Letter from the Editors-in-Chief

This fall marked the 150th anniversary of the Gettysburg Address and the 50th anniversary of MLK’s “I Have a Dream” speech. Both occasions reinvigorated national discussions of race, citizenship and public service, leading us to once again consider the place of the past in the present. The ensuing discussions reaffirmed the enduring relevance of the historical memory for a better understanding of the pressing issues of our time. Here at the Chicago Journal of History, we strive to provide a platform where undergraduates too can contribute to these ongoing conversations.

The following essays address episodes from the past that continue to resonate with us today. Tim Rudnicki’s study of Anglo-Dutch relations in the long 18th century speaks to problems surrounding national identity in an increasingly interconnected world. Next is Christopher Kingdon’s work on the British government’s response to post-traumatic stress and other psychological disorders amongst Royal Air Force pilots during the Second World War. Interestingly, Kingdon’s piece echoes some of the recent concerns about the mental health of Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans. Amelia Brackett’s essay analyzes the role chimpanzees played in the development of the polio vaccine, highlighting the debt modern medicine owes to animals as test subjects. Finally, Ben Miller examines how print culture served to consolidate the fragmented gay rights community of 1960s New York. Miller’s narrative offers a telling example of media’s increasingly central place in the social movements of our time.

We hope that you enjoy reading these essays. Please direct any feedback to ughistoryjournal@gmail.com.

Sincerely,

Pranav Jain and Thomas Prendergast
Editors-in-Chief

Koepoort in Leiden by Paulus Constantijn La Fargue ~1770

Enduring Identification
Perceptions of the Dutch among the British middling sorts in the late eighteenth century*

By Timothy Rudnicki, University of Chicago

Recently Linda Colley and others have studied "the identity, actions, and ideas of…[British] men and women" who experienced the eighteenth century to argue that the British nation, as "an imagined political community," emerged in this period along with more well known phenomena such as the industrial revolution and the British Empire.[1] While

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1 Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 1.

historians now recognize the importance of uncovering how the British made sense of their world, interpretations of the British experience during this century have often been restricted to their interactions with the French.[2] Throughout the long eighteenth century, of course, France and Britain engaged in the second Hundred Years War, a rivalry which reinforced the states' opposition: Britain was Protestant, "free," and commercial, while France was Catholic, absolutist, and territorial. The focus on the French in studies of the "creation of the British nation" has been justified by historiography and broader social scientific literature that argues such an identity can only be formed in opposition to some "Other."[3] While it is impossible to deny the attention that these states paid to each other, I argue that the British experience of the 18th century should not be merely reduced to a British–French binary. In an era of increasing communication and travel, the British interacted with a variety of European and extra-European peoples, and these interactions played a role in the creation of a British national identity in the long 18th century.

Recent scholarship has better situated the British experience in an international (or, at least, European) context, drawing attention to Britain's "under-recognized connections with the rest of Europe."[4] Stephen Conway, Steve Pincus, and others make it clear that these connections were not always ones of opposition or difference.[5] Conway states that while "the British were perfectly capable of thinking and acting in national terms, they could also…see themselves as Europeans."[6] This scholarship rightfully asserts that in order to understand the 18th-century British identity, we must pay attention to how one state with which the British frequently interacted and perceived a variety of peoples, even if their relationships with them were as much ones of similarity as ones of difference.

One state with which the British frequently interacted with throughout the 18th century was the Dutch Republic. In contrast to the more consistently antagonistic relationship between the British and French in the 18th century—they were, after all, formally at war for nearly half of it—the Anglo–Dutch relationship was much more variable.[7] Between 1688 and 1815, the two states allied with each other, fought against each other, and meddled in each other's internal political affairs, all against a background of changing levels of economic and cultural exchange.[8] As such, it might be expected that British perceptions of the Dutch varied much more over the course of the 18th century than their perceptions of the French. While various authors have paid some attention to the relationships between the Dutch and British, they have rarely done so in a sustained manner, and their focus is often limited to the first half of the 18th century—when the political, economic, and religious connections between the two countries were clearest.[9] What little that has been written about the Anglo–Dutch relationship in the 18th century has focused almost exclusively

2 Colley is the perhaps the most well-known example of this, in *Britons* as well as "Britishness and Otherness: an argument," *Journal of British Studies* 31 (1992). See also Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Vintage Books, 1988) and Gerald Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History 1740–1830* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987). On the subject of a nation as an "imagined community," see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York, NY: Verso, 2006.).

3 Colley asserts this argument quite forcibly in both *Britons* and "Britishness and Otherness," as does Stefan Collini, *English Pasts: Essays in History and Cultural* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999). A small sampling of the very broad historiography and social scientific literature on this subject, which is particularly important in colonial studies, includes E.J. Hosbwam, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), especially 91; Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1898), especially 270-271; Doreen Massey, *Space, Place and Gender* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 168-170; Tzvetan Todorov, *The Conquest of America* (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 1996).

4 Stephen Conway, *Britain, Ireland, and Continental Europe in the Eighteenth Century: Similarities, Connections, Identities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 2.

5 Steve Pincus, *1688: The First Modern Revolution* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009).

6 Conway, *Britain, Ireland, and Continental Europe*, 2.

7 This is not to say the Anglo-French relationship was totally antagonistic throughout the period, but that it was much more so than the Anglo-Dutch relationship. See Isabelle and Robert Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy: Britain and France: The History of a Love-Hate Relationship* (New York, NY: Vintage Publishing, 2008), for a statement on how in the Anglo-French relationship "rivalry, enmity, and misapprehension" mixed with "envy, admiration, and genuine affection."

8 The only example of these interactions that will not be addressed at all in this paper is the British suppression of the Dutch Patriot Revolt in 1787. For an introduction to this topic, see Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 1113–1119.

9 See, for example, John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988) and Jan De Vries, *The Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600–1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). Some cultural historians, such as Conway and Tony Claydon in *Europe and the making of England, 1660-1760* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), have treaded on this ground as well, though they are few in number.

on either high politics or colonial practices in Asia.[10] In contrast, I will examine the Anglo–Dutch relationship from the perspective of some of the British middling sorts—non-aristocratic, bourgeois "merchants, financiers, businessmen and women, and even minor shopkeepers"—rather than merely British ministers.[11] A large portion of these middling sorts resided in London, where most of my source base of periodicals, travelogues, newspapers, and treatises originate. Thus the sentiments identified may have been limited to London, though this seems unlikely in light of London's impact on the rest of Britain, particularly England.[12]

In this paper, I will trace the ways in which some Britons understood the Dutch throughout the 18th century, with emphasis on the 1770s and 1780s, a time when many of the connections that had existed between the British and Dutch had either already broken down or were breaking down. I will argue that some Britons, particularly Londoners, identified with the Dutch throughout this period, but that such identification now had a tone of warning rather than one of optimism, as had been the case in the first half of the century. I will then argue that the English used this sense of identification with the Dutch to avoid having to confront the possibility, and then the reality, that the whole of the continental Atlantic seaboard was allied against them in the American Revolutionary War. This argument will thus add to scholarship that suggests that Britons, at least through 1785, did not create their "nation" as an isolated island or Empire formed solely in opposition to France, but rather fashioned it, at least in part, through a sense of fraternity with the Dutch, probably among other European states as well.

I will begin, however, with an overview of the Anglo–Dutch relationship and the British perception of that relationship in the first half of the 18th century, in order to establish the sense of identification that the British had with the Dutch during this period. This identification was facilitated by a variety of political, economic, and cultural connections between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic.

Perhaps the most obvious connection between the English and the Dutch in the first years of the 18th century was the fact that the English king, William III, hailed from the Dutch Republic. The story of William's accession to the throne suggests the depth of connections that existed between the British and Dutch by 1688. By 1688, it was clear that James II was trying to align England with France and modernize the state along the centralized, bureaucratic, and absolutist lines of France.[13] This process invited deep resentment towards James II, particularly among those who proposed an alternative, Dutch version of state modernization.[14] The English turned to William III as an alternative to James II because his Protestantism, commercial mentality, and shared hostility towards the French aligned well with the sentiments of the populace.[15] Pincus argues convincingly that William did not "invade" England during the Glorious Revolution, but rather was encouraged at every step by the English people.[16] While the connections between the English and Dutch arguably have deeper roots, the warm welcome William III received in England marks the beginning of an affinity that would define the relationship between these two states for several decades to come.[17] Long-established trade and political connections between the states, for example, deepened in the decades following the Glorious Revolution.

While much has been made of the economic competition between the Dutch and British that existed in the 18th century, that should not hide the fact that close connections existed, and were perceived as existing, between the economies. Through roughly the 1760s, European trade was far greater than extra-European trade for all countries, including Britain.[18] The Dutch Republic was a key partner in this trade.[19] In fact, it seems that the British and Dutch, in addition to trading greatly with one another, cooperated in order to establish a division of labor in European trade: the Dutch led trade in the Baltic, while the British led trade in the Mediterranean.[20] The connections established by the trade of goods were furthered by substantial financial connections. The Dutch, in particular, were significant investors in British

10 See, for example, Daniel A. Miller, *Sir Joseph Yorke and Anglo–Dutch Relations 1774–1780* (The Hague: Mouton, 1970); John Ehrman, *The British Government and Commercial Negotiations with Europe 1783–1793* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962); Bob Moore and Henk van Nierop, eds., *Colonial Empires Compared: Britain and the Netherlands, 1750–1850* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), particularly Parts I, III, and IV; and Jur van Goor, "The Colonial Factor in Anglo–Dutch Relations, 1780–1820," in *Unspoken Allies: Anglo–Dutch Relations Since 1780,* ed. Nigel Ashton and Duco Hellema (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2001), 17–33.

11 Colley, *Britons*, 65.

12 E.A. Wrigley, "A simple model of London's importance in changing English society and economy, 1650 – 1750," *Past & Present* 37 (1967).

13 Pincus, *1688*, 475

14 Pincus, *1688*, 6. Who actually proposed this is an issue outside the scope of this paper. See Pincus, *1688*.

15 See Pincus, *1688*, particularly chapters 8–11.

16 Pincus, *1688*, 241.

17 The Dutch migrated in significant numbers to East Anglia in the 16th century, England supported the Dutch during the Eighty Years War, and the two had entered into many commercial treaties throughout the 16th and 17th centuries. On the first see Charles Wilson, "Cloth Production and International Competition in the Seventeenth Century," *The Economic History Review* 13 (1960): 209–220; on the second and third see Israel, *The Dutch Republic*.

18 Both Colley (*Britons*, 69) and Conway (*Britain, Ireland, and Continental Europe*, 91) allude to this date.

19 Conway, *Britain, Ireland, and Continental Europe*, 87.

20 Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 713. See also Richard T. Rapp, "The Unmaking of the Mediterranean Trade Hegemony: International Trade Rivalry and the Commercial Revolution," *The Journal of Economic History* 35 (1975), 499–525.

securities. Dickson estimates that the Dutch held 15% of the British national debt in 1750, and Dutch investors held large amounts of East India Company stock.[21] Securities in the Dutch Republic attracted British money as well, though the extent of such investment is less well known.[22]

Perhaps more importantly for the purposes of this paper, there is evidence that the British were well aware of these economic connections, and saw a natural affinity between British and Dutch economic interests, rather than merely competition. Such a statement is strongly made by one pamphleteer in 1721, who writes that the trade of the Dutch and English "is reciprocally advantageous."[23] He continues, warning, "The Loss [Britain] should suffer would be unspeakably GREAT…[from] the Decay [of the Dutch Republic's trade]."[24] In an era when "mercantilist ideology," which dictated that trade was a zero sum game among states, was largely accepted, such a characterization of the economic relations between two countries is remarkable.[25] The pamphlet, written in response to the threat of competition from an Austrian East Indies trading company, was probably intended for the London mercantile community, a group that encompassed a wide variety of the middling sorts.[26] The London author of this pamphlet clearly saw the Dutch as an economic partner rather than a rival and may have expressed the interests of the London mercantile community more generally.

In addition to being commercial powers, the two nations shared a further commonality in their religion. The Protestantism of the Dutch Republic and the British meant that they saw themselves jointly as the principal protectors of Europe from the tyranny of the "Popish Interest."[27] Religion was certainly crucial to self-understanding, and thus the importance of this element of identification between the nations cannot be overstated.[28] Protestantism seems to have enabled further cultural exchange, as demonstrated by the large numbers of British students who graduated from the University of Leiden in the Dutch Republic: over 1,500 between 1700 and 1750.[29] Conway suggests that even though enrollment of British students was much higher at Oxford and Cambridge, the difference between the numbers of students graduating was much lower, and, thus, Leiden was a significant source of British graduates.[30] This was particularly true of Scottish students, though, according to Conway, Englishmen such as "George Colebrook, later chairman of the East India Company; William Dowdeswell and Charles Townshend, future chancellors of the exchequer, and John Wilkes, the popular libertarian" also attended Leiden.[31] Only Townshend came from an aristocratic family. Thus the relationship between the Dutch and the British seems not to have been confined just to the aristocracy, but rather permeated the middling sorts as well.

The many shared interests and commonalities between the two nations manifested themselves in and were reinforced by the countries' alliances in three major wars between 1689 and 1748: the Nine Years War, the War of Spanish Succession, and the War of Austrian Succession. Friendly relations and similarities between the nations seemed to have allowed for some British to closely identify with the Dutch. A British government correspondent wrote from the Dutch Republic, "Most of our British merchants residing here, consider themselves Dutch."[32] John Brewer asserts, however, that the British may have done more than merely identified with the Dutch. Rather, it seems that many in Britain may have looked to the Dutch as an example for how a small country could rise to be a great power.[33] The Dutch financial system, joint-stock companies, and impressive navy had, in the 17th century, helped the Republic grow into a global commercial empire and become one of the most powerful states in Europe. Britain, with a similar culture, religion, and resource endowment, seems to have looked to the Dutch Republic as a model upon which to build their own Empire.

In the second half of the 18th century, however, the Anglo–Dutch relationship changed in multiple dimensions. The political and economic weakening of the Dutch vis-à-vis the British and French was a significant factor in their disengagement from broader European affairs, beginning

21 P.G.M. Dickson, *The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit, 1658 –1756* (London: Macmillan, 1967), 322; H.V. Bowen, "From Supranational to National: Changing Patterns of Investment in the British East India Company, 1750–1820," in *Colonial Empires*, ed. Moore and van Nierop, 131–144.

22 Conway, *Britain, Ireland, and Continental Europe*, 85.

23 *The Importance of the Ostend-Company Consider'd* (London: E. Say, 1726), 6. Gale's Eighteenth Century Collections Online (CW104205765).

24 *The Importance of the Ostend-Company*, 16.

25 Brewer, *The Sinews of War*, 169.

26 Colley, *Britons*, 65.

27 *The Importance of the Ostend-Company Consider'd*, 6.

28 Colley, *Britons*, 6.

29 Figures calculated from Conway, *Britain, Ireland, and Continental Europe*, Figure 4. Originally obtained from Edward Peacock, *Index to English Speaking Students who have Graduated at Leyden University* (London: 1883).

30 Conway, *Britain, Ireland, and Continental Europe*, 138.

31 Conway, *Britain, Ireland, and Continental Europe*, 138.

32 Wotlers to Sandwich (22 January 1765) in *The Private Papers of John, Earl of Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1771–1782, Volume I*, ed. G.R. Barnes and J.H. Owens (London: Navy Records Society, 1938).

33 In the words of Brewer, "The example to which most of the nation looked was the Dutch. In the seventeenth century that amphibious group of United Provinces had demonstrated conclusively that a small but rich country could be a great power." (Brewer, *The Sinews of War*, 189).

in 1748.[34] This disengagement is confirmed several statistics showing decreasing interaction between the Dutch and British. Dutch holdings of East India Company stock fell almost continuously from 1756 to 1791, and, between 1750 and 1800, only 370 British students graduated from Leiden, compared to 1,500 in the first half of the century.[35] Additionally in this period, particularly after the Seven Years War, the British were increasingly distracted by their growing Empire. This resulted in a broad British turn away from Europe and towards their Empire in the second half of the century, up until 1789.[36] Thus, it appears that, beginning in the early years of the second half of the century, the real political, social, and economic connections that had facilitated the close identification of the British with the Dutch began to break down.

While these real changes have attracted the attention of historians, much less attention has been paid to how the British people reacted to them.[37] After many years of clearly identifying the Dutch as the nation whose interest most closely aligned with their own, the sudden divergence of those interests necessitated a response from the British people in the way in which they talked about and depicted the Dutch. In the rest of this paper, I will argue that at least some of these responses were conditioned by contemporary British anxieties. In the early years of the 1770s, these anxieties were centered on Britain's newfound empire, and, in the later years of that decade and the early years of the next, they were centered on wariness over Britain's diplomatic isolation during the American Revolutionary War.

The 1760s were a time of great change in the British Empire and in how Britons perceived it. The Seven Years War, often considered the first world war, resulted in British imperial power expanding around the world; Canada, Florida, Senegal, various outposts in India, and islands in the Caribbean all came under British rule. Additionally, the East India Company won control of the rich Indian state of Bengal between 1757 and 1763, and Captain Cook returned to Britain with recommendations to establish a colony in Australia in 1770. Thus, the British Empire expanded greatly in a very short period. Indeed, this is the first time that the term "British Empire" came into common use.[38] However, such growth was not accompanied by ballyhooed optimism. Rather, it was feared that adapting to the new responsibilities required by a far-flung empire would corrupt the nation.[39] The anxiety caused by Britain's newfound empire seems to have played a role in the manifestation of three more specific concerns of the people: the foreign-ness of the British ruling elite, the avarice displayed by an increasing number of the middling sorts, and the high taxes required to rule such an empire. Londoners—the middling sorts, especially—may have been particularly concerned about these things, for they witnessed them most consistently. Two travelogues on the Dutch Republic, one written by Joseph Marshall in 1772 and the other by John Williams in 1777, reflect these exact concerns in their criticism of the Dutch.[40]

One such criticism was that the Dutch ruling elite were becoming more French. Marshall and Williams both describe the ruling elite of the Dutch—those that "support themselves without trade"—as "imitators" of the hated French.[41] This group, Marshall asserts, "are all more or less French, or imitators of them; they speak that language, dress in the French taste, eat in the same, and give themselves some airs."[42] Williams agrees that the Dutch "nobles…endeavor to imitate the French in their manners, their dress, and even in their gallantry."[43] Marshall, however, makes it clear that "we must not take our ideas of the national character from [these people], because they carry in their very face the marks of being but bastard Dutch."[44] In the eyes of Marshall, the ruling elite do not "exhibit the true Dutch character," and thus in a sense are not truly Dutch.[45] He says that they, and thus the Dutch government, have rather fallen under the "domineering disposition of France."[46]

This criticism of a "Frenchified" ruling elite seems to

34 Jur van Goor, "The Colonial Factor in Anglo–Dutch Relations, 1780 –1820," in *Unspoken Allies*, ed. Ashton and Hellema, 18–19.

35 On the first set of statistics, see H.V. Bowen, "Investment and Empire in the Later Eighteenth Century: East India Stockholding, 1756 –1791," *The Economic History Review* 42 (May 1989): 200–204; on the second, see Conway, *Britain, Ireland, and Continental Europe*, 139.

36 See, for example, Conway, *Britain, Ireland, and Continental Europe*, 89–93.

37 See, for example, Charles Wilson, *Anglo–Dutch Trade and Finance in the 18th Century*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1941); Bowen, "From Supranational to National," P.J. Marshall, "The British State Overseas, 1750–1850," in *Colonial Empires*, eds. Moore and van Nierop; in comparison to the cultural histories of Eliga Gould *The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution* (Greensboro, NC: The University of North Caroline Press, 2000), who mentions the British perceptions of the Dutch once, and Kathleen Wilson, *The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture, and Imperialism in England, 1715–1785* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), who does not mention them at all.

38 H.V. Bowen, "British Conceptions of Global Empire, 1756–1783," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 26 (1998), 1–27.

39 Colley, *Britons*, 102.

40 See Joseph Marshall, *Travels through Holland, Flanders, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Lapland, Russia, The Ukraine, and Poland in The Years 1768, 1769, and 1770* (London: 1772). Hathi Trust. John Williams, *The Rise, Progress, and Present State of the Northern Governments* (London: 1777). Hathi Trust.

41 Quotation taken from Marshall, *Travels through Holland,* 42. See also Williams, *The Rise, Progress, and Present State*, 72–74.

42 Marshall, *Travels through Holland,* 42.

43 Williams, *The Rise, Progress, and Present State*, 74.

44 Marshall, *Travels through Holland*, 42.

45 Marshall, *Travels through Holland*, 43.

46 Marshall, *Travels through Holland*, 352.

have been prevalent in Britain, as well. Starting in the mid–18th century, the British upper classes were accused of corrupting the British nation through their affinity for French culture.[47] Similar to Marshall's description of the Dutch upper classes, the British upper classes spoke French, wore French clothes, and adapted French culture.[48] Gerald Newman has shown the virulence of middle-class attacks on such actions, clearly pointing to the fact that contemporary writers thought that the upper classes' embrace of French culture ran contrary to the true British character.[49] One such playwright brings out this disgust with the last lines of a poem published in 1756: "Rouse! Re-assume! Refuse a gallic reign, / Nor let their arts win what their arms could never gain."[50] The concern of this writer is clearly that French "Trulls, toupees, trinkets, bags, brocades, and lace" will "win" them England by transfixing the English upper classes and bringing them under the control of the French. Thus in a very similar sentiments can be identified in Britain and in Marshall's description of the Dutch—the elites of both nation were betraying their national identity, while the middling sorts preserved it.

More generally, the 1760s and early 1770s were a period when Londoners were concerned that state, and the national identity bottled up with it, were being eroded by the upper classes.[51] Both Marshall and Williams, writing in London, would have been quite aware of the accusations made by men like John Wilkes and his supporters: that the ruling elite were foreign by both and action. [52] The attention these authors pay to the "French influence" in the Dutch Republic thus seems to have been conditioned by a similar sentiment in their hometown, that the ruling elite were somehow displaced from the true national character. While the Dutch were perhaps more prone to such influence because of their proximity to France, the wide appeal of Wilkes and his campaigns for "Englishness" suggest that some Londoners were concerned by the possibility of an alien influence in their own government.[53] Thus, while the Dutch represented a nation that was similar to England, they also represented what could happen to the nation if the government were to become even more foreign, in the manner of the Dutch upper class—the state would be under the control of a foreign power, perhaps even the dreaded French.

Further evidence that contemporary British concerns impacted the way in which Marshall and Williams depicted the Dutch comes from the different ways in which they describe the Dutch "lower classes." Writing in the late 1760s, Marshall identifies in the Dutch, particularly in those "deeply engaged in commerce," a "close unbroken industry" and contentment with a sober lifestyle, saying they seem "to give the least attention to enjoying more than a very moderate competency."[54] In contrast, Williams, writing in the mid 1770s, claims that this "close unbroken industry" of the people had transformed itself into a general avarice. Avarice is, Williams asserts, the "great vice that predominates [in the Dutch Republic]."[55] In contrast to his criticism of the upper-class Dutch as "Frenchified," Williams claims that avarice was *general* across the Dutch Republic's commercial society, saying, "All ranks of people receive in their infancy…the ideas of avarice and selfishness."[56] These criticisms of avarice were accompanied in Williams's account by the assertion that the Dutch now "give into all kinds of excess and luxury."[57] According to him, they exhibit "the greatest prodigality," which "makes them often appear very ridiculous."[58] This was, Williams notes, particularly true of the mercantile classes. He goes on to say that such greed was not always pursued honestly, but rather that the Dutch were often "vicious and dishonest" in their dealings, as they took advantage of the "ignorance or folly of those [that] they deal[t] with."[59] Indeed, Williams may have been familiar with Adam Smith's recently published *Wealth of Nations*, which asserts that the avarice of the Dutch manifested itself in their "savage policy" in the East Indies, where they had, "by different arts of oppression…reduced the population of several of the Moluccas."[60]

It is possible to account for this change by examining the context in which Williams wrote. Whereas Marshall wrote his work before the East India Company crisis in 1772 and the fallout that accompanied it in 1773, such events were probably well known to Williams. In 1772, the company, fashioned after the Dutch *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (VOC), defaulted on its repayment of loans to the British Crown after its share price had fallen 50% since 1769.[61] While the causes of this fall were complex, many Britons in both Parliament and the middling sorts blamed the avarice of British "nabobs"—young men from the middling sorts who set out for India "certain… of making a fortune" and returned to Britain to "purchase large

47 Colley, *Britons*, 88.
48 Colley, *Britons*, 88.
49 Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, 63-122.
50 Samuel Foote, *The Dramatic Works: Of Samuel Foote, To which is Prefixed a life of the author* (P. Vaillant: London, 1777), 40.
51 Colley, *Britons*, 110.
52 Quotation from Colley, *Britons*, 110.
53 Wilkes was elected a Member of Parliament (MP) twice throughout this period—in 1757 and 1768—and became Lord Mayor of London in 1774. See Colley, *Britons*, 100–113 for a description of Wilkes's appeal and success.
54 Marshall, *Travels through Holland*, 43.
55 Williams, *The Rise, Progress, and Present State*, 79.
56 Williams, *The Rise, Progress, and Present State*, 80.
57 Williams, *The Rise, Progress, and Present State*, 77.
58 Williams, *The Rise, Progress, and Present State*, 74.
59 Williams, *The Rise, Progress, and Present State*, 77.
60 Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), Volume II, 152.
61 Naill Furgeson, *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World* (New York: Penguin, 2004).

estate[s], with the most elegant villa[s]."[62] A former East India Company servant writing in a British periodical claimed that these fortunes were made by the expression of "monstrous and unconstitutional powers."[63] He elaborates, "Eastern nabobs possessed the power of doing ill in a greater degree than perhaps was ever known in the annals of time."[64] The difference between Marshall and Williams on this subject suggests that Williams's perspective was affected by the sudden attention paid to "nabobs," and thus was prone to see this contemporary British concern for avarice in the Dutch. Moreover, the generalness of Dutch avarice suggests that Williams saw the Dutch as further along on this path to destructive greed, a path which Britain was on but should avoid. Smith makes this connection more explicitly than Williams does: The English will prove "completely as destructive as…the Dutch."[65]

The high taxes of the Dutch Republic—and the perceived disastrous effects of them—were similarly well-recognized by Britons, and again reflected in contemporary British concerns. Williams asserts, "The taxes in [the Dutch Republic] are at present so heavy and so general, that it is almost impossible to augment the public revenue by this means, without endangering a commotion in the state."[66] These taxes were not only burdensome on the consumers, but more importantly ruined manufactures, according to Smith: "In Holland the heavy taxes upon the necessaries of life have ruined…their principal manufactures, and are likely to discourage gradually even their fisheries and their trade in ship-building."[67] It is clear from appeals and petitions to Parliament that Britions expressed similar worries about their precipitously rising tax rates, claiming that "taxes upon Coals, Candles, Soap…now lie heavy upon…Manufacturers… by which the prime cost of all our Manufactures is so much enhanced that it is impossible for our Merchants to sell them."[68] In an era of mercantilism, the possibility of a state's manufactures disappearing was quite worrisome, and one that the English surely feared. One Englishman from the middling sorts explicitly appeals "to what has happened to the Dutch" on account of their "most abominable and innumerable taxations"—the loss of economic prowess. It is clear that he believes that if Britain follows the Dutch path, they will end up with the same result.[69]

The commonalities between the concerns about British society and the criticisms of the Dutch are striking. They suggest that Marshall and Williams still identify with the Dutch, despite the fraying of political, economic, and cultural ties between the nations. However, the two travelogues seem to suggest that while the British were still on the same path as the Dutch, as they happily had been in the first half of the century, they should now be worried about going further down this path. The travelogues seem tell us that if they continued, the industriousness of the people could be transformed to the most dreadful avarice when they are tempted by luxury, the taxes required for the maintenance of the empire could ruin the metropole's manufacturing capabilities, and foreign influences could infiltrate the ruling elite. The Dutch were still considered an example to look to, but no longer one to follow. Rather, they came to be seen as an example the British believed they would do well to avoid.

In the years of the American Revolution, however, these warnings against following the Dutch path were not as pressing as the possibility of England being isolated in Europe by their traditional Dutch ally joining the side of the French and Spanish. While most histories make only a passing mention of the Fourth Anglo–Dutch War that grew out of the Revolution, I argue that it was a traumatic event for the British people.[70] The Revolution itself caused the British people much anxiety. The war "deprived [the British] a part of themselves," and was fought despite the close economic, political, and cultural ties between the British and the colonists (many of whom were, indeed, British themselves).[71] Worry seems to have also been brought on by the fact that Britain had no continental allies during this war.[72] I will argue that this anxiety over the conflict

62 The first quotation is from "Robert Clive: Speech in Commons on India, 1772," Fordham University: Modern History Sourcebook, accessed December 1, 2012, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1772clive-india.asp; the second is from "Memoirs of Mr. Fordyee, a late celebrated Banker," *The Gentleman's Magazine; and Historical Chronicle* (July 1772): 311. ProQuest (8367810).

63 "Part of a Letter written by an Officer who lately served in Bengal," *The Gentleman's Magazine; and Historical Chronicle* (February 1772): 69. ProQuest (8548713).

64 "Part of a Letter," *The Gentleman's Magazine,* 69.

65 Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, II, 153.

66 Williams, *The Rise, Progress, and Present State*, 132.

67 Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, II, 402.

68 Quoted from William Corbbet, *Cobbett's Parliamentary History of England: Volume X* (T.C. Hansard: London, 1812), 89.

69 "An Address to the British Electors," *The Gentleman's Magazine; and Historical Chronicle* (December 1769): 617. ProQuest (8697191). This concern was probably amplified with the expansion of the Empire in the Seven Years War. Pincus and Robinson's early research on British state spending shows that imperial projects on social and economic development attracted a significant portion of the state's budget throughout the 18th century. Steve Pincus and James Robinson, "War and State-Making Reconsidered: The Rise of the Interventionist State" (paper presented at Mellon Conference for British Studies, Chicago, IL, October 11th-12th, 2013).

