and pervasive. In his article "The Myth of the 'Weak' American State," William Novak illuminates the different forms of early American governmental power, pointing to the work of historians in uncovering the role of the government in, for example, communications, infrastructure, and legal developments.[58]American mariners in Antebellum America would agree with Novak's contention of the power of the early American government. Indeed the government was active in their lives, more so than for other antebellum laborers.[59] The government inserted itself into the maritime world through the ships' articles that formed the contract between captain and crew, the laws against overly harsh abuse that were upheld in federal courts, and the highly personal interaction of federal consular officials with individual seamen. Indeed, while black mariners on ships may have been forging trans-ethnic and trans-national relationships through their travels across the globe, they experienced a powerful American governmental presence. Letters from consular agents are filled with accounts of money spent and effort expended to aid American mariners, revealing the deep and concrete benefits that these men experienced founded on their assertions of the identity "American" in ports and on ships far from home.

Consuls regularly aided American mariners. They routinely sent letters to the Secretary of State listing their expenses, mostly demarcated as going to the "relief to be afforded to destitute seamen."[60] The consul at Tahiti detailed numerous cases of his support of destitute seamen, among them Manuel Sueze, abandoned by his captain. The consul "gave him the necessary documents to enable him to lay claim to his share of 1200 bills of oil."[61] In 1836, the U.S. consul at Buenos Aires briefly described the various cases of seamen he had aided. He paid for the medical care of John Willis who was "sick and quite destitute" and helped him find employment. William Porter, who "produced evidence of citizenship," had "recently become blind," and the consul forced a captain to take the man on board.[62] Consuls forced captains to pay seamen sufficient wages or provide passage home to stranded mariners. The consul of Buenos Aires expressed that he had the duty to care for American seamen, writing, "I have not scrupled to require vessels sailing for the United States to receive" American mariners.[63]Consuls also protected the property of American citizens abroad.[64] In their letters home to their superiors in Washington DC, consuls felt pressured to explain their sometimes high expenses. The consul at Rio de Janeiro, Mr. Wright, asserted that he had "stoically complied," with the effort to be economical, yet "agreeably to my interpretation" of the strictures of consulship and his sense of duty, "I have paid and continue to pay for the passages home, and for the maintenance of all destitute American seamen, found within the Coastline district."[65]

The consul at Buenos Aires in 1854, writing at a time of civil unrest in the country, meditated on the extent and privileges of American citizenship. In a letter to the Secretary of State describing his efforts to keep U.S. citizens from being subsumed into the ranks of the foreign army, he described how the Buenos Aires government had sought to conscript all native-born inhabitants, even those parented by American citizens. As the consul explained, there was "no express law on the subject and thus for a certificate from a consul of being the child of a citizen of his country has been sufficient protection. I inclose herewith the form of certificate I have been in the habit of giving to citizens, and when it was for their children I have entered "as hijo de" (is son of) as in the blank."[66] Assum-

57 After the Quarantine laws went into effect, they were found to be deeply harmful to southern commerce, and over fears that they would decimate the vital maritime trade that was so crucial to local economies, and to southern state's mercantile elites, voices within southern states began to push for the abolishment of the laws. The pursuit of capitalism, and of "free trade" could work in favor of black sailors, making room for their negotiation and protest. A combination of commercial interests and protest from the outside the states led to the abolition of these laws in most of the Southern states that had enacted them; see Hamer, "Great Britain, the United States, and the Negro Seamen Acts": 3-28; Schoeppner, "Peculiar Quarantines," 559-586.

58 William Novak, "The Myth of the 'Weak' American State," *The American Historical Review* 113, no. 3 (2008): 752-772

59 The active role of the government and American law in maritime work is the central contention of Raffety's work, Raffety, *Republic Afloat*; see Daniel Vickers and Vince Walsh, Young Men and the Sea: Yankee Seafarers in the Age of Sail (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); for health care for mariners see Gautham Rao, "Administering Entitlement: Governance, Public Health Care, and the Early American State," *Law & Social Inquiry* 37, no. 3 (2012): 627-656.

60 Letter to the U.S. Secretary of State, January 1835, Despatches from US Consuls in Buenos Aires, reel 5, NARA.

61 Letter to the U.S. Secretary of State, May 1857, Despatches from US Consuls in Tahiti, reel 1, NARA

62 Letter to the U.S. Secretary of State, 21 March 1836, Despatches from US Consuls in Buenos Aires, reel 6, NARA.

63 Letter to the U.S. Secretary of State, 27 April 1835, Despatches from the US Consuls in Buenos Aires, reel 5, NARA

64 For example, the consul at Buenos Aires declared U.S. vessels of war had been dispatched to "protect all property of Citizens of the US," Letter to the U.S. Secretary of State, January 1841, Despatches from US Consuls in Buenos Aires, reel 7, NARA.

65 Letter to the U.S. Secretary of State, April 1832, Despatches from US Consuls in Rio de Janeiro, reel 5, NARA.

66 Letter to the U.S. Secretary of State, March 1854, Despatches from US Consuls in Buenos Aires, reel 9, NARA.

ing the prerogatives of a judge, the consul extended citizenship to those he deemed citizens, and to their children in foreign ports. He extended citizenship protection to *male* Americans, and to their *male* children. He argued, "our law provides 'that the children of those who now are, or have been citizens of the U.S. shall though born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States be considered as Citizens of the U.S. provided that the right of Citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never resided within the United States." [67] Thus, citizenship as articulated by this consul was paternal and could extend to children outside the borders of the U.S. He goes on, "the privilege of being considered" an American citizen, "is one of the greatest that can be enjoyed."[68]Significantly, these benefits, as articulated by the consul and attested by the many cases of aid on the part of consuls, extended to black American mariners. As the consul at Buenos Aires boasted, "I have even succeeded in having released from Military service, the sons of black men from the United States, who were married with natives of this country and this not only before but twice the present Govt. came in to power this has been granted reluctantly but I urged that it was granted to Citizens of other nations and that we expected to be on the same footing with the most favored."[69] Although the difficulty of this accomplishment attested to greater vulnerability of non-white Americans, that the consul extended the protections of the United States government to black American men testifies that they, like their fellow white mariners, were citizens, as were their sons. Indeed, it was on the basis of the honorable reputation of the United States that these black men and their children had to be brought into the folds of citizenship.

The shared bonds of American citizen, man, and laborer could work across racial lines, as it did for the impressed black mariner Charles Peterson. In Buenos Aires in 1841, James Jacobs, a white American, sought out a consular agent on behalf of a fellow black American whom he saw imprisoned. Jacobs was not the only man to act on behalf of Peterson. Randal Raslet, an American mariner testified to the consul that while at Boca he saw, "a man who he had before known, named Charles Peterson, that he had worked on board a whale boat with the said Charles Peterson and knew him to be a citizen of the United States of America." Raslet had forged a relationship with Peterson, one fostered in the manly camaraderie of the whale ship. Not only was Peterson a citizen in the eyes of the government official, but he was a fellow citizen in the eyes of this American seaman, an identity that required Raslet to extend his aid. Raslet continued that, upon seeing Peterson, he "went in to talk with him" that "he was sitting on the floor, and had a pair of irons on his feet." Raslet concludes, "the next day he understood the said Charles Peterson had been removed to the Brig Elouisa and that the deponent went along side and spoke to him, and told him that he had given his protection to the consul. That the said C Peterson was in Irons on board the Brig but the next day he understood his Irons had been removed and he set to work."[70] The bonds of camaraderie that had been forged on ship combined with the abstract yet meaningful ties of citizenship compelled two American mariners to seek out aid on behalf of the enchained Peterson.

While African American identity in the mid-nineteenth century was fluid, and black writers asserted simultaneous national and diasporic identities, black mariners in ports far from the U.S. found the label "American" highly advantageous. In Buenos Aires in February of 1841, the consul received a letter from the brig *Elouisa*, which was "written for Charles Peterson by a sailor on-board the Brig of War Eloisa." Here was Peterson's own testimony, an assertion of his ability to speak on his own behalf to a representative of the U.S. government and a reflection of his expectation of recognition as an imperiled citizen:

"Sir, On the day I was taken I was ashore on business for my employer and I got a little the worse for Drink but nothing out of the way. I then along with my companion went aboard of the schooner and went to sleep I had not lain long there before I was awoke by the press-gang and ordered to go onboard of the Eloisa. I told them I would not and showed my protection, they said that would not do, they then took me by force aboard and put me in irons. I was in irons 2 nights and days, they always came to see if I would take the Bounty and I told them I would not and they then said I would be in irons until they sailed....This is the truth and nothing but the truth as I shall answer to my God at the great day of Judgement."[71]

Peterson felt that he deserved the protection of the U.S. consul as a citizen of the country. He embraced a religious identity that would appeal to reform-minded men of his day, and he also declared his belonging to the United States using rights-based language. By showing his Protection, Peterson adopted the language of rights for autonomous men to protect his own body. Following the main part of the letter, Peterson goes on:

"P.S. I gave my protection to a countryman of mine to bring and let you see it but I rather think that he has not come to you as he has never come to me with an answer. I hope to god sir you will protect me and get me ashore... I can say no more only I rely on your goodness and the justice of my Country to be taken out of this Slavery as I am a free Born American and have a right to be protected."[72]

67 Ibid
68 Ibid
69 Ibid

70 Letter to the U.S. Secretary of State, 5 April 1841, Despatches from US Consuls in Buenos Aires, reel 7,NARA.
71 Ibid
72 Ibid

Peterson, a black man, expressed a faith and loyalty in the "goodness and justice of my Country," and specifically in the fairness of judicial process. This sentiment was shared by other black sailors at moments of crisis, as when Isaac Bounds warned the threatening Captain Davis, "cut away you will be in America by and by and then you will get justice done to you."[73] In another instance, in 1842 on board the ship *Courier*, a black sailor named Gilbert responded to a racial taunt by promising Addison Grindell, a mate, "Mr. Grindell, you have taken the law into your hands, and if there is any law in New York when I get there I will have satisfaction." Grindell then beat Gilbert, and Gilbert saved his bloody shirt, and upon reaching the U.S. took him to court for this breach of his bodily autonomy.[74] These men argued that their status as citizens of the U.S. earned them and their bodies protection by the American government.

Black mariners could not help but feel the positive presence of the federal government in their lives, even as that government would soon enforce a national fugitive slave law that threatened the liberty of black men in ports like Boston, New Bedford, and Providence. Along with his expression of his reliance on the "goodness and justice" of the U.S., Peterson declared that he must, if his country was just, "be taken out of this Slavery" referencing not an abstract idea but a real condition, one that was anathema to "independent citizenship" and which he declared was wrongfully inflicted on his body. He did not deserve to be enslaved because, as he declared, "I am a free Born American and have a right to be protected." While the term "freeman" may have coded "white" in the minds of many Americans, the term was not off-limits to the rhetoric of free black men like Peterson.[75] Peterson was not, in his own mind, a second-class, disadvantaged, and excluded individual born in America, but was, in fact, a "free born American" man, an American mariner, with all the rights and privileges that that identity promised.

Peterson was not the only black mariner to declare his American citizenship in ports far from the nation's borders. David Smith was the son of a slave who earned his freedom and moved to New Bedford where he was hired as a mariner on the brig *Soley*. In 1810, Smith wrote to John Howlker, a consular agent, that he had been captured by a pressgang in Liverpool, and declared, "Sir as I am a Scitisen of the united State I Beg your honer would do all you can to free me."[76] The black sailor John Elliott, after being impressed and finding himself without sufficient proof of citizenship, wrote to the consul requesting "further documents to prove my Citizenship."[77] The black mariner Jacob Israel Potter described how he "wrote a great Many letters to my Consol and he sent me my discharge on board in the year 1806." When his protection arrived the Captain asked Potter why he didn't enter, and Potter replied, "because I was an American and likewise I was a Citizen & besides I had a wife and family." Potter declared the ties he felt, both as an "American" and, crucially, a "Citizen," reflecting his assertion of his rights as a member of the polity, while also revealing his interpersonal familial ties rooting him to the nation. He requested to the consul, "I hope you will make an Enquiry about my citizenship and bring me forward before your face and I will bring you forth and satisfy you."[78] The black Silas Cuffy, writing to his parents, similarly expressed his ties to the nation, declaring, "I hope if you receive this letter you will do your endeavor for me in order that I may once more see my native Country again if possible once more, and if possible write a letter to Plymouth and direct it to the American Consul & then I shall get it."[79] For black mariners, the mobility offered on maritime ships allowed them to forge connections across the world, and simultaneously to make demands on an American government extending its commercial reach across the globe.

Conclusion

The involvement of the U.S. government in the maritime industries grew over the course of the antebellum era, and seamen themselves helped to draw the government to the maritime world.[80] Black men were an active part of this process, demanding rescue when captured by foreign governments, taking officers to court when their bodily autonomy was abrogated, and demanding money, health care, transport, and aid from consular officials. Black men utilized an active government and consular agents' commitments to gendered visions of nation and citizen to claim entrance into the citizen body.

The fact that black men made claims on border-traversing ships is significant. Rediker and Linebaugh argue for the potency of mobility and cross-cultural interaction to allow for rebellions against subjugation to be made. African American mariners traveling across the globe made important transnational connections, as did their white, Native American, and immigrant crew mates. It was on these highly mobile, fluid, trans-national, multi-racial, and multi-ethnic ships that black men claimed rights for their persons. As much as the ship was a transgressor, the presence of the American government in the form of the ships' articles, consular agents, and court cases,

73 Testimony David Long," 16 May 1836, Despatches from US Consuls in Tahiti, reel 1, NARA.

74 Raffety, *Republic Afloat*, 182-4.
75 Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness.*
76 Jeffrey Bolster, "Letters by African American Sailors, 1799-1814," The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series 64, no. 1 (2007): 167-182.

77 Ibid
78 Ibid
79 Ibid
80 This is a crucial part of Raffety's argument, see Matthew Taylor Raffety. *The Republic Afloat: Law, Honor, and Citizenship in Maritime America* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013)

reflect the extending hand of the American government, and, indeed, the presence of the national on ships. It was this potent interplay of national and ethnic mobility and governmental intervention that allowed black men to claim their citizenship rights and see those rights recognized.[81] By activating the investment of consuls to ensure an honorable reputation for the nation, these black men simultaneously extracted protection for their bodies and rights from the government.

In 1857 Chief Justice Roger Taney opined in the infamous Dred Scott case, speaking for the federal government, "neither the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendents, whether they had become free or not," were, in the young nation, "acknowledged as part of the people." Taney wrote in his opinion that African Americans had "been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect", determining that "they were not regarded as a portion of the people or citizens of the Government then formed."[82] Yet in the years before Taney's articulation of the exclusion of the black race, black mariners had already forcefully disproved this claim. The demands of protecting national honor abroad, and the active and powerful role of the American government in the maritime world, had allowed black men to make claims for their citizenship. Consuls and black mariners mutually constructed a place for black citizenship within the nation from ports far outside its boundaries, leaving a mixed legacy for subsequent efforts by African Americans to reconcile diasporic and national identities with a vision of citizenship coded as white and male. The slave ship was not the only maritime symbol in African American history, in fact, black mariners in the years before the Civil War were an active and pervasive presence and used their identities as mariners to fight for their rights in a racist nation.[83] Free black American mariners had been loudly expressing their inclusion and citizenship long before Taney's opinion, and, at least in the foreign ports of the maritime industries, had made demands on a government that had recognized their claim.

81 Rediker and Linebaugh argue for the importance of the trans-national and fluid nature of the ship in mariners' fight against subjugation in *The Many-headed Hydra*, while Raffety argues that the national government had a powerful presence on ship in *Republic Afloat*, I argue that both are true, and may not necessarily be opposed, at least in terms of the opportunities for African American mariners

82 Paul Finkelman, Dred Scott v. Sandford: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford Books, 1997)

83 For more see Bolster, *Black Jacks*, 1-7.

"Ghana Elmina Castle Slave Holding Cell" by Kurt Dundy, Own work. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution.

"Links to the Present": The Long History of Contested Heritage in Ghana's Slave Castles

By Colin Bos, University of Chicago

The rise in African American heritage tourism to the castles has produced an abundance of scholarly books and articles. These works often try to place African American tourism to Ghana in the context of global heritage tourism or the Black Atlantic. Most of these works are anthropological, covering the sometimes volatile encounter between African Americans and Ghanaians at the castles. These ethnographies show some consistent themes: African American tourists can feel anger toward the commercialization of the forts, and feel as though Ghanaians dodge their own complicity in the slave trade. Their Ghanaian hosts react angrily to the accusation, and feel the castles are equally part of their heritage.

History as a discipline has lagged behind in investigating these encounters. Although some works discuss the castles in the era of the slave trade, no studies I have come across have looked at how the castles were understood from the 1830s to Ghana's independence in 1957. This lacuna is unsurprising. The recent rise in tourism to the Ghanaian slave castles is so current, and the theoretical issues so contemporary, that history appears to have little to say about these ideas. But the use and misuse of these slave castles as sites of heritage is much older than these studies will grant. Of course, an idea's past does not always control how the idea operates in the present. Sometimes, though, the past grabs hold of an idea's structure, and stubbornly refuses to let it go. The politics of heritage remains the platform on which anthropologists, with their presentist concerns, stage the debate over the castles. The anthropological literature seems content with presuming that the heritage of these castles must "belong" to one of the two groups, African Americans or Ghanaians, and assigning their true value to one group or the other, or both.

A historical perspective, however, shows how this debate is much older than it seems. Such a perspective demonstrates how its construction still unnecessarily influences the false choice that "owning" heritage represents. This paper will first review the theory that underlies anthropological critiques of Ghanaian heritage tourism in order to explain how the current anthropological literature leads to a dead-end. Instead of looking for ways to move beyond the debate over heritage, anthropologists have been more interesting in blaming one side or the other for lacking sensitivity or interest. This approach, I contend, is unproductive. Then, I examine the transformations in how the forts were understood and incorporated into travel writing, first in British colonial travel literature, and then

in African American autobiography. These historical examples show that in understanding what the castles mean we have not moved beyond a discussion of ownership and control over heritage. When we ignore the more sordid ways the politics of heritage has been used, we fail to see how ineffective the terms of the current debate are for diffusing the tensions surrounding the castles. If we want to change the way these contestations over heritage play out, then anthropologists will have to think past the traditional terms of the debate.

Anthropological Approaches to Castle Tourism

Though diasporan tourists, local Ghanaians, and anthropologists contest the significance of the castles' histories, the facts about those histories are less controversial. European forts in Ghana (then called the Gold Coast) were tiny pockets of uncertain authority in a large coastal area of closely linked Fante polities. The Fante are an Akan-speaking ethnic group on the central Ghanaian coast, who had a prominent role in Atlantic commerce even before the rise of the transatlantic slave trade. European traders paid customs, duties, and rent in exchange for permission to build the forts.[1] Though the African-European trade relation suffered periods of instability and war, it was durable enough to last from the fifteenth century through to the nineteenth.

The castles, and some small trading posts, were the only permanent European structures along the coast. European sovereignty was limited to the confines of the castle. Fante merchants were their necessary middlemen for procuring slaves. As the slave trade escalated in the eighteenth century, the power of the Fante merchants to dictate the terms of trade grew, keeping slave prices high and commodity prices low.[2] The importance of the forts and the middlemen declined after the British abolished the slave trade in 1807 and the Asante Kingdom conquered the coastal forts in the 1820s.[3]

The most famous of the three main castles is Elmina Castle, founded by the Portuguese in 1482, conquered by the Dutch in 1637, and sold to the British in 1872. Cape Coast Castle was built by the Swedish in 1653 and changed hands a few times, until the British secured it in 1665. The Danish built Christianborg Castle in 1661, sold it to the Portuguese, bought it back in 1683, and held onto it until selling it to the British in 1850. Following the defeat of the Asante in 1874, the Gold Coast was reformed into a British colony. The colonial government converted the castles to official buildings. Cape Coast and Christianborg became government offices. Elmina was turned into a hospital and prison.[4]

Tourism to the coastal forts is not new. Although diseases such as malaria and yellow fever limited travel to West Africa in the nineteenth century, some European travelers survived the trip, particularly after the use of quinine improved mortality rates. The forts themselves were designated as historical monuments only upon independence, and Ghana's government continued to use them as offices and military training. Tourism to Ghana actually declined between the 1960s and the 1990s, reaching a historic low in 1983.[5] Later on, Ghana invested more attention in the forts in the 1990s, turning them into full state museums in collaboration with American conservation institutions and UNESCO.[6]

Ghana's Museums and Monuments Board and its international partners altered the sites in their restoration. They installed gift shops and concessions stands and removed a great deal of the colonial additions from the main castles. Most controversially, they painted the castles white, launching what Katharina Schramm, an anthropologist, has called "the whitewashing debate."[7] Whitewashing was not simply an attempt to make the castles presentable to tourists. It was actually a historically informed preservation decision. Many travelers throughout the nineteenth century remarked on the castles' well-maintained white paint, which was essential to prevent coastal erosion. Nonetheless, this preservation provoked anger among African American commentators (and anthropologists), who decried the commodification of trauma. That the word "whitewash" has a secondary meaning of "conceal" or "cover up" is an unfortunate coincidence. It led to the debate being even more emotionally charged. Besides the problem of marketing heritage, the lack of preservation had made the experience of the slave castles more powerful for the tourists. The decrepit slave dungeons looked especially grim, symbolizing the horrors of the slave trade. The look of age in a building is itself enough to provoke a meaningful response in tourism the world over.[8] Whitewashing and renovation made diasporan tourists feel deprived of that fundamental experience.

Anthropologists usually see tourism to the castles as an example of contemporary "heritage" tourism. "Heritage" has many definitions. One of the most cited among anthropologists today is Laurajane Smith's definition. Heritage, according to Smith, is "a cultural or social process" that "creates ways to understand and engage with the present" through memory.[9] This definition builds on an enormous literature on the relationship between heritage, memory and history. The discus-

1 William St. Clair, *The Grand Slave Emporium: Cape Coast Castle and the British slave trade* (London: Profile, 2006), 39-44.

2 Ty Reese, "'Eating' Luxury: Fante Middlemen, British Goods, and Changing Dependencies on the Gold Coast, 1750-1821," *William and Mary Quarterly* 66, no. 4: 2009, 851-872

3 William St. Clair, 249-251.

4 Kwesi J. Aquandah, *Castles and Forts of Ghana* (Accra: Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, 1999).

5 Information Services Department, *An Official Handbook of Ghana* (Accra: New Times Corp, 1991), 72.

6 Katharina Schramm, *African Homecoming*, 79.

7 Katharina Schramm, *African Homecoming*, 82.

8 Katharina Schramm, *African Homecoming*, 86-101.

9 Laurajane Smith, *Uses of Heritage* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 2.

sion is old, dating back to Maurice Halbwach's 1920s theory of social memory. The essential work nowadays, cited thousands of times by scholars of heritage, is Pierra Nora's *Between Memory and History*. Nora argues that memory is a living social fact, which societies use for a variety of ends, whereas history is a reconstruction of "what is no longer."[10] In the view of Nora and later scholars who have applied his ideas to many different contexts, the purpose of memory is to use images and ideas of the past to give meaning to present situations. This allows people considerable freedom in the way the past is manipulated as a discourse. Nations, ethnic groups, and other institutions share their own memories and can exclude others from them. Using Nora, one can look at the Ghanaian slave castles as sites of memory for African American tourists. When the Ghanaian government preserves the castles in a way that block the tourists from accessing their preferred pasts, controversy erupts.

The tours can provide some moments of deep discomfort for the African American tourists, especially when they talk with Ghanaians about the slave trade. Living through the memory of their ancestors forces the tourists to recall that the ancestors of Ghanaians "betrayed" them by selling and trading them as slaves.[11] When these tourists see the legacy of the slave trade as part of their heritage, this betrayal can feel quite real. These tensions are particularly distressing because, as Schramm notes, many of these tourists travel to Ghana with the hope of reclaiming and "reconfiguring" their African "essence."[12] When African American tourists accuse Ghanaians of treating the slave trade frivolously, their belief in Ghanaian moral responsibility and the failure of Ghanaians to acknowledge that responsibility often underlies those accusations.

There is some truth to this criticism. Ghanaian history textbooks have often neglected the role of African middlemen in the slave trade Elmina and Cape Coast. Ghanaians often lack interest in Atlantic slavery, and feel as though African American tourists become "too emotional" on tours.[13] Ghanaians are aware of the historical relevance these castles have outside the slave trade context. They are proud of the castles' history as trading centers and for their role in the Asante wars. As Edward Bruner points out, there is a fight over who owns the castle: Ghanaians or African Americans.[14] When the past is made living through collective memory, abstract notions of history morph into fights over "ownership." Nor is it easy to divide the politics over the slave castles to one between Ghanaians and diasporan tourists, though most of the scholarship prefers this dichotomous approach. In taking control of the forts, the Monuments Board demanded that local Elminians and Cape Coasters pay a fee to visit the castle and prevented customary ceremonies such as funerals from taking place on the castle ground. As a result, the Board has shut out local Ghanaians from memorializing their heritage for the benefit of the diasporan tourists. [15] The controversies surrounding the castles are therefore not as two-sided as they may seem.

This is a highly emotional debate, but it is nonetheless one that anthropologists are willing to enter. Anthropologists like Bayo Holsey, for example, have joined these contestations, at least partially turning their analysis into criticism. Holsey accuses Ghanaians of "sequestering" the slave trade so they can forget its powerful imagery. She admits Holsey that some African leaders have actually apologized for their ancestors' slave trading at the ceremonies.[16] She does not consider this progress. In her view, the Emancipation Day ceremonies emphasize African American experiences at the expense of "marginalizing" African ones. Holsey seems satisfied with neither group, and her inability to arrive any sort of solution reveals a flaw in the anthropological literature when it becomes critical rather than analytical. Schramm and Bruner go to great lengths to explore the shared heritage, and therefore shared ownership, of African Americans and Africans in the Diaspora, but are not willing to grant the castles to one side or the other, and as a result they simply add ammunition to both. This scholarly detachment may seem prudent given the emotions these discussions provoke. But reifying the debate in terms of ownership to consistently point out the differences between African American tourists and local Ghanaians simply reinforces the issue. In constantly rehashing debates about blame and deception, and refusing to resolve those debates, scholars of diasporan tourism perpetuate the angry accusations of those involved. For example, the historical archaeologist Theresa Singleton aptly breaks down the categories of "Ghanaian" and "diasporan," but she still concludes by arguing that the rituals of the castle favor one group over the other.

Anthropologists investigating castle tourism draw on the literature of the African Diaspora in addition to the theory of heritage. The two bodies of literature seem to lead them to contradictory impulses. There are two contexts for scholarship on the "African Diaspora:" a historical context, which looks at the historic ties between African and Afro-Descendant populations, and an analaytical one, which looks at Diasporic identities in the present. The analytical approach has some enshrined questions and debates. The field is often said to have begun with Melville Herskovitz's 1947 book *The Myth of the Negro Past*. Herskovitz discovered shared customs between West Africans and Afro-Descendant populations in Suriname and argued that those customs had been preserved across the Atlantic. The sociologist E. Franklin Frazier took the opposite view in a 1939 work *The Negro in the United States*. He argued that African

10 Pierra Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire," *Representations* 26: 1989, 7-24.

11 Bayo Holsey, *Routes of Rememberance: Refashioning the Slave Trade in Ghana* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008): 122-123.

12 Katharina Schramm, *African Homecoming*.

13 Edward Bruner, "Tourism in Ghana," 293.

14 Edward Bruner, "Tourism in Ghana," 292.

15 Theresa Singleton, "The slave trade remembered on the former gold and slave coasts," *Slavery and Abolition* 20, no. 1: 1999, 150-169.

16 Bayo Holsey, *Routes of Rememberance*, 172.

American institutions were born out of poverty and oppression, not a diasporic link. The anthropologist Roger Bastide synthesized these two arguments in the 1960s, and suggested that the two lied along a spectrum of the "African community" on one end and the "Negro community" on the other.[17]

As Christine Chivallon notes, three standard prescriptive arguments made by historians and anthropologists regarding the maintenance of African customs in the diaspora have emerged from this base. One side, following Frazier and Stanley Elkins, argued that the horrors of the slave trade and slavery created an empty void which descendants of slaves filled. The second approach owes its current form to Sidney Mintz and Richard Price's 1976 book *An Anthropological Approach to the Afro-American Past*. This is the so-called "creolization" thesis, which holds that African ethnic groups, upon being mixed together on plantations and forced into non-African cultural customs, invented new traditions. The third argument suggests that African ethnic groups were not as disparate in some of their "core" traditions as it may seem. They argue those core traditions survived (through "resistance") largely intact.[18]

These arguments intersect with prescriptive approaches in the sense that both, to some degree, are normative. After all, scholars lay "creolization" or "core beliefs" over the same archaeological record. And as Chivallon points out, there are also three categories to classifying how cultural theorists believe Afro-Descendant populations should feel about the Diaspora. There are those who see themselves as ethnically tied to Africans ("Pan-Africanism"); those who see the Diaspora as a hybrid, with many, equally valuable combinations of cultural customs and historical influences from both Europe and Africa (put forward by Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy); and those for whom the Diaspora has and should have no meaning as an identity.[19] The three prescriptive approaches map onto the three analytical categories well, yet the connections are often forgotten.

The connection that anthropologists of heritage have with Nora and other scholars of memory and heritage leads them to be coldly precise in analyzing the politics of memory in the Ghanaian slave castles. They explore the manipulations of these "sites of memory" and what underlies their controversies. But their connection to diasporic theory, and in particular Hall and Gilroy, leads them to normative judgments about how the memory of the slave forts should be divided up. Their work becomes about the politics of identity: who is African, who is American, and to what extent do shared historical ties entitle a group to control the memory of a castle? They fail to move past notions of heritage "belonging" to an essentialized ethnic group. In doing so, they trap themselves in a politics of memory that one can criticize infinitely. A look at travel literature from the slave castles from two periods shows some of the ways groups have incorporated the slave castles into their understanding of heritage. It suggests that we should perhaps be wary of reproducing those understandings, and question how much can be overcome if we simply use their logic.