70 See the limited attention it is given in Christopher Hibbert, *Redcoats and Rebels: The American Revolution through British Eyes* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Co., 2002) and Stanley Weintraub, *Iron Tears: America's Battle for Freedom, Britain's Quagmire: 1775-1783* (New York, NY: Free Press, 2005), and Andrew Stockley, *Britain and France at the birth of America: the European powers and the peace negotiations of 1782–1783* (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 2001). A work that devotes relatively more time to it is Brendan Simms, *Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714–1783*, (New York City, NY: Penguin, 2007).

71 Colley, *Britons*, 150.

72 Colley, *Britons*, 145.

between having all of their Atlantic neighbors allied against them and the longstanding British identification with the Dutch was responsible for the inability of some Britons to ever see the Dutch as a true enemy, as Britain's other continental enemies—the French and Spanish—clearly were.

The first suggestion that the British were unwilling to accept the Dutch as an enemy comes from the disbelief that some Britons expressed over the possibility of an Anglo–Dutch conflict. While some went as far to claim that the Dutch would eventually join the British in their fight, more claimed that the two nations would at least avoid war. These opinions were expressed in a variety of London newspapers and periodicals. One such periodical contained a story of a Dutchwoman, who fell in love with a "British Officer" stationed in the Republic.[73] While the woman's father (who "could not be more devoted to his wealth") initially prevents them from marrying because the Office has no inheritance, this hesitancy is eventually overcome, allowing the Dutchwoman and British man to be united.[74] This passage, in light of its explicitness of the nationalities and personalities, can be read as a commentary on the relationship between the British and the Dutch. The two nations still have a "true passion" for one another, and such passion will be enough to overcome even the avarice of the Dutch.[75] The British believed that while the Dutch may selfishly pursue profit via trade during Anglo–American hostilities for a time, but eventually they would ally with the British. Indeed, the British seemed to have been justified in this thought, for, in March of 1775 the Dutch Republic prohibited the exportation of war supplies to British dominions in America.[76] While British officials expressed constant worry about the "inadequacy of the Dutch prohibition," some Britons seem to have been convinced that this was the beginning of Dutch assistance in the war.[77]

Indeed, the same periodical was optimistic that the Dutch would come to Britain's aid even as tensions between the two nations mounted and war became more likely. Throughout the late 1770s, several Dutch ships carrying naval supplies had their goods confiscated by the British navy.[78] The most significant of such seizures occurred in December 1779, when a group of Dutch ships was intercepted by one Captain Fielding.[79] While it is unclear who provoked who, the skirmish ended with the Dutch surrendering and Fielding ordering "all the Dutch merchantmen into Plymouth for admiralty court hearings."[80] From this point, war was probably inevitable. Even in the aftermath of this incident, however, the *Weekly Miscellany* published a story of how a Dutch ship had assisted a British ship in fighting off "two French privateers."[81] This story could not be verified in the navy's records, but its message seems to be that the Dutch were indeed ready to join the fight against the French and Spanish. The Dutch, according to this story, were still on the side of the British, despite mounting evidence to the contrary.

While few were perhaps as optimistic as the *Weekly Miscellany*, there does seem to have been a wider belief that the British and Dutch would, at least, not go to war with another. *The General Evening Post*, a London newspaper, claimed, "Of a Dutch war, there is not the smallest probability."[82] A pamphleteer in 1779 claimed that negotiations "would secure the harmony which subsisted between that…republic and Great Britain."[83] From this pamphlet and others like it, it seems that some Londoners were remarkably oblivious to or in denial of the escalating tensions between the British and the Dutch. Despite the widely reported Fielding incident, many people were not at all convinced that such tensions were insurmountable. The British might have dealt with anxieties over the prospect of the Dutch arming against the British by simply refusing to believe that an Anglo–Dutch conflict would ever materialize.

Even those commentators who appear to have accepted that war would come after the Fielding incident did not accept it enthusiastically. In contrast to the patriotic fervor that had followed the declaration of war against the French just two years earlier, there was much questioning behind the reasoning for the war in public venues such as the London debating societies. In 1780, the various societies debated the merits of the war with the Dutch at least four times.[84] Such questioning was not required when there was a battle with France—a situation which was, by this point in the 18th century, all too familiar. A war with the Dutch was more worthy of debate, because it would signal the disintegration of an alliance on which Britain had relied for the previous 80 years.

Debaters and other writers in London did not merely question the war because of their affinity for Britain's "best natural ally," but also because of the confused legal issues surrounding the war, rooted in treaties signed between the two countries in the 17th century.[85] One debate society questioned

73 "An Affecting Story," *Weekly Miscellany; or, Instructive Entertainment* (12 June 1775), 253. ProQuest (4222335).
74 "An Affecting Story," *Weekly Miscellany*, 253–255.
75 "An Affecting Story," *Weekly Miscellany*, 253.
76 Miller, *Sir Joseph Yorke*, 40
77 Miller, *Sir Joseph Yorke*, 40
78 Miller, *Sir Joseph Yorke*, 88.
79 Miller, *Sir Joseph Yorke*, 88.
80 Miller, *Sir Joseph Yorke*, 88.
81 "A Naval Anecdote," *Weekly Miscellany; or, Instructive Entertainment* (31 January 1780), 426-427. Obtained from ProQuest database, ProQuest document number 4234924.
82 "London," *The General Evening Post* (4 January 1780). Gale's British Newspapers 1600–1900 (Z2000459320).
83 *The history of the war in America, between Great Britain and her colonies from its commencement to the end of the year 1778* (1779), 350. Hathi Trust.
84 Donna T. Andrew (compiled and introduced by), "London debates: 1780*," London debating societies 1776-1799*, British History Online. I say "at least" because some of the debate topics are difficult to interpret and classify accordingly, and because only very brief descriptions of each debate are offered.
85 See footnote 12 above. The quote is from *The Scot's Magazine* 42 (1780): 522.

Figure 1: "The Dutchman in the Dumps" celebrates the British capture of the Dutch West Indies island of St. Eustatius. From left to righ are an English sailor, a Dutchman, a Frenchman, an Spaniard, and an American.

whether the actions of the government were "consistent with policy and the law of nations."[86] A commentator from London claimed in *The Scot's Magazine,* in reference to the Fielding incident, that "the Seizure of the Dutch convoy was a violent impolitic measure…depriving the Dutch of all the privileges and advantages they enjoyed under those treaties, [and] was not founded in wisdom, nor equity, nor integrity."[87] Another London author stated, "The war of England with the Dutch was entered upon precipitately, harshly, and if I were to add unjustly, I should deliver the sentiments of many wise and good men in this country," suggesting that more than a small minority held this view.[88] To these writers, Britain was not only betraying its "old and natural ally," but it also was doing so in an illegal and dishonorable manner.[89] These debates and criticisms suggest that some Britons did not want to give

Figure 2: "The Castle in the Moon" shows Spain as Don Quixote, France as a monkey on his horse, and Holland as Sancho.

up their friendship with the Dutch, pointing to the English anxiety over the prospect of being at war with nearly all of Europe. Thus, even realistic Londoners found a way to express their anxiety about an Anglo–Dutch conflict, basing their assessments on the long-standing diplomatic relations of the states.

Despite this reticence, however, war finally was declared. On December 20, 1780, the British severed diplomatic relations with the Dutch, and ordered the seizure of all Dutch ships, regardless of what they were carrying.[90] Some people seem to have reacted to the Anglo–Dutch conflict by simply blaming the French. In this way, people were able to continue to see the Dutch Republic as their "oldest and best friend," while also accounting for why they were at war with them—if the Dutch were simply under the influence of France, then, in a sense, the British were only continuing to fight their traditional enemy, and not their traditional ally.[91] The impression that the Dutch ruling elite was under the influence of the French was not new, of course, but it was now being used to explain the Anglo–Dutch conflict. This opinion is perhaps expressed most clearly in a history of the Revolution published shortly after its conclusion. "Holland," the author writes, left "her old and natural ally at the mercy of France."[92] That is, not by choice, but rather because of French influence. Dutch actions were solely "in compliance to the French court," he claimed, while the "clamors against the war with Great Britain" emitting from the common people were always strong.[93]

86 Item No. 385, in "London Debates 1780," in *London Debating Societies*, ed. Andrew.
87 *The Scot's Magazine* 42 (1780): 522.
88 *Considerations of the Provisional Treaty with America, and the Preliminary Articles of Peace with France and Spain* (London: 1783), 122. Hathi Trust.
89 *The Scot's Magazine* 42 (1780): 524.
90 Miller, *Sir Joseph Yorke*, 95.
91 *Considerations of the Provisional Treaty*, 122.
92 John Andrews, *History of the War with America, France, Spain, and Holland; commencing in 1775 and ending in 1783*, (London: 1783), 320. Hathi Trust.
93 Andrews, *History of the War*, 319, 320.

Figure 3: In "The Times, Anno 1783," the figures from left to right personify Holland, Spain, France, and England, respectively.

The ruling elite had caused the Dutch to be beholden to the French, while the common people had resisted. Contemporary political cartoons suggest that this was not merely a hindsight assessment of this author, but rather was a consistent reaction to Dutch involvement throughout the war.

One such cartoon, titled "The Dutchman in the Dumps," shows the Dutch lamenting the loss of the port of St. Eustatius, dismayed at the loss of profit they would experience (Figure 1).[94]

The Frenchman, standing in the background like a puppet-master, is alarmed that the "storehouse of the war" is gone.[95] This can be understood in light of the criticisms expressed by Williams. While, as Williams identified, all Dutch were prone to avarice, the cartoon shows that they were not concerned with the war more generally—they did not actually want to fight the British. The grander concerns for the outlook of the conflict were only held by France, Britain's committed enemy. This image was followed a few months later by a cartoon that shows the Spanish as Don Quixote, the French as his monkey, and the Dutch as Sancho, his servant (Figure 2).[96] Regardless of the relationship between the Spanish and French, the Dutch seem to be cast as the follower of the group, simply obliging the orders of their master.

The disconnect between the Spanish and French on the one hand and the Dutch on the other manifests itself in



Figure 4: "Original Air Balloon" is full of "cynical resentment at America's success."[97] The larger figures in the foreground personify, from left to right, Spain, France, Ben Franklin, and Holland.

several other political cartoons.[98] In four published in 1783, the Spanish and French are shown standing together in one part of the picture, often holding hands and talking to one another, while the Dutch are drawn standing alone, quite literally separated from the other two (see, for example, Figures 3 and 4).

These images suggest that these cartoonists imagined the Dutch as being quite distinct from the Spanish and French.

94 James Gillray, "The Dutchman in the Dumps" (9 April 1781), in *The English Satirical Print 1600–1832: The American Revolution*, ed. Peter D.G. Thomas (Cambridge: Chadwyck-Healey, 1986), 224–225.

95 Gillray, "The Dutchman," in *English Satirical Print*, ed. Thomas, 224–225.

96 James Gillray, "The Castle in the Moon" (22 August 1782) in *English Satirical Print*, ed. Thomas 248–249.

97 "Original Air Balloon" (29 December 1783), in *English Satirical Print*, ed. Thomas, 276–277.

98 T. Colley, "Peace Porridge all hot. The best to be got" (11 February 1783), in *English Satirical Print*, ed. Thomas, 258–259; James Gillray, "The Times, Anno 1783" (14 April 1783), in *English Satirical Print*, ed. Thomas, 268–269; "Proclamation of Peace" (21 October 1783), in *English Satirical Print* , ed. Thomas, 274–275. "Original Air Balloon" (29 December 1783), in *English Satirical Print*, ed. Thomas, 276–277.

They were a foe that didn't quite warrant the same enmity as the other two nations. Indeed, one cartoon shows the French and Spanish fighting the British with the Dutch standing off behind them, not engaging.[99] The underlying message of these images seems to be that the British were really fighting their traditional enemies, the Spanish and French, while the Dutch were distinct, not true enemies. Rather, they were pawns of Spain and France. In this way, some in Britain may have been able to escape confronting the fact that their traditional ally had turned against them, and that they were now fighting all of their Atlantic neighbors.

In the 1770s and 1780s the traditional sense of fraternity that had existed between the British and the Dutch for much of the previous century was strained. While the two nations seemed to have disengaged from one another, the evidence presented here suggests that some members of the middling class in Britain continued to maintain a sense of identification with the Dutch. Such identification adapted to changing times, however. In the early 1770s, it resulted in some writers suggesting that the British would do well to avoid the Dutch path, while, in the late 1770s and early 1780s, it resulted in apprehension over and disbelief in an Anglo–Dutch conflict. Each of these cases, I have argued, was a reaction to particular English anxieties. This suggests continuity in the Anglo–Dutch relationship, as perceived by the middling sorts, over the course of the 18th century, or at least through the American Revolutionary War.[100] The French were not the only continental nation that the British cared about in the 18th century. In a very different way, they paid equal attention to the Dutch. As demonstrated here, studying this attention allows us to better understand how Britons' affinity for, and fraternity with, the Dutch conditioned how Britons conceptualized *themselves*.

99 T. Colley, "The Reconciliation between Britannia and her daughter America" (May 1782), in *English Satirical Print*, ed. Thomas, 240–241.

100 This relationship would, of course, change even more dramatically in the last 15 years of the 18th century. Constraints, however, limited this paper to 15 years or so immediately prior to those changes.

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Behind Closed Doors: Revisiting Air Command's 'Lack of Moral Fiber and Waverer Disposal Policy' and its 'Treatment' of Neurotic Cases, 1941-1945

By Christopher Kingdon, University of Chicago

Part I: Introduction

> "The airman thereafter developed symptoms of an anxiety state and was treated in sick quarters for a month without improvement. In previous wars he would probably have been shot for cowardice. Today he is a "medical case", albeit a medical nuisance."[1]

Edward Jewesbury MD, RAF Neuroses Specialist, 1943.

Forced to accept the existence of combat neuroses, but wary that too lenient of a disposal policy might encourage shirkers, Dr. Jewesbury's quote reveals the quandary facing Royal Air Force (RAF) Command during the Second World War. As Air Command (Command) reacted to the perceived threat of mass noncompliance and a rapidly increasing neurotic wastage rate, it chose to institutionalize an uncommonly harsh disposal policy in September 1941: the Lack of Moral Fiber and Waverer Disposal Policy (hereafter LMFW policy). This policy was designed to not only lower rates of neuroses, but also simultaneously to deter future cases of noncompliance through its harsh punishment of neuroses and malingering and by the stigmatization of such categorized cases. Considering recent accusations that Britain's armed forces continue to attach stigma to neurotic disorders amongst its forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is pertinent to return to the LMFW

1 Edward Jewesbury, M.D., "Work and Progress Report" to Air Command, July 1943. AIR 49/357 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

policy to understand its causes and consequences, and then to explore its ramifications.

Indubitably, Britain had few alternatives than to rely heavily on the RAF to fight its early defensive wars (Battles of France and Britain) and subsequent offensive war (Bomber Offensive) against the German Luftwaffe. But throughout these years, did Command actually understand the neuroses afflicting its men? If so, how did it choose to treat wartime neuroses? Moreover, did the treatment effectively rehabilitate airmen, save lives or improve Command's operational efficiency?

During the war, as Britain's infatuation with its airmen grew, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, and the government launched an extraordinarily successful propaganda campaign evoking the heroic resistance and purported resilience of their young airmen. However, the reality of aviation combat told a different story; indeed the lethality of air combat, especially the bombing campaign, began to take its toll on RAF personnel from the outset of the war.[2] [3] It becomes painfully clear that RAF Command not only failed to understand and treat combat neuroses, but as a result LMFW policy failed to rehabilitate airmen. This resulted in a reduction of combat efficiency and an increase in air accidents. Indeed as volunteers grappled with an ever-increasing attrition rate (the highest of Britain's three services) as well as increasingly harrowing combat experiences, the airmen began to succumb to neuroses at ever-higher rates.[4] [5] Psychiatric attrition rates in Bomber Command increased from 1.5% in 1939 to 5.4% in 1943.[6]

LMFW policy demonstrates Command's pervasive paranoia for mass outbreaks of noncompliance at squadron level – it feared that these outbreaks would render the service operational ineffective, and simultaneously dismantle the service's and nation's stylized portrayal of its men's formidable stoicism.[7] Above all, the policy was designed to swiftly remove men from their squadrons to Neurotic Centers in order to prevent the spread of noncompliance. Evidence demonstrates that Commanding Officers (COs), Medical Officers (MOs), officers and aircrew met Command's disposal policy with considerable resistance due to its bluntness, harshness, and impact on operational performance.[8] Yet, more often than not, COs and MOs acquiesced enacting Command's disposal policy. Not only did Britain's Secretary of State deem the harshness and class-orientated nature of the policy 'indefensible in Parliament' as the war wound down in 1944, evidence reveals that it failed to stem psychiatric wastage, contributed to higher rates of air accidents, and perpetuated stigmas attached to neuroses.[9]

To explore this topic, primary documentation, complemented by secondary scholarship, finally allows for historians to fully recreate LMFW policy. Thus, it is now possible to develop a fuller understanding of the severe consequences facing airmen. Aircrew faced the policy's harshest consequences - transfer to combatant or ground duties.[10] These airmen, the non-officer class, included pilots, navigator, wireless operator, bombardiers and air gunners; in fact NCOs included all trained aircrew who weren't awarded the rank of officer upon graduation from aviation school. On the other hand, the officer class in the RAF faced softer, yet still stigmatic consequences, such as demotion and isolative invaliding.[11] Both LMFW officers and aircrew were met with the certainty of the squadron CO stripping the flier of his coveted wings.[12]

To contextualize LMFW policy in the historiography, this paper examines the British experience with neuroses in the First World War; in particular, the harsh and ineffective treatment of neuroses during the war and the Ministry of Pensions obsessive efforts to reduce pensions for neurotics during the interwar period.[13] This paper then studies the development of aviation psychology in the interwar period by focusing on these sources: the Birley *Report on Wartime Neuroses* (1921), Bartlett *Psychology and the Soldier* (1927) and Gillespie's *Psychological Effects of War on a Citizen and Soldier* (1942).

In light of this historiography, it becomes abundantly clear that RAF Command had an obsessive predilection, based upon Freudian concepts, that rises in neurotic rates were attributable to the character deficiencies of its wartime recruits, and not to the combined effects of prolonged exposure to combat stress and high attrition rates.

Given the above, this paper endeavors to make three

2 "At one point in 1942 RAF bomber crews had no more than 10 per-cent change of surviving a full tour of operations." Martin Francis, *The Flyer: British Culture and the Royal Air Force 1939-1945*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 18-20.

3 Stephen Bungay, T*he Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain* (London: Aurum Press, 2000), 223.

4 Around 45% of all those who served Bomber Command died during the Second World War, 56,000 in total. Max Hastings, *Bomber Command: The Myths and Reality of the Strategic Bombing Offensive 1939-1945*, (New York: Dial Press, 1979), 1.

5 "To name, but a few - lack of oxygen in the stratosphere, anti-aircraft, lack of parachutes, planes that were impossible to escape as they fell, lynch mobs… incited by German propaganda". Francis, *The Flyer*, 108.

6 Mark Wells, *Courage and Air Warfare: The Allied Experience in the Second World War* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 129-133.

7 "LMF could go through a squadron like wildfire if it was unchecked". Hastings, *Bomber Command*, 243.

8 Squadron Leader D. Reid to Air Command, September 14, 1942, AIR 49/357 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

9 Minutes on "W" Procedure, October 20, 1944, AIR 19/632 Papers, National Archives, Kew Garden, London.

10 Air Command "Memorandum on the Disposal of All Members of Air Crews who Forfeit the Confidence of their Commanding Officers" to all Commanding Officers, May 8, 1943, AIR 19:632 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, paragraphs 14-16.

11 *Ibid.*, paragraphs 14-16.

12 *Ibid.,* paragraph 17.

13 Joanna Burke, "Effeminacy, Ethnicity and the End of Trauma: The Sufferings of 'Shell-Shocked' Men in Great Britain and Ireland, 1914-39," *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 19 (Jan. 2000): 63.

core arguments about LMFW policy.

First, the totality of the RAF's war contributed to a growing disconnect between operational expectations from the government and Command, and the reality of the war facing their airmen. During the Battle of Britain a legend of invincibility and bravery was born in the skies above Britain, witnessed in the nation's cities and villages (Churchill himself was an avid nightly watcher). From these scenes, the British government wrought a propaganda machine extolling the beauty and nobility of air warfare that gripped the public's attention through the media of film, print and poster. These political and military expectations placed on the RAF, and, subsequently, its fliers, fostered a growing disconnect between Command's expectations of them and the reality of their experience. This disconnect contributed to the disposal policy in that Command used 'transfer to combatant duty' or 'resignations' to artificially lower psychological wastage rates conforming to the expectations of British propaganda.

Second, the interwar period, the dismantlement of the Royal Flying Corps (hereafter RFC) in 1917, and the rise of conflicting theories in academic aviation psychology during the interwar period, meant that lessons learned from the First World War, the RFC's institutional memory, were lost or forgotten by 1939. Indeed, the RFC had regarded neuroses with a considerable measure of sympathy – fliers were invalided to Britain. But the interwar discipline of academic psychology shrouds this memory, instead stressing that neuroses were the function of character deficiency. This becomes explicitly evident in Freudian arguments of the late 1920s that berated the 'vulnerability' of those with 'deficient characters' Combined with the Army and Royal Navy's 'treatment' of neuroses, and the Ministry of Pension's obsessive predilection with reducing pensions for neurotics in the early interwar period, it becomes evident that the RAF Command conflated and punished neurotic cases with malingering due to their conviction that wartime psychoneurosis amongst fliers was a flaw of character, rather than result of 'non-severe' combat stress. Air Command's psychoneurotic reports consistently rank "predisposition" as a major indicator of how to dispose of flying stress cases.[14]

Third, the policy embodies Command's historical preference, evidenced in the historiography of the RFC and RAF, for fliers chosen from the upper classes to fill its officer ranks. Consequently, Command had developed a deep mistrust of the lower-class wartime volunteers that flocked to join the ranks of its 'meritocratic' air service. To expand, Command had historically preferred upper class and middle-class 'public school' fliers since the inception of the Royal Flying Corps in the First World War. This was present even in the interwar and wartime period despite depictions in British propaganda of the RAF as the 'everyman's service.' In the Second World War, this culminated in the LMFW policy that, amongst other transgressions, punished NCOs far more harshly the officers. Primary evidence reveals that disposal policy punished aircrew more harshly than officers because Command viewed aircrew, mainly trained and recruited from the lower middle and working classes, as innately more predisposed to psychoneuroses than their officer-class counterparts. Thus, the disposal policy was intentionally designed to swiftly remove aircrew succumbing to flying stress to combatant duties (thus, deterring future cases), while merely invaliding or discharging officers with the same symptoms. While this is a complex argument, it can effectively explain both Command's conflation and punishment of neuroses and malingering amongst aircrew, and the provision of a more considerate policy for the service's officer class.

Part II: Historiography and Context of the RAF's War, 1912-1945

This historiographical section begins with the RAF's defensive and offensive wars (1939-1945), then subsequently juxtaposes these wars to the experience of the RAF's predecessor, the RFC, during the tumultuous second decade of the twentieth century (1912-1917), and concludes with an analysis of shifting attitudes toward neuroses in aviation psychology during the interwar period.

During the Second World War, the British nation relied on the RAF as the first line of defense in the face of early German advances, after Operation Barbarossa, and Germany's opening of a second front, the service assumed a new role as the nation's primary means of striking back at the enemy. For this paper's purposes, the RAF's wartime experience will be clearly divided into two periods: the defensive total war (1939-1940) and the offensive total war (1940-1945).

On September 31st, 1939, Germany invaded Poland. The RAF fought two defensive battles, the Battles of France and Britain, before their victory over the Luftwaffe in September 1940. The Battle of France is widely regarded as a swift and effective victory for the Luftwaffe despite their loss of 1,284 aircraft against RAF losses of 931.[15] After the British defeat and evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) at Dunkirk on the May 26, 1940 and the French surrender on the June 13, 1940, the attention of the nation shifted from the Battle of France to the Battle of Britain.

Throughout the Battle of Britain, the RAF was the only service capable of defending the nation from a cross-Channel invasion; the BEF had most of their equipment in France, while the Royal Navy was incapable of defending the Channel while subject to attack by German light bombers operating from Northern France. To Britain's advantage, heavy German losses during the small naval invasion of Norway meant that the Kriegsmarine (Germany's navy) was unwilling to attempt a cross-Channel invasion until the destruction of the RAF. Thus,

14 "In diagnosing psychological disorders… their causes, particularly in relation to flying duties, and predisposition to nervous breakdown". Minutes, April 1945, AIR 2/6252 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

15 Anthony Beevor, *The Second World War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2012), 127.

on July 6, 1939, Hitler issued "Directive No.16 for Preparations of a Landing Operation against England." This document formed the basis of aviation strategy against Britain.[16] Britain was utterly dependent on the RAF to defeat the German Luftwaffe in order to prevent a German invasion. This attitude can be encapsulated well in Churchill's *Finest Hour* speech,

> "Upon it (the RAF) depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be freed and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands."[17]

The experience of RAF fighter pilots during Britain's defensive war would fundamentally alter national perceptions of its airmen. These airmen, greatly assisted by the invention of radar, rose multiple times a day to meet incoming Luftwaffe bombing raids. As rural and urban Britons alike witnessed the tiny RAF forces clash with the massed German bombers above, a legend of invincibility was born. Command and the British government began to exploit the legend of stoicism demonstrated by these fighter pilots, a campaign best encapsulated in Churchill's epithet, *the Few.*[18]

The origins of the term *the Few* can be traced to a speech of Winston Churchill's speech on August 20th, 1940, when he said:

> "The gratitude of every home in our Island, in our Empire, and indeed throughout the world, except in the abodes of the guilty, goes out to the British airmen who, undaunted by odds, unwearied in their constant challenge and mortal danger, are turning the tide of the world war by their prowess and by their devotion. Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few."[19]

Evidently, the British government considered the RAF to be a national bellwether; if it demonstrated fortitude, the British people would be inspired to hunker down and fight out the war, yet if it displayed weakness, it could inspire defeatism amongst the people. However, RAF Command's confidence in Fighter Command would be shaken early on in the conflict. In 1941 RAF posted a 1.2% attrition rate from neuroses; this conflicted with Air Command's portrayal of its fliers as "unwearied" and "undaunted". The truth was that their airmen were already beginning to show the strain of the aviation war's stresses.

Without special attention from Command, aviation combat had already introduced unique stresses to airmen that were remarkably different than the stresses from ground or naval combat. For example, the Dowding system--the use of radar to throw the closest squadron into to the air against incoming German attacks--meant that fliers were on call throughout the day, and could fly three or four missions in a single afternoon. Anthony Beevor describes the 'dry mouth and metallic fear' of the waiting period, followed by the stress of air combat, when pilots were required to keep their "eyes skinned for enemy fighters."[20] Moreover, the nature of the conflict itself was terrifying; pilots flew at breakneck speeds in which reaction times to kill or be killed were miniscule. There are additional factors, which untrained military personnel would not even consider. These include the fact that fuel tanks were positioned in front of the pilot. If ignited, the fuel would cause horrific facial and body burns. Or, for example, that the wheels of fighter planes were liable to get stuck before landing. Additionally, Martin Francis records that the use of artificial mood-enhancers "Benzedrine" – "wakey-wakey" pills was prolific, while Adam Tooze details the widespread use of methamphetamine – Pervitin – "pilot's chocolate" amongst aircrew.[21] All these would contribute to the service's ever-growing number of neurotic cases.

The RAF's Bomber Offensive would expose tens of thousands of lightly trained RAFVR volunteers to an exceptionally terrifying and stressful form of aerial warfare. In contrast to Command's reliance on fighter pilots in the defensive war, the RAF now relied on bomber crews to fly sorties into occupied Germany. For starters, this meant that the proportion of airmen entering the force with a substantive military background started to decrease as Command came to rely increasingly on the volunteer reserve to fill its bombers. Moreover, in contrast to the defensive war, Command now relied on bombers manned by crews: these crews consisted of a pilot, navigator, wireless-operator, bombardier, and a varying number of air gunners. Significantly, this meant that the control each individual exerted over the plane was reduced drastically, intensifying fear experienced by aircrew.

In addition to these added stresses, aircrew's experiences were different to fighter pilots because bomber crews flew for most of their sorties over either water, or enemy territory.[22] Moreover, the cumbersome size of a bomber and its

16 Anthony Beevor, *The Second World War*, 126.

17 'The Finest Hour', Churchill Center and Museum at the Churchill War Rooms, accessed on March 15th, 2013, modified July 13th, 2010, http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/122-their-finest-hour.

18 Allan English, *Cream of the Crop*: *Canadian Aircrew 1939-1945* (London: McGill's University Press, 1996), 72.

19 'The Few', Churchill Center and the Museum at the Churchill War Rooms, accessed on April 8th, 2013, modified August 29th, 2008, http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/113-the-few.

20 Beever, *Second World War*, 135.

21 Francis, *The Flyer,* 120.

22 Francis, *The Flyer*, 121.

payload made it especially vulnerable to accidents at takeoff and landing. In total, 8,305-bomber crew died from accidents that occurred during non-operational flying.[23] Compounding these stresses, the amount of fuel and explosives carried meant that lethal accidents often led to vaporizing explosions. As an explanation for these "vaporizations", Command listed many RAF casualties as Missing in Action (MIA) during the Bomber Offensive.[24]

David Stafford-Clark summarized the experience of an aircrew on a night raid over Germany. He writes,

> "Danger from the enemy, from sudden blinding convergence of searchlights accompanied by heavy, accurate and torrential flak, from packs of night fighters seeking unceasingly to find and penetrate the bomber stream; of danger from collision, from ice in the cloud, from becoming lost or isolated, from a chance hit in a petrol tank leading to a loss of fuel and forced descent into the sea on the way back… there was no single moment of security from takeoff to touchdown."[25]

The terror of these raids as well as their high attrition rates pushed Bomber Command's psychological wastage much higher than that of Fighter Command, sparking Command's concerns.