The Meaning of Cape Coast Castles from the Victorian Period to the Interwar Era

The notion of castles as being part of a historical heritage began after the British abolition of the slave trade in 1807, when their use as factories was significantly diminished. This does not mean that the castles provoked deep reflection. Before the 1920s, the slave castles were merely architectural marvels and hostels for travelers to West Africa. Victorian travelers were aware of the castles' slave dungeons, but they seemed uninterested. Only tourists who "enjoy mild morbidities" would bother visiting them, said Richard Burton.[20] And the dungeons were not necessarily morbid: Mary Kingsley praised what she thought must have been the "commodious accommodation" for the slaves at Elmina.[21] There seems to have been some confusion about the purpose of the dungeons themselves. Burton's remark suggests the dungeons were known to hold slaves. A later traveler, Alfred Ellis, confirms this view, noting the "closely packed two-thousand beings" in the dungeons.[22] But William Claridge, in his massive 1915 history of the Gold Coast, argued that they kept prisoners of war. In Claridge's view, slavers packed the slaves into the courtyard.[23] The travelers lacked interest, and their ignorance never seemed to bother them. Nearly every traveler to the Gold Coast remarked on the impressive forts and their interiors, but only Ellis and Kingsley described the dungeons, and only as very brief asides[24].

William St. Clair argues that eighteenth century travelers to the castles were relatively silent about its dungeons. Though that observation is correct, it does not compare to the silence of the late nineteenth century.[25] Even after the British abolished the trade in 1807 and turned their coastal forts into bases for fighting the trade, negative remarks about the slaving forts persisted until several decades after the abolition of slavery itself. Josiah Conder, repeating a famous comment made in

17 Christine Chivallon, "Can One Diaspora Hide Another? Interpretations of a Black Culture in the Americas." *Social and Economic Studies* 54, no. 2 (2005), 71-105.

18 Chivallon, 74-93; Walter Hawthorne, *From Africa to Brazil: Culture, Identity, and an Atlantic Slave Trade* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 13-20.

19 Chivallon, 93-102.

20 Richard Burton, *Wanderings in West Africa* (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1863), 71.

21 Mary Kingsley, *Travels in West Africa: Congo Francais, Corisco and Cameroons* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1897), 27.

22 Alfred Burdon Ellis, *West African Sketches* (London: Samuel Tinsley and Co., 1881), 5.

23 William Walton Claridge, *A History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti from the earliest times to the commencement of the twentieth century* (London: J. Murray, 1915), 156.

24 For example, see: John Whitford's *Trading Life in Western and Central Africa* (1877) and Anna Badlam's *Views in Africa* (1895).

25 William St. Clair, *The Grand Slave Emporium,* 81.

1812 by Henry Meredith, depicted the Gold Coast as a "grand emporium" for the slave trade in the 1830s, and Joshua Carnes, an American traveler, decried the forts as depots for the "horrid traffic."[26]

This association disappeared surprisingly quickly. British involvement in the slave trade no longer captivated the interest of the travelers. This remained the case even during the height of Britain's grand imperialism in Africa. This was a time when "African slavery" was a rallying cry for British intervention, but such concern apparently did not spark reflection in travelers visiting the symbols of their nation's involvement in slavery. Perhaps the horrors of the dungeons affected Burton, but he felt no need to reflect further.

This is not to suggest that nineteenth century writers made no association between the coastal forts and slavery. The salient point is that these references were confined to historical writing, rather than travel writing. Nora's distinction between living memory and history is useful here. Histories such as Claridge's could mention the forts as being slave depots because it was historically relevant, but the travel literature could neglect such details as distant and irrelevant. Many more travelers noted the tombstone of Letitia Elizabeth Landon, interred at Cape Coast Castle, instead of the castle's slave dungeons. William Reade, for example, said that Landon's tombstone was the only thing of interest at Cape Coast Castle.[27] For other travelers, there was plenty to marvel at architecturally in the old towns of Elmina and Cape Coast, and the travelers did describe the town's charming stone houses. The castles were often glowingly described, their tall, whitewashed walls being especially impressive. Many of them visited the gardens, but not the dungeons underneath them.

This lack of interest seems to have shifted again in the interwar era with an equally surprising speed. Gaunt, writing in 1912, only a year before the war, worried that the ghosts of slaves were haunting the dungeon, but there was little moral concern in her writing. Tourism in the castle dungeons seems to have grown immediately after the war, however, and by the 1920s most of Cape Coast Castle had converted into a tourist destination. This is hard to glean from the historiography, and one can get the impression that the castles fell into obscurity after their military use became obsolete. This was not the case. Caroline Singer wrote in 1929 that some of the rooms were in fact placarded, and colonial officials had set up a guided tour.[28] Frank Gray, another traveler, visited the castle in the mid-1920s, where a tour guide led him to the slave dungeons.[29] Over the course of a decade, the dungeons became incorporated within the total experience of the coastal forts. In the tour itself as well as in the travel writing, a discourse had been forged. It even received an imperial seal. A travel book recounting the trip of Prince Edward throughout the British Domains describes his visit to the "horrible" slave dungeons of Cape Coast Castle.[30]

During the interwar period there was a general transition in the way many British writers viewed the Gold Coast.[31] An elite group of Fante merchants had emerged during the era of the slave trade on the Coast. Their relationship with British governing authority had always been contested and uncertain. In 1844, Fante leaders signed a "Bond" with the British lieutenant governor. The legal authority over the Fante states was unclear until the transfer of Dutch Gold Coast possessions to Britain inspired Fante leaders to form an independent Confederacy in 1868 with authority to oppose such transfers. The British quickly ended on the Confederacy. By then, British interests over the interior Asante Empire had been clarified, and the newly organized Gold Coast Colony subsumed the coastal states.[32] The Constitution of the Fante Confederacy had been the first salvo of anti-colonial nationalism that by the 1920s had fully emerged as a threat to British governance. These Gold Coasters included intellectuals such as J.E. Casely Hayford, who would later strongly influence Pan-Africanism in the United States.

In the interwar period there was a delicate balance between British paternalistic attitude toward African institutions and the need to deal with increasingly agitated coastal elites. In 1921, the Governor of the Gold Coast initiated a plan for the gradual replacement of African officials in government service with British ones, a pattern that was mirrored throughout colonial Africa in this period.[33] On the other hand local colonial subjects both used and undermined the British regime everywhere in the Empire, and the Gold Coast was no exception. In fact, the Gold Coast had highly politicized elites,

26 Josiah Conder, *Africa* (London: J. Duncan, 1830), 246; Joshua Carnes, *Journal of a voyage from Boston to the west coast of Africa : with a full description of the manner of trading with the natives on the coast* (London: Sampson Low, Son, and Co., 1853), 122.

27 William Reade, *Savage Africa; being the narrative of a tour in equatorial, southwestern and northwestern Africa* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1864), 42.

28 Caroline Singer, *White Africans and Black* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1929), 114.

29 Frank Gray, *My Two African Journeys* (London: Metheun and Co., 1928), 144.

30 Ralph Deakin, *Southward Ho! With the Prince in Africa and South America* (London: Metheun and Co., 1925), 29.

31 I take seriously Frederick Cooper's argument that evidence should inform periodization in African history, not the other way around. I use the traditional distinctions between the interwar period and the post war period because I argue that they indeed reflect changes in the sources. Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley. CA: University of California Press, 2005), 12-16,

32 David Owusu-Ansah, *Historical Dictionary of Ghana* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2005).

33 David Owusu-Ansah, *Historical Dictionary of Ghana*. For the general pattern, see: Vivian Bickford-Smith, "The Betrayal of Creole Elites, 1880–1920," in Philip D. Morgan and Sean Hawkins, eds., *Black Experience and the Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 194–227.

that the historian Carina Ray points out in a recent article were "readying [themselves] to lay claim to political power."[34] Having been disenfranchised and barred from office, African elites took to the then unregulated press, circulating their call for regional autonomy in papers like *The Gold Coast Leader*. The British colonial government was aware of this agitation and saw it as dangerous to its continued authority.[35] The usual British strategy was to reject petitions from Gold Coast elites on the grounds that they did not represent the interest of "native chiefs," (as they told a delegation explicitly in 1920).[36] The result was an uneasy compromise, both politically and intellectually, that incorporated rhetoric of both inclusion and exclusion for "detribalized" Africans.[37]

It is likely that sudden interest in the British over these slave dungeons was part of this rhetoric. The dungeons, which to Victorian travelers were merely morbidities, now provided powerful moments of reflection, and became the focal point of a visit to the castle. Frank Gray's account of his trip to Cape Coast Castle was completely dominated by his being led to the dungeons, as was Caroline Singer's. For Gray, it provoked reflection. "Here were the slaves driven so that they might be hustled into the surf boats and the holds of the ships for a life's servitude," he noted. "And from this scene we immediately returned to the offices housed within the castle of modern administration and British freedom." The contrast between a British legacy of slavery and "modern administration and British freedom" is clear: Britain's anti-slavery ideals, Gray argued, were part of its modernization.

The contrast between civilization and the barbarousness of slavery shows up in another book mentioning the castles, by Lady Dorothy Mills. Mills, a professional adventuress and staunch exponent of the civilizing mission, still had the slave castles lead her into a discussion of the horrors of slavery. The castles, Mills argued, were where Africans learned "all that was ill in white civilization," setting Africans on a path toward self-destruction.[38] The white American journalist Alexander Jacob Reynolds remarked ruefully on how the once noble military establishments "had denigrated into mere prisons for thousands" of slaves bound for the New World. One travel book described the irony of Cape Coast Castle's Tudor architectural motifs and its function as slave depot. The Castle "must have seen as much misery as any place in the world." Now its impressive whitewashed walls seemed much less noble: "As we look at these clean, white-washed walls today it is difficult to imagine the suffering they have witnessed."[39]

The British discourse surrounding the slave castles bears the hallmarks of later heritage tourism. The castles were personal structures whose history was tangible and living. Gray said that the castle was a "link to the present," and the powerful sense of guilt runs through these passages. Whereas the Victorian travelers approached the castles and their dungeons as being emotionally distant, the structure of the castles themselves provoked instant reflection on the part of the travelers of the interwar period. The authors pointed out that the bitter irony of British involvement in the business suddenly came to the fore, and reported on the stark juxtaposition between the beauty of the castles and their whitewashed walls with the horrors of the trade for the first time. Certainly this was not the first time anyone had noticed. But it had become useful for authors to make this epiphany known to their readers.

This was hardly the work of a few marginal travel writers. It was intimately wrapped up with the work of empire maintenance. Tour guides led these travelers and placards guided them. The buildings were mainly used for British government offices. And the visit of Prince Edward shows that these motifs became incorporated into the highest levels of state. In the one spare reference to the Cape Coast Castle, the journalist accompanying the Prince mentioned only the dungeons, saying that "the horrible memories chilled you even now." The mention that a government building bore the legacy of a terrible historical event shows the extent to which the British were willing to incorporate their sordid past into their conception of tropical Africa.

What explains this change of tone? That contemporary scholars do not remark on the shifting emphasis should suggest how little the writers in the 1920s were aware of it. There are some strong reasons for why they might have found it expedient to bring in their personal experience of guilt into their description of the castles. The attempt to justify proto-development theories against the backdrop of industrial warfare in the First World War played a part. It was dangerous to the British colonial regime that, after the First World War, being modern was often equated with being culturally anti-rational and anti-positivistic.[40] The British could hardly have expected their colonial subjects to reform their institutions without first acknowledging their own historical "backwardness." Slavery had been a strong motivator for the colonial intervention in Africa, and if abandoning slavery was part of the long trajectory toward advancement that all societies were supposed to reach for, then it could only have helped to show the moral growth of British civilization. Hence Frank Gray's journey from cold slave dungeons to modern British offices was a literalization of man's path to enlightenment.

34 Carina Ray, "Decrying White Peril: Interracial Sex and the Rise of Anticolonial Nationalism on the Gold Coast," *The American Historical Review* 119, no. 1: 2014, 78-110, 85.

35 Carina Ray, "Decrying White Peril," 92.

36 Vivian Bickford-Smith, "The Betrayal of Creole Elites," 214.

37Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

38 Dorothy Rachel Melissa Walpole Mills, *The Golden Land: A Record of Travel in West Africa* (London: Duckworth, 1929), 88-9.

39 Paul Redmayne, *The Gold Coast Yesterday and Today,* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1938), 64.

40 Mark Roseman, "National Socialism and the End of Modernity," *American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (2011): 697.

It was also clear that flashes of uncertainty had begun to take root, particularly when imperial thought considered educated elites. The 1919 First Pan-African Congress, designed to unite African and African-Americans under one agenda, petitioned for home rule and autonomy, and a quick transition to independence.[41] The goal of ethnic self-determination had come to the fore in dividing up Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, but Allied Powers attempted to prevent this goal from animating independence movements in their own domains. The British, French, and Americans fought, successfully, to keep anti-racist language out of the Treaty of Versailles, despite the nascent Pan-African (as well as Pan-Arab and Pan-Slavic) movements that the language of ethnic self-determination had in part engendered.[42] Anticolonial sentiments in West Africa also took inspiration from Leninism, and this alignment led to the galvanizing of underground labor movements opposed to economic projects and the colonial governments that sponsored them.[43] It was a concession, and acknowledgement meant to avoid any undermining of moral authority. It avoided hypocrisy, which the Gold Coasters were adept at spotting.

The Western travel writers laid the foundation for a kind of discourse, but its motifs were elaborated on by African American travel writers in the 1960s and 1970s. Whether these writers read works of British travel writing is not known, and it is certainly possible that the influence was indirect. As I will argue, a very different set of concerns motivated these postcolonial expatriates, and the castles are as a part of their heritage for different reasons. If the incorporation of the castles as heritage was not a direct transfer, then its logic was similar. This is especially true of the double-sided rhetoric of exclusion and inclusion. The African American travel writing cast the castles as a physical embodiment of the writers' willingness to include and exclude themselves from what they considered an African heritage.

African Americans in Ghana and the Politics of Heritage

The sense of shared identity between Africans and African Americans precedes decolonization. There were "fathers" of Pan-Africanism: Blyden and Martin Delany in the nineteenth century, for example, and W.E.B. DuBois and Marcus Garvey in the early twentieth century. Their work had an uneasy relationship with African livelihoods. Blyden and Delany both said, consistent with their time, that non-Western Africans lacked "civilization."[44] They called for civilizing missions, and Blyden viewed the "enlightenment" of Africans to be the goal of African American repatriation. DuBois and his protégés were less critical, but DuBois's travel writing from the 1920s has come to be criticized for its apparent racist overtones. He characterized the rural village as a "gift" from Africa to the world, along with "beginnings" and "beauty." This essentialized Africans as sensual and simplistic.[45]

The Gold Coast, renamed upon independence to Ghana, was the first nation in British Africa to gain independence, in 1957. Independence leader Kwame Nkrumah's pronouncements of freedom for Africans caused bitter reflection among African Americans, especially those living in the South. One story told of Vice President Richard Nixon approaching a group of people at Ghana's independence celebration. When Nixon asked the group how it felt to be free, they replied, "We wouldn't know. We're from Alabama."[46] Though possibly apocryphal, the story captures the mood of African American visitors to Ghana well. Ghana's promise as a positive racial example provided a foil for African Americans in the still divided and repressive United States. This explains why leading civil rights figures such as Martin Luther King and A. Philip Randolph attended the new nation's independence ceremony.

From 1957 to the mid-1960s, hundreds of African Americans traveled to Accra. Some, like DuBois, intended to live the rest of their life in Ghana as a spiritual homecoming and a rejection of American racism.[47] Others were affiliated with socialist or Communist organizations, and were fleeing McCarthy-era persecution. Others still, like Malcolm X, took shorter trips to Ghana to pay respect to the transnational struggles of Afro-Descendant people. It would be a mistake to flatten their decision to go to Ghana under one ideology or one notion of Pan-African self-identification . Some of the expatriates, like Julian Mayfield, embraced their identity as African entirely as a symbol of "global citizenship" in the diaspora.[48] Others were more disillusioned. But all their journeys, and the books they wrote about them, coalesced around the same question. Did they, racially, ethnically, spiritually, belong? Richard Wright's *Black Power*, published in 1954, was the first book-length travelogue of an African American to Ghana in the period of decolonization, and one of the most influential. In the opening chapter of the book, he discusses emigrating with

41 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Production of Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 387.

42 Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*, 387.

43 Alice Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).

44 Martin Delany, *The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States* (Philadelphia: the author, 1852), 160; Edward Blyden, *The Origin and Purpose of African Colonization* (Washington: The American Colonization Society, 1883).

45 James Campbell, *Middle Passages: African American Journeys to Africa, 1787-2005* (New York: Penguin, 2006), 242.

46 Kevin Gaines, *African Americans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 7.

47 Kevin Gaines, *African Americans in Ghana*, 8.

48 Kevin Gaines, *African Americans in Ghana,* 26.

Dorothy Padmore, and ponders, "*But Am I African*?"[49] The space and time where these contemplations became restated in many of these books was on a trip to the slave castles.

As the Africanist literary critic Wendy Belcher points out, twentieth century travel literature to Africa is often formulaic. This certainly includes the writing on slave castles.[50] A number of standard literary motifs, set forth by Wright, can be found in other autobiographies. The tourist infrastructure seems to have disappeared by the 1950s, as most of the writers visited the dungeons themselves or paid local guards to take them. This set the stage for a highly personal visit, one that involved intense emotional anguish and reckoning. They began their descriptions the way that the British interwar travel literature had, by noticing the "damp" and "dark" walls of the dungeons. Then the travelers often moved to the auction rooms, where African "chiefs" were said to have watched, behind a curtain, the slaves they brought to be sold at the castle. At any point in his or her tour of the castle, the autobiographer would point out the role of the European slave traders angrily. But in the auction house, the author would have an agonizing revelation (in contemporary heritage tours, the dungeons are supposed to be the most meaningful part of the castle). Here they staged their epiphany: they discovered the participation of Africans in the slave trade.

Their realization did not start with the description of the auction courtrooms themselves. To Wright, the rooms were "lofty" and "spacious," bearing the hallmarks of "luxury."[51] In her article "What is Africa to Me?" Pauli Murray, described them as "high-ceilinged."[52] The attractiveness of the room was set up in contrast to the activities that took place, the awareness of which crept up on them. The expatriate Leslie Lacy, for example, noticed "something sinister" in an otherwise innocent room.[53] Then, the revelation. Imagining themselves as slaves on the market, they pictured their slave raiders hiding in the peepholes. They "didn't want their victims to know who was selling them."[54] The account of the trip ends with reeling and out-of-body experiences. Lacy passed out on the beach by the castle; Wright's mind was paralyzed in terror.

The slave raider in these accounts is always a "chief," although Fante slave traders were not necessarily chiefs. The choice of a chief as the antagonist of these stories is an evocative one, however. As a political leader, a chief has direct responsibility for the fate of his people. In hiding behind a screen, the authors were portraying this cowardly chief as hiding from that important responsibility. The slave-selling chief was thus served as a personification for the guilt born by the slaves' fellow Africans. Murray made this connection explicit. She argued that African Americans would find it difficult to embrace an African identity so long as Ghanaians failed to acknowledge their guilt in the trade. For Wright, the metaphor of the chief was not clearly stated, but it comes toward the end of his travel account, where he found answering the question "But am I African?" more difficult. Wright exoticizes the chief using the common orientalist tropes of being decked out in gold. The chief stands out as horrendous and greedy, in comparison to the humble and miserable slaves.

There is often an uneasy feeling when these memoirs discuss the moral responsibility felt by the local Ghanaians. The West Indian writer E.R. Braithwaite was not allowed in Christianburg Castle due to repair work, but a Ghanaian friend gave him a tour of the outside by car. Braithwaite noted with amusement that for his companion the Castle was a "source of pride" and that he saw it as part of his heritage as an African.[55] Pauli Murray was appalled by the "glib" tone of her tour guide, and used her experience to call for African American disengagement from anticolonial struggles. The protagonist of Julian Mayfield's autobiographic story "Black on Black" menaces a Ghanaian chief, saying that he looked like the sort of African leader who might have sold his ancestors into slavery.[56] These accounts reflect the ambiguity of the homecoming experience. The Nkrumah-era expatriates wanted to march in the global struggle for black liberation, but instead found themselves overcome by what Maya Angelou described, regarding the years she spent in Ghana, as "the centuries of cruel betrayals."[57] In Rosa Claudette Anderson's didactic autobiography, *River, Face Northward*, she discusses the slave castles with a Ghanaian woman, Mrs. Da. Anderson depicts Mrs. Da as a model Ghanaian who views the slave castles as "a reminder never to let this happen again." By comparison Anderson damned other Ghanaians for being ignorant of their moral responsibility. Through this portrayal, Anderson idealized what she saw as progress: guilt on the part of Ghanaians.[58]

The writers portray Ghanaians as being glib about the slave trade because it occurred far in the past. As if to counter this argument, many of the autobiographies contain references to ghosts and living bodies still haunting the castles grounds. Dorothy Hunton, the wife of leading American anticolonial scholar W. Alphaeus Hunton, said that one could still smell the

49 Richard Wright, *Black Power* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), 18.

50 Wendy Belcher, "Out of Africa." *Salon*, July 28, 1999. http://www.salon.com/1999/07/28/africa/ (accessed March 6, 2014).

51 Wright, *Black Power*, 339.

52 Puali Murray, 1960, "What is Africa to Me?" *Pauli Murray Papers*, Box 85, folder 1478. Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Cambridge, MA. The above quotes from the article can also be found excerpted in her autobiography.

53 Leslie Lacy, *The Rise and Fall of a Proper Negro* (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 144.

54 Wright, *Black Power*, 339.

55 E.R. Braithwaite, *A Kind of Homecoming* (Englewood Cliff, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 230.

56 Julian Mayfield, "Black on Black: A Political Love Story," in Julian Mayfield, *Ten Times Black* (Toronto: Pathfinder, 1972), 211.

57 Maya Angelou, *All God's Children Need Traveling Shoes* (New York: Random House, 1986), 105.

58 Rosa Claudette Anderson, *River, Face Homeward* (New York: Exposition Press, 1966), 74.

"aroma of blood, sweat and breath" at Elmina.[59] Wright said that the "natives" who remembered the "horrible tales" of the slave castles preferred instead to speak of a legend that gold was buried under the castles. Wright responded that the real "treasures" were the tears the castles had accumulated of mothers who were separated from the children.[60] In a complementary motif, the memoirists described the experience of imagining themselves as slaves to appreciate the horror of the dungeons. Through this mental exercise, the experiences of their forefathers became their own experiences. With these two strategies, the slave trade became a living memory, and the blithe attitudes of the Ghanaians, an insult.

This antagonistic tone might sound difficult to reconcile with Pan-Africanist sentiment. After all, these autobiographies were to some extent records of Pan-Africanism. Without that ideological identification, the authors would not have visited Africa or perhaps would have under a different political milieu. Shared literary tropes notwithstanding, a few of the books were otherwise optimistic about the possibility of a strong intellectual connection between African Americans and Africans.[61] Others were written after the Nkrumah regime had begun censoring the press and shutting out political opposition. Others still after the Nkrumah regime was deposed in a military coup, in 1966. By then, many of the African Americans in Accra had left Ghana, partly due to the oppressive regime, partly due to the antipathy that Nkrumah's replacement, Joseph Ankrah, showed toward them, and partly due to the lack of acceptance among Ghanaians in Accra. African American emigration to Ghana had failed to establish durable connections across the Atlantic.

If the African Americans who immigrated to Ghana had not felt incorporated, they often blamed Ghanaian (and by extension "African") society. For some, this was due to a lack of maturity on the part of Africans. Wright wrote in an open letter to Nkrumah, published in *Black Power*, that "African life must be militarized!"[62] What Wright meant by this comment was that "Africans" had become lax and weak, unprepared for the show of strength necessary to support the modern nation state. Others, such as Murray, felt that the American slave experience had led to a history "that had not been shared by Africans" that had "produced a new identity."[63] Murray inscribed this onto the souls of Africans, argued that one could see this lack of shared experience in the "spirits" of Ghanaians she encountered in a rural greeting ritual. These texts show an uneasy relationship to the Pan-Africans identities that many of the authors had held so dear. This discomfort congealed around their experiences with the slave castles. If the interwar British travel accounts incorporated the slave castles into their heritage, the African American writers used them to shut Africans out of it. Their heritage was a pain owned by them alone.

Infinite Scholarship

Here we can see the two intellectual foundations on which the discourse of diasporan heritage is based. British interwar travel literature incorporated the memory of the slave castles into the narrative of the slave trade first. African American expatriate autobiographies translated this narrative of the slave trade into one of living memory. These are the sorts of stories that are informing contemporary diasporan travel, and they are also informing its politics of ownership. They show that the social utility of memory is not a fiction of the academy but really does structure the way historical actors have approached these castles. Memory in these accounts is wrapped up in questions of modernity and belonging. The purpose of exploring these two case studies is not to by association damn the current memorialization of slave castles in Ghana; that would be unfair. But a historical perspective aids in understanding the interests behind turning places into heritage, and heritage into something that can be associated with a particular group, and therefore owned.

Clearly these sites are powerful for diasporan tourists, as they are for Ghanaians and for scholars of both. There is danger in reducing the emotional power of this memory to groups of disparate people, with different interests. If the heritage of these slave castles is as complicated and historically specific as this history suggests, then why do scholars continue to insist there are ways to divvy it up? Perhaps the thought of no one owning heritage is more horrible than the politics that ownership produces. Certainly the castles themselves need some agency or group to maintain them, but that does not address who owns what the castles symbolize, and who should ultimately decide what happens to them. Questions of preservation and aesthetics are no doubt difficult, but it is hard to see how these questions are answered by resorting to battles over identity. This is particularly so when the scholarship of identity shows how hybrid and complex those identities can be.

As diasporan tourism continues to grow, studies of diasporan tourism grow along with it. The first articles on the travel to Ghana were written over twenty years ago, and recent books and articles have tended to repeat those arguments, making note of the progress that has been made but suggesting that it has not been enough. There could be no end to this publishing. So long as the castles are tied to essence of identities and their heritage, debates over issues of ownership will continue. The essentialisms are thrown out and replaced with new essentialisms, only to be critiqued, and then refashioned, and critiqued once more. To what end is this scholarship? As much as these scholars criticize our relationship to heritage and memory, these familiar political boundaries continue to motivate their work. Perhaps we cannot part with a strong sense of ownership over our constructed pasts. That argument seems to be the implicit conclusion of these articles, even though it is not necessarily true. It is not necessarily a desirable outcome

59 Dorothy Hunton, *Alphaeus Hunton: The Unsung Valiant* (Richmond Hill, NY: the author, 1986), 129.

60 Wright, *Black Power*, 341.

61 Lacy's *Rise and Fall* and Hunton's *Unsung Valiant* are examples of this.

62 Richard Wright, *Black Power*, 414.

63 Pauli Murray, "What is Africa to Me?"

either. It is, however, a challenging conclusion. Hiding away from this stark claim, the authors invest their energy into ascribing the castles to one group of their construction or to another, or simply throw up their hands and say it could very well belong to both. Meanwhile, the unproductive anger over the fate of these castles continues, from the origins it has grown out of, the politics of heritage.

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"The First Kiss" (1803) by James Gillray (1756–1815). Creative Commons.

The Inevitable Collapse of Peace

A Study of the Weaknesses of the Peace of Amiens

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Franco-British negotiations during the French Revolutionary Wars were, by necessity, a tortuous process. That Revolutionary French and contemporary British political systems were each grounded in ideological positions which were in many ways irreconcilable was bad enough, but there was also the matter of two diametrically opposed political systems *and* a historical enmity which reached back over five centuries. That neither France nor the first two Coalitions could sustain widespread success long enough to force a peace made the peace process infinitely more difficult as each side had a tendency to seize on momentary success as a sign that the other was on the verge of collapse. The general internal instability of the French Directory -- the primary governing body of France from November 1795 until the end of 1799 -- and William Grenville's increasingly uncompromising stance as Foreign Secretary from 1791 to 1801 ended all reasonable hope of a truce, let alone a full peace.

Taking these factors into consideration, it is impressive that the Peace of Amiens could be negotiated at all. The earlier attempts at a general peace in 1796, '97, and '99 had each fallen apart, and it required six months of tedious and painstaking negotiations for each of the Peace Preliminaries and the eventual Treaty itself. Only the unique circumstances of 1801-1802 allowed the successful negotiation of the Peace of Amiens, and these same circumstances dictated that the Peace could not have been much more than the truce it ended up being. The first half of the paper will deal with why Britain and France needed the Peace of Amiens, and the second half

will deal with how national interests of both countries meant that those regimes could not have maintained peace in the long term. Both countries needed the peace at the time it was signed, neither country could have agreed to terms different than those that they did, and the terms of the treaty doomed it to failure from the start.

The event which most directly dictated both the arrival and crumbling of the Peace was the return of Napoleon Bonaparte from his campaigns in Italy, Egypt, and the Holy Land in September 1799. At the time, Bonaparte was one of Revolutionary France's most successful and most famous generals. Within two months of his return he had participated in one military *coup* and then effectively staged a second, purely political, *coup* in the immediate aftermath. The net result was his election as First Consul and the abolition of the Directory. Within a month of his assumption of the role of First Consul, Bonaparte had sent letters offering peace to Britain and Austria, the only nations still actively fighting France. Whether these were genuine attempts at peace or simply an attempt by the Consulate to placate a French public tired of revolutionary politics and war is difficult to say.[1] Nonetheless, Austria and Britain did not, indeed could not, take up the French overtures. The primary issue was the instability of the new Consulate. Bonaparte faced an active insurrection for the first several months of his leadership. He was the target of some dozen assassination attempts in his first year as Consul, and he was unable to bring elements of the military, especially General Moreau's forces along the Rhine, into line with his new regime.[2] The Coalition powers had no reason to believe that Bonaparte could bring France to make a peace and, even if he could, they had reason to doubt that he would last long enough in power to make a peace treaty worth the effort.[3] Regardless, the French diplomatic notes failed to include any specifics as a basis for negotiation and, in the British case, Bonaparte's addressing the note directly to the King rather than his ministers insulted the Cabinet in general and angered Grenville in particular.[4] That the Directory, a body whose makeup (and policies) changed regularly and which was under almost constant threat of being overturned, had been ousted could be seen as a sign of growing stability in France. This was especially true as Bonaparte gained ever more control over the direction of the government- one man is, theoretically, easier to deal with and predict than an unstable council. Nonetheless the British refused to take Bonaparte seriously.

This changed with the renewal of fighting in June of 1800. Bonaparte won a decisive victory against the Austrians at Marengo, who quickly signed a temporary armistice. The First Consul offered to extend the armistice to Britain on both land and sea while he also renewed his offer to negotiate a full peace treaty. These diplomatic messages were delivered by Louis Guillame Otto, a German-born French diplomat, the French commissioner in London on matters of prisoners of war and senior French diplomat in Britain during the lead up to the Peace.[5] The initial response of the Coalition was the renewal of the anti-French alliance, complete with a British subsidy to the Austrians and a mutual promise to sign no separate peace.[6] Otto and Grenville continued to exchange notes through the summer and fall of 1800, but could not reach an agreement on an armistice as the British refused to lift the blockade of French-held ports. The Franco-Austrian peace talks also broke down and their armistice expired in November. It was the further development of the military situation that broke the log-jam, as the French won another major victory against the Austrians at Hohenlinden in December and the terms for the next armistice were dictated by the French fifty miles from Vienna. Austria was soon forced from the war and a peace conference was organized in Lunéville.[7] Bonaparte's actions had both broken the Coalition's military power on the Continent and opened up a dialogue for peace talks with both Britain and Austria.

In the meantime, military moves in other theatres had also stoked both sides' appetites for peace. The British had spent the campaigning season raiding the Spanish coast with their only large offensive force before launching an invasion of Egypt, still occupied by Bonaparte's old army. Spain, France's primary ally since 1796, represented a target more suited to Britain's desire to avoid a pitched battle following the disaster in Flanders the previous year.[8] Egypt remained the apple of Bonaparte's eye due to both his own history there and his stated belief that Egypt was the key to expanding French influence in the East and winning a long-term colonial advantage over Britain.[9] The British invasion force, while outnumbered, continued to win in Egypt and quickly bottled the French up in Cairo, leaving the key to Bonaparte's imperial dreams in danger. French-occupied Malta was, similarly, besieged and on the verge of surrender. The island had been the jumping off point for Bonaparte's original invasion of Egypt and was perceived to be the key to sending reinforcements east or, failing that, to retaking Egypt at a later date. All of this combined to leave the First Consul with a desire to conclude at least an

1 Harold Deutsch, *The Genesis of Napoleonic Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938), ch. 2 is good on French war weariness and desire for political stability.

2 John Grainger, *The Amiens Truce: Britain and Bonaparte* (Rochester: Boydell Press, 2004), pp. 5-6.

3 *Parliamentary Histories,* vol. XXXV, nos. 6 and 7, Grenville to Captain Rupert George, 29 August 1800.

4 Peter Jupp, *Lord Grenville* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) p. 240.

Parl. Hist., vol. XXXIV, cols. 1197-1198.

5 Grainger, pp. 5-9.

6 Ibid, p. 7.

7 Digby Smith, *The Napoleonic Wars Data Book* (London: Greenhill, 1998), pp. 190-192

8 Pupp, *Lord Grenville,* pp. 249-252 covers both the actions in the Mediterranean and the reasons for them.

9 Piers Machesy, *British Victory in Egypt, 1801: The End of Napoleon's Conquest* (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 53-55.

armistice under which he could resupply his beleaguered forces throughout the Mediterranean and leave France with a viable claim on Egypt and Malta at a peace conference.[10] This gave reason for France, more powerful than at any point so far in the post-revolution period, to come to the table.

Further impetus for negotiation came as a result of the situation in the Baltic. Throughout 1800, Prussia, Sweden, Denmark-Norway, and Russia had maintained an Armed Neutrality intent on resisting Britain's war policy of searching neutral shipping for contraband war goods bound for France and controlling neutral trade. Tsar Paul of Russia, an unpredictable man whose grip on the Russian throne and control over domestic Russian politics was less than absolute, had already pulled out of the Second Coalition over disputes with his former allies. Although he maintained a state of cold war with France, he had also organized an embargo of all British goods by the members of the Armed Neutrality. Additionally, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark had each agreed to pool their naval resources to resist British interference, although this cooperation could not be effected until the spring of 1801 due to the winter freezing of the Baltic ports.[11] The combined naval power of the League was estimated by the Naval Chronicle to equal some ninety ships of the line, a force numerically equal to the Royal Navy and one which, unlike the Royal Navy, could be concentrated at one point.[12] The League of Armed Neutrality was effectively a second anti-British bloc on the Continent, and a particularly dangerous one given the Royal Navy's appetite for Scandinavian naval stores.[13] The anti-British character of the League was further enhanced when Prussia occupied George III's Hanover in early 1801. These actions all influenced and were influenced by the ongoing Franco-Austrian peace talks and contributed greatly to Bonaparte's strong position vis-à-vis the Austro-British alliance.[14]

The strong position of France and the League unraveled in the last week of March 1801. The first and truly key step was the assassination of Tsar Paul by various domestic politicians. Following the assassination, his foreign policies were quickly re-evaluated by the successful plotters and Paul's heir, Alexander I. One of the new regime's first moves was the appointment of a known Anglophile (and one of the three leading plotters against Paul I), Nikita Petrovick Panin, as Foreign Minister. While Alexander I- then just 24 years old and surrounded by his father's murderers- would hardly be able to reverse all of Russian foreign policy immediately, Russian policy did cease to be overtly pro-French.[15] With Russia's participation and role within the League in doubt, events in the Baltic further weakened the League's position, as Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson sailed his outnumbered force into a fight with the Danish fleet defending the straits against British entry into the Baltic Sea. Two-thirds of the Danish fleet was captured or destroyed, while the rest was badly damaged and left unable to fight.[16] With Russia now prepared to renege on its promise of naval cooperation, the Danish fleet neutralized, and the Prusso-Swedish fleet lacking sufficient strength to resist the British alone, the Armed Neutrality collapsed. The Baltic remained open to British trade and influence, and Russia was once again truly neutral and now more closely aligned to Britain.[17] France had lost its northern advantage. The combination of the collapse of the Armed Neutrality, Bonaparte's concerns over Egypt, Malta, and the Middle/Far East in general, and France's current inability (acknowledged by Bonaparte) to stage an invasion of the British Isles drove Bonaparte to consider honest peace talks.[18]

Britain was being brought to the table by the combined effects of a decade of war. Poor harvests in 1799 and 1800, combined with wartime inflation, had resulted in ever-increasing food prices and riots throughout Britain. Imports were sufficient to keep starvation away, but had little impact upon short- or mid-term prices. The use of both militia and regular army troops for internal security, further strained the British regular army at a time when disease and defeat made "strain" the default position.[19] The Irish rebellion of 1798 was still fresh in the Government's mind and required a similar use of garrison troops to tramp down potential unrest. Perhaps just as importantly, the resentment at wartime taxes had not dissipated with time- quite the opposite in fact- and many in Britain saw the war as the sole cause of the taxes, believing that they could be eliminated if the war itself could be. The erosion of public support for the war never fully materialized, but reached its height during the transitory period from the Directory to the Consulate.[20] Macroeconomically, the situation was no better. Unemployment had been steadily rising, as had the number of both business and personal bankruptcies. Inflation within the economy could not be wholly controlled by Government restrictions on the money supply, and British commerce still relied heavily on its (now closed) traditional markets on the Continent.[21] Nor was Britain's military position any better. Austria's defeat and Russia's withdrawal from the Second Coalition has already been covered, but British military achievements had been lackluster as well. The scars of the disastrous three-year

10 Ibid, pp.55-60.
11 Grainger, p. 18.
12 *Naval Chronicle,* vol. IV, pp. 158-160 and vol. V, pp. 83-88.
13 Alfred Crosby, *America, Russia, Hemp, and Napoleon* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1965), p. 8.
14 Charles Fedorak, *Henry Addington, Prime Minister, 1801-1804* (Akron: University of Akron Press, 2002), pp. 50-54
15 Grainger, pp.26-27
16 Dudley Pope, *Great Gamble: Nelson at Copenhagen* (London: Simon & Schuster, 1972) pp. 259-301.
17 Grainger, pp. 26-27
18 Grainger, pp. 31-33.
19 Roger Wells, *Insurrection: The British Experience, 1795-1803* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1986), ch. 9
20 Clive Emsley, *British Society and the French Wars, 1793-1815* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1979) pp 85-92.
21 Fedorak, *Addington,,* pp. 46-48

campaign in Flanders remained lurid and painful, and the army and militia both were short on artillery, small arms, and ammunition. The strain of a near-continuous eight year blockade were also showing on the Royal Navy, especially as the Armed Neutrality ensured that no naval stores could be exported from the Baltic until its dissolution. Ships and men both were worn.[22] Britain *required* a respite from the war.

There remained one final obstacle to serious negotiations: the government of William Pitt and Lord Grenville's presence at the head of the Foreign Office. Both had long opposed any treaty with France, even once Bonaparte took power. This obstacle was removed between January and March of 1801 when Pitt's government collapsed on the question of Catholic Emancipation. Throughout the war, Grenville and William Windham, the Secretary of War, had been two of the most determinedly anti-French men within the Cabinet, and both refused to serve in the government of Henry Addington, Speaker of the House of Commons and the King's choice to form a new government.[23] Addington, an ardent supporter of peace with France since 1797, saw the internal troubles as too pressing to allow any delay in seeking a peace.[24]

It should be noted that, despite Pitt and Grenville's absence, Addington's new government was hardly inexperienced or opposed by the outgoing group. Indeed, many of Addington's ministers had held minor office during Pitt's tenure.[25] However, the change in personnel was widely seen as indicating a major shift in Britain's responsiveness to peace proposals. This change was perhaps best personified by Lord Hawkesbury, the new Foreign Secretary. One of the least experienced men in the new government (that itself being something of a statement considering he had already served eight years in government office), Hawkesbury's desire to pursue peace with France was already known.[26] Within a week of taking up his ministry, Hawkesbury wrote to the French representative, Otto, openly stating that he wished to discuss peace terms. The French suggested an immediate general truce that Hawkesbury immediately rejected due to Britain's favorable strong position in the colonies and on the oceans.[27] The issue in the opening weeks of the preliminary negotiations between Hawkesbury and Otto was uncertainty. It is important to note the timing of these exchanges and who knew what at the time the letters were written. Both sides knew that a French relief expedition had broken the blockade and was loose in the Mediterranean, that the Tsar was unlikely to retain power much longer (though he was still alive as far as they knew), and that Britain had a force in the Baltic opposing the Danes. Hawkesbury also knew that the Royal Navy had been encouraged to break up the Armed Neutrality and that an invasion of Egypt was due to begin at any time.[28] No one knew the final outcome of any of these actions. The negotiations began at a time when British counter-moves to French advantages were in the works but could easily end in disaster.

The initial negotiations from March and April of 1801 represented a pattern which would hold true for the rest of the year. From the initial overtures, Otto and Hawkesbury met and drew up a memorandum of initial positions between the two sides. The British vaguely agreed to return all their conquests while the French would evacuate Egypt. The French laid out a much more detailed plan in which all conquests would be returned save Egypt (to be held by France) and Franco-Dutch India, which would be retained by the British.[29] Hawkesbury, perhaps purposefully, waited several days for the arrival of news from Egypt and Denmark, and the subsequent strengthening of the British position, before going into detail regarding Britain's offers for territorial exchanges and the surrender of Egypt. Despite Britain's earlier vague assertion in support of the return of its conquests, Hawkesbury's list failed to mention the (fairly substantial) list of French, Dutch, and Spanish territory that Britain sought to retain. [30] Otto's response to this first concrete proposal, as would become the norm in these negotiations, can be best characterized as incomprehensible. Otto launched into a long list of minor and previously unmentioned grievances against the British, a list which included accusations of British involvement in assassination attempts against the First Consul, British aid to militant royalists within France, and attacks and slander directed at Bonaparte by elements of the British press. No substantive response was made to Hawkesbury's previous letter, save that Otto believed it best if further negotiation took place face to face.[31]

There is no record of these more private talks. Neither

22 Ibid, pp. 49-50.

23Ibid, pp. 32-39

Grainger, p. 24

24 Addington to Pitt, 8 Oct. 1797, Chatam Papers, PRO 30/8/140

25 John Ehrman, *The Younger Pitt: The Consuming Struggle* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 528-536.

Their ability to cooperate is probably best illustrated by the situation which arose during the transition. After Pitt had announced his intention to resign, after Addington had been chosen to form a government and picked his ministers, and after all arrangements in Parliament had been made, but *before* the king could formally accept the resignation and set the wheels officially in motion to form a new government, George III fell ill and was unable to ratify any of these actions. For roughly a month the two cabinets functioned as a dual administration, sometimes meeting together, and generally managing to take all necessary action without serious delay or dispute.

26 Earl of Malmesbury, *Diaries and Correspondence of James Harris First Earl of Malmesbury* (London: 1844), vol. IV, pp.52-53.

27 British Library Addition Manuscript 38312, pp. 2-3, Otto to Hawkesbury, 2 April 1801.

BL Add Mss 38316, pp. 1-2, Hawkesbury to Otto, 2 April 1801.

28 Grainger, pp. 31-33.

29 BL Add Ms 38316, p.4, Memorandum by Hawkesbury, 12 April 1801.

30 BL Add Ms 38316, pp. 2-3, Hawkesbury to Otto, 14 April 1801.

31 BL Add Ms 38312, pp. 3-4, Otto to Hawkesbury, 16 April 1801.

Lord Malmesbury, a longtime, but now retired, diplomat who was often consulted by various ministers, nor Pitt, whom Hawkesbury often dined with and sought advice from, kept any known written record or commentary of the meetings between Hawkesbury and Otto, and no official notes were taken of the meetings themselves.[32] When these informal discussions ended six weeks later, no substantive progress had been made. The exchange of notes restarted in early June from roughly where they had left off, with Hawkesbury demanding an official response to Britain's terms from mid-April and a clear understanding by the French that Britain also expected to gain from the terms.[33] Over two weeks passed before Otto sent a reply, this during a time when Consular France had no meaningful diplomatic, military, or political actions underway, a time in which Bonaparte could have fairly easily devoted his energies to negotiations with Britain if he had so chosen.[34] The pattern of demand, response, reply based around trivialities, followed by a stoppage of negotiation, is one that would replay itself two or three more times during 1801, and also one that was perpetuated by both sides at various times throughout the process. That said, the primary delays were undoubtedly caused by the French: the two month-long halts to the negotiations in June and September were caused by the French and undertaken at the two peaks of Bonaparte's initial military buildup along the Channel Coast.[35] It would not be until September 30th that the Peace Preliminaries would be agreed upon by Otto and Hawkesbury.

Beyond the tedious length and tenor of the negotiations were the feelings engendered on both sides during the process. Addington and, especially, Hawkesbury became more and more obstinate regarding the terms as time went on. Each delay or focus on trivialities, such as Napoleon's offense at the British press, was followed by a hardening of the British position and most of the concessions on the table would be withdrawn and talks would reset. [36] Likewise, French self-contradictions and maneuvering was generally treated with mock seriousness before being completely disregarded and asking for a direct reply to previous British proposals.[37] Effectively, it was Hawkesbury repeating himself until Otto, Napoleon, and Tallyrand could not delay with equivocations or trivialities. As the final terms of the Peace Preliminaries reflected, nearly word for word, Hawkesbury's letter of 14 April, this tactic apparently proved quite effective.

The delays and vacillating also bore on others outside the government. Pitt and Grenville, opposed to peace from the start, were also sinking deeper and deeper into antipathy and distrust towards Bonaparte, the negotiations, and Addington's ministry. Pitt remained cordial and publicly supportive of Addington for some time, much to Grenville's chagrin.[38] But Pitt and Grenville's attitudes meant that, should Addington's ministry fall, any negotiations or peace reached through those negotiations would fall with it.[39] Parliamentary politics meant that, at least in Addington's opinion, Pitt's approval was necessary for the continuance of Addington's ministry.[40] The end result of this politicking was that Addington needed the Peace for both fulfillment of national interests as well as the political capital which a popular peace would bring. However, staying in power long enough to get a peace ratified required the approval of a man who, at least publicly, was quite skeptical of peace talks. And should Addington's ministry fall, it would, by necessity, be replaced by some combination of Pitt and Grenville, the men who had refused to conduct any substantive negotiation and, in Grenville's case, denounced every subsequent attempt at peace.[41] The conditions under which all of these requisites could be fulfilled were exceedingly slim.

Furthermore, while the official ratification of the Peace Preliminaries in November 1801 ended all fighting and began the process of British demobilization, military action would continue to affect the tenor of the talks. This was especially true of the planned French expedition to retake Sant Domingue from the rebelling slaves who had seized the island. The French had made clear they wished to send such an expedition, but months of negotiation on the matter between France and Britain produced little in the way of results, beyond the British developing an understanding that the French would sail solely from Brest with a force which would not hugely impact the balance of power in the West Indies. Nonetheless, when the fleet surprisingly sailed in December 1801 it did so from five ports and had evolved into a French, Spanish, and Dutch force twice the size that the British had been led to expect. Only by sending every non-demobilized ship of the line left in home waters to trail the Bonapartist expedition were the British able to maintain something close to naval parity in the West Indies, a strategic necessity for Britain.

While France had never specifically lied about the size and nature of the expedition, they *had* known what British assumptions were and failed to correct them. It is doubtful that this was an oversight on the part of the French, and it is symptomatic of a serious flaw in British assumptions throughout the negotiations: that matters not directly negotiated between the two governments, such as the status of the Batavian Republic and Switzerland, the condition of Louisiana, or the naval balance of power, would simply revert to the *status quo ante*, a state of affairs France had no interest in seeing restored.

However, it is extremely important not to put the entirety of the blame upon France or Bonaparte, for Britain

32 Malmesbury, *Diaries,* IV, p. 57.
33 BL Add Ms 38316, pp. 4-6, Hawkesbury to Otto, 6 June 1801.
34 Grainger, pp. 38-41.
35 Ibid, pp. 45-46.
36 BL Add Mss 38316, pp. 4-6, Hawkesbury to Otto, 6 June 1801
37 BL Add Mss 38316, pp. 6-8, Hawkesbury to Otto, 25 June 1801
38 Jupp, *Grenville,* pp. 315-319.
39 Ehrman, *Pitt*, pp. 563-571.
40 Fedorak, *Addington,* pp. 44-45.
41 Grenville to Addington, 14 October 1801
Fedorak, *Addington*, pp. 108-111.

also had little interest in seeing the *status quo* back in place. Ceylon, much of Dutch Guiana, Trinidad, and Tobago were all territories that even the Addington government refused to even talk about relinquishing.[42] Just as importantly, a consensus was forming within the Government over the importance of British retention of the Maltese islands, though this would take over a year to harden into a near-universal resolve.[43]

Malta was to prove the primary sticking point throughout the negotiation of both the Peace Preliminaries and the treaty itself. The Peace Preliminaries had effectively put the question of what to do with Malta on hold until the actual negotiations could settle the question, and the negotiators had decided to put the question off until last.[44] The negotiators for the treaty itself were Joseph Bonaparte, elder brother of Napoleon and future King of Naples, Sicily, and Spain for France and Lord Charles Cornwallis, a senior general during the American War and Governor-General of India until 1793 for Britain. Both were closely supervised by their respective governments. The delay over the Maltese question was due to the incredibly complicated legal status of Malta and the unfortunate state of the Order of the Knights of St. John, the *de jure* owners of the island. Bonaparte had occupied Malta at the outset of the expedition in which he conquered Egypt, but the French garrison manning the immense fortifications on the island had been under siege by a peasant revolt since September 1798. However, the besiegers lacked any means to breach or assault the fortresses, even after British and Neapolitan troops arrived to bolster the siege. The French surrendered in September 1800 and the British took up occupation of the island, much to the chagrin of the Maltese, who had not liked the Knights or the French who replaced them and had little interest in seeing the British be the next on a list of foreign occupiers.[45] The question of what to do with the island became one of security concerns for Britain and ambitions for France.

The strategic value of Malta had been made clear during Napoleon's Mediterranean campaign, when the French had used Malta as the jumping off point for a landing at Alexandria. With it having been agreed early on that Egypt was to be evacuated by all British troops, another such strike by France would be theoretically simple if a force could be dispatched from such a relatively close point as Malta.[46] The islands location was made even more important by Britain's agreement (again, early on in the negotiations) to relinquish Minorca and Port Mahon, the staging point for operations in the central and western Mediterranean since its recapture by Britain in 1798. Without Mahon or a similar base deeper in the Mediterranean, any French force would find it fairly easy to slip out of Toulon, stop off in Malta for resupply and a harbor, and carry onward to Egypt, especially in the early stages of a renewed war before any blockade of Southern France could be reestablished from far-off Gibraltar.[47] Malta had to remain either British or neutral. However, no neutral party with the strength to fend off prospective French aggression could be found. The Knights of St. John had the strongest claim to the island but their membership was small and scattered across Europe and their income was virtually nonexistent following the seizure of their properties in France, Spain, and Flanders during the Revolutionary Wars.[48] The Neapolitans were similarly unacceptable, as the French armies and puppet-states in Northern Italy would find it all too easy to exert pressure on Naples and Sicily. The Russians showed some interest in acting as "guarantor" of the island's neutrality, and had a legal claim through the (widely challenged) election of Tsar Paul as Grandmaster of the Order of St. John following the Order's loss of the island to France. This hope, however, died with Tsar Paul, as Alexander showed no interest in taking up the mantle of Grandmaster.[49] In the end, Malta was returned to the Knights and security would be provided by a small Neapolitan garrison with political guarantees of neutrality provided by Prussia (which wanted nothing to do with the island), Russia (which was not a party to the Treaty of Amiens), France, and Britain. This segment of the final treaty was enormously complicated and caused a great deal of disquiet among Addington's Cabinet, including both himself and Hawkesbury.[50] The great importance of Malta, to French ambitions and to British security, meant that the two sides could not have realistically been expected to adhere to terms which effectively left Malta as a lightly defended open city against any potential aggressor.

While Malta was the most important sticking point (and, indeed, the only issue which nearly derailed the negotiations), it was not the only one. Land transfers, compensation for third parties which had gained or lost out in the wars, the status of Hanover and the House of Orange-Nassau, repatriation and payment of expenses for prisoners of war, British activity within France to weaken Bonaparte's regime, treatment of Bonaparte by the British press, the meddling of Grenville, the future of the various "independent" republics on the French periphery, the future of commerce between Britain and the Continent…all of these issues

42 Hawkesbury to Otto, 18 June 1801.
43Grainger, pp. 156-159
Fedorak, *Addington,* p. 108.
44 Ross, *Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis*, pp. 524-525, Hawkesbury to Cornwallis, 14 November 1801.
Ross, pp. 530-532 Cornwallis to Hawkesbury, 20 November 1801.
45 Grainger, pp.8-11.
46 Ibid, p. 76-79 for details of the treaty.
47 Ross, pp. 524-525 Hawkesbury to Cornwallis, 14 November 1801.
48 Grainger, p. 9.
49 Grainger, p. 11, pp. 38-40, p. 77.
Small wonder, that, as it was knights of the Order which had made up Tsar Paul's bodyguard…the same bodyguard which had unlocked the doors to the Tsar's chambers for the assassins.
50 Grainger, 79-80
Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/267, Hawkesbury to Cornwallis, 12 February 1802

required painstaking negotiation.[51] I list them above in no particular order to emphasize the number of issues, great and small and even insignificant, upon which the two sides had to compromise. The number of problems to be resolved, all hotly contested by one side or the other, was another key reason for the unstable nature of the Peace brought on by the Treaty of Amiens. Should Addington lose power, the Treaty would likely fail. Should Napoleon twitch wrong in the Mediterranean, the Treaty would likely fail. Should Naples, Prussia, and Russia prove reluctant to get involved with enforcing a treaty that they had no part in negotiating, the treaty would likely fail.

The final reason for the Treaty's instability and predetermined failure was two-pronged: the actions taken by Britain and France during and after the negotiations of the treaty and that those actions were predicated on the anticipation, by both Britain and France, that the treaty was to be more of a truce than a truly permanent peace. Throughout 1802, Bonaparte initiated aggressive action throughout Europe. The aforementioned Treaty of Lunéville had ordained the convention of a Holy Roman Diet in Regensburg to detail the various annexations, consolidations, and territorial transfers which would occur within the Empire's sphere. With Austria prostrate, France dominated the conference and took large chunks of land along the western periphery of the Empire. To compensate those landholders who would be affected, and to buy off the larger Holy Roman powers whose votes would be needed to approve the treaty, Imperial (Austrian) lands and the small ecclesiastical holdings which dotted the Empire were annexed by the states nearest them. Germanic powers friendliest to France benefited the most from this. The Hapsburgs were the biggest losers. [52] The treaties of both Lunéville and Amiens had included provisions calling for the independence and set-borders of the Batavian (Dutch), Helvetic (Swiss), and Northern Italian Republics which had been established by the French during the Revolutionary Wars. Since those treaties had been ratified, the Italian Republics had been reorganized into one unit which had then elected Bonaparte as its President and French garrisons had remained in place throughout Holland (later participating in a *coup* to place Bonapartists in control of the Republic). Further, the French had repeatedly interfered with the Swiss cantons to influence the ascendant powers and keep them pliable.[53] This would end with the collapse of the Helvetic government and reoccupation by French troops and the drafting of another Franco-friendly (though less centralist) constitution. Regions not dealt with by the two treaties were no safer from the French: Etruria in Italy now had a Bonapartist king and a French garrison, Parma and Tuscany both remained occupied by the French Army, and Elba had been ceded to France. French aggrandizement at the *Diet* and abuse of the terms of the two treaties does not appear to have been surprising to the British, but it was hardly the sign of a power finished with expansion, something which would have been almost as clear then as it is now.[54]

The British, for their part, seemed to never completely decide upon their course vis-à-vis the implementation of the Treaty. Throughout the September and October of 1802, as the Helvetic Republic was disintegrating into civil war, Lord Hawkesbury and Addington's ministry were engaged in negotiations with the anti-French oligarchs who had seized control of Berne and dissolved the Republic. On October 9, Hawkesbury informed a British middleman in Paris who was in contact with a representative of the anti-French party that the Cabinet had decided to take steps to ensuring Swiss independence from France.[55] Whether they (or the Swiss) realized that this was effectively an invitation to restart a European war is unclear. It seems obvious that aiding in the dissolution of a French puppet state and guaranteeing the independence of the state which supplants that puppet would lead to a war, especially when France had such clear security concerns in Switzerland (Russo-Austrian invasion forces had advanced through "neutral" Switzerland in 1798 and 1799). That Britain would have few peaceful means of aiding the independence of Switzerland should France pursue a more forceful approach should have been abundantly clear to anyone with access to a map of Europe. It is unclear what the British hoped to accomplish with this maneuver. In the event, it did not matter. Napoleon became aware of attempts by the Swiss oligarchs to contact Austria, Russian, and British representatives and ordered the immediate reoccupation and reorganization of Switzerland. Hawkesbury's note of support to the oligarchs reached Konstanz only for its courier to learn that the oligarchs had fled Switzerland and their representatives had submitted wholly to French terms.[56]

British actions regarding the repatriation of colonial holdings had also been less than forthright. Malta's turnover to the Knights had been plagued by delays beyond the control of the British or French, but the return of the Cape of Good Hope, Dutch Guiana, and French India had all been inexplicably delayed with both sides blaming the other for not following through on their part of the treaty.[57] Both Britain and France had simply been slow to implement the return, and there seems to be no evidence of bad faith by either party (except, perhaps, by Governor-General Wellesley in India who was reprimanded by Hobart for his lethargic implementation of the Treaty).[58] The suspension of all territorial returns to Bonapartist control became official Government policy on October 17, 1802 (barely a week after the Cabinet decided to intervene in Switzerland and four days before the middleman in Paris would report that the Swiss adventure had been derailed). Lord Hobart, Secretary

51 *Parl. Hist.* vol. XXXVI, pp. 337-564
Grainger, pp. 60-72.
52 Grainger, pp. 118-120
53 Ibid, pp. 115-116
54 Ibid, pp. 123-125
55 Fedorak, *Addington,* pp. 112-114.
56 Fedorak, *Addington,* pp. 116-120.
57 Grainger, pp. 79-80
58 Hobart to Wellesley, 5 May 1802.

of State for War and the Colonies, dispatched orders to India, the Cape, and Malta instructing them to retain control of areas due for evacuation as per the Treaty.[59] That this move came so soon after the British attempt to adopt a provocative stance in Switzerland is suspicious. However, that these steps should be taken in the wake of Bonaparte's twisting of the terms of both Amiens and Lunéville seems perfectly reasonable.

By all available accounts, Addington, as late as September 1802, fully intended to return Malta and see the terms of the treaty enforced.[60] This was not a desire fully shared by the rest of the Cabinet, and certainly not by the various personalities outside the Government.[61] If this is indeed the case, then it was the British response to perceived French provocation, rather than British bad faith, which most assuredly doomed the treaty. In any case it is clear that both sides had irreconcilable issues with the Treaty. In the end, which party caused the final break that doomed the Treaty of Amiens matters less than the fact that it was sentenced to failure from the start. Whether it was Napoleon's undeniable ambition, British desire to ensure security at any cost, historical animosity, domestic politics, petty grievances, or some combination of the above, the Treaty of Amiens simply could not have lasted significantly longer than it did without one side or the other completely abandoning their national interests. Just as importantly, the intensive and tenuous negotiations pretty clearly show that the Treaty itself could not have been constructed any other way than the way it was and still been acceptable to all parties. Despite all that, both sides needed the Treaty in order to best press those same national interests which consigned the Treaty to fail. Britain could not have readily supported further war with France, France could not stage an effective invasion of Britain, both economies were ailing and in need of a respite, and both nations were led by newly-minted political regimes still trying to solidify their legitimacy and political position. The Treaty of Amiens seems to be one of those rare occasions where longstanding circumstances conspired to dictate events in a specific and interdependent way which simply *could not* have been altered in any realistic fashion.

59 Hobart to Wellesley, 17 October 1802.
60 Addington to Pitt, 18 September 1802.
61 Whitworth to Hawkesbury, 3 February 1803.
FO323/4, Hawkesbury to Whitworth, 27 September 1802.