As psychological casualties began to mount during the bomber offensive, Command and the government had no clear idea as to the reasons underlying the significant increase of neuroses amongst their fliers. In its reaction, Command looked not to the reality of the flying experience, but rather to assumptions about the character of these men. To explain this shift in attitude, it is necessary to return to the RFC's experience in the First World War, and to the emergence of new theories in aviation psychology during the interwar period.

King George V founded the RAF's predecessor, the RFC, in April of 1912.[26] The service's motto was "*per ardua ad astra*", rendered as "through adversity to the stars."[27] The service's dream of becoming a permanent third service and to revolutionize the nature of war was put to the test in the following decade.[28]

As the service's motto insinuates, adversity was never far away. Tragically, the first fatalities in the service occurred within weeks of its inception during a training flight over rural Britain. In July of 1912, a pilot and his observer crashed and died on Salisbury Plain. Famously, RFC command issued the following statement, "flying will continue this evening as usual."[29]

Interestingly, the RFC's recruitment screening process during the wartime years reveals that it relied almost entirely on upper-class individuals who privately flew as a hobby. On both sides of the conflict, aristocratic flyers, such as Albert Ball of Britain and Baron von Richthofen of Germany, found an outlet for their talents.[30] The RFC itself relied upon a tiny fraction of Britain's elite who had joined a handful of flight schools that sprung up in the early twentieth century.[31] These schools provided training for the Fédération Aéronautique Internationale (FAI) license. This short test consisted of, "taking off, climbing to about five hundred feet, completing two successive figures-of-eight, landing, again taking off and climbing to about five hundred feet, making an approach with the engine off."[32] It only required four hours of practice flying time. Incredibly, the FAI was the only flying qualification the RFC required of prospective military pilots.

After the war broke out in 1914, there was a gradual increase in the demand for trained pilots, and recruitment programs were expanded to "college educated men."[33] Training was eventually revamped in 1915 to include basic flight maneuvers, a consequence of the Gospert method's success. The Gospert method was, "the brainchild of Major Smith-Barry, a student of the theory of flight who concluded that flying could be explained by relatively simple physical principles."[34] Basic concepts such as dual flight control (up-down and left-right) were taught along with basic maneuvers. This change in the training program did help to produce a somewhat better flyer, but deficiencies in instruction and training equipment perpetuated a tragically poor training program that harmed operational efficiency at the front.[35] For example, Eric Cockcroft joined the RFC in 1917 as a private. His family owned a cotton business and he had been a Joint Circuit Auditor. He attended training at St. Leonard's-on-Sea Sussex and was promoted to officer in late 1917. He writes of the, "twelve fatal crashes… during twelve weeks at Yatesbury," that marred the training program.[36] COs at the front constantly complained about the poor quality of 'trained' pilots that perpetuated high casualty rates and unbelievable station turnover. Similarly, several squadrons in France suffered from one hundred percent turnover rates in a

23 Ibid., 107.
24 Francis, *The Flyer,* 108.
25 Ibid., 108.
26 "The initial force was tiny; it consisted of two squadrons of planes and a squadron of observation balloons". Richard Cavendish, "Royal Flying Corps Founded," *History Today*, (April, 2012): 1.
27 Ibid., 1.
28 HG Well's novel depicts aviator's dreams of revolutionizing war. In the novel a British worker assists a German air attack on New York City; the novel stood as a foreboding warning of the imminent escalation of air warfare. HG Wells, *War in the Air* (London: Penguin Books, 1908).
29 Cavendish, "Royal Flying Corps Founded": 1.
30 English, *Cream of the Crop*, 22-23.
31 Ibid, 23.
32 Ibid., 43.
33 Ibid., 43.
34 Ibid., 45.
35 Ibid., 43-46.
36 Eric Cockcroft, "My Experiences as a RFC/ RAF Pilot," *Aerospace Historian*, vol. 27 (September 1980): 248.

matter of weeks.

After the outbreak of war, the demands on RFC aircrew escalated. Defensive developments, including the integration of anti-aircraft (Ack-Ack) and spotlights along the front, added new stresses to combat flying. In combination with technological advances such as the ability to fight at higher altitudes, RFC flyers received their first taste of aviation combat stress. In total, nine thousand pilots and observers would die for the RFC and a further seven thousand were wounded.[37] As one historian writes, "flyers often worked alone, and were under intense psychological pressure every time that they went aloft, whether to do battle or for a simple air test… His days consisted of "long spells of idleness punctuated by moments of intense fear," and fear was the "most intense strain to which the human nervous system could be subjected.""[38] Allan English defined the specific stresses facing RFC fliers as, "the sheer effort in controlling poorly designed, temperamental aircraft… cold, anoxia (lack of oxygen), G-forces and unusual aircraft attitudes."[39]As a result of these stresses, psychological wastage rates increased, and the RFC was forced to react.

Critically, RFC Command's responses to these cases of psychological wastage demonstrate a much higher level of compassion and understanding in comparison to the RAF's later LMFW policy. While blatant cases of malingering were court martialed, psychoneurotic cases faced softer options. These men were transferred to NYDN (Not Yet Diagnosed Nervous) Centers for primary treatment, and if they were not responsive, were returned to Britain and invalided in psychiatric hospitals.[40]

To understand why the RAF failed to repeat the RFC's sympathetic treatment of its fliers, it is necessary to address the political vulnerability, and eventual dismantlement of the Service toward the end of WWI. Initially, the RFC was formed as the sole subsidiary of the army, but as of early 1914, the Royal Navy had secured the creation of a separate wing, referred to as the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS).[41] Petty competitions between the Army and Navy for aviation resources, especially flyers and equipment, would cripple the efficiency of the service throughout the war.[42]

In 1916, German Zeppelin attacks on London helped to bring matters to a head.[43] The RFC's poor showing in the face of German aggression highlighted the impotence of a split service. This enraged war-weary workers, newspapers and politicians who collectively touted the RFC's impotence as clear evidence of the uselessness of the service in its current state.[44] These complaints would eventually lead to its dismantlement, especially as German attacks increased during 1916-7.[45] On July 11, 1917, the War Cabinet, in response to these protests, formed a special committee to consider both, "air defense and the broader and more significant problem of air organization in general."[46] The committee's recommendation would form the basis of the founding of the RAF in early 1918.

In December 1917, the government passed the Air Force Bill that created a third military service, the Royal Air Force. However, the bill was riddled with problems, organized in a chaotic manner, and caused a collision of politics and military affairs that would hamper the young Service's efforts to rebuild. This caused a drain on the memory of the collective experience of its flyers, many left in protest to the government's interference. Trenchard, appointed Chief of Staff of the RAF in February, resigned by March 1918.[47] The next chief of staff, F. Sykes, would also resign in mid-1918. These resignations were linked to government dismissals of Chiefs of General Staff, such as Sir William Robertson, and Sir John Jellicoe.[48] Evidently, the RAF was born from the political controversy surrounding the RFC's inability to defend London from German air attacks.

Critically, the resignations of 1918-1920 meant that the RAF lost much of its institutional memory of its compassionate treatment of fliers during the First World War. Rather, as of 1939, the RAF was more likely to recall methods practiced by the British government in the 1920s and the academic Freudian publications in aviation psychology from the interwar period.

The Birley Report of 1921, the first published report on aviation psychology during the interwar period, constitutes a remarkable document in its progressiveness. In his speech to the medical community, J. L. Birley, C.B.E., argues for the existence of the phenomenon 'flying stress' or 'strain'. Birley effectively dissects the phenomenon, and recommends the formation of a sympathetic policy to treat aviation stress. Birley divided every flier's experience into three periods: the period of inexperience, the period of experience, and the period of stress.[49] Insightfully, Birley posited that, "it was absolutely certain that it [period of experience] cannot last indefinitely; autumn, or

37 Cavendish, "Royal Flying Corps Founded", 1.
38 English, *The Cream of the Crop*, 63.
39 English, *The Cream of the Crop*, 62.
40 Ibid., 62-5.
41 Malcolm Cooper, "Blueprint for Confusion: The Administrative Background to the Formation of the Royal Air Force, 1912-1919," *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 22 (July 1987): 438-440.
42 Cooper, 'Blueprint for Confusion', 438-9.
43 Paul Phillips, "Decision and Dissension: Birth of the RAF," *Aerospace Historian*, vol. 18 (January, 1971): 33.
44 Ibid., 33.
45 'By 1917 the German airships had been reed by twin-engined Gotha bombers. While the German air raids were not very effective in destroying military targets, the disruption of production… was incalculable. This, and the effect on the morale of Londoners… added fuel to the public debate.' Ibid, 33-4.
46 Ibid., 33.
47 Philips, "Decision and Dissension," 36.
48 Ibid., 37.
49 John Birley, 'The Principles of Medical Science as Applied to Military Aviation' Lecture delivered before the Royal College of Physicians of London, *The Lancet* vol. 1 iss. 5046 (May 29, 1920): 1149.

the period of reaction, must supervene sooner or later."[50] Thus, from Birley's perspective, every pilot was vulnerable to flying stress, regardless of character. Critically, Birley's theory stated, "in dealing, therefore, with the reaction inevitable in war we are dealing first and foremost with the defense mechanisms developed by the individual for his natural instinct of self-preservation. When these mechanisms are weakened by shock or prolonged strain, and the instinctive tendency comes into conflict with social standards, a condition of neurosis results."[51] The most important aspect of Birley's Report lies in his recommendations for treatment. He argued, "We have first to assist the patient suffering from stress to understand his troubles, and then to appeal to his common sense and his character."[52] If Birley had published such an astute account in 1920 calling for sympathetic 'therapy' for patients suffering from stress, then why did Command institute such a harsh policy in 1941? It is important to note Allan English's claim that most COs seemed to agree with Birley's postwar report as they had utilized humane treatment methods for 'stress' cases, such as, posting, 'affected aviators back to Britain.'[53]

First, it is essential to understand that during the interwar period the Ministry of Pensions obsessively fought to reduce its pension payouts to veterans of the First World War with neurotic problems.[54] The pension service felt that the number of 'shell-shocked' men from the war was a 'gross exaggeration' leading to absurd levels of payouts.[55] Thus, the Ministry of Pensions 'obsessively' strove to ensure that it would not, in the future, have to pay out pensions to neurotics.

Second, the Board of Control's earlier treatment of 'insane serviceman' from the Navy and Army draws a surprising parallel to the abuse of airmen in the Second World War. Instead of following the recommendations of the psychiatrist to return these men 'peaceable conditions', 'insane servicemen' were incarcerated within civilian psychiatric centers along with psychotic civilians during the early 1920s.[56] Moreover, incarcerated Army and Navy personnel were 'given the lowest possible rations' and made to work as hard as 'navvies.'[57] Interestingly, the language used to describe these incarcerated men in the interwar period strikes extraordinary similarities to the description of RAF Waverers in the Second World War. One commentator wrote, "'shell-shock' was simply an 'excuse for crime', made by men who were accelerated degenerates' even before the war and were too 'lazy' to find employment."[58] The stage was set for the RAF to institute a policy that would not be based upon the RFC's sympathetic treatment of airmen, but on the Ministry of Pension's wishes, the Board of Control's experience, and the arrival of Freudian psychology in the late 1920s.

Unfortunately the combination of the political chaos that struck the RFC, the political decision to transform it into the RAF in 1917 and the ensuing resignations meant that RAF Command either forgot or decided to disregard Birley's report along with a substantial portion of the RFC's institutional memory by 1939.

Instead, modern, fashionable reports, based upon the writings of Sigmund Freud, came to dominate aviation psychology in the interwar period, including, for example, Frederick Bartlett's *Psychology and the Soldier* (1927). Bartlett's book first applied Freudian theory to military psychological disorders. Bartlett asserted in his book that, "success or failure was determined mainly by one's temperament… "Weaklings" [mentally unfit personnel] should not be allowed into the armed services, and that only men with the right kinds of temperament, the kind that gave men the strength of will to resist mental breakdown, should be kept on."[59] This influential report would serve as one of the foundations of Command's attitude toward non-compliance. In particular, Command would focus on Bartlett's claim that temperament was a key indicator of breakdown. For example, Bartlett wrote, "mental breakdown nearly always had a long history of psychological problems, no matter the rank,"[60] a sentiment mirrored in an internal Command memorandum. One report states that, "family history and environment were important. Thirty-one percent of 87 cases or war neurosis came from "broken homes" – where there had been death, divorce, desertion or separation."[61] It is interesting to note that as of 1939, Frederick Bartlett was granted a position on the RAF's Flying Research Committee demonstrating the value RAF Command saw in him.[62]

Bartlett's Freudian attitudes toward combat stress and character are referred to in Gillespie's wartime tome, *Psychological Effects of War on a Citizen and Soldier.* Gillespie writes of the '*a priori* expectation' that had come to dominate Air Command. Gillespie defines this 'a priori expectation' as the, "expectation that the poorer the economic status of a section of a given population, the greater the incidence of psychoneurotic conditions."[63] Gillespie believed that Command viewed the development of neuroses as more linked to an individual's predisposition, than to the cumulative effects of his flying stress. Thus, Birley's progressive report was shelved for the more fashionable, but more tenuous research of Freudian psychologists.

50 Ibid., 1149.
51 Birley, "The Principles of Medical Science as Applied to Military Aviation," 1150.
52 Ibid., 1151.
53 English, *The Cream of the Crop*, 65.
54 Burke, "Effeminacy, Ethnicity and the End of Trauma," 63.
55 Burke, "Effeminacy, Ethnicity and the End of Trauma," 63.
56 English, *The Cream of the Crop*, 63.
57 Ibid., 63.
58 Ibid., 64.
59 Ibid., 67.
60 Ibid, 67.
61 Symonds and Williams 'Review of reports submitted to Air Ministry since outbreak of war', April 1942, AIR 2/6252 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens.
62 Noel Sheehy, *Fifty Key Thinkers in Psychology* (London: Routledge, 2004), 34.
63 R.D. Gillespie, *Psychological Effects of War on Citizen and Soldier* (New York: WM Norton & Company, 1942), 69.

This can be evidenced in Pamphlet 100A, Orders for Medical Officers, a document that Command sent to all branches in early 1939. The pamphlet details instructions for MOs on what constituted a 'debilitating mental illness.' Command wrote of its concern that MOs had a, "tendency to assume too readily that a lack of confidence to fly or fear of flying are necessarily symptomatic of nervous illness and justify exemption from flying duty on medical grounds."[64] Attached to the pamphlet is a letter from Command that contains this directive to the MOs: "establish a *prima facie* case of illness before considering or reporting a man unfit to fly on medical grounds."[65] This presents the infamous quandary, explored by Joseph Heller in his novel *Catch 22*, that airmen had to either exhibit multiple symptoms of combat stress and psychoneurotic disorders, or undergo extremely stressful scenarios, even crash landings were oft considered insufficient, in order to be removed from combat duty honorably. But if they exhibited symptoms of combat stress without undergoing extremely stressful scenarios, they would be labeled as 'lacking moral fiber.'

Part III: Lack of Moral and Waverer Disposal Policy

Command's LMFW disposal policy constituted a seemingly unconscionable solution to the RAF's problems with wastage that mounted from the outset of the conflict. As psychological casualties mounted in the early years of the war, an emergency meeting was called in March 1940. The meeting dealt with those cases where, "there is no physical disability... nothing wrong except a lack of moral fiber."[66] As a result of this meeting, an official Command policy was drafted that dictated precise orders to COs on disposal procedures for three categories of noncompliance. The policy also dictated medical procedure to MOs for acceptable medical conditions to excuse a flier. This meant fliers had to be exposed to 'exceptional flying stress' or exhibit a debilitating mental illness. While the policy allowed for the flier to request a third opinion from a trained psychiatrist (MOs were not trained in psychiatry throughout the war), this was only exercised in a fraction of the cases. Between 1943-4, only 34.1 per cent of all neurotic cases were afforded the 'luxury' of an opinion from a trained Neuropsychiatric Specialist.[67]

Categories (see Table 1 on the follow page)

Command divided refusals to fly--involuntary or voluntary--into three categories.

Category i, (hereafter LMF cases), encompassed those men labeled as 'lacking in moral fiber'. Command defined this category as,

> "Those who though medically fit (A1B or A3B, as appropriate) come to forfeit the confidence of their Commanding Officers without having been subjected to exceptional flying stress."[68]

Evidently, officers and aircrew who had not undergone 'exceptional flying stress', nor experienced a debilitating physical or neurotic injury, were categorized as LMF. Critically, Command deemed these men had clearly demonstrated that they lacked courage in the face of the enemy, thus they 'lacked the moral fiber' of men who continued to resist.

COs categorized two types of 'cowardly behavior' as LMF cases. The first group of airmen, "gave the impression of carrying out their duties, but …nevertheless had lost the confidence of a commanding officer."[69] This group of fliers were the infamous 'fringe merchants' or 'boomerangs' of Bomber Command. Fringe merchants skirted the edges of bombing raids and did not risk the plane in a direct attack on a target, and this was evident from cameras attached to the nose of the plane that were timed with the bomb release. Boomerangs were fliers that returned from combat early without engaging the enemy.[70] The second group of airmen, "openly admitted they did not intend to fly."[71] These types of LMF cases were simple refusals to fly without exposure to exceptional stress or a debilitating injury. These men would refuse to fly for a variety of reasons including malingering and objections to area bombing, although the reason quoted most often was 'fear.'[72]

Category ii (hereafter Waverer cases) encompassed fliers that had strong symptoms of a psychoneurotic illness, yet had not undergone exceptional flying stress. Command defined Waverer cases as,

64 'Memorandum on the Disposal of Air Crews Who Forfeit the Confidence of Their Commanding Officers', May 1939, AIR 2/8591 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

65 Ibid.

66 Edgar Jones, "'LMF': The Use of Psychiatric Stigma in the Royal Air Force during the Second World War," *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 70 (2006): 443.

67 Flying Personnel Research Committee "The Occurrence of Neuroses in RAF Air Crew, 1943-4", 1944, AIR 2/6252 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

68 Air Command "Memorandum on the Disposal of Air Crews Who Forfeit the Confidence of Their Commanding Officers" to all Commanding Officers, September 1941, AIR 2/8591 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

69 'Rules for treatment of officer and airmen upon under the terms of Air Ministry Letter', AIR 2/8591 Papers (35D), National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

70 Wells, *Courage and Air Warfare*, 129.

71 "Rules for treatment of officer and airmen upon under the terms of Air Ministry Letter", AIR 2/8591 Papers (35D), National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

72 "An Airman's Son," *BBC People's Series*, last modified January 27, 2004, accessed April 1st, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/00/a2238400.shtml.

1a	Category (y) officers faced following consequences,	Category (y) aircrew faced the following consequences,
Category (i): *Lack of Moral Fiber Cases*	-Loss of Employment **Discharged, asked to relinquish commission or placed on probation.** -Possible Loss of Badges **Air Command may order Commanding Officer to strip officers of wings & flying awards.** -Marked Waverer **Employment form 1580 marked with a red 'W'**	-Remustering **Remustered to combatant or ground duties.** -Stripped of badges **Air Command ordered Commanding Officer to strip aircrew of flying badges.** -Marked Waverer **Employment form 1580 marked with a red 'W'**
Category (ii): *Waverer Cases*	-Invalided AND **At an RAF Hospital, for example, RAF Matlock** -Asked to resign commission **Asked to resign commission**	**-Same Disposal Policy as Category (i) aircrew** Paragraph 14: *'Airmen placed in this category, will, however, be disposed of in the manner described in paragraph 14 above'.[1]*
Category (iii): *Medical Cases*	-Treatment **Treatment at station, recommendation for leave, admission to hospital, or recommendation for medical board** -Retention of flying badges	-Treatment **Treatment at station, recommendation for leave, admission to hospital, or recommendation for medical board** Retention of flying badges

[1] AIR 2/8591 S.61151.8.7.e (1) Memorandum on the disposal of aircrews who forfeit the confidence of their commanding officers, (September 1st 1941), Kew Gardens, London, iii.

> "Those who are given a permanent medical category lower than A1B or A3B, as appropriate, solely on account of nervous symptoms and without having been subjected to any exceptional flying stress."[73]

Command's rationale was based on the presumption that although these fliers had displayed symptoms of psychoneurotic illnesses, they had not undergone severe flying stress. Thus, they must have had an innate weakness of constitution or lack of character that had made them uniquely susceptible to wartime stresses. If British women could survive the Blitz, merchantmen the submarine war, and children the evacuations, shouldn't fliers be able to handle flying stress?

Category iii (Medical Cases) encompassed fliers who had developed a debilitating physiological or psychological injury. In very rare cases, excusals could be handed out solely based on exposure to 'exceptional flying stress.' These men were hospitalized in twelve RAF Hospitals throughout Britain. Command defined medical cases as,

> "Those not included in (ii) above who are given a medical category lower than A1B or A3B, as appropriate. (Disposal will follow normal "invaliding" or "retention for employment within the medical category" procedure."74

To be categorized a "medical category lower than A1B or A3B" it was necessary to demonstrate *prima facie* symptoms of developed psychoneuroses, or a debilitating physical injury. Evidence of *prima facie* symptoms required MOs to observe fully developed psychoneuroses: anxiety, hysteria and manic depression. Thus, men in the process of developing neuroses could not be legitimately excused on medical grounds

Consequences for Categories

The consequences to LMF categorization were severe. Officers were forced to resign and hospitalized, while aircrew were stripped of their rank and 'remustered' to ground or combatant duties. Both officers and aircrew had their flying badges stripped at a squadron parade or upon arrival at a NYDN center. Paragraph 14 of the disposal policy states,

> "If… an individual must be categorized as lacking in moral fibre... In the case of an officer, his services will be dispensed with, either by terminating his commission… or by calling upon him to resign."75

This left little doubt as to the consequences for an officer categorized LMF, while the stigma of such a punishment for an officer could be devastating; one Air Ministry official likened it to signing the man's career 'death warrant'.[76]

Aircrew categorized as LMF faced harsher consequences. They were either to be transferred to ground duties within or remustered to combatant duties. Paragraph 14 of the policy states,

> "Airmen so classified will be in no circumstances to fly again as members of an air crew, and it must

73 Air Command "Memorandum on the Disposal of Air Crews Who Forfeit the Confidence of Their Commanding Officers" to all Commanding Officers, September 1941, AIR 2/8591 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens.

74 Air Command 'Memorandum on the Disposal of Air Crews Who Forfeit the Confidence of Their Commanding Officers" to all Commanding Officers, September 1941, AIR 2/8591 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens.

75 Ibid.

76 COs demonstrated reluctance to 'sign the "death warrant" of airmen. Minutes, October 20 1944, AIR 2/8592 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London. .

be made clear to them that they will be remustered and finally removed from air crew duty."77

If the aircrew had started his flight training with a 'transferable basic skill,' he was retained within the RAF as Aircraftman 2nd Class, and he would be forced to forfeit his aircrew badge.[78] If the aircrew had no 'transferable basic skill(s)', he would be transferred to the Army of Navy for combatant duties "under the provisions of the National Service Armed Forces Act of 1941." This aircrew, too, would be forced to forfeit his air badges.[79]

Critically, the policy punished officers and aircrew of the Waverer category as well. Officers deemed Waverers were invalided and forced to resign. Aircrews placed in the category were treated in the exact same manner as LMF aircrew. As Paragraph 15 of the policy states, "[a]irmen placed in this category, will, however be disposed of in the manner described in Paragraph 14 above."[80] It's clear that Command treated aircrew demonstrating symptoms of neuroses, albeit without exposure to 'exceptional flying stress,' in the exact same manner as LMF cases.

An officer categorized as a Waverer began a process of 'invaliding' that would lead to his transfer to an RAF neuropsychiatric hospital, and his forced resignation. It can be surmised that the intention of this was to rid the Ministry of Pensions of responsibility for the payment of postwar pensions for these officers. Paragraph 15 of the policy states,

> "Officers who are placed in the category (ii) mentioned in paragraph 2 above will not be retained in the service for employment within their lowered medical category and they will be accordingly be required to relinquish their commissions on being invalided from the service."81

Officers faced harsh consequences for displaying 'symptoms of neuroses', but at least, to some extent, their psychological wounds were treated. At the very least, these men were in the presence of a trained psychiatrist. Officers were not alone in invaliding, other 'fortunate' aircrew and officers labeled Medical Cases could be sent for processing of 'invaliding'.

After removal from the squadron, these airmen were transferred to Not Yet Diagnosed Centers (NYDN Centers) throughout Britain for processing. NYDN Centers had not improved much on their antecedents of the First World War.[82] At NYDN Centers, airmen were treated in a harsh manner that in many ways mirrored the treatment of 'shell-shock' victims in early 1920s. It becomes clear that NYDN Centers were not designed for treatment, but to be an added deterrent to the men. The evidence of one flight sergeant stressed that the NYDN centers were far from treatment centers they were designed to appear. The sheer number of combined LMF and psychoneurotic cases contributed to unprecedentedly long waits for beds in neurotic hospitals insufficiently prepared to care for neurotic cases. Wells quotes the concerns of an anonymous tail-gunner,

> "I spent three weeks at a station used for remustering aircrew, which included dealing with LMF personnel. I was and remain disgusted by the treatment of LMF charges. No sympathy was shown and they were treated like criminals. In one case I actually witnessed a pilot who had been decorated during his first tour but had lost his nerve during his second tour of operations. He was stripped of his rank and flying brevet and was a broken man."[83]

The strong language of this account leaves little to the imagination as to how cases were treated at these centers, which the research of Edgar Jones helps elucidate. He writes,

> "NYDN centers… an atmosphere of shame and disgrace pervaded. Although the regimes softened during the war as the complexity of the situation became better understood, the system operated on the assumption that the man was a coward… At the NYDN Center in Brighton, for example, RAF personnel were forced to march along the seafront distinguished by uniforms, which had been stripped of their badges."[84]

It's likely NYDN centers were not organized to improve treatment, but rather to dissuade men from opting out of operational conflict. The long waits at NYDN Centers were the most common complaint of fliers, especially those that awaited specialist opinions to reinforce their pleas for leniency to Command.[85]

From these NYDN Centers, those 'fortunate' fliers undergoing the RAF's 'treatment' regime faced transfer to RAF

77 Air Command "Memorandum on the Disposal of Air Crews Who Forfeit the Confidence of Their Commanding Officers" to all Commanding Officers, September 1941, AIR 2/8591 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

78 Unknown to unknown, 1943, AIR 19/632 General Filing, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

79 Ibid.

80 Air Command 'Memorandum on the Disposal of Air Crews Who Forfeit the Confidence of Their Commanding Officers" to all Commanding Officers, September 1941, AIR 2/8591 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens.

81 Air Command "Memorandum on the Disposal of Air Crews Who Forfeit the Confidence of Their Commanding Officers" to all Commanding Officers, September 1941, AIR 2/8591 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens.

82 Robert Ahrenfeldt, *Psychiatry in the British Army, 1914-1915* (London: Routledge, 1958), 9.

83 Wells, *Courage and Air Warfare,* 201.

84 Jones, "Use of Psychiatric Stigma," 5.

85 Ibid., 5.

Neuropsychiatric Hospitals. 'Treatment' at these hospitals was experimental and rudimentary. It was, for example, at the RAF Hospital Matlock, that Symonds conducted serious studies into flying stress that were to lay the basis of postwar aviation psychology.[86] While some progressive psychiatrists experimented with group communication sessions, deep-breathing exercises and appropriate medicines, other practitioners used electro-shock therapy or solitary confinement to bring men back to 'normality'.

To continue, it is important to return to additional punishments facing those labeled Waverers or LMF. These men faced another collective punishment: both LMF and Waverer cases had their employment forms, the Form 1580, marked with a red 'W.'[87] Command added this official label to their employment papers, under the official nomenclature 'Waverer,' to ensure that stigmatization would continue in the civilian lives of these soldiers.

Command used this infamous red 'W' to control the movement of these 'deficient characters' throughout their systems and the country. With this mark, the RAF would track their movement throughout the service's hospitals and Not Yet Diagnosed Neurological centers.[88] The red 'W' explains how Command kept these men separated from medical cases, who were also to be treated at the RAF's psychoneurotic hospitals. Moreover, the red 'W' was used to transmit information to the civil aviation authorities about the reasons for the discharge.[89] Enclosed in previously censored material, the Air Minister assured his audience during a meeting that "we were doing our utmost to prevent the employment of these individuals by Air Traffic Authorities and the Director of Personal Services agreed to arrange for a civil flying firms to impose a similar ban."[90] This damning quote reveals that Air Command was invested in ensuring that its men deemed Waverers and LMF would face difficulties in finding employment upon their return to the civil sector. In the case of aircrew, the red 'W' would be screened through the Ministry of Labour's 'Schedule for Reserved Occupation' before they returned to their industry jobs.[91] This was Command's means of ensuring their LMF and W cases faced discrimination upon their return to civil employment.

A short article from 1945 helps to shine light on how this stigma followed soldiers into their civilian lives. On Jan 20th, 1945, the Manchester Guardian reported the following article.

> "R.A.F. Discharges: Protests Against Offensive Phraseology
> Major W. Drake-Brockman, non-party Nationalist candidate for Hestan and Isleworth, at a meeting at Hound-slow last night promised an ex-Service member of the audience that if elected he would do his best to get removed from the discharged certificates of R.A.F. air crews "the damnable letters L.M.F., which mean a lack of moral fibre". The psychological effect on any prospective employer, he said, was to give him the impression that the man had no courage."[92]

Clearly, Drake-Brockman believed that men in his borough were being unfairly discriminated against due to their claimed wartime conduct.

The last, and perhaps most powerful, collective punishment for LMF and Waverer cases was the, "removal of permission to wear air crew badges."[93] In other words, Command ordered that COs at the squadron, or the NYDN Center to strip LMF and Waverer cases of their wings or aircrew badges. One memo reads, 'permission to wear the flying badge, observer's badge or air gunner's badge may be withdrawn from officers or airmen who are removed from air crew duties.'[94] The evidence makes it clear that the British government sanctioned this activity, at least in the early years. As one memo reads, "permission to wear a flying badge will be withdrawn by order of the Minister."[95]

Officers and aircrew labeled LMF or Waverer were stripped of their wings during either a squadron parade or upon arrival at a NYDN center. These coveted wings were the source of great pride to many, if not all, airmen.[96] Martin Francis explains that wings and flying badges attached to the enviable 'deep blue of air uniforms' became a symbol of honor, bravery, sacrifice and national pride. He writes that the RAF's blue uniforms were associated with both heroism and sexual magnetism, particularly if accompanied by a set of silvery white fabric wings sewn above the heart.[97] With this understanding, it becomes clear why the stripping of wings was devastating as well as stigmatizing. Not only did it exclude airmen from the RAF's brotherhood, but also the absence of wings on the airman's uniform sent a clear signal to civilians that this man was out of favor. Indeed, both Category (i) and (ii) officers and aircrews had their wings stripped. Mark Wells provides an

86 Operation Log, "Royal Air Force Operations Record Book: RAF Matlock," June 1945, AIR 29/764 Papers National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.
87 Air Command "Memorandum on the Disposal of Members of Air Crews who Forfeit the Confidence of Their Commanding Officers" to all COs, September 1941, AIR 19/632 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens.
88 Edgar Jones, "LMF: The Use of Psychiatric Stigma," 2.
89 Minutes of Air Council, 23 July 1941, AIR 2/8591 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.
90 Ibid.
91 Unknown to unknown, 1943, AIR 19/632 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens.
92 "RAF Discharges: Offensive Phraseology," *Manchester Guardian*, January 20, 1941.
93 Regulations to all Commanding Officers, 1942, AIR 19/632 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.
94 *Ibid*.
95 *Ibid*.
96 Francis, *The Flyer*, 24-5.
97 *Ibid*, 23.

excellent description of the formal procedure for COs to strip wings, recalling,

> "The whole squadron was formed into a square, and this sergeant-pilot was brought in under guard, the verdict read, "Cowardice in the face of the enemy", and his rank was ripped off him there, by the flight-sergeant, and he was then literally drummed out. I thought that was an awful thing. I've got to admit that I'd have sooner got killed than gone through that."[98]

The man's punishment was designed to be an entirely public affair. The whole squadron was brought out to bear witness to the CO stripping the flier of wings and rank. It is clear from this account that the disposal policy was designed to be stigmatic. In the hope this would dissuade further examples of noncompliance amongst the squadron's remaining fliers.

While LMF allowed some COs to opt out of pursuing the harsher consequences, it also encouraged other COs to pursue harsher agendas according to their temperament. One CO wrote,

> "I was ruthless with moral fiber cases, I had to be. We were airmen not psychiatrists. Of course we had concern for any individual whose internal tensions meant that he could no longer go on; but there was the worry that one really frightened man could affect others around him. There was no time to be compassionate as I would have liked to have been. I was flying too, and we had to get on with the war."[99]

This particular CO clearly held little compassion for LMFW cases. In his mind, the totality of the conflict necessitated an unsympathetic attitude toward cases of fearful airmen. This understandable, but abused sentiment will be explored in the next section. As discussed above, consequences to being labeled LMFW's were not confined to the squadron, and the label LMF or W meant a long path through NYDN centers to hospitalization, retirement or 'remustering' to combat duties. Thus, the stripping of wings was merely the first step in removing the fliers from aviation brotherhood.

Case Examples

In 1945, RAF psychiatrist Richard Symonds published a report of over three hundred different case examples of LMF, Waverer and medical cases. While Symonds continued to stress the need to prevent predisposed individuals from joining the military, he also articulately argued for better treatment of military personnel suffering from neuroses to extend their combat effectiveness. The report helps contemporary audiences to comprehend the arbitrary nature of the distinction between Command's three categories.

Case 225, a, 'definite example of a LMF case,' demonstrates the fluidity of Command's categories. Symonds describes,

> "Case 225: A Sergeant Air gunner, aged 27, 120 hours, no operations, reported to the medical officer at a Heavy Conversion Unit, having experienced an acute fear reaction while flying. A Halifax went out of control, the patient had to abandon aircraft but at first could not open turret. He was very afraid. He did not fly for a week; when he did so he again experienced acute fear in the air… The M.O.'s comment was "A good type who had made every effort to get over it. He might have been OK if he had flown soon after the incident, but I doubt if he could make much of ops..." He was consequently referred to executive disposal without reference to a psychiatrist." [100]

The station MO decided that the man had not experienced exceptional flying stress, and therefore his refusal to fly and his symptoms, which including insomnia, vomiting on operations and nightmares, were not considered valid medical reasons for an excusal from flying.[101] Consequently, he was disposed of in accordance with LMFW guidelines: remustering to combatant duties. In Symond's opinion, an opinion that AC clearly concurred with, the aforementioned flier's experience of being trapped in a plexi-glass turret falling from the stratosphere was not evidence of exceptional flying stress. Thus, in their mind, his subsequent refusal to fly was merely evident of a flawed character that should have been rejected during training

Case 79 demonstrates a borderline Waverer case that was disposed of along LMF guidelines; however, Command conceded that it could well have been a Category (iii), a genuine Medical Case. The flight sergeant, an air gunner, presumably from the RAFVR, had completed eight bombing raids and had been shot down twice. On his third sortie, the plane was hit and the captain ordered the crew to bale out. One of his fellow crewmen, the rear gunner, had a broken parachute. Case 79 encouraged the man to cling to him and share his parachute. They fell in their tragic embrace, as Case 79 went to open the parachute the rear gunner's grip slipped, the air gunner plummeted to his death. Symonds clearly states that the

98 Wells, *Courage and Air Warfare*, 199.
99 Wells, *Courage and Air Warfare*, 200.
100 Flying Personnel Research Committee 'Investigation into psychological disorder in flying personnel: The occurrence of neurosis in Royal Air Force Aircrew 1944-1945', 1945, AIR 2/6252 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.
101 Flying Personnel Research Committee 'Investigation into psychological disorder in flying personnel: The occurrence of neurosis in Royal Air Force Aircrew 1944-1945', 1945, AIR 2/6252 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

classification of this case depended entirely on the judgment of the station CO. As the report opens, "the outcome of which depend party on the unit medical officer. This was so in Case 79."[102] The report states,

> "Case 79: A Flight Sergeant, air gunner, aged 26, 200 hours flying, 8 night bombing sorties in Lancasters, reported to his unit medical officer with headaches, dizziness and insomnia. On his first sortie with a strange crew was shot up over Berlin. On his eight sortie both engines cut out over Munich, an order to abandon aircraft was given and countermanded; the aircraft went on to Corsica on 2 engines where it crash landed, the rear gunner was killed. The patient's wife and mother were opposed to continual flying… (He was given rest, then...) He returned to operational flying and the M.O. stated "Provided no untoward incidents occur he should finish his tour with no further trouble". On the 15th sortie the crew had to abandon aircraft, the rear-gunner's parachute was U/S (broken) so he jumped clinging to the patient but was unable to maintain his hold as the parachute opened. Later the patient reported sick with depression and anxiety."[103]

This tragic report on Case 79's wartime experience allows contemporary readers to understand how bluntly LMFW policy was enacted. This man had clearly undergone three separate scenarios that could have induced exceptional flying stress. However, as it was up to the discretion of the flier's CO and MO, the man was not classified as having undergone 'exceptional flying stress,' but rather he was labeled as an in-between case that was eventually categorized as a Waverer.

Evidently, the judge, jury and executioner were the squadron COs and MOs of RAF Fighter and Bomber Command. These executive officers governed modestly sized stations at the outbreak of the war when the average fighter squadron was twenty planes. Yet as bomber squadrons grew, and fighter squadrons amalgamated in sprawling air bases, the size of squadrons under the purview of COs and MOs grew into the thousands of personnel. High attrition rates led to high squadron turnover rates which further prevented MOs and COs from being fully informed on an individual's flying experience or mental health. Moreover, divisions in officer and aircrew messes kept MOs and COs from socializing with aircrew – a possibly key factor in the lack of any sympathetic manner toward these men. Here, one of the most fundamental flaws of the policy becomes evident.

One postwar report on neuroses claimed that of 5,000 cases of fliers referred to two different specialists that these specialists had an "even chance of agreeing upon the determination of lack of confidence."[104] The ramifications of this fact are profound; it means that the distinguishing line between noncompliance on account of 'malingering and cowardice' or 'neuroses' was arbitrary at best.

Stigma to LMFW Policy

Command intentionally attached stigmas to LMFW disposal policy that would ensure the expulsion of fliers from RAF brotherhood, the cessation of officers and aircrew's military and civil careers, and a reduction of social standing in the civilian sphere.

Since the declassification of a considerable amount of material on the LMFW policy in the early 1970s, a historical debate has grown surrounding the harshness of the policy, and whether this harshness was warranted. From this debate, undertaken by a small handful of authors including Allan English, Mark Wells and Martin Francis, it is possible to garner a large amount of evidence concerning the policy's actual effects on fliers. Edgar Jones' article argues that LMFW policy was intentionally designed to be inherently stigmatic and harsh.

Edgar Jones writes, "as a general deterrent, driven by the belief that anxiety was contagious, the RAF sent those suspected of LMF to assessment centers where they were shamed by the loss of rank and privileges."[105] It becomes clear that fliers not only lived in fear of death in the air, but also in fear of the harshness of LMFW. The viciousness of LMF policy terrified officers, and the social stigma after a sudden resignation or psychological hospitalization followed by discrimination in civil employment exacerbated the problem. The ramifications of LMFW policy wreaked havoc on a middle-/or upper-class individual's future prospects for a job, a wife, or a position in the community. The viciousness of the policy was even more apparent for aircrew, insofar as aircrew faced more severe consequences for noncompliance. A sudden transfer to combatant duty, industry, or hospital combined with the loss of the flying badges could be at best be a shameful affair, at worst a lethal one, for aircrew.

But did airmen themselves regard the label LMF seriously? To answer this question, it is important to turn to two cases of airmen LMF who committed suicide rather than receive the RAF's 'treatment' regime.

Primary evidence of a suicide within the operations log from RAF Matlock Hospital helps to expand this discussion. RAF Matlock was a psychoneurotic hospital founded in Derbyshire that treated officers that had been invalided either under the Waverer or Medical Case. On February 20th, 1942,

102 *Ibid*.

103 Flying Personnel Research Committee 'Investigation into psychological disorder in flying personnel: The occurrence of neurosis in Royal Air Force Aircrew 1944-1945', 1945, AIR 2/6252 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

104 Allan English, *The Insubordinate and Noncompliant: Case Studies of Canadian Mutiny and Disobedience, 1920 to present* eds. by Howard Coombs, (Toronto: The Dundurn Group, 2007).

105 English, *The Insubordinate and Noncompliant*, 439.

the log records one entry. It reads that on February 20th, 1941, Sgt. Ellis S.C., "fell from a window at the hospital and sustained multiple injuries from which he died immediately."[106] Although this can only be conjecture, it is difficult to characterize this event as an accident given its location and manner: 'falling from a window.'

The second suicide is found in the story of Squadron Leader Maurice Roy Skeet. After he discovered the story of his father's suicide in his teens, Skeet's son turned to investigative research to determine the causes of the matter. According to his research, Squadron Leader Maurice Skeet served in the Middle East, where he flew Wellington light-bombers from Habbaniya.[107] Skeet's son claims that upon his father's return to Europe he learned of Command's switch to the controversial tactic of 'area bombing,' or the total war tactic of bombing civilian centers to paralyze industry and military movement. Allegedly, motivated by profound disgust, the Squadron Leader refused to comply with the order and lead sorties. Skeet maintains that Command labeled his father LMF because he would not comply with orders and had not experienced exceptional flying stress. On the day he was labeled LMF, Squadron Leader Roy Skeet shot himself in the head at his air base at Linton-on-Ouse, York.[108] Herein, it is possible to have some measure of just how greatly fliers feared the stigma attached to the label LMF.

In June 1943, Dr. Jewesbury submitted a report to Command from his psychoneurotic center. He writes,

> "It is unfortunate therefore that the recent Air Ministry Memorandum… makes no distinction between the disposal of the "executive" cases… Category {i} of the memorandum and the "medical" cases… of Category {ii} of the memorandum)… One can only wonder, in passing, why, if the officers are to be invalided, the airmen are normally "transferred to the Army for combatant duties"."[109]

Dr. Jewesbury's next comments are particularly informative:

> "The present type of "blanket" disposal disregards all the issues upon which the unit medical officer, neuropsychiatric specialist and consultant in neuropsychiatry are asked to advise and it deals with all the cases who have not been exposed to exceptional flying stress as if they are lacking in moral fiber. This procedure not only ignores the work and efforts of the medical branch, but it perpetuates injustices to their patients which it is their duty to prevent."[110]

Evidently, Dr. Jewesbury viewed Command's use of medical personnel as disingenuous. This was not an uncommon view. Others have argued that MOs were superfluous as the real differentiating factor in LMF, Waverer and Medical Cases was the CO's determination of 'exposure to flying stress.' Jewesbury clearly resonates with Command's orders for MOs to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate psychoneuroses.

Effects on Operational Efficiency

This section expands upon the numerous failures of LMFW policy. In particular, how these failures contributed to the adversity that airmen and the RAF faced throughout the war.

There exists very little hard data on LMF policy. However, a small section of one report is enlightening. It states that the neuroses attrition rate rose to 2,503 cases in 1942-3, further rising to 2,989 cases in 1943-4.[111] During 1944-4, the rate plateaued at the high rate of 2,910 cases annually.[112] The policy evidently did not reduce psychological wastage rates, as it increased for two years after its implementation, and therefore it failed in its primary goal of preventing wastage that in turn would pose a threat to operational efficiency.

More perturbingly, this paper claims that the fear of LMFW policy forced fliers suffering from neuroses to stay in the air beyond the point at which they should have received medical treatment. This contributed to the RAF's inexplicably high level of air accidents during the Second World War, which led to 8,705 deaths.[113] Arguably, these aforementioned fears of the policy not only forced fliers to don a mask of stoicism in face of innumerable dangers, but it also meant that simple palliative cures for psychoneurotic illnesses were not pursued. Thus, fliers remained in the air and in danger out of a misplaced sense of stoicism.

Mark Wells concludes that the problem of LMF was, 'never big enough to affect the RAF's combat effectiveness.'[114] However, I would argue that LMF harmed operational efficiency. There is significant evidence that LMFW policy kept

106 Operation Log, 'Royal Air Force Operations Record Book: RAF Matlock,' February 20 1942, AIR 29/764 Papers National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

107 "An Airman's Son," *BBC People's Series*, last modified January 27, 2004, accessed April 1st, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/00/a2238400.shtml, 1.

108 "Secret shame of the forgotten casualties of war", *BBC Inside Out Series*, last modified 24 March, 2003, accessed 10 November, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2003/02_february/24/inside_out.shtml.

109 Edward Jewesbury, "Work and Progress Report" to Air Command, July 1943, AIR 49/357 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens.

110 Ibid, 13.

111 Flying Personnel Research Committee "Investigations into Psychological Disorder in Flying Personnel," 1945, AIR 2/6252 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens.

112 Ibid.

113 Francis, *The Flyer,* 107.

114 Wells, *Courage and Air Warfare*, 187.

volunteers vulnerable to sudden psychoneurotic attack in the air when they should have been grounded. If this man was a fighter pilot, he was merely a danger to himself, but if a bomber pilot had a neurotic attack, then he was a danger not only to himself, but also to the rest of his six, seven, eight or nine-man crew, as well as the bomber formation. Intense air fights or terrifying scenarios could lead to enormous pressure on an individual that would later spark in-flight hysteria, anxiety or paralysis, and this may have contributed to a significant portion of air accident fatalities during the war.

One wartime report helps contextualize how air accidents forced neurotics to keep flying to the danger of themselves and others. The report describes the case of a tail-gunner who underwent severe mental strain. It should be noted that contemporary audiences would deem his experiences to be 'exceptional flying stress,' but to Command, his story held nothing particularly 'exceptional.' Jewesbury writes,

> "His story… "He has completed 16 operational trips and a sea search. During the last 6 trips he has began to show signs of nerves. He has tried his best to fight against this."[115]

Herein it is possible to see that the CO acknowledged that the man showed 'signs' of nerves, symptoms, but also that he was fighting to suppress them. Jewesbury continues,

> "On his last sortie, his aircraft was attacked and badly damaged by an enemy aircraft. This experience was too much for him. His work and conduct prior to this lapse has been excellent."[116]

Clearly, the man's sudden refusal to fly was not a result of deficiency of character. He had not only volunteered for combat duties, but joined the RAF at the most dangerous position of tail-gunner. Tail-gunners had the highest death rate of all aircrew positions because they flew alone at the rear section of the plane and were thus unable to bale out of the plane properly. Yet the case becomes even more interesting. Jewesbury writes,

> "Once he had seen a man burnt to death on the station and he could not get this out his mind… Many machines were lost from his station and several of his close friends were missing… On one occasion he was attacked by a night fighter. His machine was badly damaged, he made a safe return, but in a very nervous state."[117]

This passage clearly demonstrates that the man had undergone extraordinary combat stress in a variety of ways. The next passage elucidates on how his symptoms developed during his final six missions.

> "He was depressed, slept badly and sometimes dreamt of crashes. He was easily jumpy and often felt his heart thumping. When flying he was shaky, fidgety and very sweaty and anxious while over the target area."[118]

For six missions this air gunner flew while unwell. At some point, he refused to fly and was deemed 'unfit for any further flying duties.'[119] Clearly, this man was unfit to man a plane, and could very well have caused an air accident during the six sorties that he flew unwell. Because he was forced to fly or face the consequences of the LMFW policy, it is certainly plausible that the LMFW policy indirectly caused air accidents by intimidating unfit men to fly.

In 1942 Squadron Leader Reid submitted a report titled "The Influence of Psychological Disorders in Operational Flying" to Command. In the report, Reid claims that LMFW had contributed to an untold number of air accidents. Reid stresses that the inherent 'harshness' of the policy was keeping fliers in the air when they were undergoing serious neurotic trauma. Furthermore, these fliers were causing numerous forms of operational inefficiency, such as air accidents, early returns from action, reporting sick on ops, etc. Reid writes, 'the employment of air crew suffering from psychological disorders may conceivably be the cause of much operational inefficiency and avoidably casualties.' [120] Reid continues,

> "(1) that 70-80% of accidents are due to the psychological or physical failure of the crew in a critical situation
> (2) that the failure of the pilot due to merely medical reasons is rare.
> (3) that the psychological make-up of a pilot makes or mars his future and
> (4) the typical fact about flying accidents due to psychological causes is that the same mistakes, the same failures, with their resultant consensus appear again and again and they are due to fear."[121]

Not only did this CO believe that the policy was forcing fliers suffering from psychological disorders to keep flying, but he

115 Jewesbury, M.D., "Work and Progress Report" to Air Command, July 1943. AIR 49/357 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London

116 *Ibidem*.

117 Jewesbury, M.D., "Work and Progress Report" to Air Command, July 1943. AIR 49/357 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

118 *Ibid*.

119 *Ibid*.

120 Squadron Leader D. Reid to Air Command, 'The influence of psychological disorders on efficiency in operational flying', 14 September 1942, AIR 49/357 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens.

121 *Ibid*.

also believed these fliers were accounting for most of the RAF's air accidents. Evidently, Command's disposal policy forced fliers incapable of operational flying to continue with their tour, despite evidence that these fliers were accounting for a considerable portion of air casualties. The enclosure of this report in Command's files, and the lack of any response from Command, is implicit evidence that Command read, discussed and ignored Reid's theory.

In sum, LMFW policy not only failed to reduce psychological wastage, but may also have contributed to untold numbers of air accident fatalities and the concomitant loss of vital men and war materials.

Prejudice in Policy

This section attempts to grapple further with Dr. Jewesbury's question to his superiors at Command: "one can only wonder, in passing, why, if the officers are to be invalided, the airmen are normally to "transferred to the Army for combatant duties.""[122] It asks whether there was intent within Command to bias the harsher consequences of this policy toward aircrew as opposed to officers. If so, and the policy was predicated upon punishing those with a predisposition, then did command believe that its aircrew were particularly more predisposed to psychoneuroses than its officers? If yes, then where did Command's presumptions about their aircrew originate from, and how were they perpetuated?

The disposal policy punished aircrew more harshly than officers because Command viewed aircrew, mainly trained and recruited from the lower and lower-middle classes, as innately more predisposed to psychoneuroses. Taken together with the knowledge that Command believed noncompliance to be as contagious as a 'rot,' it can be effectively posited that Command greatly feared that the reactions of the lower-middle class aircrew were the cause of its psychoneurotic wastage. Command decided to enact a policy that harshly punished the originators of the problem, those aircrew so predisposed to flying stress, while merely invaliding or discharging officers that had merely had their constitutions weakened through such exposure to predisposed aircrew.

This argument can effectively explain why Command punished psychoneuroses and malingering amongst non-officer aircrew as one and the same, while providing a more considerate policy for its officer class. Command's presumptions about the aircrew's greater predisposition lay in their historical preference for 'public-school fliers,' which led to an implicit prejudice against lower/ lower-middle class fliers that would join the service in droves when the RAFVR was established in 1936.

Based on Command's interpretation of aviation psychology, the policy was focused on those 'predisposed' to LMFW due to innate or learned character deficiency. Hidden in a Command file, a copy of The Lancet published in 1941 contains an interesting speech.

> "In taking a parting glance at the psychoneurotics of the RAF I cannot do better than to reflect on them in Dr. Stephen Taylor's words in the Lancet of March 6th, 1941: -
> "The great majority are the weaker brethren who have started life with only half a talent. They are a burden which every community has to bear – the grumpy, the worrying, the nagging, the over-particular, the selfish, the humourless, the unsatisfied and the cowardly. In times of trouble, the uniformity of their behavior makes many of us see them for the first time as a coherent group. They flood the services psychiatric hospitals. They crowd into the deepest shelters that they may live through the blitz to grumble at the peace. In quieter times, they fill our outpatients halls; they drink medicines, they collect certificates; they cost the state a lot of money and society a lot of misery. We may occasionally be tempted to despise them, but it is not their fault they are what they are. We must pity them, but for their own sake we must not make out pity. As doctors, we can help a little, but less than we would."[123]

Evidently, these psychiatrists believed that the segment of British society that was vulnerable to 'cowardice' comprised those 'weaker brethren' who have started life with 'only half a talent.' Moreover, these men came from a segment of society that 'cost the state a lot of money' and 'society a lot of misery.' Indeed, Taylor insinuates that this group 'collects certificates', that is, benefits. Clearly, this stigma is associated with those lower down the socioeconomic scale, which informs contemporary audiences that AC viewed 'psychoneurotics,' who were in AC's eyes predisposed to their condition, as originating from lower social ranks. This assumption is referred to in the mid-war publication of a RAF psychiatrist, when he writes, 'the *a priori* expectation is that the poorer the economic status of a section of a given population, the greater the incidence of psychoneurotic conditions.'[124] Given what psychiatrists were publishing, it is easy to see why the RAF viewed those lower down the socioeconomic scale as more predisposed to such conditions.

The formation of the RAF Volunteer Reserve (1936) created a volunteer pool that for the first time in RAF's history opened the doors to 'all classes.' The men that joined the RAFVR in droves, grammar school boys of the lower and middle classes, signed up to access technical training and al-

122 Jewesbury, M.D., "Work and Progress Report" to Air Command, July 1943. AIR 49/357 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London

123 M.D., "Work and Progress Report" to Air Command, July 1943. AIR 49/357 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

124 Gillespie, *Psychological Effects of War on the Citizen and Soldier*, 69.

leged meritocratic promotion structure.[125] This suited the RAF in two senses: it allowed for good propaganda of the RAF as meritocratic, while it to built a pool of reservists for the approaching war with Germany.

After the outbreak of war, the RAF became deeply unhappy with these men of the RAFVR bomber crews. Command felt that it had made the recruitment criteria too low, consequently letting in far too many cases with a 'predisposition' to combat stress. The high attrition rates during the bomber offensive and relentless need for crews forced the RAF's hand on whether or not to actually employ these RAFVR in combat. It did so with great reluctance, whilst retaining commissions for public-school boys hailing from the higher socio-economic order.[126] At the same time as the RAF's employment of these men, the intensity and danger of the bombing offensive had already begun to rise steeply.

The RAF's interpretation of aviation psychology dictated that although it would acknowledge heightened stress as a cause of fatigue for a flier, his breakdown was far more contingent on his innate predisposition, than cumulative stress. This, then, was why Command leveled such harsh consequences at aircrew. The Service's obsession with predisposition, and its belief that its wastage problems were primarily due to its recent influx of predisposed cases from the lower and lower-middle class recruits led to the design of a policy that reinforced a class bias counter to the logical conclusion that wastage inevitably increases with combat intensity. Command's fears are perhaps best articulated in the words of one Command official: 'there are indications in a number of directions that we are not getting a reasonable percentage of the young men of the middle and upper classes, who are the backbone of this country, when they leave the public schools.'[127]

Evidently, Command has a clear distrust of aircrew. To return to Stephen Taylor's speech in the Lancet one RAF report brutally concludes, "in a combatant service in wartime, the interest of the individual is overwhelmed by that of the group. Every effort must be made to make the individual into a useful component of the group, but if it becomes evident that this is impossible, then the individual must be discarded without further delay."[128] As Well states, '[d]espite the incredible skill and fortitude demonstrated by the overwhelming majority of airmen, there always seemed to be an undercurrent of doubt in the Air Ministry and even occasionally at the command level regarding morale and the discipline of flyers, especially NCOs.'[129] The next few paragraphs will explore Well's 'sense' of an 'undercurrent' and relate it back to the earlier discussion of interwar Freudian concepts of character.

It is possible to trace Command's preferences for 'public-school fliers' back to the early years of the RFC. As discussed earlier, the RFC relied initially on those aristocrats attached to flying clubs upon the service's inception. Throughout the First World War, the RFC demonstrated a clear preference for individuals that were better educated and of a higher class. English has summarized the Canadian RFC's screening process effectively. He writes, 'the RFC's ideal candidate was expected to demonstrate "gentlemanliness, educational attainment, mechanical aptitude, and physical excellence, with a measure of recklessness thrown in." All these allude to a preference for upper-class men. Thus, although RFC recruitment standards expanded in the First World War, then did not expand passed the 'college-educated' barrier.

The RAF's reluctance to commission anyone but public-school educated boys in the Second World War suggests a perpetuation of its historical preference. Mark Wells argues that during the Second World War, 'even as the requirements for manpower expanded, the Royal Air Force maintained the philosophical mind-set of a very small, elite service manned by regulars… the fundamental benchmark for commissioning during the pre-war years had been "displaying officer like qualities"… These in turn once again reflected requirements for character, intelligence and ability to set a good example –public school ethos."[130] Wells was correct that Command maintained its preference in wartime policy. For example, the Air Ministry awarded only a third of its graduating fliers with a commission, when the school called for more than half to receive commissions. Furthermore, Wells notes that Flying Training Command often fell well short of the goal. In fact, he recounts the words of one officer who stated, "of the 43 pilots who finally completed their training, only 11 were granted commissions as Pilot Officers. It was noted that all these had been educated at public school."[131]

One American volunteer stated more explicitly, "unlike the US Army Air Corps, commissioned rank is not conferred on all. Ordinarily they are granted only to those with the Old School tie and/or who play rugger. Seriously the situation is just that."[132] The RAF's decision to confine commissions to officers educated in 'public-schools' reflects a long time preference for public school educated pilots, as is evident in recruitment preferences of WWI and interwar. When the circumstances of WWII forced the RAF to expand its ranks to volunteers of all classes, it did so, but gave officer commissions to only those that met its 'requirements.' To reinforce this claim, Wells states that, "65 percent of Bomber Command's aircraft were flown by these sergeant (sic) pilots…. of course, complete non commissioned aircrew were just as common."[133] This claim means that Command had and continued to commission its officer corps along pre-war preferences for 'public-school' officers even as its

125 Wells, *Courage and Air Warfare,* 118.
126 Wells, *Courage and Air Warfare*, 123.
127 Hastings, *Bomber Command,* 242.
128 Jewesbury, M.D., "Work and Progress Report" to Air Command, July 1943. AIR 49/357 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.
129 Wells, *Courage and Air Warfare*, 132.
130 Wells, *Courage and Air Warfare,* 122.
131 Ibid., 123.
132 Ibid., 123.
133 Wells, *Courage and Air Warfare*, 123.

ranks, including pilots, expanded to include volunteers of all classes. Francis confirms the supposition. He states, "the problem was that most senior RAF commanders identified good character in terms of the qualities exemplified by the private schools and elite universities they themselves had attended. As a consequence, pilot selection proved to be heavily dependent of the right accent or the familiar stripes of an old school tie."[134]

As psychological wastage increased during the course of the war, Command believed that wastage was due to the Service's weakening of its recruitment criteria. Expansion had allowed the recruitment of individuals further down the socioeconomic spectrum, and in their minds these men were innately predisposed to neuroses. Thus, Command reacted logically from this perspective with a disposal policy that punished malingering and psychoneurotic cases amongst aircrew as one and the same, because in their opinion, they were one in the same. The malingering and the psychoneurotic case had been caused due to the man's innate predisposition due to who he was, and where he had been born on the socioeconomic scale. Or, as one RAF psychiatrist put it in his mid-war publication, "[s]ocial factors comprise mainly family life, education, outside the family and marital, economic and occupational and social opportunities; but probably the greatest of these is the family."[135] Accordingly, Command's fears of predisposition were founded upon historical class prejudices, which gripped the service's leadership.