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A 1954 North Vietnamese stamp featuring Mao

China's Exercise of *Realpolitik* and 'Containment' during the First and Second Indochina Wars, 1954-1973

By Kyuhyun Jo, University of Chicago

Introduction: Why Understanding Chinese "Containment" during the First and Second Indochina Wars Matters

On a clear July afternoon in 1954, the North Vietnamese delegation walked out proudly from a conference room in a small hotel in Geneva. That morning had been very tense, with the Vietnamese and the French constantly exchanging uncomfortable glances. The Chinese delegation walked along with the Vietnamese, congratulating them on their victory over the imperialists. The Chinese believed that they had much to celebrate, as they had succeeded in promoting their position as the leader of Asian Communism by employing intense anti-imperialist rhetoric. Most importantly, Beijing believed it had secured a firm alliance with Hanoi to counter the possible spread of American and Soviet influence in Southeast Asia.[1]

Yet, little did the Chinese know that they had just experienced the prelude of the longest "hot" war in Cold War history—the Vietnam War.[2] Beijing would experience a radical transformation in its role, from a political adviser to a nation struggling to free itself from colonial rule to a major participant in a bitter diplomatic tug-of-war with Washington, Moscow, and Hanoi as it tried to maintain its ideological integrity as a leader of the Communist world and protect southern China against a constant American military threat throughout the two Indochina wars. How did China's commitment to ideological solidarity and anti-imperialism adapt to a major international war in Vietnam in which China had to confront the United States diplomatically and be wary of the Soviet Union, previously its closest ally during the early years of the Cold War?

Much has been written about the impact of French colonialism in Vietnam and the United States' exercise of "con-

1 "Agreement of the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam," July 20, 1954 (https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/genevacc.htm).

2 The Vietnam War was also one of the most serious refugee crises in the 20th century, producing over a million refugees by the end of the war in 1975. See Peter Gatrell, *The Making of the Modern Refugee* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 207.

tainment" in the Second Indochina War.[3] Understanding the war as an American affair is highly plausible, for the United States was primarily involved in fighting the North Vietnamese on the ground. However, the Vietnam War was also a diplomatic war that used words as bullets. China actively participated in the war through a diplomatic exercise of its own version of "containment," blending anti-imperialism and *realpolitik* in framing its political rhetoric aimed at curbing both American and Soviet influence in Vietnam.

A discussion of China's involvement in the First and Second Indochina Wars is important for three main reasons. First, what is commonly known as the "Vietnam War" was only the second of the two Indochina Wars. To understand the origins of the Second Indochina War, it is imperative that we understand what happened during the First Indochina War. China, which negotiating peace for the sake of North Vietnam and for itself during both wars, will provide an explanation of the importance of linking the two wars together. Therefore, we must begin in 1954, when the decisive battle at Dien Bien Phu affirmed Vietnamese independence from France and began the Sino-Vietnamese alliance through China's ardent diplomatic support of Vietnam.

In addition, understanding China's role in the two wars will contextualize the wars within the framework of a general Cold War history and help us appreciate their importance as international historical events. They were not only bilateral conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union, but also trilateral geopolitical and ideological conflicts between China, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

Finally, the topic of China's involvement in the two Indochina Wars has much potential for further research with the release of new sources. Qiang Zhai's *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975* argues that China adjusted its diplomatic strategies throughout the two Indochina Wars according to Beijing's relations with its Cold War rivals. Qiang argues that during the 1950s and 1960s, Beijing had close ties with Hanoi because Mao Zedong thought that Ho Chi Minh as a firm Communist could serve as a bulwark against further American advancement into the Chinese mainland. However, by the 1970s, Moscow posed a bigger threat than Washington as it tried to break down the Sino-Vietnamese alliance by urging Hanoi to negotiate peace instead of continuing the anti-American struggle.

Chen Jian's *Mao's China and the Cold War* examines the Chinese leadership's strategies of international diplomacy towards the United States and the Soviet Union during major crises such as the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Chen argues that the Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-U.S. rapprochement were the monumental events that ultimately led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The two works are notable because they are the first serious inquiries into about China's relationships with the first two Indochina Wars and, to a larger extent, the political environment of an international Cold War. Despite their originality, there are two important limitations with Zhai and Chen's works. First, the geographical range of their primary sources is very limited. Most of Zhai and Chen's sources are Chinese military and diplomatic records. Second, there are newly available primary sources to expand the two authors' scope of research.[4] Most recently, the Woodrow Wilson Center's archives on the First Indochina War, the Geneva Conference, and the Second Indochina War provide more detailed information about Chinese diplomacy during the two wars through previously inaccessible Chinese, Russian, and Vietnamese primary sources, all recently translated into English.[5] Furthermore, since the primary sources dealing with China during the Indochina Wars illuminate both local and international political contexts in which the Chinese leadership chose its diplomatic strategies, scholars will be able to gain a balanced appreciation of the complexities facing Chinese policymakers during the first two Indochina Wars.

I will supplement Zhai and Chen's main arguments by showing how China pragmatically employed anti-imperialist and anti-American rhetoric as important cornerstones of its unique international diplomatic strategy: balancing ideological commitment with geopolitical security throughout the course of the first two Indochina Wars. I will demonstrate how China survived through the First and Second Indochina Wars by ma-

3 See Nicola Cooper, *France in Indochina* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2001), Mark Philip Bradley, *Vietnam at War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), and Fredrik Logevall, *Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam* (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2012) for discussions of French colonialism in Vietnam. For discussions of American involvement in the Vietnam War, see Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War*: *The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: The University of California Press, 1999), John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War* (Oxford University Press, 2005) , George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975* (McGraw Hill Publishing, 2013). For a general discussion of American historiography on the Vietnam War, see Phillip E. Catton, "Refighting the Vietnam War in the History Books: The Historiography of the War," *OAH Magazine of History*, Vol. 18, No. 5, Vietnam (October, 2004), pp. 7-11.

4 Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 267-293 and Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 327-334 and pp. 351-360.

5 See "Indochinese War," (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/152/indochinese-war) "Geneva Conference of 1954," (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/7/geneva-conference-of-1954) and "The Vietnam War" (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/87/vietnam-war) archives of the Woodrow Wilson Center's International Cold War History Project.

nipulating the Sino-Vietnamese alliance to contain U.S. and Soviet influence, all the while being very wary of the unpredictable dynamics of Cold War politics from 1954 to 1973.

China and the Geneva Conference (1950-1954)

The first diplomatic encounter between the People's Republic of China and Vietnam occurred in 1950, when Vietnam entered into the fifth year of its bitter nine-year anti-colonial struggle against France. The success of the 1949 Communist revolution was a major turning point, for, as Chen Jian argues, Vietnam had a "golden opportunity" to gain Chinese support.[6] Furthermore, by 1950, the course of the First Indochina War had become increasingly favorable for Vietnam; even with American support, France could no longer be confident of restoring the colonial order in Indochina. Within the United States, there was increasing skepticism about providing further military assistance to France, as George F. Kennan later recalled in his memoir.[7]

Nevertheless, the fall of China to Communism convinced American foreign policymakers that France was the only alternative to what Dean Acheson called "a Commie domination of Indochina."[8] As George C. Herring argues, the spread of Communism to Asia would mean the loss of a large number of American allies, the outbreak of another global war, and the loss of access to one of the world's largest sources of raw materials.[9]

In contrast to the United States' perception of Vietnam as a major bulwark against the spread of Communism, the Chinese Communists considered helping Vietnam a "duty" because, as Chen Jian argues, China felt that it had an "international obligation" to help nations engaged in anti-imperialist struggles.[10] China's commitment to Vietnam's cause was such that Liu Shaoqi told Luo Guibo, China's political adviser to Vietnam, to inform Hanoi that the Chinese Communist Party would "do its best to satisfy Vietnamese requests" and send effective military advisors to direct Vietnamese forces against the French.[11]

The Chinese leadership's perception of supporting Vietnam's struggle against France as its "international obligation" was a complex product of *realpolitik* that reflected Communism, historical anti-imperialism, and geopolitics. China believed that it was essential that the Vietnamese struggle against France, as an Asian revolution, closely followed the "Chinese model"—a Communist and anti-imperialist revolution aimed at realizing national liberation in Asia and throughout the rest of the world. As Qiang Zhai and Chen Jian argue, China believed that the success of Vietnam's anti-imperialist struggle would be clear proof of the successful implementation of the "Chinese model" and would solidify China's position as the leader of the Communist bloc in East Asia.[12]

Furthermore, as Qiang Zhai argues, "national liberation" had always been an integral part of the Chinese historical consciousness. The Qing Empire's defeat in the Opium Wars (1842-1858) and the Sino-French War over Annam (1884-1885), and the bitter struggle against imperial Japan during the Second World War (1937-1945) were powerful historical lessons that clearly taught the Chinese leadership that it must not let Vietnam remain under the yoke of imperialism.[13] Since Communism also endorsed anti-imperialism as a central ideological component, China had historical and ideological justification for supporting Vietnam's struggle against France.

In addition to ideological and historical opposition to imperialism, China's decision to help Vietnam originated from a pragmatic concern of finding China's place in international Cold War politics. The Chinese leadership was alarmed at the growing influence of the United States in Asia after the end of the Korean War and the establishment of a republican government in Taiwan. Furthermore, as Winberg Chai argues, since Chiang Kai-Shek continued to order attacks on mainland China even after his supporters fled to Taiwan and Southeast Asia, Beijing feared that the Nationalists would use Vietnam as a military base.[14] In essence, China perceived its commitment to Vietnam as a precautionary move to protect its political sovereignty and national security.

6 Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 120.

7 George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1950-1963*(New York: Little Brown, 1972), pp. 58-60 in Marilyn B. Young, John J. Fitzgerald, and A. Tom Grunfeld eds., *The Vietnam War: A History in Documents* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 35.

8 Frederik Logevall, *Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam* (New York: Random House Publishing, 2012), p. 198 and "Dean Acheson to the Manila Embassy," January 7, 1950. Adapted from George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975* (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2014), p. 18. See also Mark Atwood Lawrence, *Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to the War in Vietnam* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, England: The University of California Press, 2005), pp. 59-101.

9 Herring, *America's Longest War*, p. 22 and p. 24. For a discussion of American involvement in Vietnam before 1950, see Mark Phillip Bradley, *Imaging Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919-1950* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

10 Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, p. 122.

11 "Liu Shaoqi's telegram to Luo Guibo," May 19, 1950,"adapted from Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam War, 1950-1975* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), p. 19.

12 Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, p. 126 and Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 22.

13 Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 24.

14 Winberg Chai, "The Taiwan Factor in U.S.-China Relations: An Interpretation," *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Fall, 2002), pp. 132-133.

Hence, after the end of the Korean War, the Chinese leadership immediately turned its attention to the First Indochina War and sent Wei Guoqing as a military advisor to Vietnam, just as Liu Shaoqi had promised. Under the guidance of Wei Guoqing, the Vietnamese Communists formulated a decisive plan to surround Dien Bien Phu, which the Chinese believed would have an "enormous impact on the development of the international situation."[15] To that end, Wei Guoqing advised the Vietnamese Communists to adopt "protracted warfare," which would "separate and encircle the enemy and annihilate them bit by bit."[16] The Chinese urged the Vietnamese forces to "eliminate the enemy totally," and to "not save artillery shells" to claim a "final victory."[17] Furthermore, with the United States having denied France's requests to intervene militarily on its behalf and to send military advisors to train the South Vietnamese army, a favorable conclusion to the First Indochina War for the North Vietnamese seemed highly likely.

The Battle of Dien Bien Phu, which was, as George C. Herring aptly puts it, the "first anti-colonial military victory against a Western power," really did have immense international influence.[18] On March 2, 1954, preparations were well under way for a global conference on the aftermath of the First Indochina War. China was highly eager to participate in this conference. When Chinese participation was officially confirmed through the support of the Soviet Union, Zhou Enlai said that the decision to convene in Geneva was a "great achievement" because China's participation in the conference "already marked a big step toward relaxing international tensions," winning "widespread support by peace-loving peoples and countries all over the world."[19] Zhou Enlai would be primarily responsible for projecting Chinese diplomatic interests throughout the two Indochina Wars because Mao Zedong directly chose him to serve as China's Foreign Minister—a post that he held from 1949 to 1958. Zhou was also Mao's most faithful and trustworthy follower—a relationship that would last until Zhou's death in the spring of 1976.

A key Chinese objective during the Geneva Conference was to officially confirm a cease-fire in Indochina. China wanted, as Zhou Enlai expressed in a report to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, to "undermine the policy of blockade, embargo, and expanding armaments and war preparations by the U.S. imperialists and of promoting the relaxation of the tense international situation."[20] Hence, it was crucial for China that the Geneva Conference present a clear solution to the problem in Indochina. To that end, Zhou Enlai argued that China should adopt a policy of "negotiating while fighting," which would be "beneficial for the people in Indochina to carry out struggles for liberation."[21]

Three months before Vietnam and France officially signed the Geneva Accords, the Vietnam Group of the Chinese delegation to the Geneva Conference drafted what it called a "Comprehensive Solution to Restoring Peace in Indochina." The document stated an armistice between Vietnam and France as the main goal of the conference. China, the United States, and the Soviet Union would assure that there would be no military vehicles or personnel sent into Vietnam from the day that the armistice would be signed.[22] Most importantly, the fourth clause of the document clearly fulfilled China's wish for a peaceful and stable Indochina:

"The government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the government of the State of Vietnam, the resistance government of Laos and the government of the Kingdom of Laos, the Committee for National Liberation of Cambodia and the government of the Kingdom of Cambodia, with the participation of democratic parties and organizations in the three countries, should establish a provisional joint committee, which should be in charge of the preparatory work for achieving peaceful unification, national independence, and democracy and freedom in the three countries in Indochina."[23]

The guarantee of Indochinese independence was especially important to China because a complete cessation of all military activities was a necessary precondition for Indochina and China to realize what Zhou Enlai called the Five Principles of Coexistence and ultimately, peace for all of Asia::

"Asian countries must mutually respect each other's independence and sovereignty and not interfere in each other's internal affairs; they must solve disputes through peaceful negotiation and not through threats and military force; they must establish normal economic and cultural relations on the basis

15 Han Huaizhi et al., eds., *Dangdai Zhongguo Jundui de Junshi Gongzuo (Military Affairs of the Contemporary Chinese Army)*, Vol. I, p. 530. Adapted from Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, p. 133.

16 "Telegram, Central Military Commission to Weiguoqing, January 24, 1954," adapted from Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, p. 134.

17 "Quote from *The Military Affairs of the Contemporary Chinese Army*, Vol. I, pp. 533-534," adapted from Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, p. 137.

18 Herring, *America's Longest War*, pp. 44.

19 "Preliminary Opinions on the Assessment of and Preparation for the Geneva Conference, prepared by the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (drafted by PRC Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai) [Excerpt]" March 2, 1954, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CFMA, Record No. 206-Y0054. (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111963)

20 "Preliminary Opinions on the Assessment of and Preparation for the Geneva Conference," March 2, 1954.

21 "Preliminary Opinions on the Assessment of and Preparation for the Geneva Conference," March 2, 1954.

22 "Draft Memorandum, 'A Comprehensive Solution for Restoring Peace in Indochina,' prepared by the Vietnam Group of the Chinese Delegation Attending the Geneva Conference," April 4, 1954, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CFMA, Record No. 206-00055-04 (1); original Record No. 206-C0008. (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110592)

23 "Draft Memorandum, 'A Comprehensive Solution for Restoring Peace in Indochina,'" April 4, 1954.

of equity and mutual benefit and disallow discrimination and limitation. Only in this way can Asian countries avoid the unprecedented catastrophe of Asians fighting Asians."[24]

Since China actually experienced the "unprecedented catastrophe" herself when she engaged in an eight-year struggle against Japan during the Second World War, Zhou was cautioning Vietnam to not expand its war against France beyond Southeast Asia, lest China be forced to take military action to prevent the spread of violence and actually fight against Vietnam. In addition, Zhou, as Mao Zedong's most trusted aide, was directly presenting Mao's belief in the need for a pan-Asian anti-imperialist struggle and an exercise of *realpolitik* aimed at deterring American military intervention. Furthermore, since three nations—Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—all shared a border with China, and because there were no officially recognized borders within Indochina, China was concerned about the possibility of Vietnamese military intervention in neighboring territories, which would fundamentally disrupt "peaceful coexistence." Zhou Enlai told Richard Casey, Australia's Minister for External Affairs, that it was China's wish to see Laos and Cambodia become "countries of the Southeast Asian type," with no more foreign intervention and a firm guarantee of free elections as soon as possible. However, Zhou argued that the most pressing issue was to end the war in Indochina.[25]

For the Chinese leadership, "ending the war" had to strictly mean a complete cessation of French imperialism in Indochina. To that end, Zhou argued that a cease-fire was the most rational answer to the Indochina problem, because, as he told British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, the solution to the Indochina question must be "fair, reasonable and honorable for both sides."[26] To make sure that the French understood the importance of a cease-fire, Zhou Enlai met with Jean Chauvel, the French Ambassador to Switzerland, on July 13, 1954. Chauvel informed Zhou that France had completed a document "drafted for the cease-fire agreement and some principles after the cease-fire," but one that also acknowledged that "the current solution is not for separate governments."[27] Zhou replied that he appreciated Chauvel's efforts and although the document was a preliminary draft, it still deserved China's attention. Zhou promised that China would "study it in detail" and provide a response to the French "as soon as possible."[28]

Four days later, Zhou Enlai met with the French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France to make sure that there would be no external interference during the Geneva negotiations, especially from the United States. During the meeting, both men agreed that Vietnam and France were "gradually getting closer" to an agreement for peace in Indochina.[29] However, Zhou told Mendès France that China was concerned about the United States' intentions in creating a Southeast Asian defense organization comprising Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. If such an organization were created, it would go against China's wishes for a restoration of peace in Indochina, and for Laos and Cambodia to become "peaceful, independent, friendly, and neutral countries," which was the essence of Zhou's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.[30] Furthermore, Zhou warned that a Southeast Asian defense organization would only nullify the purpose of the Geneva Conference because rather than guaranteeing the completion of Indochina's national liberation movements, the whole of Indochina would remain as a political dependency of a major foreign power. As Zhou told Mendès France during a meeting on July 17, 1954:

"If they [Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia] join America's alliance and establish American bases, then the restoration of peace becomes meaningless. It will increase America's influence, and decrease the influence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This is not beneficial for the Indochinese people or the French people."[31]

Mendès France assured Zhou that the United States had no interest in establishing bases in the three countries. He told Zhou that China should trust France "without any reservation" that even if the United States did establish a Southeast Asian alliance, it would not include the three countries that form Indochina.[32] However, the problem of regrouping Indochina and the prospect of reducing French forces remained a persistent issue well into the final week before the scheduled date for signing the cease-fire. Mendès France defended the

24 *Renmin Ribao(People's Daily)*, May 14, 1954. Adapted from Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 55

25 "Minutes, Meeting between Zhou Enlai and the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Richard Casey (Summary)," June 18, 1954, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CFMA, Records No: 206- Y0009. (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111502)

26 "Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Anthony Eden," May 14, 1954, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CFMA, Record No.: 206-C0055. (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110619)

27 "Minutes of Zhou Enlai's Meeting with [Jean] Chauvel," July 13, 1954, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CFMA. (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111073)

28 "Minutes of Zhou Enlai's Meeting with [Jean] Chauvel," July 13, 1954.

29 "Minutes, [Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (PRC)] Zhou Enlai's Conversation with [French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France] (Exerpt)," July 17, 1954, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CFMA, Record No. 206-Y0007. (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111070)

30 "Minutes, [Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (PRC)] Zhou Enlai's Conversation with [French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France] (Exerpt)," July 17, 1954.

31 "Minutes, [Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (PRC)] Zhou Enlai's Conversation with [French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France] (Exerpt)," July 17, 1954.

32 "Minutes of Zhou Enlai's Meeting with [Pierre Mendès France]," July 17, 1954.

presence of French troops in Laos as a necessary security measure due to the fact that Laos needed time to adequately prepare for its own self-defense.[33]

Zhou warned that the stationing of French troops must end when the political organization of Indochina was completed. Zhou argued that while France's political supervision of Indochina was not "aggression," the French must realize that they were fundamentally "foreign forces." The Laotian regrouping issue should only be "provisional," and after reunification through elections, the Laotian resistance forces could become part of the Royal armed forces or local police forces, or simply be demobilized. This would be "promoting reunification and not disunity."[34] Zhou clearly showed the French how firmly he adhered to the principles of "peaceful coexistence" throughout the negotiation process. This Chinese engagement was highly proactive compared to the caution and disinterest of John Foster Dulles and the American delegation, which did not wish to lose Indochina to Communism but also feared that the Geneva Conference would only provide, as George Herring puts it, a "fig-leaf of respectability to French surrender."[35]

However, the Geneva Conference did not secure Vietnamese unification. While the Geneva Accords confirmed the "complete cessation of all hostilities in Vietnam"[36] and the prohibition of introducing any "troop reinforcements and additional military personnel,"[37] as Pierre Asselin painstakingly argues, the issue of how Vietnamese reunification would occur remained unaddressed in the agreement.[38] Ngo Dinh Diem rejected the Geneva Accords and staunchly refused to form a unified coalition government with the Communists, eventually establishing a separate Republic of Vietnam, with himself as its President. Furthermore, Vietnamese Communists opposed Articles 4 and 6, since they prohibited the introduction of fresh troops, which could permanently prohibit Vietnam from realizing its ambition to form an Indochina confederation.[39]

The Chinese and the Soviets refused to acknowledge the restrictions imposed by the armistice, especially Article 4, which prohibited the introduction of foreign military personnel into Indochina. The clause would prevent the two nations from forming an alliance with North Vietnam—a critical policy that would effectively "contain" the influence of one another and of the United States. For China, it was especially crucial that it prevented American military intervention in Southeast Asia, for failing to do so would critically damage China's reputation as an ardent supporter of "national liberation," which in turn could jeopardize the Sino-Vietnamese alliance and, more broadly, China's relations with Southeast Asia.

Despite the limitations imposed by Article 4, China was still confident that the agreement clearly established the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The Geneva Conference successfully produced what Zhou, during his meeting with the French Ambassador to Switzerland Jean Chauvel, called "a glorious cease-fire" between France and Indochina—the chief objective for which China fully "supported and promoted" the conference.[40] The cease-fire was a necessary step in Vietnamese-French negotiations because, as Zhou Enlai told Pierre Mendès France, military issues are "always related to political issues," which meant that stopping the conflict in Indochina was the "first step" after a successful conclusion of the negotiations.[41] The clear realization of this "first step" through the Geneva Agreement fulfilled China's wish "to make contributions to genuine progress and…to oppose any obstruction or destruction."[42] Zhou Enlai and the Chinese leadership were highly satisfied that the Geneva Conference effectively promised a "restoration of peace in Indo-China" thereby making China's participation in the conference a "success."[43]

As such, from China's perspective, the conference was successful because it prevented American military intervention and allowed the First Indochina War to remain primarily a Vietnamese national affair that did not spread across the Sino-Vietnamese border. Most importantly, as Chen Jian argues, a Communist North Vietnam would act as a "buffer-zone" between China and the capitalist Western world, thereby guaranteeing the security of southern China. Zhou's dominant role during the Conference confirmed the rise of China as a major power in world politics and effectively signaled a major shift away from a long history of diplomatic humiliation dating back to the First Opium War. By ending its long history of humiliation by foreign aggression, as Chen Jian argues, China was able to demonstrate through the Geneva Conference that it had the ability to realize an international political agenda

33 "Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai, Pierre Mendès France, and Eden," July 19, 1954, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CFMA. (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111060)

34 "Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai, Pierre Mendès France, and Eden," July 19, 1954, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CFMA.

35 Herring, *America's Longest War*, p.46.

36 Chapter II, Article 10 of the 1954 Geneva Accords (https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/genevacc.htm).

37 Chapter III, Article 16 of the 1954 Geneva Accords.

38 On this issue, see Pierre Asselin, *Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2013) especially chapter 1, "Choosing Peace, 1954-1956," pp. 11-44.

39 Chapter I, Articles 4 and 6 of the 1954 Geneva Accords (https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/genevacc.htm)

40 "Minutes, Zhou Enlai's Meeting with [Jean] Chauvel," June 22, 1954, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CFMA, Record No. 206-Y0007.

41 "Minutes, Zhou Enlai's Meeting with [Pierre] Mendes-France," June 23, 1954, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CFMA, Record No. 206-Y0007.

42 "Minutes, Zhou Enlai's Meeting with [Pierre] Mendes-France," June 23, 1954.

43 "Minutes of Zhou Enlai's Meeting with Bidault," June 1, 1954, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CFMA, Record No. 206-Y0007. Obtained by CWIHP and translated for CWIHP by Li Xiaobing. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111478.

without depending on other foreign powers.[44] China thereby emerged, as Chen Jian puts it, as "the main patron, as well as a beneficiary" of the 1954 Geneva Conference.[45] However, little did the Chinese leadership know how brief the sweetness of its first diplomatic success would be, with trouble brewing at home and abroad barely two years after the Geneva Conference.

China's Internal and External Crises after the Geneva Conference (1956-1959)

China could not savor its victory in Geneva for too long, for the country was highly internally and externally unstable. Domestically, China had to prove itself worthy of becoming a self-proclaimed vanguard of Asian Communism. To that end, Mao Zedong concentrated on solidifying his position as China's ultimate leader. After Nikita Kruschev delivered his "secret speech" condemning the destruction that Stalin had brought to the Soviet Union, Mao Zedong was busy promoting his own personality cult and making sure that the Chinese people did not develop an "unhealthy interest" in the "revisionist" Communism promoted by the "immature" Kruschev.[46] Furthermore, the Great Leap Forward was not producing its desired results, primarily due to a severe shortage of natural resources and bad planning.[47] In essence, China had a hard time establishing charismatic leadership and demonstrating Communism's potential to successfully resolve an agrarian-industrial complex and elevate its economic status to match its political reputation as the vanguard of Asian Communism.

Internationally, southern China became vulnerable to a military threat as some Nationalists who had not fled to Taiwan used Southeast Asia as a base to recuperate. This issue was especially troublesome in 1959, when China accused Laos of colluding with Chiang Kai-Shek by lending the Muong Sing region, which was used to carry out espionage activities, to Taiwan. The Chinese Communists suspected that pro-U.S. and pro-Taiwan forces wanted to use the Sino-Laotian border to provoke a conflict that would justify American military intervention in the region. Furthermore, when China became entangled in military conflicts with South Vietnam over the Paracel Islands, and when the United States began to encourage the formation of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, Mao Zedong complained that such moves clearly proved that the United States was "trying hard to undermine, even to tear up the Geneva Agreement."[48] China was also uncomfortable with the Soviet Union because it was increasingly becoming revisionist and, as Mao Zedong felt, the Soviet Union was trying to "choke" and "strangle" China.[49]

From North Vietnam's perspective, consistent Chinese support was crucial for the success of the Vietnamese revolution because it was important for the Lao Dong Dang (Vietnamese Workers' Party) to directly control most of northern Vietnam and the northern delta. Fulfilling this strategic objective was important because, according to a report sent to the V. W. P.:

"It is not only related to the consolidation of the whole liberated area but also serves as a foundation for achieving complete unification and independence for the nation. Also, it is related to not only the execution of all immediate tasks but also the economic restoration and long-term construction of the nation."[50]

In addition to formally winning Chinese support for unifying Indochina, the North Vietnamese were able to, as Ang Cheng Guan explains, "enrich the theories of the revolutionary war and army" by learning from the Chinese example.[51] Ho Chi Minh paid an official visit to China on September 26, 1959 and delivered a speech in which he described Hanoi-Beijing relations as "brotherly" and as inseparable as lips and teeth. He also acknowledged the importance of national independence and of Communist victory for both countries.[52] However, because Hanoi had already authorized military actions against Saigon by ratifying Resolution 15, and because most Vietnamese Communists favored using violence to achieve national unification, Ho's chief motive for visiting Beijing was to

44 Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, p. 143.

45 Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, p. 205. Most recently, Pierre Asselin affirms Chen's assertion by arguing that China's main interest in the Geneva Conference was to prevent an internationalization of the First Indochina War. See Paul Asselin, "The Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the 1954 Geneva Conference: A Revisionist Critique," *Cold War History*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (May, 2011), p. 174.

46 Lorenz M. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 51.

47 Dali L. Yang, *Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change since the Great Leap Famine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 21-40.

48 Ang Cheng Guan, *Vietnamese Communists' Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962* (Jefferson, North Carolina, and London: McFarland & Company, Inc. and Publishers, 2012), p. 108.

49 Tracy B. Strong and Helene Keyssar, "Anna Louise Strong: Three Interwiews with Chairman Mao Zedong, "*China Quarterly No.103*, (September 1985); Han Suyin's Interviews with Anna Louise Strong in 1964 and 1969 in Han Suyin, *Wind in the Tower: Mao Zedong and the Chinese Revolution 1949-1975* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976), pp. 169-170, adapted from Ang Cheng Guan, *Vietnamese Communists' Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962*, p. 109.

50 "Fulfilling the Responsibilities and Promoting the Work Ahead." Adapted from Pierre Asselin, "The Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the 1954 Geneva Conference: A Revisionist Critique," *Cold War History*, Vol. 11, No. 2, May 2011, p. 172

51 Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army* (New Delhi: Natraj, 1974), pp. 45 and 73. Adapted from Ang Cheng Guan, *Vietnamese Communists' Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962*, p. 127.