On the 16th of July 1940 the Deputy of Personnel Services for Command (hereafter DPS) chaired a conference to consider the 'medical aspects of "wavering."'[136] Present at the meeting were the Director General of Medical Services (hereafter DGMS), Group Captains Burton and Symonds (neurologists), and four civilian consultants. The DPS stated in an exclusive meeting: 'wavering' was a matter that called for strong action to prevent a 'rot.' At the same he realized that there was the, 'problem of genuine medical case.'[137] The DPS's opening statement demonstrates the mistrust Command had in its recruits, and moreover shows a clear dislike of neurotics. To describe men who risked all for their nation, as a 'rot' constitutes shocking language that calls into question the very integrity of Command. Command's use of the term 'rot' is synonymous with its failure in treating RAF personnel. Similarly, the RAF instituted a class-orientated disposal policy that arbitrarily categorized and punished men for developing neuroses, neuroses that John Birley had declared some twenty-two years earlier as an unavoidable response to war's conflict with the individual's, 'instinct for natural self-preservation.'

Part IV: Conclusion

In September 1941, the RAF Air Command decided to institutionalize an LMFW policy in response to a growing number of neurotic casualties. The policy was not rooted in the experiences of the RFC during the First World War (encapsulated in the Birley Report), but was based upon the politics of the 1920s, and the Freudian aviation psychology of the early 1930s. By design, the policy was not intended primarily to treat neuroses and rehabilitate men, but to punish airmen succumbing to neuroses as a deterrent to future cases, and to speedily remove the 'rot' from the RAF. The LMFW policy not only reflected the RAF's historical preference for recruits further up the socioeconomic scale, but it also ensured that the policy's harshest consequences were targeted towards the lower-class bomber crew recruits of the RAVR.

The RAF had to resist the Luftwaffe and subsequently follow orders to take the offensive campaign over mainland Europe. This paper questions the validity of LMFW as the most effective means of conserving manpower, rehabilitating men, maintaining operational efficiency and carrying war to the enemy. The LMFW policy failed to conserve manpower as psychological wastage rates increased throughout the declaration of the war. It also floundered in its aim of rehabilitating men as an aircrew resource all the while practicing a discriminatory policy toward the lower socio-economic orders. Lastly, the LMFW policy did not encourage operational efficiency since it coerced traumatized fliers to remain in the air, endangering themselves and their comrades, and in so doing, contributed to the RAF's high accident rate and the wastage of precious manpower and equipment. In conclusion, it was an ineffective policy that cost lives and failed to meet its intended aims.

This project has opened up a number of avenues for further research. I believe it is important to explore the allegations of the use of LMF amongst Britain's Royal Navy and Army during the Second World War and to trace the consequences in postwar Britain. There are allegations that LMFW policy remained in place until the late 1950s, meaning that fliers during the Korean War would have been subject to its rules. Furthermore, the absorption of a stigma attached to neuroses into military culture after the official dismantlement of the policy warrants further investigation. Clearly, this stigma continues to effect the lives of military personnel, but the how, why and what of the matter are still left largely unanswered. It is clear, however, that the legacy of the policy may still have impact on today's military combatants.

134 Francis, *The Flyer,* 15.
135 Gillespie, *Psychological Factors of War on Citizen and Soldier*, 62-3.
136 Minutes 'Disposal of Air Crews Who Forfeit the Confidence of Their Commanding Officers', July 1940, AIR 2/8591 Papers, National Archives, London, Kew Gardens.
137 Ibid., 19.

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An Interview with Professor Bernard Wasserstein

Professor Bernard Wasserstein, the Harriet & Ulrich E. Meyer Professor of Modern Jewish History, has been teaching and writing history for more than forty-three years now. The author of eleven books, he is one of the most distinguished and well regarded scholars in the field of Jewish history. As he prepares to retire next year in January, he sat down with the Chicago Journal of History to discuss how he became a historian and recount some of the most fascinating tales and encounters from the days when he was a student at Oxford.

Chicago Journal of History: Why did you choose to study history?

Bernard Wasserstein: Initially, I chose to study history in high school because I was pretty rotten at other subjects. I got very good marks in Greek and Latin. But I don't think I really knew them very well. In the case of Greek, my father had really stuffed me in the course of about six weeks. In Latin, I did well. But I hated it. I especially hated the Aeneid which we had to read. So, I certainly didn't want to study Greek and Latin at an advanced level. And I was no good at science. So, in high school, I chose history, French and English. There wasn't much else available.

When it comes to why I chose to study history at college, I would say that I had to specify a subject. So it had to be history or French or English. My French wasn't particularly hot. So it really was a choice between history and English. I seemed to be getting good marks in both. But, in the end, when it came to the actual examinations, I did badly in all three. I did worst in English and History. But I had the best teachers in history and I suppose that's what led me to study history at the undergraduate level at Oxford.

As for the graduate level, I collapsed into doing a Ph.D. because I wasn't particularly good for anything else. Initially, I wasn't very keen on doing a Ph.D. I would rather have done something more interesting and lucrative. When I say interesting, I mean something more active rather than contemplative. But once I finished my Ph.D., I really wanted to get out. I'd had enough. So, I decided that I wanted to be a banker. I wrote to over a hundred banks. These were mainly merchant banks.

But out of a hundred, only one of them interviewed me. When the interviewer asked me why I wanted to be a banker, I, of course, didn't tell him that I had nothing else to do. That would have been fatal. So, I gave him an incorrect answer. He, obviously, saw through that. "Look at me", he said, " Do you want to be like me when you are 65?". I said, " Of course, yes!". He said, " No, you don't. It's misery". We then took a break and, after half an hour, he again asked me, " Do you still want to be a banker". I again said, " yes, yes!". And he said, " You'll be hearing from me". He never got back to me. So, there was nothing left but to carry on and I will be carrying on till Jan. 21st, when after 43 years of research of teaching, I shall be free, free at last.

CJH: So, it was a process of elimination that led you towards history?

BW: Well, I would like to give you some high-minded reasons for why I chose to study history. One could call it intellectual curiosity. But, in my case, it wasn't intellectual curiosity exactly. It was a delight in reading people's letters, which is a large part of what my kind of modern historian does. And I really do enjoy getting into people's private lives, their private thoughts and their archives. But not for any great intellectual or noble reasons. I just find it to be a kind of higher gossip. I enjoy that.

Of course, as time went on, I tried to rationalize my view of why I wanted to be a historian. Again, I had inspiring teachers, both as an undergraduate and a graduate student. And they really persuaded me that history was indeed a worthwhile endeavor. Two in particular were very influential. One was Richard Cobb, the great historian of the French Revolution. Brilliant man but drunk most of the time. And quite disorganized. Often didn't turn up to class and tutorials. But when he did turn up, he kept us talking for about 4 hours. Wrong! He himself kept on talking for four hours, with a glass or perhaps even a bottle of whisky in his left hand. He made history seem like a lot of fun. He was a social historian trained in France and a historian who believed in entering the life of poor people and giving them a voice, particularly the poor during the French revolution. He was also somebody who immersed himself very deeply in another culture. He loved French slang in particular. Getting underneath the skin of another culture, another society excited me.

Then, there was a second teacher. This was Albert Hourani who was also my graduate supervisor. He was of Lebanese origin but was born in Manchester. He was a historian of the modern Arab World. Hourani was very different from Cobb. Cobb was a rascal; Hourani was a saint. Cobb was an irreligious man; Hourani was a practicing Catholic. He was a very high-minded man and a great expert on the late Ottoman Empire and the early thinkers of Arab nationalism. He was a man of a moderate outlook and balanced in his approach to life. Cobb, of course, was unbalanced in every possible way. Cobb was a great companion in a pub. I wouldn't say that about Hourani. But he was the second great influence.

There was a third influence. He never taught me but I attended his lectures and got to know him well. And that was the political philosopher Isaiah Berlin who was really a historian of ideas. He was a liberal in his political outlook when it wasn't particularly fashionable to be one. He was an inspiring lecturer and gave a very influential series of lectures, jokingly called, " From Plato to NATO".

These three made me believe that being a historian could be a life-enhancing thing. Their influence marks me to the present. I taught a seminar on Isaiah Berlin last quarter and still have a copy of Hourani's book on my desk.

CJH: Why did you choose Jewish history in particular?

BW: Well, it all began in the college bar. Britain, you see, is not like this benighted country. The legal age for drinking is 18 but people really start drinking at fourteen or fifteen. I was in the College bar one day talking to Professor Jack Gallagher, the author of " Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism" which had redirected the history of imperialism in the 1960s. At that time, I had little idea of what I wanted to do. I was about to graduate and was thinking of applying to do graduate work. I had applied for a Commonwealth Scholarship that I eventually got. I was all set to go the Muslim University of Aligarh in India and very nearly became a historian of India. Gallagher was mildly encouraging of this. But he wasn't altogether approving. He had recently visited India and there he got dysentery. When he came back, he had become a shadow of himself. And, in fact, he eventually died due to complications arising from this. But still he agreed to write me a letter of recommendation. But before leaving for India, I thought it good to read up a bit about the place. So, I went to the bookstore and picked up V.S. Naipaul's " An Area of Darkness" describing India. It was non-fiction. This book gave such a black picture of the country in every way that eventually I decided not to go to India.

In the meantime, I had also been admitted to Harvard and Oxford. But Harvard didn't give me a scholarship. Oxford did. In that conversation though, Gallagher asked me what I had done so far. I, of course, had done nothing but I had spent six months in Israel before I came back to college. In that case, he said, you should write a dissertation on the British Mandate in Palestine because the British government had loosened access to the archives. I thought it was particularly interesting because my parents had lived in Palestine during the Second World War. And that's what I did. And that's why Albert Hourani became adviser.

I didn't start out as a Jewish historian. I thought of myself as a colonial historian. But then I moved into Jewish history after I finished my dissertation that became my first book. I was commissioned to write another book, arising from a further

opening of the archives. It was to be about the British policies towards Jews during the Second World War. And that's how got involved in Jewish history. But I have also written on other topics.

CJH: Do you see any common threads running through your work?

BW: Well I think one can divide historians into two types: there is the historian who sees one big problem and grapples with it from different sides; and then there is another sort of historian who butterfly-like goes from one thing to another. Now, I don't see myself as a butterfly of any kind but I don't like to think of myself as writing the same thing all over again. I do like to proceed from one thing to another. There was an obvious logical progression from my first book to editing the letters of the Chaim Weizmann, since he was a Zionist leader at the beginning of the Palestine Mandate, which I was writing about in my first book. And then there was an obvious progression from writing about that to writing about British policy during World War II in relation to the Jews and there was an obvious progression from that to writing a biography of Herbert Samuel, because he had been the British High Commissioner in Palestine.

CJH: What are your thoughts on the "postmodern" turn?

BW:I'm not a great theorist and I'm not a great believer in the application of theory to history. I'm not saying that history is simply one thing after another. Of course, theory has its place and of course one must have certain conceptual frameworks, in the plural, when one is writing history, but it is fatal when one becomes a prisoner of these. Too often, I think, people do. It's more important to get underneath the skin of people in the past and people in the past, with rare exceptions, such as Marxists, were not prisoners of theory, they had other, more important ways of looking at their worlds. Of course, some of those ways were theoretical constructs, not only Marxism, but religion, and one must be aware of these.

CJH: What does the University of Chicago mean to you? Do you see a way in which the University has influenced your work?

BW: No, thank God, because in Britain, for example, universities do tend, sometimes, to influence people's work, I don't mean in a sinister way, but in Britain now there is great pressure on faculty members to produce, to publish. It used to be the case in Britain that people were not under the gun to publish, and that means people took their time…At the University of Chicago, once people have tenure and once they are full professors, they're under no particular pressure to publish this year or next year. Some books can be published in 6 months, others take longer…one of my books took 20 years, that's Barbarism and Civilization, A History of Europe in the 20th Century, but I've never felt any pressure to publish. I value that lack of pressure here, being able to do my own thing at my own pace, and then being able to produce a book that is the result of mature reflection and, I hope, exhaustive research.

CJH: What advice do you have for students of history today?

BW: I think, don't be copycats, I see a lot of copy-catting in history today. I have to admit, I've been a copycat too…but I try to be my own person, I try to plough my own furrow. One thing I dislike about the whole American system of training is the way people attach themselves to their advisors and sometimes become almost clones of their advisors, or want to, and I think that's a big mistake. So I would encourage them to do their own thing and get into the archives – archives in the broadest sense – and let the past speak: don't try to impose patterns on the past before the past itself gets a chance to speak.

And those that are missing: The role and experience of Dr. Sabin's chimpanzees in the polio crusade of the 1950s

By Amelia Brackett, New York University

On July 5, 1955, Dr. Albert B. Sabin of the Children's Hospital Research Foundation in Cincinnati, Ohio, sent a night letter to Mr. John Ash at the Chimpanzee Farm in Dania, Florida. It read: "What has happened to the chimpanzees. (*sic*) Please advise."[1] Ash was a middleman for the chimpanzee trade between Africa and research labs in the United States, and he was attempting to provide Sabin with chimps for his experiments. That year, Dr. Sabin had requested funds for forty chimpanzees from the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis in his quest to produce a vaccine against poliomyelitis.[2] By the time his polio work was finished, he had developed a successful vaccine, and performed studies on over 300 chimpanzees in the process.[3]

What did happen to the chimpanzees? The answer to Sabin's question exposes a number of other questions that challenge basic assumptions about the history of human-chimpanzee relationships, and the role of that history in a contemporary debate about the rights of both species. In an attempt to answer Sabin's question, this paper will tell the salvageable stories of the polio chimpanzees in his lab, tracing their life stories when possible and describing their daily lives and intersections with humans. The discussion will focus on Sabin's lab so that the stories of the chimpanzees who lived and died there can enter a personal plane, while maintaining a hold on the larger picture of the polio crusade and the chimpanzee trade.

In part, this is an exercise in justice. The *Homo sapiens* of the polio story have received their credit, where it is most soundly due. The *Pan troglodytes* have not. These chimpanzees *did* serve the polio cause, and this is reason enough to reconstruct what their lives may have looked like. Their role in the development of the polio vaccine is also an important factor in current debates on animal experimentation. Scientists cite their usage as historical precedent that proves the necessity of primate experimentation, while activists argue that the primates suffered needlessly in extraneous tests. This common citation demands further inquiry to determine how chimpanzees were used in the polio labs. In fact, chimpanzees were essential to the development of the polio vaccine. Their daily lives were hard, but they were costly parts of a focused, extensive system. In the context of the contemporary biological sciences, they were also the crucial final step before human testing. This more detailed investigation of the polio labs sets the foundation for an equal playing field in the experimentation debate. After exploring the history of chimps in polio research, this paper will briefly address the contemporary possibilities for chimpanzees in medical research, considering the questions and themes that emerge from the preceding examination.

Use and Abuse: A Brief History of Animal Experimentation

In 1789, in the midst of cruelty toward animals and humans alike, British philosopher and jurist Jeremy Bentham asked, "The question is not, Can they *reason*? nor, Can they *talk*? but, Can they *suffer*?"[4] Bentham may have been attempting to hone popular inquiry, but his words evoke more questions. How long had humans wondered if animals could reason, if they could talk? Why would they care? And, of course, what had Bentham witnessed that would cause him to ask, Can they *suffer*?

Primates have been subjugated to human experimental curiosity since antiquity. Marcus Aurelius' physician, Galen, employed apes in his presentations.[5] Galen and subsequent physicians used experiments to exemplify established theories, rather than to test hypotheses.[6] As the scientific method developed away from Galen, animal experimentation developed alongside it, becoming a mode of discovery instead of a chalkboard.[7] For example, Galen would have cut open a dog to show that he could bleed, while the scientific method of William Harvey's era would have cut open a dog to see how he bled.[8] With this new method came new problems: How accurately can anatomical functions in animals be applied to humans? When Harvey mapped blood circulation in the seventeenth century, there were unresolved debates over the

1 Sabin, Albert. Letter to John Ash, July 5, 1955. Animal Correspondence, Box 9. Albert B. Sabin Papers, Winkler Center for the History of the Health Professions, University of Cincinnati, Ohio.

2 Sabin, A.B. Grant proposal, 1955. National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, Box 5, Folder 7. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

3 Sabin, A.B. Letter to Alfred Roller, Oct. 29, 1965. Correspondence, Box 3, Folder 24. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

4 Jeremy Bentham. *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, 1781. Quoted in Anita Guerrini. *Experimenting with Humans and Animals: From Galen to Animal Rights*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 3.

5 Guerrini, 2003, 16.

6 Ibid, 13,16.

7 The use of primates in experimentation continued through Louis Pasteur's rabies vaccine. Guerrini, 2003, 99.

8 Ibid, 3, 23.

universality of like anatomical structures in different species.[9] By the eighteenth century, animal experimentation debates also included a concern for the animal experience of pain, as well as skepticism regarding the validity of projecting animal results onto untested human bodies.

Nineteenth-century scientist Marshall Hall used vivisection--surgical experimentation on a living organism--to continue Harvey's circulation work.[10] While performing his studies, he created guidelines for a research society that would monitor the use of animals in experiments. He proposed that animal experiments be necessary and goal-oriented, and cause minimal pain.[11] While these concerns may have been genuine, Hall was also writing in an era that encompassed, among other movements, the foundation for the Society of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in Britain. The public profile of his work suggests that he was responding to this newfound sensibility to the animal experience[12]

Almost a century after Bentham wrote his famous line, it seems that humans were no closer to understanding if animals suffered, but they might be inclined to care. One development would drastically change both the concept of and the concern for animals' pain: anesthesia. Anesthesia was first used in Boston in 1846,[13] after which it derailed the pain discussion. Gone were the images of the dog, paws nailed to the table, howling and twisting as Francois Magendie's knife sliced its face open[14]. Anesthesia solved vivisection's aesthetic complication. And since no one had answered Bentham's implied question on animal communication, the now-anesthetized dog could not be asked about his post-op experience, or if anesthesia even worked the same way on dogs as it did on humans. The discussion of pain faded, and the question of anatomical relevance remained inadequately addressed into the twentieth century.

Chimpanzees in Twentieth-Century Research: Learning about Chimpanzees to Benefit Humans

Early twentieth-century work with chimpanzees involved psychological and psycho-biological experimentation.[15] These experiments challenged doubts about the similarities between humans and chimpanzees by answering basic questions about chimpanzee anatomy, emotionality, and intelligence.[16] Dr. Robert Yerkes was a psycho-biologist who developed an early fascination with chimpanzees and how they might be used in psychobiological studies.[17] Yerkes studied chimpanzees and documented his work extensively, including an entire book compiling great ape knowledge up until 1929.[18] His writings display the scientific knowledge of and interest in primates in the time immediately preceding the polio crusade.

When he began his research, there were federal and private collections of chimps, and the first chimpanzee was born in captivity on April 27th, 1915.[19] But Yerkes dreamed of a different type of collection: he wanted a chimpanzee colony specifically for scientific research. Before Yerkes opened his dream facility, the Yerkes Laboratory of Primate Biology, he compiled all the anthropoid-related knowledge he could access in *The Great Apes: A Study of Anthropoid Life*. In his section on chimpanzees, Yerkes discussed recent examinations of the social, intellectual, and emotional capacities of chimpanzees in the wild and in captivity. Comparing these aspects, Yerkes wrote, "The chimpanzee more closely resembles man affectively than in its intellectual or cognitive life," implying behavioral distinctions between a chimpanzee's capacity for emotion and its intellectual/cognitive abilities.[20]

Throughout his work, it is clear that Yerkes was not comfortable with contemporary distinctions of habit and instinct, nature and nurture. The occasions of his adamancy — his insistence on the emotionality of chimpanzees and their importance to science, for example — stand out all the more amidst his caution, especially his belief "that such terms as temperament, individuality, and personality are as useful, nay even as essential, in the description of the chimpanzee as of man."[21] Yerkes was so convinced that chimpanzees could access emotion that he insisted on applying anthropomorphic terms to them in a time when not everyone was comfortable being related to primates.[22] He was less sure of their intellectual likeness, but he wanted to continue experimenting on all aspects of their lives.

The trends of approach and discourse in Yerkes' work are best described through a quotation from a section on food:

> Oftener perhaps than any other question, those who have chimpanzees in captivity are asked, what do they eat? Our reply is, what they are taught to, as we do! This is an intimation of our conviction that the selection, acceptance, or rejection and

9 Guerrini, 2003, 3, 17.
10 *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "vivisection," web.
11 Guerrini, 2003, 77-78.
12 Ibid, 78.
13 Ibid, 78.
14 French physiologist famous for his public surgeries on animals. Guerrini, 2003, 70.
15 Yerkes coined the term psychobiologist and founded the discipline.
16 Yerkes, Robert, *Almost Human* (New York: The Century Co., 1925), xi-xii; *The Great Apes* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), 299.
17 D.D. Dewsbury, *Monkey Farm: A History of the Yerkes Laboratories of Primate Biology, Orange Park, Florida, 1930-1965* (New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 2006), 47.
18 *The Great Apes*.
19 Dewsbury, 2006, 46.
20 Robert Yerkes and Ada Yerkes, *The Great Apes: A Study of Anthropoid Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), 299.
21 Yerkes, 1929, 278. Cite second and onward citations as Author Year, Page.
22 Yerkes, 1925, xii.

> manner of eating foods are chiefly manners of habit, and therefore individually determined… it is so generally assumed or implied that choice and manner of taking foods are instinctive and characteristic for a species.[23]

The dialogue is completely dependent on the chimpanzee's relation to the human species. Yerkes leaps from a repeated chimpanzee action to its human counterpart constantly with little interest in an actual explanation for the resemblance; rather, there is an underlying assumption that the merit of an observation and, by extension, a species, is constructed by its proximity to human characteristics. Although Yerkes believed that "the humble primates may be helpful," it is clear his contemporaries did not want to associate humans with the anthropoid apes. In order to combat these "ill-founded and unprofitable prejudices and superstitions," Yerkes wrote about his findings and founded his lab.[24] His goal was to convince his contemporaries of the merit of primate research, which he believed would reveal lessons for mankind.[25]

Yerkes' education informed his understanding of the natural order. At Harvard, he studied comparative psychology and met leading faculty in eugenics, namely Francis Galton, and took courses in philosophy.[26] These influences often appear in his later primate work. In *Almost Human*, published when he was a professor of psychology at Yale, Yerkes answered his own question, "Who is a primate?" relying heavily on the Linnaean classification system, clearly regarding man as a "creature" in this system. [27] While he alludes to anatomical differences between the non-human primates and man, such as opposability in the feet, Yerkes seems to see the most significant difference as man's propensity for control and "perfectibility:"

> [Man's well-nigh universal habitation] is due chiefly to the measure of man's control of his environment, for whereas the gorilla or other ape adapts to climatic conditions chiefly by change in physical characters, man depends quite as much on modifications or control of the environment itself. [28]

He cites the use of fire to illustrate his point.[29] This control factor extends to the lab: "Experimental study…yields understanding of the nature, relations, principles, and conditions of vital processes. It enhances our ability to control them."[30] In his books, Yerkes presents an understanding of the natural order that allowed him to respect and even be in awe of chimpanzees and other primates, and still to subjugate them to experimentation. In fact, the control factor is perhaps the most definite characteristic in Yerkes' differentiation between non-human and human primates; thus, in engaging in this outlet for perfectibility, Yerkes was exerting that which made humans distinct from other primates.

Another interesting aspect of Yerkes' work is his conception of the natural order as a porous continuum, rather than a ladder. His complex view of the human species followed eugenics theory, not unpopular at the time, which organized different groups within each species based on perceived intraspecific differences. Just as traits overlapped among species, species could be subdivided. In fact, some races shared traits of other primates, while still remaining human:

> Negro and chimpanzees seem to recognize in each other similarities which attract and differences which repel. The feelings of the negro are pretty generally shared by mankind, for the appearance and behavior of monkeys and apes offend while they fascinate most of us.[31]

Eugenics and Social Darwinism are not new historical concepts, but their place in Yerkes' work deserves more than appalled dismissal. This quotation shows his willingness to place humans in relation to primates, but also primates in relation to humans, based on specific traits that he believed experimentation could identify. Animal experimentation relies on this fluid understanding of the interrelationships of humans and animals, and the assumption that humans can learn something from animals.

Yerkes' passion for using primate experimentation to advance mankind betrays another, more sinister of his beliefs.[32] As the above quote shows, "negroes" existed in a space between human and primate: while "mankind" is similarly repulsed and attracted to its mirrored image within the chimpanzee, these feelings are only "pretty generally shared." These distinctions among the three subjects correspond to the fear of Yerkes and other scientists that the intelligence of the human race was declining on a backwards trajectory towards its evolutionary roots.[33] In one of the most oft-cited experiments of the period, Yerkes conducted intelligence testing on Army soldiers and concluded that blacks were less intelligent than whites by an

23 Yerkes, 1929, 231.
24 Yerkes, 1925, vii.
25 Ibid, vii.
26 Dewsbury, 2006.
27 Robert Yerkes, *Chimpanzees*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943), 1, 3.
28 Yerkes, 1925, 25.
29 Ibid, 25.
30 Yerkes, 1943, 1.
31 Yerkes, 1925, 26-27
32 Yerkes, 1925, vii.
33 Steven Selden, "Transforming Better Babies into Fitter Families: Archival Resources and the History of the American Eugenics Movement, 1908-1930," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 149 (2005): 205.

average of 3 mental years, even classifying them as "moronic."[34] In the face of general lower intelligence, Yerkes believed that the key to reversing this downward trend was studying the relation between biology and intelligence on the sliding scale of whites, blacks, and primates. As scientists in the eugenics movement, the same ability that allowed Yerkes to imagine and subsequently examine interspecies relations also promoted the intraspecies division of humans into racial categories purportedly based on levels of intelligence.

Yerkes' conclusions in his army tests contributed to popular "scientific racism," but other of his conclusions were less popular.[35] Yerkes believed and explicitly professed that man was not a "unique organism" because of his "genetic relations to other types of living creatures."[36] Using these other living creatures, Yerkes hoped to engage in "inquiries of behavior, experience, and [in] anatomical and physiological correlates; in social relations and institutions, neural functions, endocrine effects and imbalance; in pathology and experimental surgery."[37] In chimpanzees, Yerkes saw the possibility for even greater service:

> If as a servant of science the chimpanzee should help to make clearer and more attractive to mankind ways for the achievement of greater social-mindedness, dependability, and cooperativeness, how immeasurable our debt! The really important things for us at present are recognition and active acceptance of the principles of modifiability, controllability, and consequent improvability, of human nature.[38]

Yerkes takes his literary license to the extreme here, but even beneath the flourish, he suggests that studying the chimpanzee could help humans become more human by improving their understanding of themselves.

Yerkes was not alone in ascribing such importance to chimpanzee research. Wolfgang Köhler studied chimpanzees in the Canary Islands, employing them in some of the world's first psychological tests. He published his findings in 1925, in his book, *The Mentality of Apes*.[39] Yerkes refers to Köhler's work in the Canary Islands as a study of ape intelligence, measured by problem-solving skills, especially in relation to other animals. Köhler believed that chimpanzees were particularly useful in intelligence testing:

> We may, under the simplest conditions, gain knowledge of the nature of acts of intelligence… So one may be allowed the expectation that in the intelligent performances of anthropoid apes we may see in their plastic state once more processes with which we have become so familiar that we can no longer immediately recognize their original form: but which because of their very simplicity, we should treat as the logical starting-point of theoretical speculation.[40]

Köhler evaluated the intellectual workings of chimpanzees as a "plastic state" from which scientists could understand basic human functions. He believed these tests were vital in determining the origin of intelligence, which could not be thoroughly investigated using grown male humans because their nurtured intelligence would not display the basic steps of problem solving 'natural' to a brain unfamiliar with the trappings of culture.[41] Köhler, like Yerkes, was inspired to investigate the origins of man and their infant capacities in chimps because of their physical "human" resemblance:

> [Apes] show so many human traits in their "everyday" behaviour that the question was quite automatically suggested whether the animals do not behave with intelligence and insight under conditions which require such behaviour. This question expresses the first, one may say, naïve, interest in the intellectual capacity of animals. We wished to ascertain the degree of relationship between anthropoid apes and man in a field which seems to us particularly important, but on which we have as yet little information.[42]

These men show that scientific inquiry was interested in explaining humans, and any discoveries regarding chimpanzee biology would be interpreted through that lens.

Yerkes' writing reflects a lack of concern for the chimpanzees' pain, even on a scientific level. A small section titled "PAIN" in *Great Apes* continues the historical narrative of simultaneous avoidance and fascination with different species' pain experiences. Yerkes refers to observations of pain expression, adding that he himself saw those expressions caused by surgery. He admits that he had limited knowledge on the science of pain, yet displays no interest in exploring the neurology further: "Our data on pain…suggest that the acuity of the cutaneous pain sense is very considerably less

34 National Academy of Sciences, *Psychological Examinig in the United States Army,* 1921. Fred Galloway, "Inferential Sturdiness and the 1917 Army Alphia: A New Look at the Robustness of Educational Quality Indices as Determinants of Interstate Black-White Score Differentials" *The Journal of Negro Education* 63 (1994): 252. John Jackson and Nadine Weidman, "The Origins of Scientific Racism" *The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education* 50 (2005): 76.
35 Jackson, 2005, 76.
36 Yerkes, 1943, 2-3.
37 Yerkes, 1943, 3.
38 Ibid, 11.
39 Wolfgang Köhler, *The Mentality of Apes,* Trans. Ella Winter, (London: Routledge, 1925).
40 Köhler, 1925 1-2.
41 Köhler, 1925, 1-2.
42 Ibid, 1.

than in man."[43] While Yerkes' writing style does not want for generalization, it also does not lack for words and repetition. Thus his cursory treatment of this section and the absence of a call for further analysis encourage skepticism.