52 Ang, p. 128.

realize an ideal balance of forces, which was, as Pierre Asselin puts it, the "barometer" by which the Vietnamese Communists measured the progress of their revolution.[53]

However, Beijing did not wholeheartedly share Hanoi's desire to form a brotherly relationship of mutual respect. China's support of Vietnamese reunification was borne largely from a pragmatic geopolitical calculation rather than from a pure commitment to the Sino-Vietnamese alliance. China considered a reunified Vietnam to be the keystone to a pacified Indochina. China also hoped that Vietnam would not seek further geographical expansion, which could potentially challenge Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. Hence, until 1959, China's approach toward North Vietnam's military operations to achieve reunification was very cautious, only sending a task team which was advised to take no other action than to listen to North Vietnam's requests.[54] During this period, the Chinese helped the Vietnamese develop their economy, most notably by assisting in the implementation of land reforms that closely followed the original Chinese model, focusing on expropriating land from the landowners and putting the distribution of land under state control.[55] However, according to Qiang Zhai, Vietnam's land reform was suspended because in addition to popular hostility towards the policy by 1956, the Vietnamese Communists also feared a backlash from the landed gentry who could ally with South Vietnam to overthrow them.[56]

China's auxiliary role was understandable, because for the Vietnamese Communists, "reunification" did not just mean the rebirth of a unified Vietnam but a unified Indochina. It was essentially a question of whether Vietnam would exist as an independent sovereign state or as the leader of an Indochina confederation. Initially, the problem of reunification aroused intense debate within North Vietnam on the question of whether a pacifist or a militant approach towards South Vietnam was suitable. Finally, on May 13, 1959, the North Vietnamese announced their ultimate decision during the Fifteenth Central Committee Conference, which emphasized the continuation of a bitter struggle against the American-backed Diem regime and hoped that sympathizers in South Vietnam would join the Communist cause:

"Our compatriots in the south will struggle resolutely and persistently against the cruel U.S.-Diem regime holding aloft the tradition of the South Vietnamese uprising, the Ba To uprising and the August general uprising…and other valuable traditions of the workers' movement and of countless legal and semi-legal struggles…Our people are determined to struggle with their traditional heroism and by all necessary forms and measures so as to achieve the goal of the revolution."[57]

According to Lien-Hang Nguyen, after much deliberation during the Fifteenth Plenum held in May 1959, Hanoi concluded that it should proceed with the plan to overthrow the Diem regime. To that end, it established Group 559 to maintain a consistent flow of supplies along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Four months later, the supply route reached southern Laos, which was expected to become the new headquarters for North Vietnamese military operations in support of fellow Communist Pathet Lao forces. However, because Hanoi was uncertain about whether it would be able to get sufficient material support from Beijing due to uncomfortable Sino-Soviet relations after Kruschev criticized Mao's failure during the Great Leap Forward movement, news of Hanoi's plans did not reach Saigon until 1960.[58]

In addition, the internal political situation in North Vietnam was not completely organized. Although the North Vietnamese concluded that a military struggle was more feasible than waiting for negotiations, there were many pressing problems that Hanoi had to address before proceeding with the plan. First, Hanoi had to consolidate its socialist project by completing currency reform and by rooting out counter-revolutionaries. In addition, the Communists in Saigon were too poorly organized for an effective recruitment drive to take place. Most importantly, if Hanoi attacked Saigon, the North Vietnamese Communists feared that they would not only lose Moscow's support by violating "peaceful coexistence," but also invite unnecessary American military intervention.

Beijing remained ambivalent and did not intervene on Hanoi's behalf for two main reasons. First, China did not want to provoke the United States and stage a direct confrontation, especially given the immensely tense international political climate. Second, should China encourage Vietnamese expansion into Laotian territory and eventually to all of Indochina, China would be betraying its own support of anti-imperialism at the cost of jeopardizing diplomatic relations with other Communist allies in Southeast Asia. Hence, China believed that the volume of its military and technological aid should be proportionate to the level of conflict that Vietnam faced while maintaining political order in Indochina. Any further direct aid, such as sending military reinforcements on Hanoi's behalf, would not only jeopardize China's relations with the rest of Southeast Asia, but also ruin China's fulfillment of its goal of balancing ideology with geopolitics to deter American and

53 Asselin, *Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965*, p. 55.

54 The team was sent to Vietnam at Pham Van Dong's request to Zhou Enlai. See "Zhou's Meeting with Pham Van Dong," October 17, 1959, adapted from Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 82.

55 A detailed analysis of the impact of land reform at the village level in China is given in Zhang Xiaojun, "Land Reform in Yang Village: Symbolic Capital and the Determination of Class Status," *Modern China*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (January, 2004), pp. 3-45.

56 Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 75.

57 "Editorial in *Nhan Dan*, May 14, 1959," adapted from King C. Chen, "Hanoi's Three Decisions and the Escalation of the Vietnam War," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 90, No. 2 (Summer, 1975), p. 246.

58 Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, *Hanoi's War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam* (Chapel Hill: The North Carolina University Press, 2012), p. 46.

Soviet intervention in Indochina and along China's southern border.

Instead, in late 1959, China chose to directly address these concerns by resuming its role as the chief political mentor to the Vietnamese Communists. China's decision stemmed from a complex concoction of two important motives. First, China feared that should the United States use South Vietnam's ambition to defeat the Communists as a pretext to increase its military presence in Saigon, the conflict would surely spread to Hanoi. Second, China did not want the Soviet Union to expand its influence in Vietnam.[59] Should the Soviet Union boldly choose to militarily confront the United States, China feared that the North Vietnamese would turn their attention to Moscow for technical and material support, supplanting an important role that Beijing had assumed to cement the integrity of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance.

Second, Beijing had a good reason to be worried about Moscow. By the early 1960s, the Sino-Soviet split had already become inevitable. Differences between Chinese and Soviet interpretations of what was going on in Vietnam were most pronounced during the Moscow Conference, held from November 10 to December 1, 1962. China believed that it had to continue supporting Vietnam's war for national liberation. By contrast, the Soviet Union believed that China was only trying to expand a local conflict into a global one. Hence, the Soviets accused China of paying "lip-service" to Vietnam, oscillating between "peaceful coexistence" and an inevitable continuation of the war. Although the Moscow Statement confirmed Zhou Enlai's Five Principles and supported Vietnam's war against imperialism, it was merely a "cosmetic truce," leaving China very suspicious of Soviet "revisionism."[60]

China was motivated by these two central reasons to advise Vietnamese Communists that while an armed struggle against the corrupt Ngo Dinh Diem regime was necessary, they should limit the use of warfare to fulfill their central revolutionary aim—to unite Vietnam under Communist rule.[61] This instruction cleverly mixed China's historical experience with "protracted warfare" in its struggle against Japan (1937-1945), which required "rallying in unity and persevering in resistance through a united front," with its strategic desire to limit the spread of the Vietnam War beyond its loci of origin.[62] Beijing knew that national sovereignty is the heart of a nation, while alliances are merely blood vessels. Even Moscow, once Beijing's most trusted ally in the Communist world, turned into one of Beijing's most bitter enemies a year later.

The Sino-Soviet Split and Its Impact on China's Indochina Policies (1960-1962)

Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated after the Moscow Conference. China criticized the Soviet Union's version of "peaceful coexistence," which favored seeking peace in Vietnam for the sake of easing Cold War tensions with the United States. In addition, when the Soviet Union began to pressure Vietnam to pay back debts, China accused the Soviet Union of abusing the anti-imperialist nature of the "peaceful coexistence" doctrine. To assure Hanoi of Beijing's sincere devotion to "peaceful coexistence," and to make sure that Vietnam was more attached to China, Zhou Enlai was sent to instruct North Vietnam on industrial development. This decision was largely borne out of China's implementation of its own industrialization plans aimed at realizing self-reliance and at "seeking truth from facts." China realized that any nation aspiring to become rich through industrialization had to establish a production system that befitted its political system. China wished to spread its success to Asia and to the world, which was why Zhou Enlai told Vietnamese officials that China was "very willing" to introduce its own experience to Vietnam.[63]

Despite China's eagerness to promote its own industrial model to the North Vietnamese, there were significant obstacles. First, the collectivized production program did not significantly increase Vietnam's productivity. According to Qiang Zhai, by 1962, the North Vietnamese State Planning Board confessed that North Vietnam was too politically and economically "unsophisticated" to implement collectivization.[64] Second, the flow of Chinese aid was temporarily suspended due to the outbreak of the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962. While "America's capitalist press had created a chart on the Sino-Indian border issue that still classified Vietnam as a part of China," North Vietnam wished to demonstrate its ability to pursue its own national interests without China's advice, while at the same time wishing to see continued Chinese support for its cause. Therefore, Hanoi cautiously declared neutrality dur-

59 Li Jie, "Changes in China's Domestic Situation in the 190s and U.S.-Sino Relations," in Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds., *Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973*(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002), p. 294.

60 Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*, p. 191. See Austin Jersild, *The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014), pp. 156-176 for further elaboration on this issue.

61 Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 83.

62 For further elaboration on "protracted warfare," see Mao Zedong's "On Protracted Warfare," a lecture-series delivered from May 26 to June 3, 1938 at the Yenan Association for the Study of War of Resistance Against Japan.(http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_09.htm).

63 "Zhou Enlai's Talk with the Vietnamese Workers' Party (Dang Lao Dong)," May 12-13, 1960. Adapted from Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 84.

64 Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 85.

ing the conflict, greatly disappointing Beijing.[65]

However, Hanoi's claim of neutrality was highly pragmatic, because for North Vietnam, the unresolved question of a proper reunification was a more urgent matter. The North Vietnamese believed that as a progenitor of nationalist movements in Indochina, they had the right to lead the Indochina region as a confederation, rather than a region divided into three independent states of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. As Qiang Zhai correctly observes, political unity was essential for Indochina to recover from the ravages of the long and brutal struggle for freedom against colonial rule.[66]

However, Hanoi's plans for national and regional reunification had to be postponed because there was a resurgence of instability in Laos from 1960 to 1962. Laos became increasingly pro-U.S. and pro-Taiwan, prompting a military response from the Communist Pathet Lao forces. The North Vietnamese chose to intervene militarily on behalf of the Pathet Lao. The North Vietnamese wanted to assure Communist political hegemony in Southeast Asia, while also making sure that American military intervention did not unnecessarily transform the Laos Crisis into a major international war.

China remained ambivalent towards North Vietnam's military operations in the region. From China's perspective, Vietnam's military intervention in Laos was very welcome, for it would protect China from what Liu Guibo called an American attempt to "sabotage" the Geneva Agreements.[67] Furthermore, as Ang Cheng Guan argues, the North Vietnamese military was performing a crucial task in place of China—restoring order and pacifying Indochina—and thereby preventing a large-scale war from occurring "too close for Beijing's comfort."[68]

However, close ties between Hanoi and Moscow, fostered by the Soviet Union's logistical support of Vietnam's military activities in Laos, made Beijing increasingly suspicious of both Vietnam and the Soviet Union. The Chinese and the Soviets sharply disagreed about the proper solution to the Laotian Crisis, exacerbating the Sino-Soviet Split. As Nguyen argues, unlike China, which favored supporting the Pathet Lao to increase Communism's international sphere of influence, the Soviet Union favored cooperating with the West to conclude a cease-fire in Laos and ultimately neutralize the country.[69] From China's perspective, the Soviet Union's stance was unacceptable, for it would leave open the possibility of an anti-Communist and pro-U.S. regime that could promote its ideas across Southeast Asia, exposing southern China directly to another possible source of American military threat.

To resolve this uneasiness, China had two options. It could increase its aid to the Pathet Lao and compete against Moscow and Hanoi, or it could participate in an international conference to negotiate terms for peace.[70] Since the first option entailed the risk of inviting American military intervention into Laos for the sake of "containment," which would aim to democratize the country and expose China to further tensions with Indochina, China chose the second option with the aim of producing a cease-fire in Laos, which would prevent American intervention and guarantee the security of southern China. To that end, China, as Lien-Hang T. Nguyen puts it, "loudly increased its support for the Laotian Communists" and "favored the continuation of the Pathet Lao's struggle so that it could "negotiate from a position of strength."[71]

China was fully dedicated to helping Laos acquire an advantageous position during the negotiations. According to Qiang Zhai, China's new Foreign Minister Chen Yi concentrated on "seizing higher moral ground" by "portraying the Communists as victims and the United States as the aggressor."[72] Chen forcefully reiterated Zhou Enlai's "peaceful coexistence" doctrine as a main cause for Chinese support of Southeast Asia.[73] This line of rhetoric struck a strong chord with Hanoi, which was also wary of inviting American intervention in Southeast Asia. In May 1962, the Pathet Lao forces occupied Nam Tha, the last remaining stronghold of the rightist Phoumi government. Two months later, on July 23, 1962, the Geneva Agreement on Laos officially confirmed the neutrality of Laos.[74]

The neutralization of Laos indirectly fulfilled China's two major objectives in participating in the conference. First, it prevented the United States from intervening in Indochina. Second, China demonstrated and increased its influence in the region through its support for the Pathet Lao. As Qiang Zhai argues, although the peace created at the conference was a "mirage" and did not significantly change the political status

65 "Ho Chi Minh's Views on the Sino-Indian Border Conflict," November 24, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC MFA 106-00729-04. Translated for CWIHP by Anna Beth Keim. (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114463

66 Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 61. Zhai argues that Vietnam's motivation behind the creation of an Indochinese confederation had its roots in the French colonial tradition of treating Indochina as a single entity—an ironic imperialist construct.

67 "Liu Guibo's Speech at the Second National Conference on Foreign Affairs," March 4, 1959, adapted from *Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 94.

68 Ang Cheng Guan, "The Vietnam War, 1962-1964: The Vietnamese Communist Perspective," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 35.4 (October 2000), p. 602.

69 Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, *Hanoi's War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2012), p. 58 and Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 104.

70 Chae-jin Lee, "Communist China and the Geneva Conference on Laos: A Reappraisal," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 9, No. 7 (July, 1988), p. 524.

71 Nguyen, *Hanoi's War*, p. 58.

72 Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 101.

73 Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, pp. 101-102.

74 "Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos," July 23, 1962 and the "Protocol to the above-mentioned Declaration.," July 23, 1962 (https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20456/volume-456-I-6564-English.pdf)

quo—North Vietnam was still actively involved in Laos—it did produce two historically significant harbingers. First, Hanoi would increasingly seek China's assistance throughout its war against the United States, and second, the fundamental difference between Hanoi and Beijing's policy on Laos—intervention versus a strategic desire to neutralize Laos—would bring about a breakdown of Sino-Vietnamese relations by the end of the Vietnam War, eventually leading to the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War.[75]

The biggest problem confronting Hanoi was that even the decision to militarily intervene in Laos was inconclusive. The North Vietnamese were divided between the choices of pursuing immediate reunification through the use of military force and seeking "peaceful coexistence" with their Southeast Asian neighbors, a policy that won much support from the Soviet Union, which wanted to have a relaxed relationship with the United States. However, the great influence of Chinese diplomacy during the First Indochina War and the political bond that subsequently formed were not easily dispensable either, as Hanoi knew all too well that the Chinese were more reliable providers of direct technological and military support due to geographical proximity. This would prove very true when the United States began its military intervention in Vietnam in the late summer of 1963.[76]

American "Bandit-Style Imperialism" and Chinese Response (1963-1968)

The Chinese were very worried about the ambiguous but clearly strong American desire to seek victory at all costs in Vietnam. In March 1963, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi told Xuan Thuy, his North Vietnamese counterpart, that the Chinese government and people were "deeply concerned about the grave situation created by U.S. imperialists in South Vietnam and are firmly opposed to the U.S. imperialists' crime of stepping up their war of aggression there."[77]

However, China was careful to distance itself from a direct military confrontation with the United States over Vietnam. China's primary motives for aiding Vietnam were that Vietnam was a Communist ally suffering from foreign imperialism and because a spillover of the Vietnam War into Chinese territory would force China to engage in an unnecessary war against the United States for the sake of maintaining a peaceful southern border. Hence, China made sure to carefully balance its ideological duty of supporting a Communist country with its realist duty of preserving national security.

Furthermore, China was not militarily ready to actively fight on the Vietnamese side because, as a report by the War Department emphasized, there were "many problems emerging" and some of them were "very serious."[78] The failure of the Great Leap Forward movement had taken a massive toll by creating major economic and social problems. China's push for rapid industrialization resulted in a general imbalance between industrial and population growth such that the industrial sector became "over-concentrated." For example, 60 percent of the civil machinery industry, 50 percent of the chemical industry, and 52 percent of the national defense industry was concentrated in 14 major cities with a population of over one million.[79] China was essentially experiencing a "military-industrial-population" complex, which if left unsolved would leave the entire mainland China vulnerable to possible American military attacks. In addition, China faced the problem of maintaining balanced population growth in cities which were near coastal areas and were "very vulnerable" to airstrikes. There were no "effective mechanisms" to encourage the continuation of war preparations while also ensuring the evacuation of the majority of Chinese civilians in the event of war.[80] Principal railroad junctions, bridges and harbors were also heavily exposed to air attacks such that if the initial stages of the Vietnam War should spread to China, these important "transportation points" could "become paralyzed."[81] China urgently needed to solve these critical problems which were "directly related to the whole armed forces, to the whole people, and to the process of a national defense war."[82] Mao described the report as "excellent" and worthy of careful study and gradual implementation of its recommendations.[83] The "gradual implementation" of the report's suggestion bore fruit through the creation of

75 Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 111.

76 For further discussion about the American decision to enter the Second Indochina War, see Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of the War in Vietnam* (Berkeley and London: The University of California Press, 1999), pp. 1-42.

77 "*Peking Review*, No. 10 (March, 1964), p. 25,"adapted from Frank E. Rogers, "Sino-American Relations and the Vietnam War, 1964-1966," *The China Quarterly*, No. 66 (June, 1976), p. 296.

78 "Report by the War Department of the General Staff," April 25, 1964, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, *Dangde wenxian*[2] (Party Documents) 3 (1995), 34-35. Translated by Qiang Zhai. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111513. The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was another major political and social problem that limited China's preparations for war. See Roderick Macfarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008).

79 "Report by the War Department of the General Staff," April 25, 1964.

80 "Report by the War Department of the General Staff," April 25, 1964.

81 "Report by the War Department of the General Staff," April 25, 1964.

82 "Report by the War Department of the General Staff," April 25, 1964.

83 "Mao Zedong's Comments on the War Department's April 25 Report," August 12, 1964, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Dangde wenxian[2] (Party Documents) 3 (1995), 33.

the "Third Front," which was a radical effort to make China as self-sufficient in industrial production as possible, reducing the degree of vulnerability to American attacks.[84] Until 1963, the "Third Front" accounted for almost 40 percent of China's national industrial production.[85]

Unfortunately, the United States' rapid translation of the Tonkin Resolution's principles into military action by 1964 meant that China could no longer afford to direct its attention solely to domestic problems.[86] Although Mao initially assumed that the United States, China, and Vietnam all would not want a war, events on the battlefield told a different story.[87] The deeper North Vietnam became entangled in its struggle against American aggression, the more proportional the relationship between the amount of American pressure on Vietnam and Vietnam's necessary reliance on Chinese assistance became.[88]

In 1965, as American military efforts further intensified, Beijing chose to integrate ideology and pragmatism by helping North Vietnam as a Communist ally and at the same time exercising geopolitical *realpolitik* to effectively prepare itself against American intervention.[89] The resulting answer was that China would provide North Vietnam with whatever it could based on the latter's demands, but only if North Vietnam promised to be fully responsible for its own actions during the war. This was because, as Liu Shaoqi told Le Duan, Hanoi essentially had the "complete initiative."[90]

Nonetheless, China assured North Vietnam that it did not wish to assume a passive role in supporting the North Vietnamese military effort. In July 1964, Mao told the Vietnamese delegation to an important conference held in Hanoi to discuss the war that China shared Vietnam's goal of victory in the war and that it would provide "unconditional support." Most importantly, China also made a promise to the North Vietnamese that was highly conscious of its own national security. China promised North Vietnam that if the United States expanded the war beyond Vietnam, China would send ground forces and more economic aid.[91]

According to Chen Jian, China's decision to deeply commit itself to North Vietnam's struggle against the United States can be understood in three ways. First, China was still consciously devoted to the principle of helping other socialist countries complete their Communist revolutions by overthrowing imperialist nations—a position that Hanoi also welcomed because it did not want a "dishonorable Munich" type agreement with the United States.[92] Second, China wished to export its own Communist revolution as a model for the rest of the world. From China's perspective, a Communist revolution had a uniform beginning—the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and imperialists—and required an unending flow of proletarian revolutionary action to fully realize that goal. This uniform beginning was both the purpose of the revolution and the essence of its continuous process. The rest of the socialist world was the "world's countryside"; China was to be a leader of the socialist camp and lead a "continuous revolution" against the capitalist side of the world, which was represented by the "world's cities." Within this "countryside versus cities" paradigm, the victory of the Communists in Vietnam was expected to serve as concrete evidence of how China's vision of a "continuous revolution" was a realizable goal.[93]

It is also likely that China had another important realist motive: the Sino-Soviet split. Throughout the 1960s, ideological tensions between China and the Soviet Union had become more acute than they had been in 1956. Mao Zedong was increasingly critical of Kruschev's anti-Stalinist views and condemned Kruschev as a "revisionist." Zhou Enlai also concurred with Mao's view and criticized the Soviet Union for "carrying out nothing but Kruschevism," making it "absolutely impossible for them to change."[94] China was worried about the possibility of Soviet-North Vietnamese collaboration during the war. Even if there was no collaboration between North Vietnam and the Soviet Union, China's leaders felt that China had to guide North Vietnam to victory over anti-imperialism, for failure to do so would result in a loss of national prestige and credibility. Hence, as Chen Jian aptly argues, China perceived Vietnam as a "litmus test for true Communism."[95] Therefore, China favored clandestine cooperation with North Vietnam such that no major details about the relationship would be revealed to the Soviets. As Zhou Enlai told Ho Chi Minh on March 1, 1965:

"In our course of revolution, and in our struggle

84 Barry Noughton, "The Third Front: Defense Industrialization in the Chinese Interior," *The China Quarterly,* No. 115 (September, 1988), p. 353.

85 Noughton, "The Third Front: Defense Industrialization in the Chinese Interior," p. 365.

86 Logevall, *Choosing War*, pp. 193-221.

87 Li Xiangqian, "The Economic and Political Impact of the Vietnam War on China in 1964," in Priscilla Roberts eds., *Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World beyond Asia* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), p. 182.

88 Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 129.

89 On American military escalation, see Logevall, *Choosing War*, pp. 300-332.

90. "Discussion between Liu Shaoqi and Le Duan," April 8, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113058

91 Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, p. 209.

92 "French General Delegation, Hanoi to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris," April 4, 1965, #99, Asie-Oceanie: VietnamConflit, Archives Diplomatique de France, La Courneuve, Paris, I. Adapted from "'We Don't' Want a Munich': Hanoi's Diplomatic Strategy, 1965-1968," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (June, 2012), p. 548

93 Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, pp. 211-212.

94 "Zhou Enlai talking to Ho Chi Minh," March 1, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113055.

95 Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, p. 211.

against the U.S., the matters of top secrecy should not be disclosed to them. Of course, we can mention the principles, which we also want to publicize. We oppose [the Soviet] military activities that include the sending of missile battalions and 2 MiG-21 aircraft as well as the proposal to establish an airlift using 45 planes for weapon transportation. We also have to be wary of the military instructors. Soviet experts have withdrawn, so what are their purposes [when they] wish to come back? We have had experience in the past when there were subversive activities in China, Korea, and Cuba. We, therefore, should keep an eye on their activities, namely their transportation of weapons and military training. Otherwise, the relations between our two countries may turn from good to bad, thus affecting cooperation between our two countries."[96]

Zhou had a good reason to suspect the Soviets' sincerity about providing aid to North Vietnam. Six years earlier, Kruschev had ordered the withdrawal of all Soviet scientists from China without any prior official notification to Mao Zedong—a decisive event that ushered in the Sino-Soviet split in 1960. Zhou was therefore cautioning Ho about the potential for great dishonesty on the part of Moscow towards Hanoi. In addition, the magnitude of the war was already big enough with the Americans bombarding almost every inch of Vietnamese territory. Soviet military intervention would not only unnecessarily enlarge the scale of the conflict, but should Moscow successfully defend North Vietnam's interests, Hanoi might be tempted to abandon the Sino-Vietnamese alliance in favor of an alliance with Moscow. Such a scenario would critically shift the balance of power within the Communist world in favor of Moscow and hence, China ironically ended up supporting the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam more than the North Vietnamese did.

Fortunately for Beijing, Hanoi did not require direct Soviet military intervention, for it was determined to show that "the American imperialists and their lackeys sabotaged the 1954 Geneva Agreement."[97] The North Vietnamese also did not lose sight of their original objective of promoting national reunification and supported those Southern Vietnamese who were fighting the Americans for the sake of the "just cause" of national independence.[98] The North Vietnamese interpreted their mission of national liberation as a call for international resistance against American imperialism.

Moreover, the North Vietnamese wished to create their own sphere of influence as leaders of the Communist world. They believed they were making a "great contribution" to the world because they were supporting not only national liberation but also peace, democracy, and socialism.[99] American imperialists were using South Vietnam as a testing ground for their "special warfare" strategy, which was aimed at extinguishing the struggle for liberation by the peoples of all nations. The United States was essentially carrying out a policy of "neo-colonialism" and was preparing for "a new world war."[100] To confront and prepare an adequate military response to the United States' attempt to encroach on Vietnam's sovereignty, North Vietnam favored cooperation between North and South Vietnam to put forward "appropriate requests for assistance and support."[101]

Mao Zedong eagerly wanted to prove that the United States' policy of expanding aggression against South Vietnam was highly misguided and instructed Zhou Enlai to convince leaders from the non-aligned nations that American aggression in Vietnam would "fail completely."[102] Zhou met men such as Pakistani President Ayub Khan and Algerian President Ben Bella and told them that there was "no possibility that Vietnam would yield to American pressure."[103] An "unconditional surrender" was a veneer with which the United States really wanted to "scare China."[104] China would not be intimidated nor would it abandon its original stance of supporting Vietnam. Unconditional surrender was nothing but "requesting that the people in South Vietnam should stop armed struggle, that North Vietnam should stop supporting the struggle in South Vietnam, and that the puppet troops in South Vietnam would be given some breathing space, so that the United States would be able to strengthen its military presence in South Vietnam."[105] The situation in Vietnam confirmed why Zhou reflected China's readiness and anxiety about defending herself from American aggression. From 1965 to 1969, the violence in Vietnam intensified as the United States focused on increasing, as Marilyn Young put it, "the body count of enemy dead rath-

96 Zhou Enlai talking to Ho Chi Minh," March 1, 1965

97 "Resolution of the Party Central Committee on the Immediate Situation and Urgent Responsibilities," March 27, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Party Central Committee, Hanoi.

98 "Resolution of the Party Central Committee on the Immediate Situation and Urgent Responsibilities," March 27, 1965.

99 "Resolution of the Party Central Committee on the Immediate Situation and Urgent Responsibilities," March 27, 1965.

100 "Resolution of the Party Central Committee on the Immediate Situation and Urgent Responsibilities," March 27, 1965.

101 "Resolution of the Party Central Committee on the Immediate Situation and Urgent Responsibilities," March 27, 1965

102 "Zhou Enlai and Pakistani President Ayub Khan," April 2, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113057).

103 "Zhou Enlai and Pakistani President Ayub Khan," April 2, 1965

104 "Zhou Enlai to Algerian President Ben Bella" March 30, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113056).

105 "Zhou Enlai to Algerian President Ben Bella," March 30, 1965.

er than attempt[ing] to secure territory."[106] The battleground became so dangerous that, according to Truong Nhu Tang, a North Vietnamese soldier:

"We [soldiers] lived like hunted animals, an existence that demanded constant physical and mental alertness…. The rice ration for both leaders and fighters was twenty kilos a month… it was our entire diet, a nutritional intake that left us all in a state of semi-starvation."[107]

Despite the miserable conditions under which soldiers were engaged in the war and the skepticism and ambivalence of the American public towards the war, the United States sent 180,000 ground troops by the end of 1965. This figure would double at the end of 1966, clearly demonstrating the United States' urge to bring the direction of the war under its control and secure a convincing victory. As Frank Rogers put it, the United States was trying to promote a "limitless expansion until the enemy relented."[108]

China was determined to prove that American usage of Vietnam as a strategic base to both achieve a victory over the Communists and to "contain" China at the same time was a highly dangerous policy. China believed that the coexistence of a war of aggression and a war of defense was not possible because, as Zhou Enlai told Pakistani President Ayub Khan during a meeting in Karachi on April 2, 1965, it becomes "impossible to draw a line" between two very different kinds of war. The United States was clearly trying to stage a war of imperialist aggression in the name of "containing" a threat—a poor excuse to justify American plans to invade Vietnam.[109] However, the impossibility of "drawing a line" in a war does not mean that a war must necessarily be inevitable. China was furious with the United States for ambiguously justifying its increased commitment to expanding a war that had no fundamental objective. The United States was responsible for devising a capricious policy based on an unclear definition of "aggression." As Zhou told Khan:

"American propaganda claims that if Vietnam does not stop its "aggression," the United States will expand the war of aggression. This is the most ridiculous bandit-style logic of imperialism. According to this logic, South Vietnam's resistance to American aggression is "aggression," and North Vietnam's support to South Vietnam is "aggression" against one's own compatriots. If so, the resistance by the NLF in Algeria to the French colonists becomes Algeria's "aggression" against Algeria, and Egypt's taking back the Suez Canal becomes the Egyptians' "aggression" against the Egyptians…. This question became crystal clear as soon as I discussed it with the Algerians and Egyptians. This is nothing but America's bandit-style logic. On the other hand, the United States is propagandizing that the expansion of the war will be limited to South Vietnam, and that it only wants North Vietnam to stop its support to South Vietnam. The United States is hoping to separate South Vietnam from North Vietnam, thus isolating the South."[110]

Zhou clearly believed that the ambiguity of the United States' definition of "aggression" was chiefly responsible for obstructing Vietnamese unification. This, in turn, was detrimental to China's national security, because the longer the conflict in Vietnam persisted, the more unstable China's southern border would become. In addition, the ambiguity of "aggression" implied that China could not move into Vietnam to protect its national security, for this would only justify the United States' continuation of its war against "aggression."

The root cause of the ambiguity of "aggression" was the ambiguous manner by which the United States conducted its policy of "containment." Zhou told Ayub Khan that the fundamental problem with American "containment" towards Vietnam was that it was highly unpredictable and "wavering," because:

"First, it asks the Vietnamese to stop "aggression" against the Vietnamese, this is groundless. Second, it has been wavering on expanding the war. Whenever it takes a step, it will look around for taking the next step. It does not have a fixed policy."[111]

Zhou also told Khan that it was precisely such ambiguity in American "containment" that would lead to certain American defeat. Despite the fact that the policy was "unsound," Zhou argued that the United States was adamantly refusing to admit the reality that "to withdraw is the best way to save face." Instead, the United States was "recklessly" trying to continue the war, which would cause it "to lose more face."[112]

However, the Chinese leadership was careful to avoid direct involvement in the Vietnam War as much as possible and concentrated on protecting southern China from the war through diplomacy. When General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party Le Duan visited Beijing to ask for Chinese aid on April 8, 1965, Chinese Communist Party Vice Chairman Liu Shaoqi told him that while China would do its best to support Vietnam, if there was no "invitation" from Vietnam, the Chinese would not come to Vietnam. Liu added that the

106 Young, Fitzgerald, and Grunfeld eds., *The Vietnam War: A History in Documents*, pp. 101-102.

107 Truong Nhu Tang, with David Chanoff and Doan Van Toai, *A Viet Cong Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam War and its Aftermath* (New York: Vintage, 1986), pp. 157-171, adapted from Young, Fitzgerald, and Grunfeld eds., *The Vietnam War: A History in Documents*, p. 101.

108 Frank E. Rogers, "Sino-American Relations and the Vietnam War, 1964-1966," *The China Quarterly*, No. 66 (June, 1976), p. 295.

109 "Zhou Enlai and Pakistani President Ayub Khan," April 2, 1965.

110 "Zhou Enlai and Pakistani President Ayub Khan," April 2, 1965.

111 "Zhou Enlai and Pakistani President Ayub Khan," April 2, 1965.

112 "Zhou Enlai and Pakistani President Ayub Khan," April 2, 1965.

North Vietnamese had the "complete initiative."[113] Liu represented the Chinese leadership's prevailing view that the Vietnam War had to remain strictly fought in Vietnam.

Ironically, while the phrase "complete initiative" seemed to suggest that Vietnam could autonomously request assistance whenever it was required, it was actually China that exercised initiative to its advantage. China oscillated between providing aid and suspending it. For example, on May 16, 1965, Mao Zedong agreed with Ho Chi Minh that China would send construction teams to build six roads along the North-South Vietnamese border to enhance combat efficiency in future battles.[114] However, China also wanted to remind North Vietnam of Liu Shaoqi's warning that it would only enter the war if there was a request for military assistance. On the same day, Zhou Enlai met with Nguyen Van Hieu, a journalist, and reminded Vietnam of the four important principles China would abide while formulating its policies toward the war. First, China would not voluntarily engage in a war with the United States. Second, China would remain consistent throughout the course of the war. Third, China would always be militarily ready should the war spill over the Sino-Vietnamese border. Finally, if the United States expanded the Vietnam War by means of air warfare, China would respond with ground attacks.[115]

China's refusal to enter the Vietnam War militarily should not be equated with a total disregard for military preparations. The Chinese had three major objectives in choosing military preparedness as a central strategy against the United States. First, they wanted to counter what was perceived as an increasing Soviet influence in Vietnam. China especially deemed inappropriate the Soviet Union's proposal to open negotiations between Vietnam and the United States, as it would disrupt the fulfillment of China's socialist mission of ensuring Vietnam's national liberation. Opening an international conference for U.S.-Vietnam negotiations was a direct "manifestation of weakness in front of American imperialism." This in turn, would "strengthen the aggressive revelry of the United States" and "damage the fighting spirit of the Vietnamese people."[116] Defending Vietnam from American imperialism was also an indirect but clear method of showing the United States the importance of adhering to agreed principles. China wanted to teach the United States that it had violated the 1954 Geneva Agreement and that genuine peace would only be realized when the United States completely withdrew its military and let the peoples of Southeast Asia solve their problems on their own. So long as the United States continued to "make noises about broadening the war," it was certain that the conditions for negotiations were "not ripe."[117]

China made sure that the Soviets also understood the relationship between making such "noises" and the prospect for negotiations. When the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Kosygin asked the Chinese to help the United States devise an exit strategy in Vietnam, Chinese leaders warned the Soviets not to use Vietnam as a bargaining chip in their relations with the United States. Zhou Enlai even branded such an attempt as undeniable evidence that the Soviet Union was trying to "sell out its own brothers."[118]

China wanted to curb possible American-Soviet collusion in working out a peace plan for Vietnam and to preserve the Sino-Vietnamese alliance. Zhou Enlai met North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong in October 1965 and warned his Vietnamese counterpart not to rely heavily on Soviet aid because their help was "not sincere."[119] Zhou Enlai argued that Vietnam could always depend on China to assume the Soviet Union's role in Vietnam because the Chinese always wanted to help Vietnam and never thought about "selling them out" as the Soviets did.[120] China only allowed the Soviet Union to use Chinese railways to ship military supplies to Vietnam,

113 "Discussion between Liu Shaoqi and Le Duan," April 8, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations*(http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113058).

114 "Discussion between Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh," May 16, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113059).

115 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai, Nguyen Van Hieu and Nguyen Thi Binh," May 16, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversation s* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113060).

116 "Oral Statement of the PRC Government." Transmitted by PRC Vice-Foreign Minister Liu Xiao to the Chargé d'Affaires of the USSR in the PRC, Cde. F. V. Mochulskii, on February 27, 1965. *[Source: Arkhiv Veshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii(Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation; AVPRF), Moscow, Russia, fond 0100, opis 58, delo 1, papka 516, 1-2. Translated from Russian by Lorenz Lüthi.]*.

117 "Oral Statement of the PRC Government,"February 27, 1965.

118 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and Ho Chi Minh," May 17, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113061).

119 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong," October 9, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113065).

120 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, October 9, 1965."

which amounted to 43,000 tons by the end of 1965.[121]

China's decision to deploy a massive amount of military personnel and equipment was not whimsical, but rather was a highly calculated move that fully reflected Liu Shaoqi's prescient warning about a critical need for military preparedness. On May 19, 1965, Liu told the Central Military Commission that "faster and better" military preparations were highly necessary because the enemy "may even dare to invade" and if there were no adequate preparations, such a prospect "would not be impossible."[122] Liu argued that if China successfully carried out a defensive war against the United States, it would prove that the American military's lack of morale was a decisive factor that would mark the difference between a just and unjust war.[123] Liu Shaoqi argued that an increase in the number of troops, an increase in the number of military regions, and a unified leadership were the three essential ingredients for a successful military preparation for a possible American invasion of the Chinese mainland. China would never retreat in the face of an enemy invasion unless it was "cut into parts."[124]

Zhou Enlai felt that China's decisions needed sufficient international legitimacy. Nine days later, he met with Indonesian Prime Minister Subandiro and explained that China's decision to militarily counter a possible spread of the war into its own borders was meant to show how wrong it was for the Americans to "dash around madly" in Vietnam advocating "gradual escalation." The United States chose a policy that was the "worst taboo in a military sense," that was based on extreme pragmatism which had to be countered using all necessary means, including both air and ground warfare. Zhou argued that China was even prepared to fight abroad against the United States should Chinese territory become occupied by American troops.[125]

Finally, China understood Vietnam's conflict with the United States as a major extension of Vietnam's struggle for national liberation—a direct echo of China's perception of the importance of the First Indochina War. During a meeting in June 1965 with Tanzanian President Julius Nyere, Zhou Enlai stressed that the situation in Vietnam was "most serious" from a world-wide perspective and that the more "America is bogged down," the better it would be for the continuation of Vietnam's national liberation movement. The most important question was how support would be provided for Vietnam's cause, and Zhou told Nyere that China was willing to provide "all kinds of support" to Vietnam and disperse the strength of the United States, thereby rendering it powerless.[126]

From June 1965, China sent various kinds of military personnel such as minesweepers, engineers, and logistic units to North Vietnam. In addition, until 1968, when the Tet offensive was reaching its boiling point, China diversified and increased the volume of its material support, from weaponry to various foodstuffs and other daily necessities. Chinese aid to Vietnam was most significant during the peak years of the Tet Offensive. In 1967, 170,000 Chinese soldiers were deployed to provide infrastructural help to Vietnam—constructing bridges, railroads and factories. By March 1968, Chinese troops stationed in Vietnam amounted to 320,000.[127] As such, until the end of the Tet Offensive, Chinese support for Vietnam remained fairly consistent. It was only from the early 1970s, when the war was drawing near to its conclusion with North Vietnam's occupation of Saigon, that Sino-Vietnamese relations hit their nadir and China drastically reduced its support of North Vietnam.[128]

The rapid increase of Chinese support to Vietnam up until the end of the Tet Offensive was based on fervent opposition to a negotiated peace with the United States. The Chinese Foreign Ministry criticized the Johnson Administration's call for international support for peace negotiations as an exploitation of the ignorance and the fear of Third World nations about a possible expansion of war. The Chinese feared that should negotiations really take place, they would decisively sever diplomatic relations between China and the Third World.[129] In addition, the United States was indirectly trying to sever Sino-Vietnamese relations. The United States branded China as the "only obstacle" to negotiations, eagerly trying to blame the Chinese for delaying a crucial opportunity to show the United States' genuine commitment to realizing peace in Vietnam. On the other hand, the United States was inviting forces that were hostile to China, such as "the Soviet revisionists, India, Yugoslavia, and other reactionaries."[130] Under such

121 *Peking Review*, March 11, 1966, p. 5. Adapted from Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 150. See also Li Danhui, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute over Assistance for Vietnam's Anti-American War, 1965-1972," in *Behind the Bamboo Curtain*, pp. 296-304.

122 "Liu Shaoqi's Speech to the Central Military Commission war planning meeting on May 19, 1965," May 19, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, *Dangde Wenxian* 3 (1995), 40 (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110410).

123 "Liu Shaoqi's Speech to the Central Military Commission war planning meeting on May 19, 1965."

124 "Liu Shaoqi's Speech to the Central Military Commission war planning meeti.ng on May 19, 1965."

125 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Indonesian Prime Minister Subandrio," May 28, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113062).

126 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Tanzanian President Julius Nyere," June 4, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77Conversation*s(http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113063).

127 Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, pp. 135-136.

128 Zhai*, China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 137.

129 "Chinese Foreign Ministry Circular, "Vietnam 'Peace Talk' Activities,"" August 19, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Jiangsu Provincial Archives, Q 3124, D, J 123. Translated for CWIHP by Qiang Zhai (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114469).

130 "Chinese Foreign Ministry Circular, 'Vietnam 'Peace Talk' Activities,"" August 19, 1965.

circumstances, negotiations were nothing more than a "betrayal of the Vietnamese people."[131]

China's opposition to a negotiated peace was such that Zhou Enlai even rejected French Minister of State Andre Malraux's offer to neutralize the Vietnam War, arguing that the United States started the war in violation of the Geneva Accords and that the war would continue because the United States was unlikely to leave Vietnam.[132] Chen Yi, the new Chinese Foreign Minister, elaborated on this particular point by praising the North Vietnamese for their determination to achieve a final victory which would eventually "unmask the face of the enemy." Unmasking America's true intentions in Vietnam was crucial because the Americans showed "no signs of wanting to have peace" and were instead busy trying to open talks to "deceive public opinion." The only feasible option left for North Vietnam was to engage in political struggle in response.[133] Although China desired a conclusion of the Vietnam War on North Vietnam's terms, a cessation of the conflict was highly unlikely in 1965, because the time was, as Zhou Enlai put it, "not ripe."[134] The Chinese leadership thought that should North Vietnam choose to negotiate with the United States, negotiations must only take place when North Vietnam could establish positive conditions.[135] China was once again firmly adhering to its cornerstone principle that "peaceful coexistence" could not be realized without full respect for national sovereignty.

China's support for a complete North Vietnamese victory remained firm until the Tet Offensive. During a meeting with Le Duan, Zhou Enlai praised North Vietnam for being at the "forefront of the anti-American struggle" and said that the blood of the Vietnamese people had been shed for a noble cause, earning them a high reputation as the "standard-bearers of a world revolution."[136] Zhou also urged the North Vietnamese to be wary of Soviet support, which was primarily aimed at arranging an armistice between Vietnam and the United States. Such a move was "deceitful," because it aimed to "cast a shadow between Vietnam and China." Improvement in U.S.-Vietnam relations would only obstruct the continuation of Vietnam's national revolution. Adhering to the Soviet Union's proposal for a negotiated peace was akin to adhering to "revisionism," which was incompatible with Vietnam's anti-American resistance.[137]

China and North Vietnam spent much of the following year analyzing ways to carry on Hanoi's struggle against the United States. Zhou Enlai told Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap that the American military strategy was largely centered on a heavy use of artillery—a tradition that began in the American Revolution and one that the American used as if they were "conducting exercises."[138] Zhou also warned that Vietnam must prepare for two likely scenarios. First, the war could simply expand. Second, should the Vietnamese refuse to surrender, the Americans could chose to totally blockade all of Vietnam's coastlines, even at the risk of jeopardizing relations with other countries. Zhou argued that Vietnam must promote a national propaganda, appeal for sympathy and aim to divide the enemy as much as possible to continue waging a war—the highest form of political struggle.[139] Zhou recommended that the Vietnamese take their time in fighting the United States, because it was a 100-mile journey that could only be completed when the first 90 miles were traveled.[140]

Hence, China sought to localize the war by mentoring the North Vietnamese on how they could effectively wage a de-

131 "Zhou Enlai's talk with E. H. K. Mudenda, Agricultural Minister of Zambia" August 20, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, The Diplomatic History Research Office of the People's Republic of China Foreign Ministry, ed., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975 (Chronology of Zhou Enlai's Diplomatic Activities, 1949-1975) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1993), p. 474. Translated for CWIHP by Qiang Zhai (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111524).

132 "Chinese Foreign Ministry circular, "Malraux's Visit to China," August 12, 1965, Record Group 3124, File 123. Jiangsu Provincial Archives. Cited in Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 162.

133 Chen Yi, "On U.S. Aggression in Vietnam," in *Vice-Premier Chen Yi Answers Questions Put By Correspondents* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), p. 6. (www.marxists.org).

134 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi," December 19, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113068).

135 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Nguyen Trinh Dinh," December 19. 1965. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWHIP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACFB39.pdf).

136 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Le Duan," March 23, 1966. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, 77 *Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113069).

137 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Le Duan," March 23, 1966.

138 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai, Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap," April 7, 1967, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113073).

139 "Zhou Enlai's Talk with Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap," April 10, 1967, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, The Diplomatic History Research Office of the People's Republic of China Foreign Ministry, ed., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975 (Chronology of Zhou Enlai's Diplomatic Activities, 1949-1975) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1993), p. 510. Translated for CWIHP by Qiang Zhai. (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112660)

140 "Discussion between Mao Zedong, Pham Van Dong, and Vo Nguyen Giap," April 11, 1967, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113053).

fensive war on their own. On April 11, 1967, Mao Zedong met with Pham Van Dong, the North Vietnamese Prime Minister, and told him that North Vietnam should firmly adhere to its strategy of guerilla warfare and maintain a defensive position throughout the course of the war:

"First, of course, it is necessary to construct defensive works along the coast…. The best way is to construct defensive works like the ones [we had constructed] during the Korean War, so that you may prevent the enemy from entering the inner land. Second, however, if the Americans are determined to invade the inner land, you may allow them to do so. You should pay attention to your strategy. You must not engage your main force in a head-to-head confrontation with them, and must well maintain your main force. My opinion is that so long as the green mountain is there, how can you ever lack firewood?"[141]

Mao also emphasized that since fighting a war of attrition was "like having meals," it was best not to take "too big a bite."[142] True victory in a war could only be declared when a nation demonstrates that it is able to fully "digest" the war and learn from that experience how to prepare for a much larger conflict against a more powerful adversary. By the end of 1967, the North Vietnamese had very painfully learned what Mao meant, losing more than 200,000 men.[143] However, members of the pro-war faction in the North Vietnamese government, such as Le Duan, remained convinced that Hanoi could still claim a victory because

"It is impossible for the United States to maintain its current troop level, to expand the war, or to drag it out. The Americans have no other option than employing greater military strength…I say we increase our military attacks so we can then seize the initiative to advance the diplomatic struggle in order to use world public opinion against the imperialist Americans and their bellicose puppets."[144]

After much deliberation, on January 21, 1968, North Vietnam's politburo issued an official statement announcing the beginning of the Tet Offensive. The statement confirmed the formation of the "Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces," which would aim to "divide the enemy to the greatest extent," and fight for "independence and sovereignty, freedom, and democracy," all of which would be possible through the realization of the ultimate goal—withdrawal of American troops. The Alliance was to fight for a liberated and unified Vietnam, and for anyone who wanted a South Vietnam that was "sovereign, independent, democratic, peaceful, and neutral."[145]

For Beijing, the most important objective was to effectively control the amount of violence near its southern border. Furthermore, China's leadership was increasingly wary of a possible collaboration between Vietnam and the Soviet Union because the Tet Offensive strongly emphasized controlling cities and towns in South Vietnam, a strategy which the Chinese considered as immature. As Lien-Hang Nguyen argues, Beijing strongly disapproved of the strategy because it was a "total repudiation of Mao's protracted warfare and an embrace of Soviet-style warfare."[146] Therefore, the ideal amount of violence that China favored was, as Qiang Zhai describes, "low to mid-intensity," so that China could localize the conflict in Vietnam as much as possible to avoid a direct military confrontation with the United States and wrestling with Moscow over how much support should be provided to Hanoi.[147] With these crucial objectives in mind, China advised the Vietnamese to engage in mobilized warfare against the United States. Zhou Enlai told Ho Chi Minh on February 7, 1968 that Vietnam should consider organizing Army corps which would maximize numerical superiority to overwhelm the United States:

"Each of them will be composed of 30,000-40,000 soldiers, and each of their combat operations should aim at eliminating 4,000-5,000 enemy soldiers in whole units. These field army corps should be able to carry out operational tasks far away from their home bases, and should be able to engage in operations in this war zone, or in that war zone. When they are attacking isolated enemy forces, they may adopt the strategy of approaching the enemy by underground tunnels. They may also adopt the strategy of night fighting and short-distance fighting, so that the enemy's bombers and artillery fire will not be in a position to play a role. In the meantime, you may construct underground galleries, which are different from the simple underground tunnels, in three or four directions [around the enemy], and use them for troop movement and ammunition transportation. You also need to reserve some units for

141 "Discussion between Chinese and Vietnamese delegations," April 11, 1967,"History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112155).

142 "Discussion between Mao Zedong, Pham Van Dong, and Vo Nguyen Giap, 11, 1967."

143 William Thomas Allison, *The Tet Offensive: A Brief History with Documents* (New York and Oxon, U.K.: Routledge, 2008), p. 7.

144 "Vietnamese General Staff-Combat Operations Department, *Lich su Cuc Tac Chien*," p. 468, adapted from Nguyen, *Hanoi's War*, p. 98.

145 "Secret North Vietnam Politburo Cable," January 21, 1968, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Party Central Committee, Hanoi. Translated for CWIHP by Merle Pribbenow (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/11397). See also Allison, *The Tet Offensive*, pp. 22-27 and 28-56 for a general discussion of the specific stages of military operations during the offensive.

146 Nguyen, *Hanoi's War*, p. 113 and Nguyen, "The War Politiburo: North Vietnam's Diplomatic and Political Road to the Tet Offensive," *Journal of Vietnamese Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1-2 (February/August, 2006), pp. 29-30.

147 Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 178.

dealing with the enemy's reinforcements."[148]

In addition to strongly encouraging the extensive use of guerrilla warfare against an enlarging American force, upon hearing the Johnson Administration's announcement of the so-called "March 31 Statement," China seized the chance to increase its level of criticism of the United States. On April 13, 1968, Zhou Enlai met with Pham Van Dong and warned of a possible continuation of American aggression. Zhou called the Johnson Administration's decision to send more troops to Vietnam a "wicked and deceitful scheme" and argued that it was evident that the Johnson Administration did not want to give up on the war.[149] However, Zhou was also wary of Vietnam's mistakes in agreeing to sit at the negotiation table with the United States. Zhou criticized Vietnam's leaders for solving the Johnson Administration's problems, making a decision which so many people did not understand. Zhou believed that the Vietnamese ceded a superior position during the negotiations by accepting the Johnson Administration's offer to "meet" instead of "contacting" the Vietnamese, thereby lessening the importance of rejecting the negotiations for the Vietnamese to gain an advantageous position over the United States. This blatant display of complacency allowed the United States to easily reject Vietnam's offer of Phnom Penh and Warsaw as venues for negotiations.[150]

These two critical mistakes not only "increased the number of votes for Johnson and increased stock prices in New York," but also allowed the United States to employ a "double-dealing policy" of continuing to bomb South Vietnam while prolonging its efforts to hold negotiations.[151] Zhou suggested that instead of negotiating a way out of the war, the North Vietnamese should prepare to fight for the next two or three years, focusing on the question of how to gain a great victory, which would require large-scale battles.[152] However, Hanoi had a more realistic solution in mind that would not require any fighting—negotiating with Washington.

The Paris Peace Talks and the Last Gasps of Tension (1968-1971)

Despite China's warnings to not engage in negotiations with the United States, North Vietnam agreed to negotiations on May 13, 1968. The North Vietnamese delegation, led by Xuan Than Thuy, demanded a complete American withdrawal from Vietnam. In response, the American representative Averell Harriman demanded North Vietnam's complete withdrawal from South Vietnam. However, the conference was brought to a deadlock over the issue of when the bombings in South Vietnam would cease. The United States offered a final compromise in which North Vietnam's military de-escalation would guarantee a total cessation of the bombings. On October 27, 1968, the two sides officially agreed that bombings would be brought to an unconditional halt and that the United States would recognize the Saigon government in the Paris peace talks.[153]

When Beijing heard the news of the agreement, it quickly reminded Hanoi that the negotiations were just a silent phase of a war that was far from over. On November 17, 1968, Mao Zedong told Pham Van Dong that negotiations are like fighting and involve deception. Hence, it was unwise to rely solely on negotiations to make the United States withdraw its troops from Vietnam. Mao told Pham that China would withdraw unneeded troops from Vietnam and send them back if assistance was required.[154] Convinced that the failure of the Tet Offensive marked Hanoi's political independence from Beijing and departed from Mao's doctrine of "protracted warfare," China withdrew most of its military personnel from Vietnam by the summer of 1970.[155]

As negotiations between Nixon and Thieu were underway, Beijing cautioned Hanoi to be suspicious of Washington.[156] On April 12, 1969, Zhou Enlai told a North Vietnamese delegation to Beijing that while China was happy to see North Vietnam's determination to fight the Americans and the South Vietnamese and that the Nixon Administration was "facing a lot of difficulties," the Nixon Administration was still "stubbornly promoting neo-colonialism" in Vietnam.[157] Zhou argued that while Nixon was "more intelligent" than Johnson in recognizing Cambodia, China was not optimistic about what was happening in Cambodia because Cambodia was "tilting to the right," and the United States already knew that China was

148 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Ho Chi Minh," February 7, 1968, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations*. (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112172).

149 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong," April 13, 1968. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations*. (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112173).

150 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong," April 13, 1968.

151 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong," April 13, 1968.

152 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong," April 17, 1968. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112174).

153 Zubeida Mustafa, "The Paris Peace Talks," *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (First Quarter, 1969), pp. 30-31.

154 "Discussion between Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong," November 17, 1968, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22*, 77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112181).

155 Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 179.

156 On this topic, see Nguyen, *Hanoi's War*, pp. 140-142.

157 "Zhou Enlai and Kang Sheng's comments to a COSVN Delegation" April 12, 1969, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112182).

supplying the North Vietnamese forces via Cambodia.[158]

Zhou's pessimistic assessment of the military situation proved correct as Nixon announced his determination to take "effective and strong measures" to reduce American casualties by substantially increasing the American military commitment in Vietnam.[159] In response, the Hanoi-based *People's Daily* harshly criticized the Nixon Doctrine for

"…dividing the socialist countries, winning over one section and pitting it against another in order to oppose [the] national liberation movement and carry out a counter-revolutionary peaceful evolution in socialist countries. Nixon's policy also consists of trying to achieve a compromise between the big powers in an attempt to make smaller countries bow to their arrangement."[160]

North Vietnam's military headquarters, sharing the same fear about the Nixon Doctrine as the *People's Daily*, issued a nation-wide directive urging the continuation of the struggle against the United States, even if it had to be done without Chinese assistance.[161]

However, since China clearly understood how important the security of its southern border was in the face of increasing American aggression, it did not sit idly and wait for a natural failure of its "containment" policy. By the end of December 1969, China had completed a road that linked Yunnan Province with Muong Sai in northern Laos. As Qiang Zhai argues, China was still keen to protect its influence over its Communist allies in Southeast Asia, although it had militarily withdrawn from Vietnam. North Vietnam became very suspicious of the veracity of China's commitment to the Sino-Vietnamese alliance, and China's activities in Laos would become a major factor in the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations throughout the 1970s.[162]

Moreover, China had to pay attention to more than Vietnam during the early 1970s, as the war in Vietnam expanded to Cambodia. More specifically, the Nixon Administration's secret bombing of Cambodia, which would last for three months after its initiation on April 29, 1970, meant the appearance of a major new source of instability along China's southern border. The answer to whether Cambodia could guarantee neutrality lay in the hands of Lon Nol, a pro-democracy Cambodian candidate who enjoyed American support, and Prince Sihanouk. China supported Sihanouk because Nol's victory in upcoming general elections in 1971 would allow the United States to expand the war into Cambodia. By contrast, Sihanouk's victory would ensure Cambodia's neutrality. Although it was clear that Sihanouk's victory would be more advantageous for the security of its southern border, China was caught in a dilemma over the problem of whether to support the incumbent Sihanouk government. The Sihanouk government's proclamation of neutrality assured that Hanoi's influence over Cambodia would effectively be capped. On the other hand, as Qiang Zhai argues, China's perception of the Sihanouk government's "tilt to the right" brought fears that it would increase the intensity of the revolutionary Samlaut forces, which were anti-American. Failure to support the Communist Samlaut forces would jeopardize China's international credibility as the vanguard of Asian Communism. Yet, because China strongly trusted Sihanouk's ability to lead a stable government, it had a difficult time clearly deciding with whom to form an alliance..[163] Furthermore, China wanted to establish an independent Indochina consisting of sovereign states—a plan that directly ran counter to Vietnam's ambition of increasing its influence through the creation of a united front against American aggression. Hence, a successful handling of the crisis in Cambodia was a critical cornerstone to determining the postwar order of Indochina.[164] China once again successfully balanced geopolitical security with ideological commitment.

On March 21, 1970, Zhou Enlai told Pham Van Dong that China and Vietnam should support Sihanouk because of his support for the anti-American struggle and because Cambodia shared a history of anti-imperialist struggle against France and Japan. Pham Van Dong replied that he did not see any need to negotiate with Cambodia about the expansion of the war, and that China will have to "wait, explore Cambodia's attitude, and play for time."[165]

However, Zhou did not wait for Cambodia's response. Zhou Enlai met with Sihanouk and told him that so long as he was "determined to fight to the end," China would fully support him.[166] About a month later, China hosted an informal conference on Indochina and urged all Indochinese peoples to be united in the struggle against American aggression, a struggle China promised to strongly support. The conference most notably saw Sihanouk's agreement to Vietnam's use of Cambo-

158 "Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, Pham Van Dong, Hoang Van Thai and Pham Hung address the COSVN delegation," April 20, 1969, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations*. (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112183).

159 Richard Nixon, "Vietnamization Speech," November 3, 1969 (http://vietnam.vassar.edu/overview/doc14.html).

160 P.J. Honey, "North Vietnam Quarterly Report No. 42, Nixon's Peking Visit and the Vietnam War," *China News Analysis* 855, 17 September 1971, pp. 1-7. Adapted from John W. Garver, "Sino-Vietnamese Conflict and Sino-American Rapprochement," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 96, No. 3 (Autumn, 1981), pp. 454-455.

161 John W. Garver, "Sino-Vietnamese Conflict and Sino-American Rapprochement," p. 455.

162 Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 180.

163 Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, pp. 182-183.

164 Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 184.

165 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong," March 21, 1970, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112185).

166 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Prince Sihanouk," March 22, 1970, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112189).

dian territory in preparation for the war's possible expansion beyond Vietnamese territory.[167]

When the United States finally invaded Cambodia in May 1970, China encouraged North Vietnam to continue fighting the Americans without any fear. During a meeting with Le Duan, Mao Zedong argued that the United States had its limits in military capacity, and refuted Nixon's claim that the United States had never been defeated up to the Vietnam War, citing the Korean War and the First Indochina War as notable examples. Mao further advised Le to use the United States' fear of being defeated to North Vietnam's advantage, because the Americans "had no guts." Mao argued that North Vietnam had a more legitimate cause in the war, for it was the Americans who had "sabotaged the two Geneva Conferences." Mao was very certain of North Vietnam's eventual victory over the United States such that he thought it was better that the United States had breached the agreements reached during the Geneva Conference.[168]

On September 17, 1970, Pham Van Dong met with Zhou Enlai and told Zhou that North Vietnam was considering diplomatic negotiations with the United States, although diplomacy was just a "play with words." Pham argued that North Vietnam wished to influence both American and world public opinion by making North Vietnam's intentions clear on two major issues: an unconditional withdrawal of American troops and a removal of the Thieu government in South Vietnam. Zhou replied that North Vietnam should share with China critical information regarding the negotiating process because of their close relationship.[169]

China supported North Vietnam not only to prevent a possible escalation of the American military threat, but also to deter the possible spread of Soviet influence over Vietnam. On March 7, 1971, Zhou Enlai met with Le Duan and told him that inviting the Soviet Union to participate in Southeast Asia's affairs was a risky business, because it would cause the loss of both China and Vietnam's political independence. "If we take the Soviets' side, they will control us. And if there is disagreement between us, we should talk it out on the basis of independence and self-reliance. If we establish a world-wide people's front that includes the Soviets, they will control this front. So you have to take the initiative on this matter...the Soviets wish to establish a united front in which we have to listen to them."[170]

Beijing soon thought up a simpler, albeit risky, method to solidify the Sino-Vietnamese alliance and contain Moscow—increasing economic and military aid to Hanoi.