Conceptions of Chimpanzees

Scientists such as Köhler and Yerkes reflect an intense interest in chimpanzee anatomy and behavior. The detail and devotion dedicated to the study of chimpanzees was completely enveloped in their relation to people and how they might help the human species. The scientists understood on a rudimentary level the similarities between humans and chimpanzees, and they reveled in the opportunity to use the primates in experiments.[44] The question for Yerkes and his contemporaries was not, "what is a chimpanzee?" but rather, "what aspects of chimpanzees are identical to those of humans?" By parsing out degrees of "human" and "non-human," they would be able to determine how and to what extent they could use chimpanzees to learn about and to serve humans. Yerkes' and Köhler's work represents the scientific conception of chimpanzees at the time they began to be used in the polio crusade.

The Polio Fight

By 1952, the United States had suffered through two massive epidemics of poliomyelitis, accompanied by an ever-increasing rate of infection.[45] That year, there were 57,879 documented cases, the highest ever recorded.[46] The United States was not alone: by the mid-twentieth century, every section of the world, including isolated places such as Australia, reported cases of the disease.[47]

Poliomyelitis, or infantile paralysis, takes three main courses: abortive, non-paralytic, and paralytic. An abortive case manifests as flu-like symptoms, and non-paralytic involves aching of the legs and neck. Paralytic polio causes temporary or permanent paralysis, and it can attack any part of the body, from a muscle in a hand to the muscles used in respiration.[48] One such victim, Norma Smith, was paralyzed from the waist down:

> I've always thought that paralyzed people were numb. I always thought if anybody was paralyzed they wouldn't feel anything and of course you do feel everything. It's a deep bone ache. It's in every muscle and everything and your whole body seems to shriek with pain.[49]

To combat this disease, scientists all over the United States used chimpanzees and other primates to learn about the strains of poliomyelitis and to create a vaccine. One such scientist was Dr. Albert Sabin who, working in his lab at the Children's Hospital at University of Cincinnati, would eventually use more than 300 chimpanzees in his experiments.

Chimpanzees were the key experimental tools in the development of the polio vaccine. With the current reliance on genetics, the reasons for their selection may seem obvious. It is commonly repeated that humans and chimpanzees share more than 99% of their DNA.[50] While this revelation has had immense imaginative effect on perceptions of chimpanzees and humans alike, it neglects other indicators that were available to the polio scientists. It also overemphasizes the role of genetics in determining relationship: after all, DNA codes for all biological processes. Organisms as seemingly disparate as clams and elephants share the DNA that allows them to turn carbohydrates into energy.[51] Fortunately for the scientists working before molecular biology was a common reference, chimpanzees and humans share similarities that can be measured in other ways. For example, their evolutionary divergence occurred only around four million years ago.[52] That calculation was made in the 1960s, overthrowing the previous notion that placed the separation nearly ten million years earlier. Here again is a measurement unavailable to Sabin and other polio scientists, who believed chimpanzees and humans to be more distant relatives. The main method of comparison that encouraged polio scientists to use chimpanzees was anatomy. These anatomical studies, discussed earlier, qualified chimpanzees for polio studies, for which they proved apt instruments. Other animals, such as mice and macaques, can be infected with polio in the lab and can even show symptoms of paralysis.[53] Chimpanzees, however, acquire polio in the same manner and display symptoms that are the most similar to humans.[54] When inoculated in the lab, chimpanzees can acquire all three responses: non-paralytic, paralytic, and passive immunity, just

43 Yerkes, 1929, 323.
44 Yerkes, 1925, preface and introduction.
45 M.R. Smallman-Raynor, et al, *A World Geography: Poliomyelitis Emergence to Eradication* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 134, 150, 257-258.
46 Ibid, 262.
47 Ibid, 192-193.
48 Smallman-Raynor, 2006, 30-33.
49 Edwin MacColl, Charles Parker, Peggy Seeger, *Body Blow: A radio-ballad about the psychology of pain*, first broadcast 27 March 1962, album released 13 July 1999 on Topic Records, accessed via Spotify.
50 Jonathan Marks, *What it means to be 98% chimpanzee*. Berkeley: UC Press, 2003.
51 Ibid, 28.
52 Marks, 2013, 11.
53 Howard Howe, "Antibody Response of Chimpanzees and Human Beings to Formalin-Inactivated Trivalent Poliomyelitis Vaccine," July 28, 1952, http://aje.oxfordjournals.org/.
54 D. M. Oshinsky, *Polio: An American Story*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 130.

like humans.[55] Chimpanzees were also documented as having been infected by "accidental contagion" from other lab animals without inoculation.[56] These characteristics of acquisition of and response to polio mimic humans effectively enough to make chimpanzees excellent predictors of human response to different attenuations and formulas for the vaccines, serving not only as experimental tools, but also as a protective step before human testing.

The year after the record number of cases was reported, Dr. Sabin asked the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (NFIP) for funds to purchase his first twelve chimpanzees. President Roosevelt had announced the creation of NFIP in 1938, seventeen years after he was stricken with polio.[57] The foundation launched its famous fundraising campaign, The March of Dimes, the same year.[58] Polio labs such as Sabin's were funded through NFIP, and it would suggest importing firms and even regulate the intergovernmental tensions that arose in the process of procuring live animals.[59] In a 1939 letter to Basil O'Connor, the director of NFIP, Sabin lamented the scarcity of polio research due to the cost of the monkey, "the only animal which has yet been found susceptible [to polio]."[60] Over the next two decades, NFIP funding and international intervention would make possible primate experimentation for polio labs.

During his time with chimpanzees, Dr. Sabin's laboratory worked to determine the passage of polio through the body and to differentiate the different strains and their respective effects.[61] The chimpanzees were the largest, most expensive part of a complex system of lab animals, in which they occupied the top tier of an experimental hierarchy constructed to determine their biological relationship to each other as well as to provide a similar framework for each experiment.[62] Lab mice, cows, and other such non-primates were used in initial testing, then cynomolgus monkeys (or crab-eating macaque), chimpanzees, and finally humans. Each new species required two types of observation: first, the similarities between the current species and the species before it would have to be determined, then that species' reaction would also be recorded. The typical experiment was set up thus: Can *x* virus do *y* when *z* in chimpanzees, as it did in monkeys? Or, can *x* virus do *a* when *b* in humans, as in chimpanzees? In the semiannual report for January to June 1954, Sabin describes this relationship:

> Strains of each of the 3 types [of polio virus] which possess this limited virulence for monkeys by the spinal route were found to be completely avirulent when inoculated into the spinal cord of chimpanzees, producing neither paralysis nor lesions.[63]

In the report for the second half of 1954, similar experiments included humans, tested with these same polio strains that were not virulent in chimpanzees.[64]

Sabin never fully explained the specifics of his methods in his grant requests or semiannual reports, but the budget sections of the grant requests illuminate a key difference between chimpanzees and the rest of the laboratory animals that may partially explain their top position: cost. In the NFIP grant proposal[65] for 1955—a median year in time and characteristics for the chimpanzee period—Sabin requested a total of $181,000. This request included money for more than 9,000 lab animals, including 40 chimpanzees. Of the top three most used animals (mice, cynomolgus monkeys, chimpanzees), these 40 chimpanzees represented only .004% of the population, but they accounted for more than 20% of the purchasing grant allotted for these three categories of animals.[66] Overall, those 40 chimpanzees made up 11% of the total grant. They cost $500 each. In the same year, one cynomolgus monkey shipped all the way from India cost $35, and one mouse cost $0.25. Although the total allotted for the cynomolgus monkeys was $50,000 more than for the chimpanzees, that amount accounted for fifty times more animals.[67]

These numbers show that chimpanzees were extraordinarily valuable. At the same time, they were not the only animals used in experimentation; they were only a piece of a huge system, including tens of thousands of animals. Even so, the chimpanzees were different. Their inclusion in the lab required international diplomacy, special training, money, and time. These difficulties were worthwhile, however, because

55 H. Howe and D. Bodian, "Non-Paralytic Poliomyelitis in the Chimpanzee," *Journal of Experimental Medicine*, March 1, 1945; "Passive Immunity to Poliomyelitis in the Chimpanzee," March 1, 1945; PubMed.

56 Howard Howe, "Poliomyelitis by Accidental Contagion in the Chimpanzee," *Journal of Experimental Medicine*. Nov. 1, 1944. Pubmed.

57 Oshinsky, 2005, 24, 53

58 Ibid, 54.

59 Ibid, 119.

60 Sabin. Letter to Basil O'Connor, Feb. 8, 1939. Box 6, Folder 2. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

61 Semiannual Reports. NFIP, Box 7, Folder 16. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

62 Lab notebooks. Lab Notebooks Polio: Chimps, Box 51, 54, 58, 59. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

63 Semiannual Report, January 1-June 30, 1954. NFIP, Box 7, Folder 16. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

64 Semiannual Report, June 30-December 31, 1954. NFIP, Box 7, Folder 16. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

65 Grant proposals do not reflect actual numbers, but are best for comparative purposes because they are well preserved for the period in question, and Sabin procured all his chimpanzees through the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, to whom these grant proposals were addressed.

66 Semiannual Reports. NFIP, Box 7, Folder 16. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

67 Grant proposal 1955. NFIP Box 5, Folder 7. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

chimpanzees mostly closely mimicked the human process and symptoms of polio. Some of the humans who came into contact with them noted their special qualities and even developed bonds with them. The chimpanzees used in the polio fight had life histories of their own, and some of those stories were closely documented by their human captors.

Sabin's Chimps: Origins

Most of Sabin's chimpanzees came directly from the jungles of West and Central Africa. The laboratory system in the United States relied on intermediary firms, such as the Chimpanzee Farm in Dania, Florida, and Trefflich's Bird & Animal Company in New York and California. These companies arranged international and domestic paperwork, capture, blood sampling, shipment, and health of the chimpanzees until they were safely delivered to the various American labs. The chimpanzees were captured all over British, French, Spanish, and Belgian colonial Africa, including Spanish Guinea, French Guinea, Gabon, Liberia, and the Congo.[68] The American companies had on-the-ground representatives who captured the chimpanzees and took their blood samples to check for polio antibodies.[69] One such representative was Phillip Carroll, who worked for Henry Trefflich, of Trefflich's Bird and Animal Company. In a memorandum to Sabin, Trefflich describes Carroll's methods for capturing the chimpanzees:

> They were trapped…by spreading a net under the palm trees in which the chimpanzees slept. After being trapped they were put in a compound in the American Mission where they were housed in big cages, 4 to 6 chimpanzees per group. They were fed by native boys and the food consisted of rice cooked in palm oil, fruit, yams, etc. These chimpanzees left Africa June 22 and arrived [in New York] on the morning of June 30. They were bled immediately after arrival.[70]

This account reflects the typical manner of and subsequent waiting period for capturing chimpanzees. The chimpanzees would also be bled as soon as they were captured in Africa, with a 30 cc Sheppard-Keidel vacuum tube.[71] During the entire time from capture to delivery, the health of the chimpanzee was paramount: Trefflich would have to pay for any sick or dead chimpanzees sent to Sabin, in addition to taking the expense for any that arrived dead to his firm in New York.

Some chimpanzees came directly from Africa, but not from the jungle. Two chimpanzees named Aba and Yangambi were captured in the "Belgic Kongo" (*sic*) and sent to Sabin in the winter of 1955. Dr. Jezierski of the *Laboratoire de Recherches à l'Institut National pour l'Etude Agronomique du Congo*[72] sent Sabin the serum samples. In his accompanying letter, Jezierski wrote: "The one of them was captured near Stanleyville, Congo River-Central Congo, and must be about 8 months old. The [other] one was captured near Aba, Soudan (sic) border-North-east Congo and is aged about ten months."[73] Due to the high presence of polio antibodies in larger wild chimpanzees, as well as their relative difficulty to handle and to transport, Sabin wanted young chimps between ten and twenty pounds.[74] These baby chimpanzees would be perfect.[75]

Not all of Sabin's chimps came directly from the jungle, however. June and Agnes, for example, came the Army Medical Graduate School at Walter Reed Hospital in Maryland, where they were used in typhoid experiments.[76] On May 5th, 1954, scientists at Walter Reed wrote a letter regarding these two chimpanzees:

> "In the event you are interested in identifying the chimps, they may be differentiated on the basis of the following characteristics: June is slightly smaller in stature and lighter in weight. She has an irregular area of pigmentation extending over the bridge of her nose. Her pleasant personality may not be evident initially, but, although less demonstrative of her affection, is more phlegmatic and manageable. Both animals are easy to handle."[77]

When he received them, Sabin wrote that they were "excellent."[78]

68 Letters, notes, memos. NFIP, Animals, Box 9, Folder 13, 14, 15; Research Notes & Materials, Box 24, Folder 1, 3. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

69 Sabin insisted on immediate sampling upon capture for two reasons. First, he had noticed that adult chimpanzees had polio antibodies already, and he wanted to know if there was a type of jungle polio that chimpanzees were infected with in the wild. Second, he could not accept any chimpanzee with polio immunity, and he wanted to ensure that he only received chimpanzees without polio antibodies.

70 Memorandum from Phillip Carroll and Henry Trefflich, 1954. Box 54, Folder 1. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

71 Letter from Sabin to Phillipp Carroll, 11 Oct. 1954. NFIP, Animals, Box 9, Folder 13. SA, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

72 Research Laboratory at the National Institute for Agronomic Study in the Congo.

73 Letter to Sabin from Dr. Jezierski, 16 Nov. 1955. Research Notes & Materials, Box 24, Folder 3. SA, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

74 Sabin. Letter to John Ash, April 29, 1954. NFIP, Animals, Box 9, Folder 14. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

75 Letter to Jezierski from Sabin, 27 Dec. 1955. Research Notes & Materials, Box 24, Folder 3. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

76 Letter from Dr. Joseph Smadel at Walter Reed to Sabin, 22 April 1954. NFIP, Animals, Box 9, Folder 13. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

77 Letter from Smadel to Sabin, 22 April 1954, ibid.

78 Letter from Sabin to Smadel, 22 May 1954. NFIP, Animals, Box 9 , Folder 13. SA WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

Their excellence allowed them to be useful in a special operation-experiment called, "Inoculation of Mahoney KP33 Virus Into Spinal Cord of Chimpanzees." The Mahoney virus was the most virulent strain of polio.[79] Routine inoculation involves swabbing tongues, intramuscular, intra-cerebral, or intra-spinal injections with needles.[80] For injected inoculations, the chimpanzees were anesthetized. For this experiment, however, Sabin wanted to see exactly where on the spine the virus was being injected and to bypass the tough process of piercing chimpanzee skin.[81] June, number 6621, was first under the knife. Her laminectomy—removal of the vertebrae necessary to expose the spinal cord—was made "where ribs leave the spinal column."[82] Agnes, number 6622, was incised in the middle of her spine, forcing the experimenters to remove more of her vertebrae than planned until they located the desired region.[83] June and Agnes were killed at the end of the observation period so that the internal results could be evaluated.[84]

Sabin received at least five other chimps from Walter Reed. Geoffrey Edsall, Director of the Immunology Division, wrote: "The remaining chimpanzees are champing (?) (*sic*) at the bit, looking forward to the opportunity to serve the cause of polio."[85]

June's and Agnes' story hints at a complex emotional method in dealing with chimpanzees. First, the correspondence here disclosed is between scientists. The enthusiasm apparent in their words lacks the motivation of monetary reward; these are colleagues discussing a mutual tool. The May letter describes not only June's physical stature but also her personality. Discussion of personality as a method of identification does not necessarily denote a belief in the 'humanity' of these chimps, although it does suggest the belief that they can demonstrate human qualities. This letter describes such a nuanced personality, however, that it begs more attention than the descriptions of "playful" chimps that litter other correspondence. These observations necessitate an intimate relationship in order to identify these characteristics in the chimpanzee, *as well as* the assumption that a complete stranger will recognize them. While experimenting on her, Dr. Smadel established a deep understanding of June's multilayered personality. This tension between acknowledging a developed personality and forcing that personality to undergo experimentation recurs in the chimpanzee story because their physical and emotive similarity to humans is so striking to these scientists. Yerkes' work includes the same friction, as he observed "that such terms as temperament, individuality, and personality are as useful, nay even as essential, in the description of the chimpanzee as of man" while insisting that it was essential to use chimpanzees in experimentation, including surgery.[86]

Just as Yerkes rectified this tension by creating a willing role for chimpanzees in research, Edsall's letter about the chimpanzees "champing at the bit" connects the chimpanzees to the eradication of polio. By expressing the role of chimpanzees in this way, Edsall shows that for at least one scientist, all the intimacies in the world between chimpanzee and man could not compare to the fight against polio; Edsall dedicated the lives of the chimpanzees to the a defense against disease, just as he had dedicated his. In fact, framing this discussion in terms of 'tensions' projects the concept of contradiction necessitating rectification onto a group of men who may not have seen any conflicts in their use of chimpanzees. Yerkes' natural order allowed him to identify his humanity based on his control of the environment and his own perfectibility. Both of these 'human' characteristics include the subjugation of animals as a function of the human species. Perhaps the best way to understand Sabin and other polio scientists' ability to recognize emotionality in the very chimpanzees whose brains they later dissected to answer "what has happened to the chimpanzees" with another question: what *could* happen with the chimpanzees? The possibility of scientific discovery, prestige, and most importantly, of saving lives, lay ahead of these scientists, and chimpanzees were an integral piece in obtaining those goals. It is possible that such a question as this paper poses exists only in retrospect.

The Importers: Trefflich and Ash

Henry Trefflich was the colorful owner of Trefflich's Bird & Animal Company, Inc., Importers & Exporters of Mammals, Birds, & Reptiles. His main headquarters were on Fulton Street in New York City. His company imported all species of animals from Africa and India, and his letterhead declared his firm the "Monkey Headquarters of the United States."[87] His letterhead from 1940 is plain and straightforward; ten years later, the now-fancy lettering is covered with animals.[88] Part of his success in that period was due to his contract with the NFIP, through which Sabin became aware of his business. Sabin was not satisfied with Trefflich for long, however. By May 1954, their letters were riddled with accusations from

79 Oshinsky, 2005, 118.
80 Lab notebooks. Lab Notebooks Polio: Chimps, Box 51, 54, 58, 59. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.
81 Lab notebook, 17 May 1954. Lab Notebooks Polio: Chimps, Box 51. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.
82 New Oxford American Dictionary, "laminectomy," web. Lab notebook, 17 May 1954. Lab Notebooks Polio: Chimps, Box 51. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.
83 Lab notebook, 17 May 1954. Lab Notebooks Polio: Chimps, Box 51 AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.
84 Lab notebook, 17 May 1954. Lab Notebooks Polio: Chimps, Box 51. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.
85 Letter from Dr. Geoffrey Edsall at Walter Reed to Sabin, 1954. NFIP, Animals, Box 9, Folder 13, AS WCHHP, UC, Ohio.
86 Yerkes, 1943, 3, 278. See page 9.
87 Trefflich. Letters to Sabin. NFIP Animals, Box 9. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.
88 Trefflich. Letter to Sabin, May 23, 1940. NFIP Animals, Box 2, Folder 6. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

Sabin and defensive pandering from Trefflich.[89] No doubt, both men were in difficult, demanding positions. But by 1957, their relations were so bad that Phillip Carroll—Trefflich's representative in Africa—was soliciting Sabin directly.[90]

Sabin sought out John Ash after his troubles with Trefflich began.[91] Ash ran the Chimpanzee Farm in Dania, Florida. In addition to being a fresh alternative, he only charged $500 per chimp, just at the time in the mid-50s when Trefflich was raising his price to $600.[92] Both Trefflich and Ash dealt with legal difficulties in procuring the chimps, mostly in the form of rising fees and permits that constantly needed renewing. Ash received his share of letters from Sabin, complaining of unfit chimps and delayed orders. Procuring chimps was an arduous process for all involved. It is interesting to note that the firms named all the chimpanzees that they sent to Sabin, and sometimes even inquired after specific chimps. In their lab notebooks, Sabin and his assistants always referred to the chimpanzees by their lab numbers, with the exception of June and Agnes. But when Sabin had to write to Trefflich or Ash about certain chimpanzees, he used the names the firms' had given them so that they would know which ones he was talking about.[93]

Transnational Transportation

The chimpanzees had to be transported thousands of miles before they finally arrived in the polio labs. Even though the upmost care was taken to keep them healthy by shipping them with food and water, and sending instructions to regulate temperatures, many died en route.[94] Once they were caught in Africa, they were often shipped out in the same month after being held by the firms' African associates. They were placed on airlines such as Air France and Pan American with direct flights that would last twenty-four hours.[95] Sometimes, the flights had stopovers in Europe.[96] On one occasion, the weather in London became so cold that the chimpanzees froze to death.[97] Those who arrived safely in the U.S. were checked for health, weight, and polio antibodies again at the respective firms before being sent to the labs. Once they had been thoroughly examined and deemed fit, they were shipped by air, train, truck, and even station wagon.[98] One letter from Trefflich refers to a shipment of fourteen chimpanzees by "our Station Wagon (*sic*)," all the way from New York to Ohio.[99]

Complications arose right from the beginning of the process. By the time Sabin started ordering chimps, international cooperation had stalled as colonial powers began to guard their colonized regions' zoological resources. The firms that sold the lab animals to Sabin dealt with importers and representatives from all over the European, Asian, and African regions, and the powers in these regions began demanding permits and increasing their export taxes for captured chimpanzees. Phillip Carroll, Trefflich's representative in Africa, reported such demands from the British in Sierra Leone, the Spanish in Spanish Guinea, and the French and Belgians in Central Africa. The demand for the animals created an economic opportunity for these governments, but they claimed to have other reasons, as well. P. Bourgoin, the Inspector General of Hunting and the Protection of Fauna at the French Ministry, demanded a scientific permit for the firm, explaining,

> We are obliged, given the scarcity of the apes and the increasing demands, to ensure the proper exchange for all those used in scientific experiments. Current international regulations do not allow us to work with organizations that will use [the chimpanzees] commercially .[100]

These types of regulations and demands increased the cost of chimpanzees as well as the paperwork involved in procuring them. Now, the labs and the firms had to provide documentation attesting to the scientific nature of the research to representatives of European governments in Africa and in Europe, as well as to the U.S. government, whose primary concern was the role of imported animals as vectors of human

89 Letters between Trefflich and Sabin, May 1954. NFIP Animals, Box 9. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

90 Phillip Carroll. Letter to Sabin, Aug. 19, 1957. NFIP Animals, Box 9, Folder 13. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

91 Sabin. Letter to Ash, April 29, May 17 1954. NFIP Animals, Box 9, Folder 14. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

92 Ash, John. Bill to Sabin ,March 25, 1955; Trefflich, Henry. Invoice to Sabin, March 25, 1955; NFIP Animals, Box 9, Folder 13. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

93 Letters between Sabin and Trefflich; Letters between Sabin and Ash; Box 2, 9. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

94 Dascomb, Captain Harry at Walter Reed, June 22, 1952. NFIP Animals, Box 9, Folder 13. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

95 Franz, K. H. Letter to Dr. Henry Kumm at NFIP, Dec. 18, 1954. NFIP Animals, Box 9, Folder 13. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

96 Ibid.

97 Trefflich. Letter to Sabin, Feb. 11, 1954. NFIP Animals, Box 9, Folder 13. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

98 Trefflich to Sabin, Feb. 8, 1954; Trefflich to Sabin May 17, 1954; Trefflich, Invoice to Sabin, Oct. 4, 1954; Walter Reed Hospital to Sabin, Telegram June 24, 1954. NFIP Animals, Box 9, Folder 13, 15. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

99 Trefflich to Sabin, Feb. 8, 1954. SA, Acc. NFIP Animals, Box 9, Folder 15. WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

100 "Nous sommes obligés, étant donnée la rareté des anthropoïdes et l'augmentation constante des demandes, de contrôler la bonne livraison de tous ceux que nous cédons pour des éxperiences scientifiques. Les conventions internationales actuelles ne nous permettent pas d'en accorder à des organismes susceptible d'en faire un commerce." Bourgoin, P. of the French Ministry. Letter to Sabin, March 23 1955. NFIP Animals, Box 9, Folder 14. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

diseases, and which also collected an import tax.[101] Import and export permits were issued to a firm for a specific number of chimpanzees from a particular area.[102] Each new batch of chimpanzees required a new permit. These dealings mostly resulted in approved permits, although sometimes the firms' representatives were able to manipulate colonial tensions by landing exclusive contracts with fledgling governments such as Cameroon in the midst of its war for independence from France.[103] It seems that Sabin and the firms with whom he dealt carefully complied with these demands, sending letters confirming the chimps' scientific purposes along with annual request estimates. While this paper focuses on Sabin's lab, it is important to remember that the story of research chimps is international. Just as Yerkes was inspired by Köhler, a German scientist working in the Canary Islands, and corresponded with the French Pasteur Institute in French Guinea (now the "Guinea" on the east coast of Africa,) chimpanzee research for the polio vaccine involved not only the chimpanzees' native regions, but also the European powers that were still governing there in the 1950s.[104] Including the macaques from India, polio primates were a tricontinental phenomenon.

Chimpanzee shipment faced more difficulties than international relations. Letters between Sabin and Trefflich and Sabin and Ash are riddled with threats from Sabin's end and apologies from the firms' sides for the delivery of unhealthy or dead chimpanzees. Trefflich and Ash often cited transportation as the cause of the unfit chimpanzees; whether or not this was actually the case or whether the firms were trying to cover other mistakes, the results were the same for the chimpanzees: disease, injury, and death. After another unsatisfactory shipment, Sabin wrote, "The problem appears to be not one of death shortly after arrival but one of developing illness after they arrive by air which in time leads to their death. We have never had anything like it happen before."[105] He suggested that Ash's firm switch from Riddle Airlines, whose temperature regulation Ash accused of causing the illnesses, to Railway Express. Trefflich had a similar problem: "The chimps seem to be leaving in good condition but somehow during the air trip something happens."[106] There is no record of what may have caused these strange deaths.

Chimpanzees were part of a vast trade of exotic species for zoos, private collectors, and scientific research that had existed for decades. They were rare and sensitive animals who required expert handlers and specific environmental regulations in order to arrive safely in the laboratories that relied on them, but for every death in the lab, the firms' letters suggest that countless more chimpanzees died along the routes between Africa and the U.S. and between the U.S. firms and the labs.

Daily Life



Figure 1. Diagram of a wall of cages labeled with the chimps' lab numbers, including some from the Chimpanzee Farm ("Ash") and several cages of deceased chimps. Chimpanzees were kept in individual enclosures, often developing the chimpanzee's emotional and social reliance on his caretakers.

The lives of laboratory chimpanzees were marked by physical captivity, human contact, inoculation through food and injection, blood and stool samples, and disease. Each chimpanzee was housed in his own cage lining the walls of the room (*figure 1)*.[107] Sometimes, a chimpanzee outsmarted her captivity:

> Note: On the night of 2/26 to 2/27 chimp 7404 became a liberator. Although she herself cannot get out of her cage—she was able by banging herself around to move her cage around (it is on wheels) close enough to others to open the cage. On Sunday morning 2/27 chimp 7406 was found loose and on Monday morning chimp 7343 was loose. Measures were then taken to prevent a recurrence.[108]

On 7343's chart the next morning, someone noted: "out of his cage last night—wandered around room."[109]

Some information about the chimpanzees' daily life

101 Ash to Sabin, May 14, 1954; Ash to Sabin, Sept. 18, 1954; Trefflich to Sabin, June 11, 1953; Sabin to Trefflich, July 27, 1954; Trefflich to Sabin, Nov. 15, 1954. NFIP Animals, Box 9, Folder 13, 14, 15. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Public Health Service Washington 25, DC; Excerpt from Foreign Quarantine Regulations, PHS, 71.156 a and b. "Etiological agents and vectors"

102 Permit from P. Bourgoin to Sabin, 28 March 1955. NFIP Animals, Box 9. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

103 Carroll, Phillip. Letter to Sabin August 19, 1957. NFIP Animals, Box 9. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

104 NFIP, Animals, Box 9, Folder 14. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

105 Sabin. Letter to Ash, Oct. 23, 1956. NFIP, Animals, Box 9, Folder 14. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

106 Trefflich. Letter to Kumm. NFIP Animals, Box 9, Folder 15. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

107 Diagram. Box 51, Folder 4. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

108 Lab notebook. Box 51, Folder 5. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

109 Lab notebook. Box 51, Folder 5. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.



THAT'S KISKA all right, says Zip the Chimp, one of the stars of San Diego's world-famous Zoo, pointing at a picture of a bear colleague at the zoo. Zip is perusing the current Saturday Evening Post which contains an article telling how the zoo was built up by shrewd "horse-trading" of its officials.