Between Peace and Ideological Integrity (1971-1973)

China sought to assuage its own fear of a close Soviet-Vietnamese relationship by increasing the volume of its military and economic aid to North Vietnam from 1971 to 1973. China sent engineers and technicians to repair critical road networks that connected Vietnam with China's southern border. In addition, China made sure that tense Sino-Soviet relations did not impede the acceleration of China's support for North Vietnam and signed agreements with various Soviet satellite states to allow supplies to reach Vietnam more quickly. On June 18, 1972, China and North Vietnam agreed that shipments from Cuba and Eastern Europe could pass through Chinese ports to facilitate the delivery of supplies.[171]

However, Hanoi was growing increasingly impatient with slow negotiations, and even South Vietnam grew very weary of the war and issued a final ultimatum. On July 1, 1971, South Vietnam's foreign minister, Nguyen Thi Binh, issued a seven-point declaration demanding that the United States give a specific date for a complete withdrawal and recognize the South Vietnamese people's right to overthrow the ruling Thieu Administration. If these terms were satisfied, South Vietnam would be a neutral country and establish normal diplomatic relations with all other countries in the world.[172] South Vietnam hoped that these demands would draw attention from both China and the United States and put a decisive end to the war.

China did not want to sever its relations with the United States for the sake of Vietnam, but did wish to see a clear end to the war. About six months after South Vietnam's issue of the seven-point declaration, Zhou Enlai met with the United States Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Kissinger informed Zhou that the United States wished to end the war through negotiations by announcing a timetable for a complete withdrawal. Zhou told Kissinger that the United States should withdraw

167 Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 191.

168 "Discussion between Mao Zedong and Le Duan," May 11, 1970, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113033).

169 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong," September 17, 1970, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113104).

170 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai, Le Duan and Pham Van Dong," March 7, 1971, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113108).

171 Nicholas Khoo, *Collateral Damage: Sino-Soviet Rivalry and the Termination of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 74-75.

172 "A Seven-Point Declaration of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam," July 1, 1971, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry Archives, published in "Basic documents on diplomatic struggle from April 1965 to July 1980", pages 35-39 (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114440) and Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 197.

from Vietnam very soon if it wished to preserve its national honor.[173] What Zhou really meant was that China wanted to see some clear proof that American and Soviet influences were "contained" by securing peace in Vietnam.[174] China's choice to normalize relations with the United States, as Nicholas Khoo puts it, led Hanoi to believe that Beijing was "violating the trust and sincerity" of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance.[175] As John Garver argues, when a Sino-American summit opened in February 1972, Vietnam complained that China and the United States had no right to decide its fate.[176] Hanoi wanted to ascertain that it was clearly in charge of what was rightly Vietnam's national affair, and did not fully expect Beijing to present conditions that were in Hanoi's favor when negotiating with the Americans. Hanoi even criticized Beijing's invitation of Nixon as akin to "throwing a life preserver to someone who is about to drown," and ordered the Vietnamese press to not publish anything on the matter until late 1971.[177]

On February 28, 1972, China and the United States signed the Shanghai Communiqué, which promised the normalization of Sino-American relations, the avoidance of international military conflict, and opposition to the establishment of hegemony over Asia and the Pacific by any nation, and confirmed that both sides would not "negotiate on behalf of any third party or enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states."[178] The two sides also agreed that the normalization of China-U.S. relations would "contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world."[179] To erase North Vietnam's doubts about China's sincerity towards the Sino-Vietnamese alliance, Zhou Enlai met with Nguyen Tien Binh, Hanoi's charge d' affairs, in April and reaffirmed China's unwavering support for North Vietnam in the wake of another massive American bombing campaign. Zhou told Binh that although the United States planned to extend the bombing, it would not succeed, because China was determined to support the "serious stand of the DRV government," and to try its best to "support the Vietnamese people to carry the anti-American patriotic war to its end."[180] Zhou also met with Xuan Thuy, who was serving as Hanoi's representative to the Paris peace talks, in early July and told Xuan to concentrate on the offensive, especially during the crucial four-month period of July to October, as Zhou thought that a clear North Vietnamese victory would strongly convince Hanoi of the continuing and visible efficacy of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance against American imperialism.[181]

Hanoi also eagerly wanted to end the war on its own terms to demonstrate that the course of the war should remain independent from the Sino-American rapprochement. Furthermore, North Vietnam's leaders believed that success in the offensive would effectively discredit Nixon and significantly reduce his chances of winning reelection. Finally, as Qiang Zhai argues, despite the importance of its alliances with the two Communist superpowers, Hanoi did not want to emulate China and the Soviet Union, both of whom were becoming increasingly conciliatory towards the United States.[182]

However, what Beijing genuinely and urgently wanted to see was a permanent peace between Washington and Hanoi. In accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, North Vietnam's push for ultimate victory was of little value for Beijing if it meant an indefinite continuation of violence in Indochina. Therefore, Zhou met with Le Duc Tho and urged Hanoi to negotiate with the United States. While Beijing did not recognize the Thieu Administration, for it was a "puppet of the United States," Zhou suggested that Hanoi could accept it as a "representative" of the coalition government and urge the United States to correctly assess the conflict in Vietnam as a national one, and therefore, outside military intervention was no longer necessary.[183] Le replied that only when the United States recognized a tripartite government would Hanoi allow for general elections to take place. Zhou advised that it was probably wise for Hanoi to play a balancing game in which the establishment of a coalition government would buy time for

173 Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 196 and Nguyen *Hanoi's War*, p. 213.
174 Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 197.
175 Khoo, *Collateral Damage*, p. 68.
176 John W. Garver, "Sino-Vietnamese Conflict and Sino-American Rapprochement," *Political Science Quarterly*, .Vol. 96, No. 3 (Autumn, 1981), p. 455.
177 Garver, "Sino-Vietnamese Conflict and Sino-American Rapprochement," p. 454.
178 "Joint Communiquéof the United States of America and the Peoples' Republic of China," ("Shanghai Communique") February 28, 1972 (http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/china/shanghai_communique.pdf), p. 2.
179 "Shanghai Communique," p. 3.
180 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Nguyen Tien," April 12, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113111). See also Shen Zhihua, "Sino-U.S. Reconciliation and China's Vietnam Policy," in *Behind the Bamboo Curtain*, pp. 355-359.
181 "Zhou Enlai's Talk with Xuan Thuy, Head of the DRV Delegation to the Paris Talks, in Beijing," July 7, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975 (Chronology of Zhou Enlai's Diplomatic Activities, 1949-1975) (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi chubanshe, 1993), p. 636. Translated for CWIHP by Qiang Zhai. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111532.
182 Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*, p. 202.
183 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Le Duc Tho," July 12, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* . (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113113)

North Vietnam to grow stronger than South Vietnam.[184]

Hanoi chose to ignore Zhou's confusingly contradictory advice and tried to militarily pressure South Vietnam to agree to a Communist-led national reunification. National reunification had to be realized at any cost, even if it meant that the Nguyen Thieu regime could not be overthrown.[185] However, Hanoi's belief in deciding its own fate soon turned out to be a mirage, for Beijing quickly exploited the failure of the Spring Offensive as a sure chance to teach Hanoi about conducting flexible negotiations. The Communist forces only had enough strength to defend Hanoi from American bomb attacks, and could no longer exert pressure on South Vietnam.[186] After engaging in "people's diplomacy" by inviting Jane Fonda to assess the intensity of American bombings, Hanoi finally agreed with Washington in July to initiate negotiations.[187]

China clearly favored this rapid development of a consensus around negotiations, for Hanoi's success in negotiations with Washington would not only accelerate a Communist victory in Vietnam, which would surely provide China with much credit for being Hanoi's dedicated ideological companion, but would also increase the safety of China's southern border. Thus, China eagerly pushed North Vietnam to sit for negotiations as soon as possible. On December 29, 1972, Mao Zedong told Nguyen Thi Binh that success in the negotiations was crucial because it would not only normalize relations between Hanoi and Saigon, but also decide the duration and the nature of the conflict. If the war should continue for another century, it was a revolution; otherwise it was "opportunism."[188] Zhou Enlai met with several other North Vietnamese high officials, including Le Duc Tho, and urged them to continue negotiating seriously with Washington, since Nixon was planning to withdraw American forces from Vietnam completely. Zhou emphasized that flexibility in negotiations should have one important aim: to allow the Americans to leave Vietnam.[189]

Zhou was not suggesting, however, that China had completely abandoned North Vietnam's cause. He met with Le Duc Tho on July 12, 1972 and urged Hanoi to concentrate on addressing the problem of what should be done with Nguyen van Thieu, South Vietnam's President.[190] Zhou said that China did not approve of Nguyen because he was merely a "puppet of the U.S." and would only recognize Thieu if he agreed to be part of a coalition government. When Le mentioned the problem of dealing with neutral forces who were both "pro-French and pro-Vietnamese," Zhou advised that it would be in Hanoi's best interest if Saigon "played with time," debating about who were the most suitable members for a coalition government, so that Hanoi could have time to recover and continue fighting.[191] However, what Zhou told Le was only a half-truth.[192] China was growing extremely weary of almost two decades of political instability along its southern border and decided to restore Sino-American relations and seek genuine and permanent peace.[193]

Hence, Zhou quickly flew to Washington to discuss with Kissinger concrete and effective solutions to end the Vietnam War as soon as possible. During their meeting, both Zhou and Kissinger agreed that there must be a clear conclusion to the war through peace negotiations between Washington and Hanoi. Kissinger emphasized that the United States no longer had any interest in "defeating or destroying" North Vietnam. It was for "everybody's sake" that peace be firmly realized in Indochina.[194] Should the war continue, it would cause the United States to "act much more violently" than under normal circumstances and Hanoi would have to face consequences that would go beyond Vietnam and affect the security of Indochina as a whole.

In addition, Kissinger assured Zhou that there was no longer any "fundamental opposition" to the normalization of Sino-American relations.[195] Zhou replied that China only wished for a quick withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam and full political independence for Indochina.[196] The Zhou-Kissinger conversation made it clear that Sino-American relations would no longer have to remain cold due to what

184 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Le Duc Tho," July 12, 1972.

185 George C. Herring, "The Cold War and Vietnam," *OAH Magazine of History*, Vol. 18, No. 5, Vietnam (October, 2004), p. 20.

186 Nguyen, *Hanoi's War*, pp. 260-261.

187 Nguyen, *Hanoi's War*, p. 261.

188 "Discussion between Mao Zedong and Nguyen Thi Binh," December 29, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113114).

189 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Le Duc Tho," January 3, 1973, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, *77 Conversations* (http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113116).

190 Le was the Special Adviser to the North Vietnamese delegation during the negotiations.

191 "Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Le Duc Tho," July 12, 1972.

192 Lien-Hang Nguyen makes a similar observation in *Hanoi's War*, p. 256.

193 For an elaboration of Beijing's motives to push Hanoi toward negotiations with Washington, see Shen Zhihua, "Sino-U.S. Reconciliation and China's Vietnam Policy," in *Behind the Bamboo Curtain*, pp. 359-365.

194 Henry Kissinger, "Discussion with Zhou Enlai of Moscow Summit, South Asia, and Vietnam," Top Secret, Memorandum of Conversation, June 20, 1972, p. 36 (http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/KT/00516/all.pdf).

195 Kissinger, "Discussion with Zhou Enlai," p. 36.

196 Yafeng Xia, *Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949-1972* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), p. 168, and Chris Tudda, *A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969-1972* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2012), p. 186 and p. 189.

was happening in Vietnam. With respect to the fact that China's primary goal in its diplomacy since 1954 had always been protecting the stability of southern China, it was logical for the Chinese leadership to instruct Zhou to negotiate terms for peace, ideally without sacrificing any Chinese soldiers. Kissinger's promise of American withdrawal assured the security of southern China after 19 years of constant geopolitical insecurity.

On January 27, 1973, the American and Vietnamese delegations signed the Paris Accords. The Accords confirmed that the United States "fully recognized the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam." The agreement granted full autonomy to Vietnam in answering the critical question of national reunification, on the basis of "discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam, without coercion or annexation," so that both sides could promptly start negotiations.[197] However, Mao Zedong was keen to recognize that American withdrawal from Vietnam would not resolve the original tension between North and South Vietnam. Hence, he installed a "safety valve" in Indochina by advising Le Duc Tho to concentrate on "stabilizing the situation in South Vietnam."[198] Mao thereby successfully adhered to non-interference, containing the conflict between Hanoi and Saigon strictly within Vietnam and also securing a firm defense of Southern China. Beijing watched, unscathed, as Saigon fell on April 30, 1975. China's two decades of international diplomacy against the United States and the Soviet Union were finally over.

Conclusion: Chinese "Containment" During the First Two Indochina Wars as a Major Jigsaw Puzzle in History

Throughout the first two Indochina wars, China wanted to maintain a complete equilibrium between ideological integrity and geopolitical security. For almost two decades, China's main concern was to secure the stability of southern China by pivoting between China's domestic and international priorities. Domestically, Mao Zedong had to worry about maintaining his power, while also making sure that China's industrialization did not get bogged down by the pressure of the war. Internationally, China adopted Communist ideological integrity and anti-imperialism as its major slogans for foreign diplomacy, primarily relying on Zhou Enlai to make non-aligned nations understand its position. China also tried to give North Vietnam sufficient confidence about its sincerity towards the Sino-Vietnamese alliance and sought to use that alliance to its own advantage, eventually going so far as to abandon it in 1972. Such diplomatic flexibility allowed China to avoid shedding much of its own blood throughout the two Indochina Wars.

However, there is more to explore about the dynamics of China's involvement. Since the Chinese Communist Party does not make available primary sources on China's activities during the Cold War, the primary sources studied in this paper represent only the tip of the iceberg. Hanoi's role during the two wars also remains very hazy because of the Vietnamese government's restrictions on access to important Party documents. Further study about Vietnam's initiatives during the 1954 Geneva Conference and about North and South Vietnamese motives and actions throughout the Second Indochina War is highly necessary to clarify Vietnamese agency during the war.[199] Finally, more research on Soviet and American initiatives during the two wars needs to be done, and given that barely forty years have passed since the fall of Saigon, there is much potential for more original scholarship to be published on Soviet and American roles during the two Indochina Wars.

Despite these limitations, I have attempted to present Chinese "containment" during the first two Indochina Wars—balancing ideological integrity with geopolitical integrity—as an exercise of *realpolitik* during one of the most turbulent moments in world history. Although China had to oscillate between ideological integrity and geopolitical security interests, often alienating North Vietnam, this was always for the sake of southern China's security. China's unique cultural, historical, and political motives to pursue this strategy during the longest military conflict in international Cold War history might allow us to understand "varied and paradoxical consequences" of China's strategy and transcend the dichotomy of a "Democracy versus Communism" paradigm in Cold War history.[200] Only then will the remaining pieces of the Cold War jigsaw puzzle finally have found their rightful places.[201]

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199 Nguyen, *Hanoi's War*, p. 11.

200 See Matthew Connelly, "Taking off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 105, No. 3 (June, 2000), p. 767 and p. 769.

201: See Edward Hallet Carr, *What is History?* (New York: Vintage House Books, 1961), p. 135.

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"Vaux-Hall - Dr. Johnson, Oliver Goldsmith, Mary Robinson, et al" (1785) by Thomas Rowlandson . Creative Commons.

Vice in Vauxhall: Debauchery and the Pleasure Garden, 1730-1770

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On the 21st of April, 1749, George Frederic Handel rehearsed his ill-fated fireworks display at the Vauxhall Pleasure Gardens. It was a spectacle for all of London: "A thousand twenty five coaches passed the Turnpike that Morning, in their way tither," causing a roadblock that lasted for hours on the London Bridge.[1] Drawing thousands of visitors was nothing new for Lambeth's most popular attraction. Vauxhall appealed to a wide array of people in eighteenth-century London and the Pleasure Garden itself habitually drew people from all around the metropolis. As court life offered little entertainment, many looked elsewhere for places to spend their leisure time. Luckily for the Gardens, the English gentry and aristocracy had a preference for entertainment in the open air, and soon after the Restoration, probably in 1661, the Vauxhall New Spring Gardens were opened. Initially, there was no fee to this meager collection of trees on the rural south bank of the River Thames, but it would mushroom into one of the pre-eminent attractions of London. As such, it is of much interest for those wishing to explore the social dynamics of London and ascertain who, precisely, dictated social mores around London.

Curiously, however, many authors skirt over an issue central to our knowledge of the operation of this Pleasure Gar-

1 "London Intelligence", *Whitehall Evening Post or London Intelligencer*, April 25, 1749.

den: the way debauchery looked and operated there.[2] As a location where significant social intermingling occurred, Vauxhall reveals much about the negotiated nature of acceptable comportment. Unfortunately most have concentrated on the development of the Gardens and the personality of Jonathan Tyres in his roles as master of ceremonies and proprietor at the expense of this analysis. Warwick W. Wroth and Arthur E. Wroth's *The London Pleasure Gardens of the Eighteenth Century* is a quintessential example of early scholarship on the development of the Pleasure Garden from its inception to its closure.[3] They further contextualize Vauxhall among all other pleasure gardens they discovered, sixty-five in total. Others have contributed a more focused view. Walter Scott's *Green Retreats* explores the history of the Gardens, but also addresses the problem of access and publicity to which Wroth and Wroth do not devote much attention.[4] T. J. Edelstein's *Vauxhall Gardens* beings where Scott's account left off, detailing the pecuniary aspects of the Gardens, especially as they related to the regulation of space.[5] Specifically, Edelstein argues, the proprietors of the Gardens had to carefully balance polite respectability and its reputation of overt sexuality in order to be successful. Indeed, that the Gardens stayed open for so long hints at its success. Miles Ogborn's *Spaces of Modernity* features a chapter on the Gardens as a cultural and social geography.[6] Ogborn sees Vauxhall principally as a spectacle of consumption wherein a person could show off their politeness or become more polite by osmosis. Indeed, in an era where leisure time was a key indicator of high social standing, it is thoroughly unsurprising that many sought to consume leisure time in as public a manner as possible. More recently, David Coke and Alan Borg's incisive and authoritative *Vauxhall Gardens: A History* examines not only the owners and patrons of the Gardens, but also the geography, art, and music that so captivated thousands of visitors.[7] P. J. Corfield's *Vauxhall: Sex and Entertainment* stresses the problems management faced with maintaining public interest without giving in to debauchery.[8]

The proprietors certainly wanted to make money and thus relied on cultivating respectability at the same time as encouraging some less-than-polite behavior. Vauxhall relied first and foremost on very wealthy and famous gentry to encourage many of the middling sorts to attend. Tyres thus faced a very difficult conundrum: if they attempted to cultivate an image of polite respectability, as did their chief competitor Ranelagh, they would preclude the attendance of many of those who bought tickets and contributed to Vauxhall's monetary success. However, if the Gardens was a site of too much libertine debauchery, the gentry would take their business elsewhere and a chief incentive for many to come to Vauxhall would be no more. Part of Tyres's response was a price increase, which in many cases prevented poor and middling sorts from attending on nights when important people had planned to see the Gardens. Historians have detailed this problem extensively and further demonstrated how the proprietors of the Gardens responded – successfully or no – to them.[9] There is, strangely, as of yet no reflection on precisely *whom* owners identified as the cause of these problems. Were these problems the conduct of drunken gentry after one too many of the notorious and heady Vauxhall rum punch or a more systematic penetration of middling individuals – or the owners themselves – into a space frequented by those with deep pockets and polite sensibilities?[10] If the former is the case, then the policing of polite sensibilities by bourgeois individuals flips the typical police of comportment on its head.[11] If the latter, then the actions of proprietors betray a sort of social inertia on their part, but also indicate that middling Londoners were quite keen to access (and hence denature) the spaces of polite Londoners, if not to disrupt the

2 In this essay, "debauchery" refers to acts that would normally call into question a person's polite reputation. In Vauxhall, this was largely limited to loud and lewd suggestions – frequently sexual – that arose from Vauxhall's very potent punch. The "flashing" of erogenous zones was relatively common, as were flirtation and kissing, but we have no evidence that sexual intercourse ever took place in the gardens. All the above activities would have called into question the respectability of a Londoner to some extent.

3 Warwick William Wroth and Arthur Edgar Wroth, *The London Pleasure Gardens of the Eighteenth Century* (London: Macmillan, 1979).

4 Walter Sidney Scott, *Green Retreats: The Story of Vauxhall Gardens, 1661-1859* (London: Odhams Press, 1955).

5 T. J. Edelstein and Brian Allen, *Vauxhall Gardens* (New Haven: Yale Center for British Art, 1983).

6 Miles Ogborn, *Spaces of Modernity: London's Geographies, 1680-1780* (London: Guilford Press, 1998), 116-157.

7 David Coke and Alan Borg, *Vauxhall Gardens: A History* (London: Yale University Press for the Paul Mellon Centre for Studies in British Art, 2011).

8 P. J. Corfield, *Vauxhall: Sex and Entertainment: London's Pioneering Urban Pleasure Garden* (London: History & Social Action Publication, 2012).

9 See for example Corfield, *Vauxhall*, 11; Edelstein, *Vauxhall Gardens*, 25; Coke and Borg, *Vauxhall Gardens*, 220; and Wroth and Wroth, *The London Pleasure Gardens of the Eighteenth Century*, 292.

10 Politeness was a court culture in this period, reserved principally for aristocracy and gentry who were in many cases *de facto* polite regardless of their conduct. It replaced sixteenth-century discourses of civility and showed significant imbrications with respectability, decorum, and decency. Near the end of the seventeenth century, many found politeness too affected and the concept of sensibility came into vogue. By the reign of Queen Victoria, the idea of respectability became the norm for the higher classes of London.

11 Police in this essay will refer to proprietors' attempts to control behavior in Vauxhall. Police in London during the 18th century was inherently decentralized. Many historians cast the aristocracy as the arbiters of polite comportment in our period, but the aristocracy, attempting to avoid charges of French absolutism, frequently allowed much lewd behavior for the sake of free will. Police then appears as a communal (though not entirely equitable) force in Vauxhall.

cultural hegemony of the landed aristocracy. This essay argues that Tyres's control of polite comportment in his gardens complicates the traditional narrative historians weave. By controlling the behavior of all in his gardens, he in some cases replaced the aristocracy as the exemplars of politeness.

This essay concerns itself most with Vauxhall during its rise and apogee. In 1728, Jonathan Tyres secured a lease for the New Spring Gardens at Vauxhall from Elizabeth Masters for £250 per annum, and in the coming decades would renovate and market the Gardens to make it a pioneering location that ranked among Westminster, the Tower of London, and St. Paul's as a visitor attraction.[12] Subsequent purchases by Tyres in 1752 and 1758 culminated in his becoming the sole proprietor of the Gardens. Shortly after securing the initial lease from Masters, Tyres organized a *Ridotto al Fresco* – an Italian-style carnival and ball – to celebrate the reopening of his Gardens. Over 400 of London's finest turned up to his *Ridotto*, which cost one pound, significantly more than the normal one-shilling admittance fee.[13] This was a special event designed to cement the respectability of Vauxhall in the minds of aristocrats and was especially crucial to the success of the Gardens given its previous reputation. From 1661 until Tyres took over, Vauxhall was infamous for its debauchery. Some even went so far as to liken it to an outdoor brothel.[14] Tyres had to work within the confines of this image; the sexual seductiveness of the site itself was one of the chief reasons many attended. Yet the *Ridotto* demonstrates Tyres's wish to make Vauxhall a polite space. From this Italian-style ball until his death in 1767, he worked tirelessly to balance the specter of libertine sexuality with the requisite respectability the nobility expected. In some sense this was a never-ending battle, but Tyres and his employees devised several ways to secure the politeness of the Gardens while concurrently hinting that they were places where one could get away with a moderate amount of debauchery. The very existence of the Dark Walk (or Druid's Walk) on the southernmost edge of the Garden evoked a sexuality prohibited from the light of London. After Tyres's death, Vauxhall began a slow descent into ignominy and financial hardship, closing finally in 1859. This study focuses on the high years of Vauxhall under Tyres, 1730-1770, in order to observe the Gardens when it had its largest impact on, and representation of, London society. But in order to understand the police of Vauxhall, one must first comprehend the space of the Pleasure Garden itself.

The main entrance to Vauxhall was on the west side of the complex. A gate revealed a 900 foot long Grand Walk that terminated (for the period that concerns us) with a statue of Aurora, goddess of the dawn. Two walks ran parallel to the Grand Walk. One came to be known as the Italian Walk and was framed by three Triumphal Arches. On the very south side of the garden was the Druid's Walk or Dark Walk. While much of the Gardens would have been dark, by 1750 lights embellished the trees almost everywhere except the Dark Walk making it a choice location for those seeking less respectable entertainment. Other walks ran perpendicular to these three and were called cross-walks. Yet the architectural facets of the Garden were at least an equal draw for visitors. On the far west side of the Garden facing east and looking down the Italian Walk was the Prince's Pavilion, named after Frederick, Prince of Wales, a frequent visitor and landlord of Vauxhall. Just to its southwest was the Gothic Piazza, which included spaces for those wishing to dine in the Gardens. In the middle of the Gothic Piazza stood a statue of Handel, fashioned as Apollo playing a lyre, facing the orchestra building.

Erected in 1751, the Orchestra stood in the middle of a well-lit grove surrounded by trees. The grove was the locus of polite entertainment in the Garden and many of its most respectable visitors spent time there. Other visitors were more content to walk among the trees, admire the *trompe l'*œuil paintings, and gossip as the music echoed along the boulevards. On the other side of the grove, facing south towards the Orchestra and considerably larger than the Gothic Piazza, was the Temple of Comus, renamed the Chinese Pavilions after renovation in 1751, evoking an Orientalist architecture that further complicated the intriguing mix of Classical, Gothic, and nascent Baroque styles. Attached to the west end of the Chinese Pavilions was the Great Room, Rotunda, or Music Room. It was here the orchestra would play during rainy weather, though many would also dine in the Great Room in these circumstances, as spaces in the Chinese Pavilion, Prince's Pavilion, and Gothic Piazza reserved for refreshments were leaky. Both dining boxes and the Music Room featured paintings to embellish their looks. While those in the Music Room were of a significantly grander scale, those in dining booths tended to show every-day activities that required very little interpretation by the contemporary visitor. While these paintings were clearly indicative of the climate Tyres tried to cultivate, they also provided social cues to those dining in or walking past the booths.

It appears that food was in some respects the most expensive part of entertainment, but this was crucially a factor that did not exclude people from participating in the spectacle that was Vauxhall.[15] While some middling sorts did purchase refreshments in the gardens, it was the admittance charge that likely constituted the largest expense. Yet this charge was remarkably little for many, staying at one shilling from 1730-70 and beyond. Certain events required a more discerning clientele and entrance fees rose accordingly, chiefly to preclude middling individuals, as occurred – somewhat unsuccessfully

12 P. J. Grosley, *A Tour to London: Or, New Observations of England and its Inhabitants* (Dublin: Exshaw et. al., 1772), 171.

13 "By Desire of Several Persons of Quality and Distinction", *Daily Journal*, June 17, 1732.

14 Thomas Brown, *The Third Volume of the Works of Mr. Thomas Brown, Containing, Amusements Serious & Comical, Calculated for the Meridian of London* (London: Bragg, 1708), 51.

15 John Trusler, *The London Adviser and Guide* (London: Trusler, 1786), 163.

– during Handel's firework music rehearsal referred to at the opening of this essay. As Handel's concert demonstrates, if the entertainment was enticing enough, middling individuals could and did scrape together enough money to attend. For exceedingly polite events, tickets had to be purchased in advance to ensure all those in attendance were of a sufficiently respectable sensibility to fit the occasion. While the vast majority of entertainments at Vauxhall were open to the wealthy, gentry, and middling sorts, the very poor were excluded in almost all cases. Lack of leisure time, the costs associated with travelling to Vauxhall, and entrance fees compounded to preclude the entry of ignominiously impolite individuals.

Vauxhall was not the easiest place in the metropolis to access, but nor was it the hardest. Located along the south bank of the Thames about two miles southwest of the City of London and south and a bit east of Westminster, early travelers like Pepys took boats across the Thames to visit the Gardens. This could take anywhere between 20 and 50 minutes, depending on traffic on the river and the speed and skill of the oarsmen. On special occasions, landing on the south bank were precarious as many boats jostled to land first.[16] Boat rides were expensive, preventing the more middling sorts from attending, so to counteract the issue of access, Tyres occasionally rented out boats to carry visitors across the Thames at specified intervals to alleviate traffic and encourage visitors. With the opening of the Westminster Bridge in 1750, the most polite segments of society theoretically had significantly easier access, as it required only a coach – which many gentry and aristocracy possessed partially as status symbols – to reach the Gardens.[17] But possession of coaches was not limited to aristocrats: it was the merchants and their guests coming from the City of London that caused so prodigious a traffic jam on London Bridge in 1749, as most gentry probably came by boat to Vauxhall for Handel's rehearsal. Initially, Vauxhall was not particularly urban: its rural nature was a chief draw for many in its earlier years, as the gentry doubtless enjoyed the similarities to their country estates and merchants, traders, and even middling individuals could appreciate, if not articulate, the budding romanticist implications of the wide open spaces Vauxhall offered. Tyres was therefore cautious not to obstruct the view of the surrounding rural areas from Vauxhall and elected to secure the perimeter of the gardens with only a ha-ha, or small ditch that could easily be climbed over. Indeed, on May 12, 1769, a man was caught sneaking into the gardens over the ha-ha and was caged for the rest of the night by guards employed by Jonathan Tyres the younger, the proprietor of Vauxhall after his father's death.[18] Eventually, the view of the Gardens was compromised by London's relentless urban expansion and iron bars were placed up around the perimeter of the gardens, though this occurred after our period.