Figure 2. Chimpanzees were traded between labs, zoos, and even private collections. "Zip the Chimp" first came to the States for Sabin's lab, later continuing his captivity at the San Diego Zoo.

can be gleaned from lab notebooks, but comprehensive records of care procedures and life statistics are hard to find. This area of inquiry is well supplemented by a newsletter sent out to the laboratories using chimpanzees in the early 1950s, by the Assistant Director of the Yerkes Laboratories of Primate Biology in Orange Park, Florida, Henry Nissen. The letter from April 1, 1952, presents a convenient inventory of all 138 chimpanzees possessed by the laboratory since June of 1930, which gives a comparative overview of different chimpanzee life stories:

> We may next ask what has happened to the animals:
> 58 of them are not at the [Yerkes] Orange Park Laboratories.
> 8 of them are on loan at several other laboratories and zoological parks.
> 21 have been transferred to other laboratories for experimental purposes. According to present information all but two of these are now dead, some having died of diseases and some having been sacrificed in connection with experimental procedures.
> 51 Animals have died at the [Yerkes] laboratories as the result of disease, accidents, and experimental work.[110]

This inventory reflects the intricate network of chimpanzee users in the United States, all of whom traded chimpanzees back and forth. A chimpanzee brought over from Africa who first came to a zoo could easily be sent to Sabin's lab if the owner wanted to contribute to the fight against polio or to make a bit of money, just as a chimpanzee brought over for lab work could eventually 'retire' to a life at a zoo.

One such transfer occurred in 1955 between Sabin and the San Diego Zoological Gardens. C.R. Schroeder of San Diego sent a request for any male chimpanzees Sabin might be willing to part with, writing, "We have no objection whatsoever to securing chimpanzees which have been used in medical research, polio or otherwise…in fact, we make a point of telling the public that these animals have already contributed their services to medical research and are now entertaining our children."[111] For $600, Sabin shipped two males by Railway Express:

> Chimpanzee No. 7829 is particularly affectionate. He is very expert in drinking his milk and other beverages from a pop bottle and, as a matter of fact, delights in doing so. Chimpanzee No. 7405 is very playful but has not been pampered by attention during his stay in this institution.[112]

The next year, Schroeder sent a note to Sabin, along with a newspaper clipping: "One of your former charges, and coming along in good style, and as you will note, quite contented."[113] The newspaper clipping (*figure 2)* shows Number 7829, now called Zip the Chimp, sitting on an upholstered chair and reading a newspaper. The caption reads, "That's Kiska all right, says Zip the Chimp, one of the stars of San Diego's world-famous Zoo, pointing at a picture of a bear colleague at the Zoo."[114] From Africa, to New York, to Cincinnati, and finally to San Diego, Zip had traveled the world and lived as a test subject and an entertainer.

Disease

Of the seventy total deaths from the original group

110 Nissen, Henry. Carworth Farms Quarterly Newsletter, April 1, 1962. Box 3, Folder 21. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.
111 Schroeder, C.R. Letter to Sabin, August 22, 1955. NFIP Animals, Box 9. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.
112 Sabin. Letter to George Pournelle at the San Diego Zoological Gardens, October 28, 1955. NFIP Animals, Box 9. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.
113 Schroeder. Letter to Sabin, February 11 1956. NFIP Animals, Box 9. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.
114 See *figure 2* at end. Schroeder. Letter to Sabin, February 11, 1956 with newspaper clipping. NFIP Animals, Box 9. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

of 138 at Yerkes Laboratory, Nissen attributed sixteen to experimental procedures, six to accidents, and forty-eight to disease. Two of the accidental deaths were infants killed by first-time mothers, but Nissen does not make clear who or what perpetrated the other four accidents.

The number of chimpanzees who succumbed to disease is striking, especially considering that death by experimentation is a significantly smaller proportion: of the original 138, 50% had died by 1952, 69% from disease, but only 23% from "sacrifice."[115] Laboratory diseases included colds, lobar pneumonia, dysentery, tuberculosis, parasitism, vitamin deficiencies, and meningitis (*figure 3*).[116] As previously discussed, the most useful chimpanzees were small ones without polio antibodies. This meant that the lab chimps were mostly infants and early adolescents, making them particularly susceptible to catching diseases from their human handlers.[117] Most of Sabin's diseases were respiratory, which his lab treated with penicillin.[118] Routine for dead chimpanzees usually included an autopsy even if the chimpanzee died independent of experimental tests. Chimpanzee number 7338 was intramuscularly injected with the Leon strain and was found dead on October 25, 1954. The chimpanzee was put into a refrigerator until an autopsy could be performed, where the scientists found nothing in particular in the region of inoculation, but preserved two pieces of the muscle for histology. Over the course of the experiment, number 7338 had suffered and been treated for severe diarrhea, difficulty breathing, and a runny nose.[119] This story is emblematic of the chimpanzees who died in the lab, many of them experiencing combined symptoms from the experiments and communicable diseases.

Experimentation

The experience and process of experimentation is inseparable from disease and death, but many chimps repeatedly fulfilled their purpose as experimental tools while they were alive. Sabin used the chimpanzees and other lab animals to study how they reacted to the three different strains of poliovirus and how the strains traveled through their bodies after being injected or ingested. As was the case with June and Agnes, the two chimpanzees from Walter Reed who underwent intra-spinal inoculation and laminectomies, chimpanzees were also used in surgical experimentation, usually for higher inoculation precision but sometimes to assess internal symptoms of inoculation (vivisection). Other ways of assessing post-inoculation symptoms were blood and stool samples, and pharynx, cheek, and tongue swabbing.[120] The scientists used several methods to inoculate the chimps: intra-spinal, intra-cerebral, and intramuscular injection; and ingestion, or feeding the chimpanzees food such as bananas or milk with the virus in it.[121] While these treats were probably not daily staples, these notes of lab technicians inoculating the chimpanzees through bananas and milk are the only specific references to the chimpanzees' diet. After blood and stool sampling, this was the most common experimental event in the chimps' lives. Notes for an experiment using the Mahoney strain describe an intra-spinal injection:

> The muscles on the chimpanzees (*sic*) back are big and powerful and it is difficult to palpate the spinous processes. A point was taken roughly at the lower edge of the ribs—an 18 gauge 1.5" needle was pushed through until a little spinal fluid was seen—and then the syringe was attached and 0.2 mil [of the strain] was inoculated…No traumatic paralysis immediately after inoculation.[122]

This excerpt highlights one of the main challenges scientists faced when using chimpanzees. Their size and muscle mass made them difficult to maneuver, even when anesthetized. Sabin made sure that he obtained chimps under twenty pounds, but they grew and became stronger while they were in captivity, and even a small animal can be difficult to manage when the mood sets in.

This is not to say that every chimpanzee encounter was fraught with physical stress and danger, although of course the possibility of catastrophe for both the humans and the chimpanzee was always present. The scientists, veterinarians, and animal husbandry staff were all highly trained, and the chimpanzees were mostly small and amenable to human contact. For routine processes such as blood sampling, most chimpanzees were trained to sit still while their blood was drawn. Henry Nissen even attested to the phenomenon of chimpanzees who were isolated in their cages growing attached to their only other animal contact: the humans in the lab. He observed: "The animal caged by himself becomes much more dependent on the caretaker; the caretaker becomes not only the source of food and such necessities, but also the chief source

115 Nissen, Henry. Carworth Farms Quarterly Newsletter, October, Box 9; Lab notebook April 20, 1955, Lab Notebooks 1954, Box 51, Folder 5; AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

116 See *figure 3* at the end. Picture of rhinitis chimp. Seminannual Report 1955, Box 9, Folder 17; Nissen, Henry. Carworth Farms Quarterly Newsletter, October, Box 9; Lab notebook April 20, 1955, Lab Notebooks 1954, Box 51, Folder 5; AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

117 Nissen, Henry. Carworth Farms Quarterly Newsletter, July 1 1952. Box 3, Folder 21. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

118 Lab notebook, April 20, 1955. Lab Notebooks 1954-55, Box 57, Folder 4. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

119 Lab notebooks, October 25, 1954. Lab notebooks, Box 51, Folder 4. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

120 Lab notebook. Lab notebooks, current chimpanzees 1956, Box 59, Folder 1. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

121 Lab notebook. Lab notebooks, 1954, Box 51, Folder 5. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

122 Lab notebook. Lab notebooks, 1954-55, Box 54, Folder 1. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

of the social stimulation or companionship which the young chimpanzee needs."[123]

When he received a shipment of chimpanzees from Walter Reed Medical Hospital, Sabin replied, "They are much larger than chimpanzees we have handled before and thus far have the upper hand over their caretakers, but I hope that in due time a *modus vendi* will be worked out."[124] There is no record of what Sabin's *modus vendi* may have looked like, but there is also no evidence in Sabin's notes or in any of the instructive literature he received that suggests fear tactics or physical violence were used to control the chimpanzees. In fact, this one sentence is the only suggestion in Sabin's chimpanzee records that even hints at any issues of control or handling.

In his Quarterly Newsletter, Henry Nissen attributed sixteen out of fifty-one deaths to "experimental work."[125] Such chimpanzees would have been killed in order to perform autopsies. In Sabin's lab, autopsies were carefully recorded and followed strict procedure. The scientists collected blood samples by puncturing cardiac vessels, and tissue samples. They also collected entire organs, including lymph nodes, livers, spleens, kidneys, hearts, lungs, and pieces of the brains.[126] By the end of chimpanzee 7827's autopsy, the scientists had collected his entire lymphatic system and ten separate organs, in addition to assorted "ganglia," and blood, tissue, and "brown fat" samples.[127] The body parts and samples obtained from these procedures were used to assess effects of inoculation as well as provide new information for comparative anatomical studies.

While investigating the details of these experiments, it is important to recognize the complexity of comparative anatomical studies in this period. The brief summary of primate experimentation laid out at the beginning of this paper described the assumption of early anatomists that animal and human structures were essentially alike and thus would respond to inflictions in the same way. Through a long history of anatomical discoveries and debates, by Sabin's time, this had been disproven. But the theory of evolution and its myriad implications held a special place in this narrative for primates, whose anatomical, chemical, and biological similarities to humans allowed them to be one of the most valuable experimental tools. This broad-stroke narrative plays out in the microcosmic example of Sabin's lab, as the hierarchy of his lab animals depended upon their biological relation to each other, and the chimpanzees' ultimate relation to humans. Before reaching this point, strains were tested on lab mice, rabbits, etc.; then monkeys, and finally chimpanzees. Along each step, there were simultaneous experiments and observations to determine the reactions of each species to the one previous. This process continued right through chimpanzees to humans.



Figure 3. Chimpanzee with symptoms of a cold.

Yet science is never a complete story, and Sabin's lab is no exception. The chimpanzees were essential as a substitute for human testing, as humans were used only after thorough experimentation in the lab. Even as he relied on scientific knowledge of comparative anatomy among the lab animals and between chimpanzees and humans, his and other polio labs were also working in uncharted territory, relying on their own experiments, observations, and samples to develop a vaccine and learn more about chimpanzees relative to humans.

Following inoculation, each experiment included an observation period. This period usually lasted 20-30 days. Each day, a technician would take blood and stool samples and note the chimp's condition. Most of these notes address minor cold symptoms and some note more serious symptoms, but most of the days pass acknowledged only by a "check mark."

Lee, number 7970, arrived from Ash's Chimpanzee Farm in Florida on April 13, 1955. He arrived in a shipment of chimps that were "in very poor shape and had undergone no previous handling," but Lee was "good" in comparison to the

123 Nissen, Henry. Carworth Farms Quarterly Newsletter, July 1, 1952. Box 3, Folder 21. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.
124 Sabin. Letter to Captain Harry Dascomb at Walter Reed. NFIP Animals, Box 9, Folder 13. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.
125 Nissen, Henry. Carworth Farms Quarterly Newsletter, April 1, 1952. Box 3, Folder 21. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.
126 Lab notebook. Box 51, Folder 4. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.
127 Lab notebook. Box 51, Folder 4. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

others, such as Spook, who was "very nervous" and "afraid."[128] 7970—referred to exclusively by his lab number outside of Sabin's correspondence with Ash—made it through his first experiment with no notable symptoms of disease or other affliction aside from than a cough on the twenty-second day of observation.[129]

A shipment from Trefflich arrived in Cincinnati that same spring with two chimpanzees from another lab. These two, 7827 and 7832, were used in an experiment in which they were inoculated by mouth with a virus obtained from a child in New Orleans. 7827 weighed just 10 pounds, and was a "scrawny chimp" that "lies curled up in box." On day 16 of observation, 7827 was eating only orange slices. Two days later, s/he was dead of "extensive pneumonia." This small chimpanzee was the same 7827 from the autopsy report.[130] 7832 came into Sabin's lab with a runny nose and was treated with penicillin,[131] but came through the New Orleans experiment with nothing but checks.[132]

In the same spring shipment were three chimpanzees from British West Africa: 7827, 7828, and 7830. Shortly after arrival, 7830 was found dead. Cause of death was not listed on the log, but it was most likely due to disease or stress from shipment. 7828 and 7829 survived to be used in an experiment for which they were inoculated by mouth with a virus obtained from a child in Cincinnati. Sabin wanted to assess "comparative behavior" of the virus. 7828 passed the observation log without any notable symptoms or behavior, but not 7829. 7829 was "almost moribund upon arrival. After treatment with penicillin improved. Then relapsed—treated again…Marked improvement except for ulcerating lesion around left ear." 7829 also had severe diarrhea, and this up-and-down pattern of health continued throughout the log. In the margins of 7829's log, an observer wrote, "Craves affection."[133]

Doctors for Dogs: The Expropriation of the Polio Animal Story

In the early 1990s, animal rights activists began hijacking quotes from iconic scientists to bolster their cause against animal experimentation. Albert Sabin and his polio research was a focal point. He had been a respected member of the medical community before the polio crusade, but his development of the oral polio vaccine made him a hero, and also a target. The activists' main argument was that chimpanzees were not necessary to the development of a polio vaccine, and thus the experiments caused needless suffering.[134] An article in the *Winston-Salem Journal* from 1992 is typical of the tactic. Dr. Steph R. Kaufman quoted Sabin's Congressional testimony by citing, "the polio vaccine was based on a tissue culture preparation…not animal experimentation."[135] In a letter to the editor, Sabin responded, "Dr. Kaufman correctly quoted my 1984 testimony… but drew wrong conclusions from it. On the contrary, my own experience in more than 60 years in biomedical research amply demonstrated that without the use of animals and of human beings, it would have been impossible to acquire the important knowledge needed to prevent much suffering and premature death not only among humans but also among animals."[136] The logic behind Sabin's assertion that animals were helped by his biomedical research is unclear; certainly, it is even absurd in the case of his polio work, since no non-human animal can naturally contract the disease. However, there is no doubt that animal experimentation effectively served humans in that case. In the span of two years, Sabin received at least four separate requests for counterstatements to misquotations such as these, from institutions such as Yale and UC-Berkeley. Sabin responded to each supportively, and sent statements and even entire letters to the various newspapers. By Sabin's own words, it is impossible to misconstrue his belief in animal experimentation.

Some detractors went even further, claiming that animal experimentation harmed the scientific process. Dr. Richard Simmons at the University of Nevada wrote to Sabin in such a situation, calling on him to rebut "the irrational accusations of the animal rights cultists."[137] He was complaining

128 Their sera samples, which had arrived six days earlier, were accompanied by samples from Chillicothe, where Sabin was testing on human prisoners. Their shared shipment serves as a reminder of the scope of the polio crusade and the many animal and human lives that were affected by the disease and the search for a defense. Shipment note, 14 April 1955. Research Note & Materials 1955-56 Tests on Trefflich and Florida Chimps, Box 24, Folder 3. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

129 Lab notebook 20 April 1955. Lab Notebooks 1954-55, Box 51, Folder 4; Sera Notes March 1955, Shipment note, 14 April 1955. Research Note & Materials 1955-56 Tests on Trefflich and Florida Chimps, Box 24, Folder 3. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

130 First cited on page 31. Lab notebook. Lab notebook chimps 1954-55, Box 51, Folder 4. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

131 Sera notes. Research Notes and Materials 1955-56 Tests on Trefflich and Florida Chimps, Box 24, Folder 3. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

132 Lab notebook. Lab notebook chimps 1954-55, Box 51, Folder 4. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

133 Lab notebook. Lab notebook chimps 1954-55, Box 51, Folder 4. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

134 Oshinsky, 2005, 17-18. Advertisement. *Los Angeles Times*. Box 1, Folder 8. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

135 Quoted in Sabin's letter to the editor, from "Misrepresenting Research," *Winston-Salem Journal*, Feb. 20, 1992. Use of Animals in Research, Box 1, Folder 8. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

136 Sabin. Letter to the editor, "The Correct Conclusion," *Winston-Salem Journal*, March 20, 1992. Use of Animals in Research, Box 1, Folder 8. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.

137 Richard Simmons. Letter to Sabin. Use of Animals in Research, Box 1, Folder 8. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.



PHYSICIANS, SCIENTISTS, AND OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS REJECT

ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION

An Open Letter to the American People

We represent thousands of concerned health professionals who oppose animal experimentation (vivisection). We'd like you to know why.

False Promises, False Claims

The biomedical research industry's claim that our health and survival depend on vivisection is patently false. Animal experiments fail to address the true causes of human disease. Our illnesses are a result of numerous factors - lifestyle, environmental toxins, genetics, poverty, etc. - which cannot be recreated in animals. In fact, information derived from animals is misleading and often dangerous when applied to humans.

Historically, clinical practice with astute deductive reasoning has resulted in the major health improvements. The discovery of penicillin and digitalis, the development of x-rays, the microscope, and hygienic principles for infection control, are just a few of the examples that owe nothing to animal experimentation. To justify its consumption of public health resources, the vivisection industry credits itself with important developments, but in reality:

- ❑ The practice of open heart surgery was delayed by at least ten years by misleading dog experiments.
- ❑ "Work on (polio) prevention was delayed by an erroneous conception of the nature of the human disease based on misleading experimental models of the disease in monkeys." —Dr. Albert Sabin.
- ❑ Scientific studies have shown that modern improvements in longevity are due not to animal-tested medicines, but to better sanitation, nutrition, and other living conditions.

No Miracle Cures

People and animals alike suffer from the futility of vivisection:

- ❑ Heart disease is still the number one cause of death. Yet *recent human patient studies* prove that it is preventable and reversible through lifestyle changes, including diet.
- ❑ Animal research has failed to stem a four-fold increase in birth defects over the last forty years. Easter Seals now funds only non-animal studies.
- ❑ While three animals die every second in U.S. laboratories, one in three Americans can expect to contract cancer in their lifetimes.

"It is impossible to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion in regard to cancer in man by experimenting on animals." - Robert Bell, M.D., Vice President, International Cancer Research Society

Vivisection Squanders Scarce Health Care Dollars

The U.S. spends $600 billion per year (12% of our GNP) on illness treatment - more than any other country in the world. Yet our health care system is in shambles.

The U.S. has a higher infant mortality rate than 22 other developed nations. Tens of millions of Americans have no access to health care. Trauma, mental health and drug rehab centers are closing for lack of funds. Efforts to rid the environment of disease-causing toxins are severely underfunded.

Vivisection is Unspeakably Cruel

Behind the locked doors of thousands of institutions, atrocities are inflicted on frightened animal subjects. They have no rights, no voice or representation, and no way of escape. Breeding farms, public pounds, and stolen pet dealers provide an endless supply of innocent victims. For example, millions of animals a year die painfully for useless product testing just to provide liability protection for manufacturers.

- ❑ "I can find no evidence that the Draize Test, LD-50 test, or any other tests using animals to support the 'safety' of chemicals and cosmetics, have any relevance to the human species..." —Donald C. Doll, M.D., Columbia, MO

Vivisection is Big Business

Biomedical "research" is a vast, lucrative industry, supported each year by $15 billion in taxes and charity...while killing 65 to 100 million animals. Animal experimenters guard a privileged status with an enormous financial network of charities, and control the Federal agencies for health science funding. This multi-billion dollar industry is self-perpetuating, self-monitoring and self-congratulating. Meanwhile our health care system is self-destructing.

"I abhor vivisection. It should at least be curbed. Better, it should be abolished. I know of no achievement through vivisection, no scientific discovery, that could not have been obtained without such barbarism and cruelty. The whole thing is evil."

Dr. Charles Mayo, Founder, Mayo Clinic
New York Daily News, March 13, 1961

Kenneth P. Stoller, M.D., Pediatrics, with Madeline Hassin and companion, Shep. Photo: Robert Fiermonte

"The real choice is not between dogs and children, it is between good science and bad science; between methods that directly relate to humans and those that do not." — Robert Sharpe, Ph.D., The Cruel Deception, 1988.

❑ All our energies and resources must be committed to productive endeavors such as preventive medicine and research methodologies which relate directly to human beings including ethical human-based research, human tissue testing, and population studies (epidemiology). It is time to embrace ways of living and learning that are self-sustaining, non-polluting, and respectful of all life. Only then will our health-care goals be realized.

Signed:

Kenneth P. Stoller, M.D., Pediatrics • J. Leichtberg, M.D. • Kathleen Waddell, Ph.D., Clinical Psychologist • Paula Klubak, D.V.M. • Sam Snyder, Ph.D. M.P.H. • Jonathan Lomler, D.C. • Kathy MacLeay, Ph.D. • Lorin Lindner, Ph.D., M.P.H. • L.J. Marx, M.D., Psychiatry • Susan Stewart, R.N. • Elliot Katz, D.V.M. • Richard S. Benedon, M.D., F.A.C.E.P., Emergency Medicine • Julie Fernes, R.N. • Donald E. Doyle, M.D., F.A.C.S., Otolaryngology & Facial Plastic Surgery • Joan Priestley, M.D., General Medicine • Cheryl Anne Reller, R.N. • A. Yvonne Miles, M.S.N., C.C.R.N. • Joseph Nichanda, Ph.D, Biochemistry • Harry J. Silver, M.D. • Les Stewart, D.D.S. • Charles Kuell, Ph. D., Family Counseling • Richard S. Blinstrub, M.D., Dermatology • Nedim C. Buyukmihci, V.M.D. • Michael Klaper, M.D., General Medicine

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IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS • LAST CHANCE FOR ANIMALS

❑ I agree! Vivisection is an appalling waste of our medical resources. Thank you for publishing this important information. Enclosed please find my tax-deductible donation to help defray costs and expand your educational efforts.

❑ Please send me additional information.

❑ Please send "The Truth About Vivisection" flyers for me to distribute.

Please make checks payable to: IDA / LCA
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Figure 4. An advertisement in the LA Times: "Physicians, Scientists, and Other Health Professionals Reject Animal Experimentation: An Open Letter to the American People. We represent thousands of concerned health professionals who oppose animal experimentation (vivisection). We'd like you to know why." To the right is Dr. Stoller, and the highlighted section is a quote from Dr. Sabin.

Dr. Sharpe's words highlight the dilemma in using the polio labs as evidence against the usefulness of animal research. As this paper has shown, the labs used the chimpanzees methodically and purposefully, and experiments exploiting their similar biology helped produce a vaccine. Their usage was not "bad science" in the least. Children today who grow up free from the fear of paralysis and death at the swimming pool owe that freedom to the polio scientists, and to the chimpanzees and other lab animals they sacrificed.

Recognizing the importance of chimpanzees and telling their individual stories encourages a new approach to the ethical debate. When history is used not as a weapon but as an illuminator, it becomes clear that focused animal research has saved countless human lives, a fact that merits no judgment value. The scientific possibilities do not have to end there, though; biomedical science can continue to progress, while considering animal welfare of equal importance. Instead of trying to disprove the accuracy of previous trials, doctors and scientists such as Dr. Sharpe can focus on new ways to conduct research.[142] Acknowledging the important role of chimpanzees in the polio lab and investigating their lives encourages new dialogue about the relationship between past and future animal experimentation.

Conclusion

Dr. Albert Sabin insisted on the importance of chimpanzees during his polio career and for decades afterwards. He developed the oral polio vaccine using chimpanzees; he would know. His lab notebooks are precise, detached, and methodical, suggesting that each and every undertaking had an explicit purpose toward the creation of a polio vaccine. There is no evidence of abuse in his lab beyond the inherent terrors of being a lab animal. And why would he waste his chimps, or neglect them? They cost the NFIP thousands of dollars to provide, and Sabin himself must have spent countless hours dictating letters back and forth about the chimps. With so much time, effort, and money, it is inconceivable that he would do anything but use the chimps for carefully constructed experiments and make sure they maintained their daily health. Perhaps in order to maintain the professionalism of his lab, Sabin was also very careful about how he referred to his chimpanzees. In his lab, they were always referred to by numbers. He used names only when corresponding with his providers. There are two exceptions: June and Agnes. In the lab notebooks that documented their final days, June and Agnes are referred to by their lab numbers and their names. Perhaps there was something particularly special about their personalities; certainly, the scientists at Walter Reed provided detailed analyses of them. More likely, based on the referent trends in all his other notebooks and correspondences, Sabin wanted to make sure he kept track of which chimpanzees came from Walter Reed, so he could report on their service to his colleagues there.

The chimpanzees in Sabin's lab—one aspect of the larger chimp-polio story—illuminate several important themes for the lab animal debate. First, these scientists relied on a fluid understanding of the natural order at a time when the double helix was still being puzzled out and the evolutionary divergence between chimpanzee and human was three times

138 Advertisement. *Los Angeles Times*. Box 1, Folder 8. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.
139 Oshinsky, 2005, 17-18.
140 Oshinsky, 2005, 17-18.
141 See *figure 4* at end. Advertisement. *Los Angeles Times*. Box 1, Folder 8. AS, WCHHP, UC, Ohio.
142 Jane Goodall Institute. http://www.janegoodall.org/chimps-GAPA-fact-sheet.

farther back than it is currently placed. This is not to say that Yerkes, Sabin, and the rest had no concept of genetics; when Yerkes wrote that humans resemble other animals genetically, he was working with an understanding of inheritable traits as detailed as the knowledge that chromosomes carried those traits from parent to child.[143] But physical evidence for genetics and even evolution was still developing behind the theories, and public opinion was—and still is—even slower to catch up. In effect, the most concrete measurement of similarity between chimpanzees and humans was appearance and, to a lesser extent, mannerism. Based on these characteristics and the contemporary understandings of evolution and genetics, scientists selected chimpanzees as the final step before human testing. It was these same mannerisms that allowed a scientist to record that a small chimpanzee "craves affection" or that June had a blooming wallflower personality. It was also this same appearance that convinced these scientists that chimpanzees were necessary to develop a polio vaccine, and they were right. Now, instead of positing science and animal rights as having separate interests, perhaps science can turn its attention towards the implication of such similarities in its analysis of aspects of animal life such as pain.

Efforts such as those discussed in the previous section to dismantle the history of the polio vaccine serve no one. Instead, the exercise of tracing the life histories of the animals, of asking what happened to the chimpanzees, engages them as part of the polio story along with their "higher" primate brethren. In this way, their stories can become not something to exploit, but rather a way to acknowledge their importance and their service—unwitting and unwilling though it may have been—and treat them as creatures with histories who deserve the attention and protection of modern scientific efforts not in spite of their history as lab animals, but because of it.

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"Undesirable Elements": New York City's Gay Press Before Stonewall, 1960-1969

By Ben Miller, New York University

In July 1969, readers of the *New York Mattachine Newsletter* (put out by New York Mattachine, the city's largest and oldest formal gay group) found five mimeographed sheets inserted into their copies of the magazine. Titled, "The Hairpin Drop Heard Around The World," the article summarized the events of the Stonewall riots: the 1am bar bust, the accumulating crowd, and the decision to fight back, concluding with the following declaration:

> Homosexuals are tired of waiting. After all, we can't be put off with the old line that things will improve in the next generation and our children will lead better, happier lives. Most of us aren't going to have children, and we have to struggle to make our own lives better. If the traditional means of winning reform cannot work in this age…then possibly the only place for those of us who care about reform is in the streets.[1]

How did the gay movement arrive at this point, and how did periodicals like the *New York Mattachine Newsletter* aid in the construction of physical communities and constitute communities in themselves? I attempt to answer those questions by examining periodicals aimed at gay men in New York City during the 1960s. This period is a useful one to examine as it contained social movements that shifted social norms and opened up space for increased communication between LGBT people.

1 Addendum to The New York Mattachine Newsletter, July 1969. Box 142. The LGBT Periodicals Collection. Manuscripts and Archives Division, The New York Public Library. Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundations. (Henceforth "The LGBT Periodicals Collection").

Notably, the 1969 Stonewall riots kickstarted the mature phase of the LGBT rights movement in which the movement made its major legal and social/cultural advances to historical date. Thus, the period leading up to Stonewall is of particular historical interest. The paper focuses on male periodicals simply because there were more of them: the broader breadth of material provides a fuller basis for analysis.

Increased sexual openness during the 1960s created media space where gay periodicals could thrive. Pornographic magazines dropped their pretenses and became explicit locations for celebrating gay sexuality, while non-pornographic publications spread information and communication and aided in the establishment of physical communities. Both types of periodicals created communities of print, proving to their readers by their very existence that there were other men who shared their sexual and romantic interests. The explosive post-Stonewall expansion of the gay press was only possible because of, and largely arose from, the pre-Stonewall magazines.

The primary source archive examined here is the LGBT periodical collection at the New York Public Library. The International Gay and Lesbian Information Center collected these domestic and international LGBT periodicals from the 1950s through the 1990s from individual donations. Thus, the collections are often partial and fragmented. A reduction of the source material to gay periodicals produced in and around New York during the 1960s provided 19 pornographic magazines and 12 non-pornographic magazines, with runs ranging from complete 1960-1969 sets (*The New York Mattachine Newsletter*, for example) to only a single edition. The breadth of the collection is enough to counter any selection bias that could be present given the collection's random sampling of source materials.

Literature on pre-Stonewall gay periodicals is extensive in scope but lacks detailed analysis of this specific period and location. *Unspeakable: The Rise of the Gay and Lesbian Press in America* by media historian Rodger Streitmatter proved useful for framing periodicals from this area and time; it provided significant, necessary prehistory and some cogent analysis, but left out many of the key details about New York City's gay periodicals. Martin Meeker's book *Contacts Desired* provided a useful theory of mass media interaction as introduction to queer media that this paper explores, deepens, and corroborates with additional evidence from New York**.** David K. Johnson's *Journal of Social History* article "Physique Pioneers: The Politics of 1960s Gay Consumer Culture" provided much needed information and analysis about the development of the legal and social environment surrounding 1960s gay periodicals, although I propose to expand Johnson's thinking about the scope of the 1960s gay physique community, greatly extending his concept of what "community" means in this context.