While a few tried to sneak in, most came in legally. By paying a shilling at the main entrance to the west of the Gardens, entrance was granted. In cases where large crowds were anticipated, Tyres opened up two more entrances manned by employees to ease traffic and visitors were instructed as to at which entrance they ought to present themselves. There were frequently restrictions on how one could dress and a violation of these sartorial mores would preclude entrance. During the opening *Ridotto* in 1732, for instance, no admittance could be offered for gentlemen wearing swords or masks.[19] For this event, the attendees were doubtless incredibly polite, so swords as a status marker indicating high military rank would largely be superfluous and given the potency of Vauxhall's punch, could prove dangerous. Masks, enjoyed by many in polite society during masquerades, prevented as open an interchange as between people without masks. Tyres seemed committed to showcase the newly respectable nature of his Gardens, but he did so here by policing the behavior of *polite* society. This is exceptionally interesting given that many of the attendees were the traditional arbiters of politeness. Tyres, by giving cues as to appropriate dress in order to cast his Gardens in the best light possible, became the judge of polite comportment in Vauxhall, an inversion of authority over politeness. Four years later, Tyres was still cultivating the veneer of politeness he kicked off at the *Ridotto*. In a 1736 advertisement, he states that he would not longer be offering admission to the gardens by ticket, as servants appeared to have been abusing their roles in purchasing entry and in so doing allowing many to access the Gardens who, in Tyres's estimation, were "not fit to intermix with those persons of quality, ladies, gentlemen and others".[20] While there is certainly a capitalist bent to this declaration, there is a cultural one as well. The Gardens relied on the patronage of polite London to induce many to come, and it was them who Tyres first tried to protect.

His strategy was a resounding success. Vauxhall in the late 1730s and 1740s counted the illustrious Frederick, Prince of Wales and his wife among their patrons. Newspapers commonly proclaimed the attendance of the Prince and Princess of Wales along with several of their polite entourage in Vauxhall and unfailingly claimed that the concerned parties had enjoyed themselves during their visit.[21] Throughout this period, Tyres appeared relatively *laissez-faire* in his attitude toward the rich. Rather than policing their behavior or suggesting polite mores to them at his Gardens through newspapers, he chose to lionize the Prince of Wales and the company he kept as paragons of politeness. There was clearly a commercial impetus for this

16 Coke and Borg, *Vauxhall Gardens*, 8.

17 Peculiarly enough, many gentry even after the opening of Westminster Bridge chose to come by water instead of coach in order to enjoy the journey there and to conspicuously consume leisure time.

18 "London", *Public Advertiser*, May 12, 1769.

19 See note 10.

20 "London", *Daily Gazetteer*, June 7, 1736.

21 See *Read's Weekly Journal or British Gazetteer*, July 8, 1738; "London", *London Daily Post and General Advertiser*, June 4, 1743; "London", *Daily Post*, May 21, 1744; "London", *Daily Post*, August 27, 1745.

– that one might see the Prince of Wales at Vauxhall was doubtless a significant draw to those outside of court culture. Yet a trend toward the lauding of politeness as opposed to the punishment of its opposite was present as well. To encourage his patronage and thank him for his attendance and good humor as a landlord, Mr. Arne, a musician at Vauxhall dedicated an ode to the Prince and Princess of Wales on August 24, 1745, causing the Gardens to be open past their regular hours.[22] Arne and Tyres needed to thank Frederick for his business of course, but they also needed to celebrate his personality for less pecuniary reasons. Vauxhall relied on not only the presence of polite individuals, but their proper conduct within the Gardens and Frederick provided the perfect personality whose conduct visitors would follow. While the aristocracy were practically polite by virtue of being aristocracy, and little they ever did could preclude them from respectability, many still sought to penetrate into higher social circles and the Prince of Wales was for some the highest one could potentially reach. While the rich did not go to Vauxhall to seem more polite – this occurred much more at Ranelagh or in small social gatherings and, albeit later and almost exclusively for men, in clubs – Tyres employed the celebrity of the Prince as a way to dictate the norms he expected to see at his Gardens from all segments of society. When the Prince died in 1751, Tyres organized a dirge on his death and charged an inflated price of 2s 6d for entrance. At this price, fewer could gain access, further cementing the respectability of the Gardens at an event to mourn the death of so polite an individual.

Inflated prices were not abnormal at Vauxhall. Only a year before his death, a concert celebrated the Prince and Princess of Wales there and because of the respectable nature of the attendees to whom the concert was dedicated, there was a price increase to half a pound. This price put it firmly outside the realm of access to all but successful merchants and nobility, but Tyres took no precautions and only admitted people with tickets. Although tickets could be bought at several locations around London, buying a ticket took time, further limiting the number of those who could attend and *de facto* casting it as a space for polite entertainment.[23] Morning entertainments also grew increasingly common at Vauxhall, but Tyres could not tolerate any debauchery in the daytime, and usual morning concerts required a 2s 6d admittance fee.[24] The ideological reason should be obvious by now: Tyres wished to cultivate a respectable image by attracting the custom of polite Londoners and concerts helped accomplish this goal. It is here we begin to see Tyres's techniques for generating business at work. That concerts often occurred on Wednesday mornings also betrays an economic bent to his decision to increase the price. Those who did not have significant leisure time – the customers he relied on most for evening entertainments – would be at work. This price change then was also a way for Tyres to increase the price while not deterring too many from attending. The morning entertainment eventually bled into the evening as well: on June 6, 1758, The Governors of the Lock Hospital dined at Vauxhall for a very successful charity night that raised £100 p. a. and Tyres and his staff that night served four hundred of London's most discerning and respectable individuals, including nobility, gentry, and "most of the foreign ministers."[25] A similar event occurred in 1764, when a great personage desired to see Vauxhall, and tickets were distributed at select locations around the metropolis for the purpose of attending.[26] On a typical night, the admittance price of one shilling was advertised in newspapers around London and when special events occurred they were as well, so those who planned on coming to Vauxhall any given night knew precisely what was expected of them and if they could get in.[27]

A price increase in some cases excluded the middle classes, but it was also the selling of tickets throughout London and the consequent consumption of leisure time that prohibited many from even attempting to buy tickets to very respectable events. Only shops known for their polite or quasi-polite cultures served as hubs for the sale of tickets to special nights at Vauxhall, and typical locations included the Star and Garter Tavern in Pall Mall, Will's Coffee-house by the Admiralty, George's Coffee-house near Temple-Bar, Mr. Sheepey's Bookseller under the Royal-Exchange, and Vauxhall itself – reinforcing the polite nature of the Gardens.[28] This exclusionary practice was the case for another *Ridotto al Fresco* in 1769, this one after Jonathan Tyres the elder's death. Clearly evoking the initial *Ridotto* that placed Vauxhall firmly on the map of polite London, this *Ridotto* entailed an increase in ticket price, to the familiar figure of half a pound with the added insurance of mandatory tickets.[29] This *Ridotto*, like its predecessor, was styled as a ball and concert and promised an evening full of entertainment. Tyres the younger clearly learned something from his father's techniques, for to cultivate respectability and equalize the company of guests, an advertisement encouraged visitors to dress as was customary for assemblies and posited that no masks would be permitted. Again the mores of Vauxhall's polite entertainment provided an explicit cue to nobility and merchants as to what was and was not acceptable on their grounds. Politeness was as encouraged as usual in Vauxhall, even if the Gardens had lost their great proprietor.

This concern over polite culture can perhaps be most clearly discerned through a comparison between two seasons: that of 1759 and that of 1760, both under the direction of

22 "Spring-Gardens, Vauxhall", *General Advertiser*, August 24, 1745.

23 "By Command of the Royal Highnesses the Prince and Princess of Wales", *General Advertiser*, April 23, 1750.

24 "Spring-Gardens, Vauxhall", *General Advertiser*, April 29 1751.

25 "London", *Public Advertiser*, June 9, 1758.

26 "Articles of Intelligence from the Postscript of the Craftsman", *Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser*, May 12, 1764.

27 See for example "Spring-Gardens, Vauxhall", *Public Advertiser*, August 2, 1765.

28 See note 23.

29 "Spring-Gardens, Vauxhall", *Public Advertiser*, May 6, 1769.

Jonathan Tyres the elder. A May 15, 1759 announcement proclaimed that the Gardens would open the next day and each person would be obliged to pay "two shillings for coming in; and in order to preserve the requisite Decorum, no disorderly Women can possibly be admitted."[30] That these two thoughts are so closely linked they literally become articulated in the same sentence is remarkable. Women, the traditional arbiters of polite society, obviously could not be admitted if they were disorderly, lest they pollute the Gardens with their lack of propriety. The price increase further reflects a need for Tyres to foster an even more polite image of the Gardens than he had hitherto enjoyed. A principally economic reasoning for this price change is unconvincing for 1759. Large and expensive renovations had occurred eight years previously and no new overhauls were planned, so a large cash influx was not required, though it was certainly welcome. Tyres instead clearly strove to limit the number of baser people who might enter through this price increase as a way of protecting the Gardens' reputation. But by increasing the exclusivity of the gardens, he also drove up demand, for the opening night of the next season, when admittance was lowered to one shilling where it would remain for the rest of our period, over 6,000 people attended. Peter Nettle's account of the night deserves special attention. For Nettles, the falling price of admittance was the key reason so many flocked to Vauxhall. This was a matter of reclaiming a space middling sorts knew and loved, but it also reveals that Tyres was remarkably successful in restoring the image of Vauxhall to its former respectability – if his project failed, few would have attended. A chief reason many middling sorts came to Vauxhall was to experience polite culture and perhaps even rub elbows with celebrities, as noted above. The increased exclusivity of the 1759 season temporarily quieted concerns about Vauxhall's debauchery and led many to attend when its prices had reduced sufficiently. Nettles tellingly posits that two types of people exist in Vauxhall, "People of Taste, and those who have no Taste at all."[31] Tyres always prohibited livery servants in the Gardens, as reiterated in an April 20, 1748 post that boasted Vauxhall's new embellishments.[32] This prohibition served a double purpose. First it excluded those who were considered among the least polite individuals in the metropolis and who might compromise Vauxhall's reputation. Second and more importantly for this analysis, it reduced all in the Gardens to a similar plane. Wealthy individuals could not show off their status by bringing along a large cadre of servants to exclude them from other visitors and instead walked the Gardens by themselves. By denying this marker of status, Vauxhall was a more level social space than London as a whole, and this was a crucial aspect of the garden's draw for less wealthy individuals. This great social leveling entailed a homogenization of polite society that concurrently temporarily diminished the politeness of the most respectable members of society while raising that of more middling sorts. In this light, Tyres's genius lay partially in the fact that he could allow some forms of vice while clinging to Vauxhall's reputation as a polite space.

No small part of this was due to the cultivation of a polite clientele, but Tyres had one more critical innovation that helped secure the gentility of his Gardens: the season ticket. Introduced in 1737, season tickets were carved out of metal and could be purchased from Tyres. These pendants entitled one to free admission to the Gardens over the course of the season and granted the further privilege to jump the queue for coaches on busy evenings. Only one pass was ever granted for life, going to William Hogarth, a dear friend of Tyres and informal designer of the Gardens. In 1737, season tickets sold for £1, putting them largely out of the reach of all but the most polite and wealthy in London. The next year Tyres increased the price for season passes to £1, 3s, due to the price of silver on which the new pendants were etched, and in 1741 the price of season passes rose again to £2.[33] Tyres's talent of manipulation is apparent here as well. What better way to maintain the image of the gardens as a polite space than to encourage the most polite to return again and again? While the gentry enjoyed a diverse array of leisure activities, they still disliked wasting money, so upon buying a ticket, Tyres would likely enjoy their custom. Season passes technically entitled a stagecoach to enter the gardens, so a single pass could also be used to introduce the Gardens to other polite individuals. While Ranelagh served a larger role than Vauxhall in the courtship rituals of polite London, Vauxhall played some role due to its long-standing reputation as a meeting-place for the two sexes. Some even came to Vauxhall for the express reason of meeting a pretty person with whom they could engage in light debauchery: a kiss, perhaps, but almost never full sexual intercourse, as this would invalidate both the politeness of the space and that of the individuals involved.

Decorum was a concern for Tyres both inside and outside Vauxhall. It became clear to him that some were abusing the season ticket privileges he afforded by purchasing a ticket and then renting them out to allow middling sorts to queue jump on especially busy nights. Tyres did not take kindly to this and stated he would confiscate any passes that were abused in such a manner. As an added deterrent, he increased season pass prices to limit the financial returns of such an activity. The people he tried to attract using these tickets clearly would not mind a price increase of 3s, especially if the passes were printed on a precious metal. The subsequent increase to £2 in 1741 further disincentivized would-be fraudulent season pass users from this sort of criminality. Tyres once more employed a clever monetary tactic to keep certain tokens of politeness within the reach of the gentry alone, for any compromising of this image was threatening not just to his Gardens's reputation but also fundamentally antithetical to the class-entrenched po-

30 "Spring-Gardens, Vauxhall", *Public Advertiser*, May 16, 1759.
31 "To the Printer", *Read's Weekly Journal or British Gazetteer*, May 17, 1760.
32 "Spring-Gardens, Vauxhall", *General Advertiser*, April 28, 1748.
33 *Ibid.*

lite culture of eighteenth-century London. This was difficult, though. Tyres certainly tried to cast Vauxhall in as polite a light as possible, but this could not come at the expense of the brand of adult enjoyment that attracted many to its walks in the first place.

Tyres still did much to discourage vice and debauchery in his gardens. Initially he faced a daunting task: to transform the reputation of the Gardens from that of a functional brothel into a place for polite comportment. He planned the 1732 *Ridotto al Fresco* to cater to the most polite of London, but with so much riding on this, Tyres took no chances, and he hired no fewer than 100 soldiers to guard the walk from the bank of the Thames to the Gardens themselves. Wroth and Wroth see this as an unnecessary precaution, but more recent research has tended towards the analysis that it was absolutely vital for the *Ridotto* to go off without a hitch and therefore the soldiers were warranted.[34] If one of the guests had been robbed on the short journey from the river to the Gardens, it would severely compromise its image. Once his initial ball was finished, Tyres maintained a sort of police on the grounds. A letter published in the *Grub Street Journal's* August 18, 1732 edition under the pseudonym Anticonstabularius is worth quoting at length for its discussion of police at Vauxhall:

> ... two or three ill-looking fellows with painted mopsticks, who burslequed constables, and, with terrific looks and magisterial behaviour, seemed to insult the company, and threaten something I was wholly ignorant of. Desiring from my friend some account of these preternatural Phœnomena, he told me, *They were guards stationed there to prevent indecencies, and secure the Ladies from the attacks of rude fellows* [sic].[35]

Anticonstabularius, as the name indicates, disliked this police and asks if "the politest gentlemen of the politest part of England, restrained from obscenities by no more generous a motive than fear?" Anticonstabularius later ponders: why, if guards are necessary to secure the good behavior of society, ought they not also be present in parks? For him, pleasure was enjoyed through freedom unmediated by fear, but Tyres clearly had more practical motives. To answer Anticonstabularius's rhetorical question, it seems that in some cases, the politest in England indeed restrained from obscenity "by no more generous a motive than fear." This was a fear of social exclusion as well as a fear of authority. That Tyres felt the need to police the activities of all his clients frames him as a paternal figure looking over the well-being of his garden-going guests, but it also displays an upsetting of the arbitration of politeness. While the purpose of the guards being to "secure the Ladies from the attacks of rude fellows" no doubt demonstrates the patriarchal attitudes of the time, it is also crucial to note that as arbiters of politeness, ladies' opinions of the Gardens were especially vital to its good reputation.[36] In this clause, Anticonstabularius saw the guards as mainly protecting the polite members of society from the more base levels and ponders why Tyres would allow the latter sort in the first place, but constables were present to police the rich as much as the middling classes even if the latter were more likely to be targeted than the former. Tyres kept all of his guests on a relatively equal plane, rarely differentiating between his finer and more plebian guests on regular nights. Anticonstabularius was surprisingly correct in his assessment of the Gardens, even though his assessment was negative. In his letter he reacts against Tyres's police of polite society, something he found ludicrous; he doubtless preferred that a commoner not delimitate mores of politeness for the most discerning facets of London society, even if that meant the Gardens suffered financially. Contemporaries even recognized how Tyres's suggestions of polite mores problematized the aristocracy's hold on respectable behavior.

As Edelstein notes, striking the right balance between respectability by using an exclusive social cachet and adult entertainment through the marketing of an ambiance of accessibility was incredibly difficult and Vauxhall's success is a monument to Tyres's ingenuity.[37] Yet Tyres did not simply allow debauchery in his Gardens, he enabled and even encouraged it. While constables were present throughout the Gardens to protect the sensibilities of ladies, many images suggested interclass social intermingling, debauchery, and sexual tension that many found hard to resist.[38] Grand *trompe l"*œuil images were too public to be the loci of any significant reference to debauchery, but the images in dining booths around the gardens were at once public enough to be seen by many strolling along the walks and private enough to suggest sexuality in a more muted tone. As Coke and Borg demonstrate, these paintings were of daily events that allowed easy comprehension.[39] It is in this light a specific image on the inside of Vauxhall's dining booths must be analyzed. Around 1745, Robert Sayer published an engraving by an anonymous engraver titled 'The Stealing of a Kiss'. In it a woman leans over to kiss a man who snoozes as his wig falls off. Another lady in the foreground looks on with intrigue while a servant boy fans the man with a blanket. In the background, a woman at an open doorway appears appalled by the debauchery she witnesses (see Image 1).[40] While this was a reproduction of an original painting at Vauxhall, it is still worthy of detailed analysis. The lady in the background is perhaps the easiest to analyze. Dressed in respectable clothes,

34 Wroth and wroth, *The London Pleasure Gardens of the Eighteenth Century*, 290.

35 "Gentlemen", *Grub Street Journal*, August 5, 1736. Emphasis in original.

36 See note 35 ("Gentlemen").

37 Edelstein, *Vauxhall Gardens*, 11.

38 *Ibid*., 32.

39 Coke and Borg, *Vauxhall Gardens*, 98.

40 Robert Sayer, 'The Stealing of a Kiss', *London Metropolitan Archives*, pressmark SC/GL/PR/L1/VAU/gar, collage 17347, (1745).

she demonstrates the socially unacceptable nature of this action in a way that bolsters the image of politeness cultivated at Vauxhall. The reaction from the lady on the left is another matter. She and the lady in the doorway are dressed remarkably similarly: both wear a dress that tapers into a point at the end of the torso and give the waist a naturally slimming silhouette and in both cases, voluminous dresses are worn. The lady in the foreground, however, wears a fashionable floral pattern, unlike her relatively drab counterpart. For both ladies the silhouette of the dress evokes a respectable air of sexuality. Floral patterns manufactured both overseas and in London itself (primarily around Spitalfields) were much the fashion and the lady's fan and shoes further attest to her high social stature.[41] The offending party wears a fashionable floral pattern on her sleeves, hinting at her otherwise polite sensibilities. That a servant boy is present further suggests that these are wealthy merchants or aristocrats. The man's dress also betrays him as erotic. The wig, jacket, and shirt he wears were typical for gentlemen at the time, but his legs are of particular note. In a style standard for the early eighteenth century, he wears knee-breaches that are skin tight past the knee, showing off his large calves, an erogenous zone. This man snoozing in bliss appears so titillating that a woman dressed in the highest fashion of the day cannot help herself but stoop to sexual debauchery. That another wealthy woman appears to condone this activity illuminates the sexual tension of the image. It was a tension that served as a metaphor for every night at Vauxhall.

This was due to its hinting at sexuality and debauchery. While diners and passers-by would see the image and perhaps dislike the sexual deviancy portrayed, that such activity was shown at all, and depicts so polite a lady accepting it, was an implicit critique of the ostensibly polite segments of society, as well as a covert suggestion that the Gardens were still a place for reveling in light debauchery. While this was clearly a satire of polite society, it is likely that most members of the aristocracy who saw the image viewed it less as critiquing them than some of their distant acquaintances, so it was not too offensive. The suggestion of sexuality in a sexually charged environment such as Vauxhall is also demonstrative of a covert suggestion to embrace some sexual debauchery in the gardens. The satire of the image then comes in less as a critique of the libertine, but rather a critique of a libertine that is too open or visible in one's sexuality. This image in fact encourages covert sexual debauchery as the pleasure of the two ladies in the foreground – and perhaps even the man himself – indicates, especially given its location was renown as a place where erotic conduct frequently, though covertly, occurred.

On a more discreet level, Tyres employed his Gardens as a space that celebrated erotic activity. This was nothing new to Vauxhall; the Dark Walk was a continuation of Vauxhall's previous reputation for debauchery and was significantly less policed that more lighted areas and that Tyres allowed these walks to remain dark for so long was conducive to this covert vice. So long as the Gardens did not too openly encourage sexual indulgence, Tyres was content to allow some light debauchery for the sake of his brand of adult entertainment. Prints of Vauxhall in this period often exhibit a man and woman staring lustfully into each other's eyes, both encouraging and exhibiting a libertine sexuality that was culturally and institutionally animated.[42] While images of the Gardens itself often show characters in daylight or along well-lit areas, the Dark Walk was a hotbed of sexual titillation. Vauxhall was therefore much less restrained than Ranelagh, as Tyres both allowed and encouraged a certain amount of adult pleasure. A May 18, 1764 newspaper advertisement for Vauxhall explains that while Tyres regretted the lighting of the back walks because of the resulting public displeasure he felt it necessary to preserve the requisite decorum at the Gardens.[43] Tyres clearly had to find a way of manipulating the debauchery of Vauxhall and by shining more light on the (in)famous Dark Walk, he discouraged the kind of vice many supposedly practiced. That Tyres's lighting of the Dark Walk instigated a wave of complaints demonstrates the powerful nature of the specter of erotic desire in the Gardens.

Large – and hence middling – crowds further encouraged debauchery. Vauxhall was intentionally open to a variety people, and drew great numbers on several occasions. On May 18, 1751, Vauxhall opened for the season and "was so crowded that the People could hardly pass each other."[44] It appears that the opening and closing nights of the Gardens were particularly well attended, as Peter Nettle's letter asserts that "near Six Thousand Persons" were present at the 1760 opening.[45] Philo-Vauxhall noted to the *Public Advertiser* that on the closing night of 1764 upwards of four thousand people were present.[46] The opening night of 1765 also occasioned the attendance of over four thousand individuals.[47] The season closing in 1765, according to *Lloyd's Evening Post*, drew near five thousand people.[48] Some nights that involved no special entertainment also drew crowds. Pouring through newspaper archives, the date of May 26 1767, only a month before Tyres's death, stands out as attracting over three thousand visitors.[49] Few of these people were polite, and the sheer number of people present was a key factor that contributed to Vauxhall's success while limiting its

41 See Natalie Rothstein, *Silk Designs of the Eighteenth Century: From the Collection of the Victoria and Albert Museum, London, with a Complete Catalogue* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1990).

42 M. Romano, "Scene at Spring Gardens, Vauxhall", *London Metropolitan Archives*, collage 18057 (1741).

43 "Spring-Gardens, Vauxhall", *Public Advertiser*, May 18, 1764.

44 "Supplement", *General Evening Post*, May 18-21, 1751.

45 See note 31.

46 "To the Printer of the Public Advertiser", *Public Advertiser*, August 25, 1764.

47 "Postscript", *Lloyd's Evening Post*, May 8-10, 1765.

48 "London", *Lloyd's Evening Post*, August 28-30, 1765.

49 "London", *St. James's Chronicle or the British Evening Post*, May 26-28, 1767.

reach as a polite space, so sometimes more extreme measures were necessary to deter crime. *Lloyd's Evening Post* detailed an incident in early July 1769 – under the stewardship of Tyres the younger – where "... a fellow was detected in picking a Gentleman's pocket, as he was going into Vauxhall-gardens; he was given up to the Coachmen, &c. who ducked him till he could scarce crawl."[50] The reactions of coachmen and other passersby to whom the thief was given illuminates attitudes towards criminality in London as a whole and the severity of the punishment was for them equivalent to its threat to the social, spiritual, and economic health of the metropolis and the empire. While Ranelagh prided itself primarily on its social exclusivity, Vauxhall was open about its appeal to a broad range of people, from the royal family to common laborers, and this sometimes led to conflagrations. It was precisely this socially intermixed milieu that reinforced a tension between politeness, purity, vice, and debauchery that also made Vauxhall so compelling a location.

Vauxhall, because of its wealthier clientele and reputation for covert debauchery, was also a popular spot for those for whom vice was profession – the criminal. Crime was obviously a problem for Vauxhall as it compromised the polite image Tyres tried so hard to maintain. Frequently items of special value to visitors were lost in the gardens, and there is a significant paper trail in the form of newspaper advertisements for missing items. On September 23, 1752, a lady reported losing a mother-of-pearl knife and offered a 5s reward for it.[51] Eleven years later, somebody dropped a £50 bank note (approximately £3,740 in 2005 currency), prompting its owner to cancel its payment at the Bank and offer a £10 reward for its safe return.[52] That this person owned a £50 bank note reveals great wealth and going to Vauxhall clearly risked a non-trivial amount of assets for some. Yet vice was frequently visible at Vauxhall and apparently even involved a major crime ring. The story of William Meredith, alias Bushey is of particular note. In June 1753, he was caught picking pockets at Vauxhall and once detected by Tyres's crew, threw a knife designed to slash pockets away from him. He was quickly apprehended and was found in the possession of a silk green purse. Following his capture, police around London leveraged his expertise to detect a ring of "a most dangerous and numerous Gang of Rogues" around the metropolis, consisting of a dozen individuals, some of whom were women.[53] William Meredith was not the only one who stole from people in Vauxhall. In June 1758, "a Man, very well dressed, was detected picking of Pockets at Vauxhall Gardens."[54] The masquerade of fashionable dress was likely a charade to distract from his illicit activities, albeit an unsuccessful one. That this strategy was employed suggests that constables at Vauxhall less heavily regulated those who appeared of higher social stature; but that it was unsuccessful speaks once more to the great social leveling at the Gardens and indicates that constables regulated the behavior of all visitors, both by their mere presence, and more authoritatively by intervening in situations. Not all of these crimes involved property. In early June 1759, the *London Chronicle* reported that a lady was viciously attacked in Vauxhall and states no apparent reason for the assault.[55] Spiritual and occasionally even physical danger seemed an omnipresent facet of the Gardens, and this at once drew people to, and deterred people from going to, the Gardens. This incident demonstrates the limits of the safety Tyres tried to instill around Vauxhall. That anyone, much less a lady, could be attacked at the Gardens was a significant breach of its quasi-polite reputation. This vice was tightly policed and incursions like this were quickly stopped. A *London Chronicle* article of mid June 1760 suggests the rapidity with which Tyres and his constables acted when it detailed "there was a rencounter at Vauxhall-Gardens, occasioned by a dispute between some ladies. It is said that the gentlemen were brothers; but the aggressor being presently disarmed, there was no damage done."[56] The social and institutional policing of behavior was frequently swift in its action and worked primarily as a preventative force for more serious vices such as pick pocketing and assault. The motivation for this crime is worthy on note too. These brothers had a conflagration over a dispute involving ladies, betraying the significant imbrications between the Vauxhall's sexual debauchery and the more serious spiritual vices that Tyres, polite London, and Tyres's employees consistently attempted to discourage. Vice of this sort was never appropriate for polite individuals, and those noted in these accounts were likely not of a high social stature, indicating a surprising similarity between the control of the Gardens and the decentralized nature of metropolitan police more generally. Later in the eighteenth century and into the early nineteenth century, it appears that debauchery and vice rode more roughshod over the polite sensibilities cultivated by Tyres until his death, but in the period that interests us, this police seemed geared toward the less polite segments of society and did not so openly target rakish elites. Crucially, the constables impacted both polite and impolite individuals in similar ways, even though the surveillance of polite individuals rested more on an interdiction of overt debauchery.

Who did Tyres target in order to preserve this dialectic of debauchery and respectability in his Gardens, and what do its impacts tell us about Vauxhall's operations? As noted in virtually all the studies about Vauxhall to date, Tyres was challenged to make the gardens both as pleasurable and as respectable as possible – that he largely succeeded evidences his brilliance. Tyres kept a surprising amount of control over both politeness and debauchery in the Gardens. By employing constables, he was able to swiftly interdict activities he felt

50 "London", *Lloyd's Evening Post*, July 5-7, 1769.
51 "Lost", *General Advertiser*, August 3, 1752.
52 "Lost", *Gazetteer and London Daily Advertiser*, May 27, 1763.
53 *London Evening Post*, June 30-July 3, 1753.
54 "Fresh Advices from our Correspondents", *Whitehall Evening Post or London Intelligencer*, June 6-8, 1758.
55 *London Chronicle*, June 7-9, 1759.
56 *London Chronicle*, June 14-17, 1760.

inappropriate but as a master media manipulator was able to both enable and encourage covert debauchery in the Gardens as well. Ever wary that this vice might preclude the custom of polite individuals, he frequently used the Gardens for private parties and subsequently increased prices to contribute to the socially exclusive nature of the varied festivities. On regular nights, however, the sheer number of visitors, sometimes greater than 4,000 people, demonstrates that the vast majority of garden-goers were not quintessentially polite. By charging only one shilling, rarely deviating from that price, and precluding the admittance of livery servants, he allowed many to access and enjoy his Gardens *on relatively equal terms*. Tyres also employed season tickets to attract the return custom of respectable individuals, at once securing a stable financial base from a single large cash influx at the beginning of every season and casting the Gardens in a more respectable light. By refusing to allow rude women's attendance, prohibiting certain clothing choices (he deemed them a great threat to decorum), broadcasting sartorial expectations, and including seductive paintings such as 'The Stealing of a Kiss', he manipulated garden-goers into his dialectic of debauchery and politeness. That even the most respectable individuals can and did descend into the realm of salacious vice was no secret and Tyres covertly hinted at this media trope in his Garden advertisements and paintings around Vauxhall. Even more surprising than his manipulation of polite images was his police of polite mores more visibly by the use of constables. That these were at least theoretically applied to rich and poor alike, as demonstrated by Tyres's commitment to relative equality of treatment upon entrance to Vauxhall, Anticonstabularius's tirade, and occasional apprehension of fashionably dressed individuals inverted class markers, as he, a self-described "yeoman" from a leather-working family was the ultimate judge of acceptable behavior in his Gardens. That through his efforts Vauxhall became so incredibly popular and internationally regarded hints that the hegemony over politeness by gentry and aristocrats, and especially females in these classes, may not have been as total as scholars have so far assumed. Whatever Vauxhall's implications for class in seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century London, it is virtually inarguable that those who walked its boulevards and listened to the music emanating from the Orchestra in the grove were drawn as much by its reputation for vice and debauchery – even if it was sometimes dangerous – as they were by the specter of politeness Tyres so brilliantly cultivated.

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