I begin my analysis of 1960s New York gay periodicals by discussing the major trends and shifts in pornographic magazines during this time. Given the social and legal environment of the 1960s, for the purposes of my analysis I define these as magazines primarily consisting of sexualized images or drawings of nude or near-nude men, whether or not the magazine labeled itself as pornography. This allows for an examination of physique magazines whose pretenses to non-pornographic status are among their most interesting characteristics.

It is overly simplistic to state that magazines became more explicit during this time, although that statement is largely true. Rather, it is more useful to examine changing trends and the impact these magazines had on the construction of community across three major parameters: whether or not they pretended to be anything other than pornographic and what forms that pretense took, what parts of the male figure were shown in images and whether photographs or drawings were used to show explicit material, and the ways in which magazines served as consumer hubs through which individuals could become integrated into a gay consumer community.

Before the mid-1960s, even obviously pornographic magazines fronted a fig leaf of respectability, often maintaining the pretense that they were artistic studies or informational magazines for serious bodybuilders. Even in many near-explicitly pornographic magazines, homoerotic and homosexual imagery was accompanied by heteronormative language and a pretense to non-pornographic status. While earlier in the decade these pretenses were often elaborate (and potentially effective), by the second half of the decade these magazines began to mock their own pretensions. A sheltered heterosexual bodybuilding enthusiast or art student might purchase an early-60s physique periodical out of genuine misunderstanding; it is almost impossible to imagine such a mistake being made with the periodicals produced in the second half of the decade.

1959's *American Apollo* exemplifies both bodybuilding and artistic pretense in the early years of the decade. In its first issue, a man poses with arms akimbo holding a sword suggestively. Superimposed over him is a quote from John Ruskin about education. This photographic spread is accompanied by many similar ones, and articles about good health, sunshine tips, sit-ups, pimple remover, protein tablets, and "gems of existentialist literature."[2] *Physique Illustrated* described its models as "displaying the care they take with their bodies,"[3] and *Beach Adonis* informed readers that they had purchased "artistry and physique exercises."[4] Interestingly, these magazines tended to be small, quarter-page size affairs – cheaper to print given their small circulations, and easy to hide or ship in nondescript brown paper envelopes.

Central to the bodybuilding and artistic pretensions these magazines fronted were the specific types of male bodies displayed. Late-50s and early-60s magazines almost exclusively show muscle-bound and hairless male forms, often compared either implicitly or explicitly to Greco-Roman statuary and/or Renaissance painting. The debut issue of *Go Guys*, published

2 American Apollo, 1959. Box 3. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

3 Physique Illustrated, Summer 1965. Box 90. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

4 Beach Adonis, 1964. Box 8. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

in Spring 1963, featured articles about San Francisco outdoor sculpture, Greek sculpture, Botticelli, and Velasquez in addition to soft-core pornographic locker-room images.[5]

The use of Greco-Roman statuary was particularly inspired, placing the male nude or near-nude form into a respectable pseudo-historical context.

The same edition also features a remarkable – and to the contemporary eye, rather hilarious – example of the pre-

STATUES OF SAN FRANCISCO

San Francisco has a wealth of beautiful sights to see such as Victorian homes, modern skyscrapers, huge bridges and a multitude of museums containing some of the finest works of art in the world. We would like to introduce our readers to a small portion of the City one rarely hears about -- the statues of San Francisco.

At the Palace of the Legion of Honor, located atop a hill in Lincoln Park, you can see works by Rodin, the best known of his works, "The Thinker", sits in the Grand Courtyard and is impressive, even if you prefer classical style of sculpture.

In the gardens of the De Young Museum in Golden Gate Park you will find copies of ancient Greek masterpieces such as "The Winged Mercury," (The Messenger of the Olym-

tensions to heterosexuality that these magazines pursued. A remarkable photo essay features two young, tanned, muscular blond men (nude but for jockstraps) cavorting on a beach during their spring break. The essay is accompanied by short paragraphs of description with thinly coded gay subtext. In the last of these paragraphs, however, we are informed that this beach vacation ended up with both of them happily marrying women[6]. Additional photo essays featuring men nude from the rear were described as demonstrations of "artificial respiration techniques" and "wrestling."[7] Even as late as 1967, some publications maintained these thin veils of heteronormativity. *Summer Boys* featured an article about bodybuilding informing its readers that "wholesome women are interested in wholesome men. They look for a mate who has character and ideals…who [gives of himself] to family, town, country, and to God." This text was laid out next to a picture of a seated man wearing a jockstrap, beneath which his genitals are clearly visible[8]:

As the decade progressed, however, these pretensions became coyer and toyed more obviously with the reader. *Thor* features writing that calls out obviously to the pornographic status of the images which it accompanies, even as it still grasps at the idea that the photographs are intended for non-prurient



TUCK POWELL, a young Marine believes fully in the value of constant training. He recommends a good workout with the dumbbells every day as a tune-up. (Champion)

WHY BODY-BUILDING IS GOOD FOR YOU

YOUR BODY is the "house" in which you live while here on earth. Your common sense will tell you that it must be kept in good condition. After you have done that, you will be prepared for a future life that will bring rewards of constant good health with plenty of pep and energy. You will also be ready to go ahead to further triumphs in your career, whatever it may be. It is a verified truth that a man who is in good physical condition has a much better chance of getting a good job. Whether is is manual labor, a construction engineer in Argentina, or just an office job in your home town, an applicant for a position or job who shows and radiates good health will always get the preference. Of course, how you think and your formal education are also important. But if you are not physically fit, you will not be able to utilize your educational knowledge as well. If your employer sees that you are healthy, he will feel that you will be more dependable and have to miss less time for possible sickness. Then, of course, it is always a fact that a man in good health will always look better no matter what his stature or physiognomy may seem.

Your physical fitness is also important in social relationships. The man who is healthily exhuberant spreads good fellowship.While he has developed his body, he has also developed his mind. He has the wisdom to know that they work together in making the title total of the man he is. In his relations with the opposite sex he has an advantage, too. Wholesome women are interested in wholesome men.They look for a mate who has character and ideals. His personality attracts them. They are also basically concerned with a man who is, intellectually and physically, competent to become the father of their children. A mother will naturally love her children, whether they be weak or strong. If they begin life in the best of health, she will have much to be thankful for.

If you are physically fit, you have a larger appreciation of life. You are more sensitive to its needs and desires. Your imagination readily responds to its many fascinations and possibilities. You appraise the man you see and then judge him for what he is. Even though he may have an infirmity, you can credit him with the care he has taken of the body he possesses. With a good program of physical training you can become strong because you have willed it so. That same power within you makes you a better man in every other aspect of life. You find added strength also in the infinite world of the spirit. You give of yourself to your family, your town, your country, and to God. All this you can do and is possible because, when you were young you took good care of your body with systematic training. Now you are ready for the rewards that come from a healthy, happy life on earth.

purposes: "ONE Picture is worth 10,000 words, so here are two pictures of Ronnie and Julio. Unusually powerful muscular development to be viewed by the naked eye. Two pictures of two men. At least 10,000 words a piece should be good for at least 40,000 words. Just sit back and think about them."[9]

By 1965, startup magazines felt free to begin to distance themselves from the bodybuilding excuse. *Young Champ* declared proudly in its first issue that it was "not a formal bodybuilding magazine. It rather combines the art of physical grace, muscularity, and beauty–with the art of photography. It is designed as a showcase of the well built man."[10] This language of the celebration of gay sexuality was not limited to *Young Champ*. By 1966, the magazine *Master* could discuss a bar in New Orleans where "campy" bartenders protected gay patrons.[11] Discussions of gay sexualities and spaces on the printed page created space in which readers could be integrated into

5 Go Guys, Spring 1963. Box 53. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Summer Boys, 1967. Box 104. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

9 Thor, 1964. Box 11. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

10 Young Champs, Issue 1, 1965. Box 119. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

11 Master, January 1966. Box 74. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

gay communities.

The various items of clothing, props, and specific poses that concealed male nudity gradually shifted from enforcing the pretense of non-pornography to winking at the need for any coverings at all. Adapted from the competition garments of bodybuilding, posing straps served as the primary mode for enforcing non-nudity in gay male pornographic magazines during the 1960s. Typically little more than two patches of fabric with string around the sides, these straps left little to the imagination, often showing clear outlines of genitalia underneath:[12]

By 1962, legal codes were fairly clear around the consumption of photographs of men in posing straps: the Supreme Court in 1962's *MANual v. Day* decision found that these photographs were not "patently offensive" and were therefore protected by the First Amendment.[13] Nude photographs operated on a shakier legal footing: the magazine *Butch*, produced out of



Minneapolis, which published full-frontal nude photographs starting in 1965, faced legal backlash with a federal court obscenity prosecution in 1967. In this landmark case, the judge found that the fully-nude photographs were not obscene: "the rights of minorities expressed individually in sexual groups or otherwise must be respected. With increasing research and study, we will in the future come to a better understanding of ourselves, sexual deviants, and others."[14]

Increased gay sexual and legal self-confidence was mapped neatly by the decrease in size and thickness of posing straps. While posing straps were brief-shaped, thick and covered the upper thighs of the models in May 1963's edition of Jr., there were tight, g-string-based, erection-revealing posing straps scattered throughout the January 1966 edition.[15] Posing straps sometimes appeared in mesh, as in 1967's Young Physique, in which the straps are (intriguingly) being worn in the shower.[16] *Butch* began publishing nudes in 1965 as mentioned above, and after their court victory celebrated with a nude photo captioned, "This photo was declared NOT obscene in a Federal Court."[17]

Even when magazines couldn't give their readers fully explicit photographs in their pages, they could sell those photographs by correspondence. David K. Johnson has argued that many physique periodicals formed essential locations in which gay men could join a consumer world built around their sexual expression, citing the many advertised opportunities to "become a part of the physique world" by joining pen pal clubs, responding to bookstore advertisements, purchasing more explicit photographs, and ordering slides or film strips.[18] More explicit photographs could be purchased from less-explicit magazines which served as catalogues for the more lucrative and expensive explicit material. As Johnson argues, "before there was a national gay political community, there was a national gay commercial market."[19]

Throughout its 1963 issues, Go Guys informed readers that "for a more provocative look," they could "order the more sensational pictures we didn't publish."[20] January 1966's edition of *Man Alive* contained coded reviews of gay-friendly bars in New Orleans and advertisements for gay book services and more explicit photographs.[21] Many magazines examined in the research for this paper –including *101 Boys*, *Physique Illustrated*, and *Thor* – promoted the photographs from individual photo services that could be contacted directly for the purchase of additional photographs. The February 1966 edition of 101 Boys, for example, described a model as "a great big

12 Beach Adonis. May 1964. Box 8. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

13 David K. Johnson, "Physique Pioneers: The Politics of 1960s Gay Consumer Culture," *Journal of Social History*, Summer 2010, 879, JSTOR.

14 Johnson, 881.

15 Jr.. May 1963 and January 1966. Box 64. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

16 Young Physique, 1967. Box 119. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

17 Johnson, 881.

18 Johnson, 884.

19 Johnson, 867-868.

20 Go Guys, 1963. Box 53. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

21 Man Alive, January 1966. Box 71. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

new DISCUS discovery" and offered the contact information of DISCUS to individuals seeking more pictures of him.[22] An example of a typical purchase spread is below, from July 1967's *Big*:[23]

The siting of physique magazines at the center of the gay male consumer world—and their significantly larger circulation numbers compared to non-pornographic material—meant that they served as essential introductions into gay community. In 1956, Physique Pictorial began including the addresses of ONE and Mattachine Review, two national non-pornographic gay magazines for interested readers, even

though homophile movement leaders tried hard to dissociate themselves and their organizations with the tawdry physique magazine industry.[24]

While Johnson analyzes the consumer market of physique periodicals with skill, he sees the purchase of additional commodities beyond the magazine itself as an "interactive experience" essential to entry into the physique community. I, however, argue that the physique community was even larger, including everyone who purchased such a magazine with the intent of using it in a sexual manner. The simple availability of a pornographic magazine to a specific individual implies that there are other people who wish to purchase it—others who share a similar sexual interest in the nude male form. Individual consumers of these magazines could thus understand that the availability of the magazines as products implied a market and thus the existence of other gay men. In a world in which many gay men were unable to identify themselves publicly for fear of losing housing, employment, and social privilege, the availability of this community through pornography was of vital importance.

Other gay men could also be found through non-pornographic means. In New York City, the gay community used non-pornographic publications to spread information about safety and provide space in which the physical community could publicize itself, gain membership, and extend its reach to men who could not attend physical meetings. Rodger Streitmatter downplays the importance of these New York-based magazines in his history of the gay media in America, leaving out New York publications except for ones which interfaced with the counterculture. By ignoring *Eastern Mattachine Times* and the *New York Mattachine Newsletter*, as well as the other small periodicals produced by clubs and membership organizations, Streitmatter impoverishes his analysis. He describes the "explosive" growth of post-Stonewall gay periodicals in New York without accounting for the gunpowder. [25] Without the increased confidence aided and demonstrated by the brasher and more open gay periodicals of the late 1960s, the Stonewall riots could not have occurred.

New York City's branch of the Mattachine Society began publishing its own independent newsletter in the mid-1950s. By the dawn of the 1960s, the New York Mattachine Newsletter was a small, quarter-page sized mimeographed booklet with obvious care taken in its design and presentation. The fall 1960 editions were primarily concerned with elections and discussion group meetings throughout New York City. Reports of the topics of various discussion groups—active groups on the Upper West Side, Brooklyn Heights, and Greater Brooklyn are mentioned—were included, along with information about how individuals could attend group meetings.[26]

These group-meeting descriptions reveal one of the primary ways in which periodicals were used for community construction during the early 1960s. Martin Meeker has argued that mainstream media articles about homosexuality provided an important portal into the gay community for men. Newspaper articles about homosexuality included the names of major organizations. Men could then contact those organizations and be linked to circulating publications, and, if they lived in a major urban area, local meetings.

To explain this mechanism, let us use a hypothetical individual living in Brooklyn in the early 1960s. Perhaps confused about his sexuality, he wished to receive more information or attend a discussion group. If he heard about national Mattachine in the news, he could contact them and be directed to New York Mattachine. After beginning to receive their newsletter, he could then find out about the Brooklyn Heights discussion group and begin attending. My findings corroborat-

22 101 Boys, June 1966. Box 83. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

23 Big, July 1967. Box 94. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

24 Johnson, 883.

25 Rodger Streitmatter. *Unspeakable: The Rise of the Gay and Lesbian Press in America*. Boston: Faber and Faber, 1995.

26 New York Mattachine Newsletter, November 1960. Box 155. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

ed this: there is evidence that letters were forwarded among the organizations, and some discussion about that process.[27] Lists of publications and local organizations nationwide appeared in virtually every issue of virtually every homophile magazine, and they even maintained clearing house newsletters and newsletter indexes to aid this inter-organizational communication.[28] Here, I expand Meeker's argument to discuss the mechanics of the semi-obscured gay media, and how information was split between public and private to aid in the construction of communities that existed both in the real world and on the printed page.

In 1964, New York City's outpost of the Mattachine Society split its newsletter into two - Inside Mattachine (later renamed the *New York Mattachine Newsletter*), and New York Mattachine Newsletter (later renamed the *Eastern Mattachine Times*). The announcement ran in the December 1964 edition: "*New York Mattachine Newsletter* will continue to direct itself towards the public, in general, and *Inside Mattachine* will direct itself towards the membership by carrying details of meetings, activities of the society, and qualifications of the quarterly business meetings and committee reports."[29] Implicit in this split was the notion that the distribution of information and the construction of community within the printed space of these publications needed to be segregated between the innermost membership and any individual who wished to purchase a copy. Publicly available magazines needed careful self-censorship to not destroy reputations or out closeted members.

The contents of the internal newsletter divide into two broadly defined categories: one in which the Mattachine community could criticize or promote itself and other elements of the homophile movement, discuss and document the organization's bureaucracy, and make frank appeals to members; and a second in which media portrayals of gay people could be discussed, advertisements from (often covertly) gay businesses could be discreetly posted, safe cruising spots could be identified, and information about dangers to the community could be spread. The latter category was also covered by the published magazine, but the newsletter's appeals on these issues tended to be franker and more revealing given the intended audience of the publication.

Within the first category, documentation of the organization's extensive bureaucracy occupied much of the newsletters, especially in the years 1965-1967. But for the then-controversial subject matter, these sections of newsletters are familiar to anyone who has ever seen a newsletter from any other volunteer membership-based organization or church. Individuals wishing to become more involved in the Society could find minutes from meetings, discussion of the election of new elected board members, and appeals to attend decisive meetings and vote in them.

January 1965's newsletter brought a typical call to action to members: "[membership] is a responsibility. Each member has the responsibility of contributing in whatever way he can to the achievement of MSNY's goal."[30] This "people-to-people" dialogue was to be pursued through financial donations, attendance at meetings, and the contribution of individual private talents to the aims of the organization.[31] The March 1965 edition contains a particularly pointed criticism of members who were absent at a recent bureaucratic vote. September 1965's edition contained more calls to action—to write articles for the newsletter and the published magazine, and to attend meetings. Additionally, from September 1965 on many newsletters contained calendars with information about not just the society's public meetings but members-only events often held at private homes.

Discussion and complaints about media portrayals of gay people were often present. March 1967's newsletter denounces the now-infamous CBS Reports documentary on homosexuality, pointing out its narrow focus on only certain individuals and types of individuals, and its many factual inaccuracies and prejudices. Additional complaints about Harpers' articles and other external media portrayals written by members served as testing grounds for public rebuttals that were then published in *Eastern Mattachine Times*.

As the newsletter grew, its production values rose, and soon advertisements were being accepted even in this members-only publication. The January-February 1968 edition included an advertisement for "investors in a new Turkish Bath," advising interested and open-minded parties to call the advertiser directly, "NOT…THE MATTACHINE OFFICES REGARDING THIS MATTER."[32] By the end of 1968, several advertisements for gay bookstores and what few non-mafia-run gay bars existed appeared regularly in the newsletter, as could lonely-hearts ads, and even ads for "Space-Age Computer Matchmaking."[33]

Cruising — where it could take place, and what the dangers were — also provided a popular subject of discussion within the newsletter. July 1968 featured the debut of "D.D's New York," a gossipy column with information about cruising spots. A typical excerpt:

> RIIS PARK is still active (Bays 1 and 2) for sun and surfers...but be careful in the bathhouse. OK to cruise,

27 Mattachine Newsletter Index, 1962. Box 75. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

28 National Homophile Clearing House Newsletter, 1967. Box 78. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

29 New York Mattachine Newsletter, December 1964. Box 80. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

30 New York Mattachine Newsletter, January 1965. Box 80. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

31 Ibid.

32 New York Mattachine Newsletter, January-February 1968. Box 80. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

33 New York Mattachine Newsletter, September 1968. Box 80. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

but don't touch! IF you own a car, take a trip to JONES BEACH between parking areas 6 and 9 (that's right - 69) and check the areas in and around TOBAY. My beachcomber friends tell me that the fuzz has already begun to raid the TOBAY area.[34]

The frankness of the tone and subject matter demonstrate the relative safety that community members felt in expressing themselves within the spaces created in the private publication. The organization, however, took care to ensure that the newsletter did not *explicitly* endorse any illegal activity. "D.D." clarified: "I'm not endorsing ACTIVITY in public - only publicizing cruisy areas in the city. After you make out, take them home. As Mae West used to say, a man in bed is worth two in the bush."[35]

Such a discussion of cruising would have had no place in *Eastern Mattachine Times* (*EMT*), which wrote for a public audience and thus with much more discretion, seriousness of tone, and polish. This periodical mostly focused on legal and political battles of importance to gay men and women and critiques of mainstream media representations of and articles about them. It tended to focus on movement minority politics, consistently referencing other civil rights struggles and placing what it called "the homophile movement" at the heart of a comprehensive civil rights agenda.

Each edition of *EMT* contained a comprehensive listing of homophile organizations around the country, with names, addresses, and telephone numbers: the May 1965 edition promoted these addresses alongside recaps of events in New York and Washington, DC featuring activists Barbara Gittings, Frank Kameny, and Hendrick Ruitenbeek.[36] The magazine thus displayed its intent to communicate with a broader regional audience, bringing what it could of New York's more concentrated gay community out to individuals who did not have physical access to meetings, organizations, and events. A typical page of events listings is included here, from January 1966. Note the event listing and address of a new "homophile" publication on the left, and on the bottom center summaries of speeches from the ECHO conference of homosexual activists:[37]

The March 1965 edition of *EMT* further exemplifies many of these trends. An editorial on the inside front cover advocated for the Weiss bill for civilian police review, asking individuals to mail petitions and associating New York Mattachine with "The American Civil Liberties Union, the New York Civil Liberties Union, the NAACP, and other civil rights organizations."[38] A special section entitled "You and the Law," written by Mattachine hero Frank Kameny, gave advice to individuals if they were arrested or federally interrogated, telling them to avoid discussion of their employment, to plead not

January, 1966 Eastern MATTACHINE Magazine Page Five

The address of TANGENTS, a new homophile publication, was omitted from the last issue of this magazine. It is: 3473½ Cahuenga Blvd, Hollywood, Calif.

PUBLIC MSNy MEETING

Feb. 16

'10 Myths About Homo - sexuality

Donal MacNamara

FREEDOM HOUSE

20 W 40th St.

8:30

seems to me, after reading the materials out there, that the homophile movement has been so effective that what these conferences may amount to is the movement's opportunity to see if the heterosexual speakers have kept up with all the literature the organizations are putting out!"

Also available were the popular slogan buttons One of the favorites being worn was EQUALITY FOR HOMOSEXUALS, referring to the movement's campaign to secure for the homosexual, as a homosexual, complete equality with his or her fellow citizens.

But the button that stole the show was LET'S LOVE ONE ANOTHER. As one DOB member said, "Half the impetus for a Great Society is in that little message."

SCANNING THE SPEECHES

If the ECHO 1965 conference didn't offer a clear forecast for the homosexual citizen in the Great Society, it did provide plenty of advice for the homophile movement, as well as commentary on institutions in our present society. Some of this advice and commentary was even contradictory.

Psychoanalyst-social philosopher Ernest van den Haag cautioned organized homosexuals not to picket and not to get their cause mixed up with any other causes, while author-educator Paul Goodman advised the movement to ally itself with all other liberal causes.

Mr. Goodman proposed that the ideal state of being will bring "roses to the cheeks," but he then went on to recommend to the homosexual all the kinds of burdens and worries that, however elevating, would probably take those roses out.

Mr. Goodman, who talked on "The Homosexual Citizen in a DECENT Society," declared that in a decent society, the word homosexual probably wouldn't be used, whereas attorney Gilbert Cantor said that in the Great Society, the homosexual as such would have a symbolic function and would continue to stand for "other-mindedness, diversity, and individuality."

Mr. Cantor championed diversity within a culture and advocated that a new Great Society take its cue from the old great society, ancient Greece. On the other hand, psychotherapist and researcher Ralph Gundlach discussed speculations about the male citizen of ancient Greece as narcissistic, self-aggrandizing, and "a poor father and husband." He didn't say how such a personality produced the Greek society which he characterized as "the fount of our western civilization."

Both Dr. Gundlach and SEXOLOGY editor Isadore Rubin touched on the 1984-style idea that shaping of

guilty, and to complain to Mattachine and to relevant authorities if they received any "ridicule, gibes, insults, taunts, jeers, or other improper behavior." [39] The advice provided in these sections is tinged with a palpable sense of panic:

> On matters having in any way to do with homosexuality, say NOTHING; "no-thing" means NO thing; and "no" means NONE AT ALL, with NO exceptions. It does NOT mean "just a little." […]Do not attempt to exercise your judgement as to what may or may not be harmful to discuss. Close the door firmly and absolutely to discussion or comment upon ANY and EVERY aspect of homosexuality and, in fact, of sex generally.[40]

34 New York Mattachine Newsletter, July 1968. Box 80. The LGBT Periodicals Collection. Manuscripts and Archives Division.

35 Ibid.

36 Eastern Mattachine Times, Volume 10 no. 4. May, 1965. Box 28. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

37 Eastern Mattachine Times, Volume 11 no. 1. January, 1966. Box 28. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

38 Eastern Mattachine Times, Volume 10 no. 3. March, 1965. Box 28. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

This focus on dignity and stoicism as opposed to louder activism would later come back to haunt Mattachine, leading to its demise in a post-Stonewall era of gay activism defined by brashness and openness..

Eastern Mattachine Times accepted ads from the start. Public service announcements from its publishers were particularly prevalent - in January 1966, *EMT* ran a column ad advising anyone who felt a "victim of police entrapment" to "help stop these abuses… and notify Mattachine of your case."[41] Advertisements for gay products and services reflect the consumerization of gay society and culture as public gatherings of gays in designated spaces and neighborhoods became more acceptable: for example, hair removal services and greeting cards were advertised throughout 1965.

Organizations significantly smaller than Mattachine used their newsletters in similar ways. One of my most remarkable findings was the September, 1967 issue of Black and Blue, the newsletter of the (gay) New York Motorbike Club. Made up of mimeographed sheets stapled together, the newsletter offers a remarkable glimpse into a particular gay haven in 1967 New York, and shows us how this community used its newsletter to organize and publicize events and remind members of the community that existed beyond their individual organization.

Set up as a private club, as were many gay bars to avoid liquor-licensing law, the club opened in fall of 1966. The newsletter, interestingly enough, takes the concept of the gay bar for granted – the opening editorial, celebrating the club's one-year anniversary, reminisces about "how much needed the club was…it was almost impossible to go drinking anywhere if you were wearing leather."[42] It goes on to contain a write-up of the anniversary party, congratulatory telegrams from other gay biking clubs in Europe, a who's who section of the club's officers including their names and photographs, information about motor biking around New York, minutes of general meetings, thank-you notes to individuals, calls to action for members to contribute to the newsletter, general meeting minutes, and photographs and notes from a club-organized trip to Europe.

The anniversary party write-up is a useful example of the ways in which individuals not present or active could be enticed into joining the organization's physical activity. Details as small as invitation text and the types of food in the buffet were included. But for the accompanying photographs of buff, leather-clad men, this segment might read like a church bulletin. The inclusion of full real names and places of employment of many members and officers throughout the newsletter indicates that internally-distributed private communications were considered safe spaces by gay men in which they could self-identify as gay and discuss their lives, community, and identity openly.

This increased confidence in private spaces was necessary for an event such as the Stonewall Riots to occur. When they did, however, the existing periodicals reacted to Stonewall with a mixture of tempered joy and worry about their lack of relevance to the countercultural gay movement then developing, while a host of new periodicals sprung up in the following weeks and months. The *New York Mattachine Newsletter*'s response, examined briefly in the introduction, is a good example of these reactions. The initial article celebrated the riots as "the first gay riots in history," praised "swishes" (meaning drag queens and effeminate gay men) for their role in leading the riots, and included the militant statement about taking to the streets quoted in this paper's introduction.[43] Subsequent issues, however, hemmed and hawed about the phrase "gay power" favored by radical protestors—Mattachine ended up adopting the phrase, but merely placing it at the bottom of its traditional list of proposed reforms, including an end to police harassment and public acknowledgement and respectability.

New publications, on the other hand, demonstrated openness and confidence about gay identity and gay power in new and radical language. Printed on newsprint and issued much more frequently than the usually-monthly homophile magazines, these new papers served as the foundation of the 1970s and 1980s gay press. A fetishist magazine called *The Inner Tube* contained pornographic crosswords and advertisements for fetish gear featuring male genitalia.[44] In its first issue, *Gay* advocated fighting back against bar raids and contained articles about "the danger of the heterosexual."[45] In fact, so many new publications were popping up that one of them, a newspaper called *Gay Ways* full of lists of bars and ads for nude photos, opened its first editorial by saying, "What?! ANOTHER GAY NEWSPAPER?"[46] In a move that brings us full-circle, back to Mattachine and the pioneering homophile press, the newspaper (apparently short for content) included the entire December 1969 issue of the New York Mattachine Newsletter, reproduced and printed in its middle few pages.

The 1960s gay press served as a central component of community and identity for New York's gay men. It provided mechanisms by which they could find each other and safe space in which they could explore their sexual interests, discuss problems of identity and policy, and come to a progressive political consciousness. The central message sent by the existence of these periodicals was this: you are not alone, there are others like you; you are part of a community. Physique periodicals created a community in which queer sexuality could

41 Eastern Mattachine Times, Volume 11 no. 1. January, 1966. Box 28. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

42 Black and Blue, September 1967. Box 9. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

43 Addendum to The New York Mattachine Newsletter, July 1969. Box 142. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

44 The Inner Tube, 1969. Box 62. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

45 Gay, December 1, 1969. Box 39. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

46 Gay Ways, 1969. Box 52. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.

be explored and celebrated. Private newsletters put out by organizations extended the reach of their communities beyond the physical world and into print. Newsstand publications provided avenues for introduction into the gay community. Without the developments in these periodicals in New York City, Stonewall and the mature phase of the LGBT movement would not have been possible. For gays in New York, the 1960s opened with the timidity and pretense of the tamest of the physique magazines, and ended with the post-Stonewall newspaper *Come Out*, which printed on the first page of its first edition: "Come out for freedom! COME OUT NOW! POWER TO THE PEOPLE! GAY POWER TO GAY PEOPLE! COME OUT OF THE CLOSET BEFORE THE DOOR IS NAILED SHUT!"[47]

Or, as the (possibly apocryphal) drag queen reported to have started the Stonewall Riots said as she smashed a trash can through a window: "We ain't taking this shit no more."

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47 Come Out, June 1969. Box 17. The LGBT Periodicals Collection.